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Abstract
This thesis aims at explaining the reasons behind Mexico’s tax revenue stagnation, 
by exploring the structural weaknesses of the tax system, identifying the main actors 
in the tax policy making process, and studying the tax reforms attempts and the role 
policy actors played to shape them in the last thirty years.
The dissertation first shows Mexico’s low tax collection yield and its stagnation for 
more than thirty years. The analysis portrays an inefficient tax collection system, with 
a tax structure plagued with a plethora of privileges and exemptions that dilute 
collection. A large number of interviews with public authorities, politicians, 
intellectual, representatives of businesses, social and international organizations 
showed a common concern over Mexico’s low tax effort. An issue, which surprisingly 
has always been in the rhetoric of the political agenda, but has received very little 
political, social or scholarly attention.
The thesis rises a puzzling paradox. By looking at the dynamics of tax reform, the 
evidence seems to suggest that even in a strongly centralized and hierarchical state 
like Mexico, frequently depicted as authoritarian, policy makers have been 
constrained to shape tax policy. Government’s policy objectives and the 
“uniqueness” of the relationship with socio-economic actors, principally the business 
community, have affected the nature, profile and outcome of the tax reforms. I argue 
that the Mexican political system has been upheld by a very fragile political coalition 
with socio-economic actors, which has become the most important constraint on 
reform.
The historical analysis shows that a substantial tax reform has been avoided, despite 
that increasing government revenue is crucial for the long-term economic 
development of the country. Instead, the government pursued other less politically 
troublesome means for financing the State. However, these alternative revenues- 
raising policies exacted a very high social and economic cost in he long run.
The study of the tax policy decision making highlights the dominant role of politics in 
the policy making process, concluding the clientelism best describes the politics of
ii
tax policy making. As a result, the current shape of the Mexican tax system responds 
largely to the political accommodation of powerful vested interests. Economic 
policies have been subordinates to political stability, as well as upholding the fragile 
coalitions that support the Mexican political regime.
To my father with love.
I did not become the medical doctor 
he wanted me to be, however as he 
says, I still can try to cure some 
of my country’s social diseases.
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Introduction
In the last three decades, Mexico has experienced a profound economic 
and political transformation. The government has experimented with different 
development strategies that range from Import Substitution Industrialisation 
(ISI) to an outward oriented model. Independent of the strategy, the rhetoric 
has always considered taxation a top priority for sustainable economic 
development. However, taxation is probably the area that has lagged furthest 
behind in the process of economic reform, which has been taking place in 
Mexico since the early 1980s. Mexico’s tax burden is surprisingly low compared 
to other OECD member countries and advanced Latin American nations. More 
striking is the fact that the total burden of taxation in GDP terms in 1970 was 
8.2%, and almost thirty years later and after numerous reforms, the state 
collects just around 10% of its GDP from taxes. The stagnation in tax revenues 
is inconsistent with the profound programme of structural reforms undertaken 
by Mexico in the last 18 years. A structural adjustment process, highly praised 
by International Financial Institutions (IFIs),1 included the implementation of 
substantial tax reforms to strengthen revenues as one of the core policies, 2 but 
did not actually improve the rate of tax collection.
1 See Sebastian Edwards ed., Latin America and the Caribbean: A Decade After the Debt 
Crisis (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993); “IMF Approves US$ 17.8bn Stand-by Credit for 
Mexico,” International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 95/10. February 1, 1995; Structural 
and Sectorial Adjustments: World Bank Experience. 1980-92 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
1995); Peter Kenne, “The Use of IMF Credit,” in The International Monetary Fund in a 
Multipolar World (Washington, DC: Transactions Books, 1990); Eduardo Lora, “A Decade of 
Structural Reforms in Latin America: What has Been Reformed and How to Measure it?, 
Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1997. Mimeo; John Williamson ed., Latin 
American Adjustment: How Much has Happened? (Washington, DC: Institute of International 
Economics, 1990).
2 Tax reform is one of the 10 policies of what is known as the “Washington Consensus." See 
Williamson, 1990.
1
The inability of the Mexican State to raise taxes highlights an ironic paradox. 
The Mexican State, usually depicted by the literature as strong and 
authoritarian, has shown to be weak and vulnerable regarding tax collection, 
the most essential function for the survival of any state. It is difficult to 
understand how a country like Mexico, with such huge social and infrastructure 
needs, still collects less than 50% of its total income through taxation. This 
weakness is evident since the country has faced recurrent liquidity crises at the 
end of every presidential term, since 1976.
This thesis explores whether selecting tax instruments and defining fiscal] 
policies has been a process of choices made on rational calculations of . 
economic cost and benefits, or the by- product of accommodating policies in a j 
corporatist political system. I argue that the development of the tax system has 
been based on political expediency rather than economic or administrative 
logic. Tax policy has been to a large extent the by-product of constant tension 
among economic and political groups trying to push for the implementation of 
tax instruments that will produce policies biased in the direction they prefer. 
The ability of these groups to resist policies that would affect their well-being or 
could remove their privileges is highly relevant. Although rent-seeking is 
present in any capitalist economy, the unique characteristics of the Mexican 
political system have exacerbated its negative effects.3
The historical analysis shows that a substantial tax reform has been avoided; 
despite the fact that increasing government revenues is crucial for the long­
3 These “unique” characteristics include an authoritarian presidential regime and a corporate 
political system, where the economic elite enjoys a high degree of control over the country's 
economy.
2
term economic development of the country. The most plausible answer to why 
taxation as the main source of revenue has long been disregarded lies in the 
politics of tax policy making itself. The unique nature of the Mexican political 
system has largely contributed to the stagnation of the tax system, since i 
assuring the support of most powerful interest groups became essential for ! 
maintaining a fragile coalition that legitimised the political regime.
The various presidents in the last thirty years have opted to pursue alternative 
means of financing the state, in an attempt to avoid political confrontation with 
powerful interest groups, especially large investors, empowered with their 
ability to transfer capital abroad with devastating effects on the economy. The 
love-hate relationship between the state and the economic elite has been j 
governed by a tacit agreement with the business sector, which secured low tax 
rates and government support to businesses in exchange for them keeping 
away from politics.4 The official argument in favour of policies of low taxation 
has been the unsubstantiated belief that an increase in the tax burden would 
reduce investment and induce capital flight, thus diminishing economic growth. 
Mexico’s powerful economic elite has taken advantage of the government’s 
insufficient resources, using their capacity to transfer capital assets abroad as a 
powerful instrument to oppose adverse economic policies, particularly taxation. 
As Prof. Philip states, Mexico has been a victim of globalisation and the 
mobility of capital since the 1970s, long before the term was even invented.5 
Another influential force resisting tax reform has been privileged corporate
4 For authors that refer to this implicit agreement between the economic elite and the state, see 
Dan A. Cothran, Political Stability and Democracy in Mexico: the Perfect Dictatorship? 
(Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1994) and John J. Bailey, Governing Mexico: the State Craft of 
Crisis Management (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988).
See George Philip, “The Lawless Presidency: Economic Crisis and Democratic Accountability 
in Mexico, 1970-1994, “Democratization. Vol. 5 No. 1 Spring, 1998: 23-41.
3
actors. Although there has been a clear decline in their influence since the early 
1980s, they have remained influential in policy making, being capable of 
resisting the withdrawal of multiple privileges and exemptions that could have 
affected their interests.
A key element behind the government’s evasive attitude towards a radical tax ,
i
reform has been the fact that resources could be obtained by less politically 
troublesome means in the short term. However, these have exacted a very high 
social and economic cost in the long run. Such revenue-raising policies are:/ 
running up budget deficits; inflation; contracting foreign and internal debt; 
increasing the price of goods and services supplied by the state; relying on oil 
revenues; privatising state owned companies; or recycling foreign investment; 
frequently in the form of volatile portfolio investment. In many cases these 
revenue maximising policies are not very reliable and may create economic 
distortions. Privatisation is finite while other means, such as increasing the 
price of goods and services supplied by the public sector, involve a very high 
social cost. In addition, by relying on these alternative means of financing, the 
Mexican economy has become very vulnerable to external shocks. External 
factors such as the lack of foreign credit, the collapse of oil prices, the volatile 
flows of capital and the rise of international interest rates greatly affect the 
economy as well as government spending.
The absence of an efficient tax collection system and the subsequent abuse of 
these mechanisms has produced profound distortions in the economy, which 
have required the implementation of deeper and costlier structural adjustments 
to correct. The government has traditionally solved the chronic malaise of the
country’s poor revenue collection by reducing government expenditure, 
lowering subsidies and cutting public investment. Such measures have exacted 
an extremely high cost on the population, making them politically and socially 
almost unsustainable. These structural adjustments have been extremely harsh 
on Mexican society, even affecting areas that the World Bank recognises as 
spending priorities, such as health and education.6
*
The central question of this thesis is: if increasing revenues from taxes is so 
important for the long-term development of the country, why has the 
government failed to increase significantly the collection of taxes in the past 
thirty years? Analysis of the literature offers four possible hypotheses that could 
explain the Mexican case. The first is structural weaknesses embedded in the 
economy. The second is exogenous factors determining the direction and 
nature of domestic tax policy making. The third is the lack of an efficient 
administrative structure, limiting the potential for collection and reform, and the
fourth is that domestic politics are the reason behind the evasive government ,
/ i
attitude towards tax reform.
The analysis of the four hypotheses during my research led me to conclude 
that each one of them is important and complementary in understanding 
Mexico’s inefficient tax collection system. Nevertheless, I consider the political 
variable to be the most important factor shaping the tax structure and inhibiting 
its development and I will test this assumption throughout this dissertation. MyH 
hypothesis is that beyond the limits posed by structural weaknesses,
6 The World Bank acknowledges that the Mexican may be under-spending on health care, see 
Adjustment Lending Policies for Sustainable Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990).
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administrative deficiencies and international influences, the accommodation of 
political interests (both domestic and international) has played the main role in 
determining the outcome of tax policies in Mexico, and the vested interest of 
these groups represents the main constraint on reform^/
At first glance, the stagnation of tax revenues during the past thirty years could 
suggest that the most important structural weakness of the Mexican State, its 
inability to finance itself, has been largely ignored. In fact, taxation has always 
been at the top of the government agenda. The highest-ranking public officials 
have always openly recognised that the fragility of public finances, due to the 
low tax yield, hinders the country’s prospects for development. One after 
another, authorities have promised to strengthen the country’s tax income. 
Neither could it be argued that there has been little awareness of the 
importance of strengthening tax revenues on the Mexican society. Public 
authorities, academics, intellectuals, businessmen, social groups, and 
international organisations have all expressed their concern and understanding 
of the grievous implications of an inefficient tax system. But despite the political 
rhetoric, its perennial presence in the political agenda and a seeming societal 
awareness of the problem, the fact is that in the last thirty years only lukewarm 
measures have been implemented to correct the low revenue yield.
Aims and Conceptual Synopsis
This dissertation aims to explain the reasons behind Mexico’s tax revenue 
stagnation, by exploring structural weaknesses and identifying the main actors 
within the tax-policy making process, and studying the tax reform attempts of 
the last thirty years and the role that policy actors have played.
This thesis makes the following arguments: politics is the most important factor; 
influencing tax policy-making, although the other variables mentioned should 
also be taken into account. Tax policies have been shaped by the struggle 
between the state and vested interests. Tax policy-makers, particularly those of 
the economic elite, have accommodated the interests of political groups to 
maintain their loyalty to the status quo. No serious attempts have been made to 
reform the system because this would jeopardise the fragile political coalition, 
which sustains the political regime. The highly restricted capacity of the state to 
extract resources from socio-economic actors portrays a rather weak Mexican 
State in frank contradiction to the authoritarian depiction used in the specialised 
literature.
This hypothesis draws from basic assumptions in tax literature: from Peters, 
Hansen, Rose and Karran, Bird, Elizondo, Kaldor and Reithchkmen comes the 
idea that the process of tax policy-making is a system with political actors, 
articulated and aggregated into a policy proposals.7 The nature of tax policy­
making is to reconcile conflicting interests in order to bring about acceptable 
and workable solutions.8 It also takes from a basic premise widely accepted by 
scholars, which states that all governments act under the same paradigm: any 
tax reform strategy must involve a minimum political cost, by avoiding political
7 Richard Rose and Terence Karran, Increasing Taxes. Stable Taxes or Both? the Dynamics of 
United Kingdom Tax Revenues since 1948 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1983); Richard 
M. Bird, Tax Policy and Economic Development (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1992); Carlos Elizondo, “In Search of Revenue: Tax Reform in Mexico,” Journal of Latin 
American Studies Vol. 26, 1994: 162; Nicholas Kaldor, Reports on Taxation II (London: 
Duckworth, 1980); Benjamin Retchkiman. Polftica Fiscal Mexicana (Mexico: UNAM, 1983).
8 Richard Bird, Optimal Tax Policy fo a Developing Country: the Case of Colombia (Toronto: 
Toronto University Press, 1969): 37.
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confrontation as much as possible.9 In order to bring these premises into the 
Mexican context, it takes from Needier the argument that the Mexican political 
system is supported by a fragile political coalition of societal groups whose 
unity helps to legitimise the government.10 I take this argument further, | 
suggesting that such a coalition is so fragile that multiple political and economic 
benefits need to be given by the state to hold together these self-interested 
factions. Thus, a profound tax reform that removes tax privileges, particularly^ 
from the business community, would undermine this tacit agreement holding 
together the political system. Due to the absence of a full democracy,11 the 
state needed to legitimise the political regime by holding together the most 
important societal forces. As result the state was faced with a dilemma: 
whether to extract the necessary taxes to finance government expenditure at 
the risk of breaking the political coalition; or to seek alternative means of 
financing, therefore avoiding political confrontation, while protecting vested 
interest groups. The state chose to keep the fragile coalition, which proved to 
be very efficient in maintaining a stable and civilised political system that 
allowed rapid and almost continuous economic development. However, it 
became a major constraint on the modernisation of the country’s public 
finances.
9 See Richard Bird and Oliver Oldman ed., Readings on Taxation in Developing Countries 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), Richard Bird and Oliver Oldman ed., 
Taxation in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), Bird, Tax 
Policy: Rose and Karan; Guy B. Peters, The Development of the Tax State (Glasgow: 
University of Strathclyde, 1895), Guy B. Peters, The Politics of Taxation: A Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1991) and Susan B. Hansen, The Politics of Taxation: 
Revenue without Representation ( New York: Praeger, 1983).
Martin C. Needier, Mexican Politics: the Containment of Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1990).
11 Although elections where held routinely they were controlled by a single party in government, 
in what is described by Sartori as an hegemonic party. See Giovani Sartori, Parties and Party 
Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
8
Synopsis of the thesis
The thesis is divided into three sections. The first one explores Mexico’s low tax 
collection problem, its stagnation for more than thirty years and the attempts 
made to explain it. The second is the structural analysis, unveiling the anatomy 
of tax policy making, deconstructing the tax system and exploring the effects on 
the tax structure of vested interests. The third section makes a historical review 
of tax reforms during the past thirty years, analysing the main tax reforms, the 
evolution of the policy actors and the conditioning factors influencing the path of 
these reforms.
a) The Problem and Review of the Literature
The first chapter examines Mexico’s poor tax collection yield, using country 
comparisons with OECD and Latin American nations, demonstrating that 
Mexico lags far behind. In terms of the tax ratio compared to GDP, Mexico 
stands as one of the lowest in the world compared to countries with similar 
development. It also draws some conclusions on the consequences of an 
insufficient flow of tax revenues. Secondly, it shows how the tax yield has 
remained stagnant over the past thirty years, despite a profound programme of 
structural reforms implemented in the past two decades. Interviews with the "A 
most important policy actors clearly demonstrate a common concern for the \ 
country’s low tax ratio. But despite the authorities' and societal concern there is , 
little awareness of its consequences, and even less support for sharing the 
burden of increasing the tax effort.
The review of the literature shows that the issue of tax reform in Mexico and the 
country’s low revenue yield has received very little academic attention.
9
Surprisingly, in Mexico very few books and academic articles have been written 
on the subject in the span of thirty years. In their absence, reviewing the 
international literature on the topic of taxation helps to draw four possible 
hypotheses, of which, after careful analysis, the variable of domestic politics is 
selected as the underlying factor, not just shaping but holding back the 
development of the tax system and its collection potential. A major contribution 
of the thesis is that it raises a puzzling paradox on the nature of the Mexican 
State, which is frequently portrayed as authoritarian, here will be shown to be 
weak in response to vested interests, and particularly to the influence of capital. 
Such argument attempts to contribute not just to the economic but also to the 
political debate on the nature and limits of the Mexican political regime. The 
elucidation of the anatomy of tax policy-making and the analysis of the tax j 
structure will show the reader clear evidence of the power of vested interests. A j 
tax system crowned with exemptions and privileges, but perceived by the 
political elite as necessary to maintain a fragile political coalition that legitimised 
the regime itself. Chapter two brings to light Mexico’s greatest paradox: an 
apparently strong state unable to extract sufficient resources from its socio- /  
economic actors. The various positions taken by scholars on the autonomy of I 
the Mexican State are reviewed and summarised in support of this argument.
b) Structural Analysis
To understand the impact of policy actors in the tax system, the thjrd_chapter 
identifies the principal actors involved in the process of tax policy making, 
adjusting the theoretical model proposed by Peacock and Forte on tax planning]
10
to the Mexican context.12 This section identifies the main actors, their influence 
and leverage, and examines how these actors interact to shape policy. It also 
explores how the process of tax policy-making, as well as those actors that 
shape the tax system, have been transformed by the evolving political and 
economic conditions in Mexico.
This dissertation recognises that the very complex problem of the country’s low 
tax collection and stagnated development cannot be explained solely by 
political factors. That endogenous and exogenous forces, as well as structural 
weaknesses, also play a major role and cannot be disregarded by a political- 
economy analysis, but it will not be possible to explore them in greater detail 
due to the required thesis extension.
The fourth chapter demonstrates how the pressure of vested interests plays a 
major role in explaining why loopholes and tax expenditures have developed 
and still persist. Deconstructing the tax structure and studying its principal tax 
instruments helps to understand how these policy actors have shaped the 
structure while seeking to maximise their benefits. The current profile of the taxi 
system shows past struggles of vested interests to secure benefits and 
exemptions. Tax authorities and specialists agree on the fact that the erosive 
effects of harmful preferential tax regimes and multiple exemptions are largely 
accountable for the country’s low tax collection yield and constitute evidence of 
political trade-offs.




For academic purposes the historical analysis of tax reforms and their 
conditioning factors is divided in three distinct periods based on the last five 
presidential administrations. The three periods are: Macroeconomic Populism 
(1970-82), which studies in chapter five the periods of President Echeverria 
and Lopez Portillo. Chapter six explores a period that I have called Economic 
Openness (1982-94) and covers the sexenios of Presidents De la Madrid and 
Salinas.13 Chapter seven, titled Democratic Openness (1995-2000) 
encompasses the reforms made during President Zedillo’s administration and 
the new political framework where the reforms took place. The empirical 
evidence will show that the context in which decisions are made and the nature 
of the Mexican political system ultimately determine the development of tax 
policies. The examination of the more important tax initiatives during the past 
five presidential administrations and of the prevailing political and economic 
conditions will shed light on how politics has affected the fate of the tax reform 
process.14
The historical analysis encompassing the last five presidential terms, divided in 
three distinct periods, will help me to demonstrate that tax policy making has 
been governed by political expediency rather than economic or administrative 
logic. The wish to accommodate political interest, rather than the limits posed 
by structural deficiencies, has played the main role in the design and outcome 
of tax policies.
13Hereafter I will use the word “sexenio” to describe the six years span that constitutes a 
presidential term. Note that job titles reflect the position the interviewees held at the time of the 
interview.
14 It is important to note that this dissertation makes no judgment on the economic advisability 
of the changes, neither does it make an evaluation of their technical quality.
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Chapter I
Mexico’s Low Tax Collection: Lagging Behind After Thirty Years of
Reform
7 am not saying that people in Mexico do not pay taxes, some 
may even pay quite a lot The truth remains, however, that by 
looking at the overall national scope, total tax collection is 
relatively low and certainly insufficient to address our nation’s 
needs.”
President E. Zedillo,15
This chapter highlights Mexico's very low tax collection yield in a cross-country 
comparison, stressing how after a process of profound economic 
transformation tax reform has lagged far behind other structural adjustments. 
After more than thirty years of tax reforms, tax revenues as a percentage of 
GDP have stagnated with adverse consequences for economic development.
This chapter raises the question of whether Mexico’s tax fragility has been 7 
ignored by society and authorities, only to find out after intensive interviewing, 
that the issue has been at the top of the government agenda in the last three 
decades and representatives from every corner of society seem to be aware of 
the problem and its consequences. Surprisingly, despite the relevance of this 
matter, very few scholarly works have attempted to explain the factors that 
have constrained the development of the tax system. I explored four possible 
hypotheses in this regard, coming to the conclusion that although each one is 
relevant, it is politics the main constraint to reform.
15 See Presdiente Zedillo's speech on Apodaca, Nuevo Le6n, September 23rd, 1999, 
Comunicacidn Social Presidencia de la Republica, stenographic copy.
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1.1.- Mexico’s Tax Collection Effort in a Comparative Perspective
President Zedillo has repeatedly expressed to business representatives his 
concern over the country’s fragile finances, stating that “Mexico’s tax burden is 
extremely low compared to countries with a similar level of development.”16 
Mexico has one of the lowest yields of tax collection in the world as a 
percentage of GDP, about 16% if one takes into account revenues from oil, or 
just around 10% when only revenues from tax sources are considered.17
Mexican Public Finance has traditionally suffered from a small stream of 
revenue through taxation.18 In 1960, a study commissioned by the Secretary of 
Finance, Ortiz Mena to an internationally recognised tax expert, Nicholas 
Kaldor, found that Mexico’s revenue from taxation, amounted to just 9% of 
GDP, one of the lowest in the world at the time. Kaldor stated four decades ago 
that “the public revenue of Mexico is too small not only absolutely, but relative 
to its stage of underdevelopment.”19 By the 1970s, despite a slight 
improvement, Mexico still suffered from one of the lowest tax burden in Latin 
America, only ahead of Argentina.20 By the 1980s Tanzi's quantitative analysis 
of the tax systems in developing countries, found again that Mexico had a very 
small tax collection yield when compared with other countries with similar per
16 President Zedillo's quotation during a meeting with the country's business elite, including the 
leaders of Coparmex, the umbrella organisation representative of the country's employers. See 
Rosa Elvira Vargas, “Cambiaran las Metas Econdmicas: Zedillo,” La Jornada March 14th, 
1998:1.
17 The OECD uses the 16% figure while the Secretariat of Finance reports use a figure close to 
10% of GDP.
18 According to the quotations in Elizondo, Mexico had the third lowest level of tax income in the 
world in the 1960s. By the early 1970s it still had the second lowest in Latin America after 
Argentina. Carlos Elizondo, “In Search”: 162.
19 Kaldor, Reports: 215.
20 Quoted by Elizondo “In Search," 162.
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capita income.21 Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP has changed very 
little since 1970, by the end of the 1990s Mexico still had the lowest level of tax 
collection among OECD countries and the third lowest in Latin America.22
The average tax revenue as percentage of GDP in OECD countries is 38%.23 
Using OECD's data that includes taxes from oil, Mexico’s total tax revenues 
account for only 16% of its GDP. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the 
OECD countries with the highest tax/ GDP ratio are Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, Belgium and France with over 45% of GDP. Based on Mexico’s poor 
tax ratio figure, the OECD has made an urgent call to increase its tax revenue 
generating capacity, since more financial resources are required to make up for 
the country’s lags in human development and infrastructure.24
Graphic 1.1.- Tax Revenue as % of GDP in OECD countries
Source: Tax Revenue Statistics OECD, 1999.
21 See Victor Tanzi, “Quantitative Characteristics of the Tax Systems of Developing Countries,” 
in D. Newbery and N. Stern, eds., The Theory of Taxation for Developing Countries (Oxford: 
Oxford University, 1987):221.
22 See OECD Statistical Revenues (Paris: OECD, 1999) and The Fiscal Covenant: Strengths, 
Weaknesses. Challenges LC/ G 204 (Santiago: ECLAC, 1998).
See OECD Statistical Revenues for an IMF analysis on the share of tax revenue/GDP in the 
world between 1986 and 1992, or Janet Stotsky, "Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice, " in 
Parthasarathi Shome, Tax Policy Hand Book (Washington. DC: IMF, 1995): 279-284.
24 See Mexico: Economic Survey, 1999 (Paris: OECD, 1999).
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A comparative analysis with Latin American nations shows similar results. 
Based on a study made by the Under-Secretariat of Revenues, in 1994 tax 
collection as percentage of GDP in Mexico was 14%, including revenues from 
oil. A tax burden ratio smaller than the average 16.7% of GDP in South 
America and 15.1% in Central America.25 CEPAL data, which do not include 
revenues from oil, shows an even gloomier picture. Mexico stands as the third 
lowest country in terms of central government tax receipts, with 9% of GDP (a 
figure also used by government statistics). The national government tax take 
(excluding social security contributions) represents 13.6% of GDP in Latin 
America and 27.2% in the Caribbean countries.26
Graphic 1.2.- Central Government Tax Receipts in 
Latin America, 1996 
(as percentage of GDP)
Source: Figure I-2, Central Government Tax Receipts in The Fiscal Convent, ECLACL, 1998. 
The figures include social security contributions, but not oil.
Comparative cross-national tax data shows that Mexico’s tax collection lags 
behind other countries with a similar level of development or per capita
25 Ruiz, “Hacia," 4.
26 See Fiscal Consolidation in The Fiscal Covenant.
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income.27 The following table compares Mexico with other countries grouped 
under “upper middle income” as defined by the World Bank. Turkey is 
included, despite the fact it is being classified as a low middle-income country, 
because per capita income is quite similar to the Mexican one. In addition, it is 
often used in cross-country comparison with Mexico as is the case with Korea, 
Spain and Portugal, although per capita income in these countries is far greater 
than in Mexico.
In every case, Mexico’s tax burden is lower than their counterparts, and / 
dependent to a higher degree on non-tax revenues. It is noteworthy to mention j 
that the figure used by the World Bank for Mexico includes oil revenues, if it did 
not, then Mexico’s position would be even worse. The data on selected high- 
income economies sheds further light on the existing differences in terms of tax 
and non-tax revenues with these countries. The conclusion is that countries | 
with similar level of per capita income have developed their tax systems much 
better than Mexico, since they developed a better revenue generating capacity. 
The empirical evidence suggests that there is a correlation between the tax; 
burden and per capita income, those countries with a per capita income of less j  
than $5,000 had a tax burden below 20% 28 Again, Mexico performed poorly 
even when this variable is taken into account.
27 Elizondo argues that comparisons ought to be made with countries with similar GNP per 
capita, since countries with higher GNP per capita tend to raise and spend more as percentage 
of GNP. Thus, I used for the comparison those countries classified by the World Bank under a 
similar GDP per capita income. However, Kodrzycki argues that among OECD there is no 
general relationship between a country’s GDP per capita and its overall level of taxation, 
explaining that more affluent countries rely more heavily for their revenues on income and 
profits taxes. See Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson “A Second Word About Taxing Affluence,” in 
Herbert Stein ed., Tax Policy in the Twenty First Century (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1988): 
248-252.
28 See Graphic 1 titled Recaudacidn Total como Porcentaje del PIB, promedio 1994-1996 in 
Carlos Elizondo, "La Fragilidad Tributaria del Estado Mexicano: Una Explicacibn Politica," El 
Mercado de Valores Nacional Financiera, July 1999.
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Table 1.1 .-Tax Revenues: Comparative Perspective
Upper Middle Income Countries
Country Income per 
capita in USD
Total Tax 





GDP in USD 
(millions 1995)
Turkey 2,780 14.3 7.3 164,789
Mexico 3,320 14.8 8.0 250,038
Brazil 3,640 18.6 4.9 688,085
Czech Republic 3,870 37.5 13.0 44,772
Malaysia 3,890 20.6 6.6 85,311
Hungary 4,120 44.9* 20.5* 43,712
Chile 4,160 17.8 9.7 67,297
Argentina 8,030 28.9 ** 2.6* 281,060
Greece 8,210 26.0 17.8 90,560
High Income Economies
Korea 9,700 17.7 6.5 455,476
Portugal 9,740 30.9 12.8 102,337
Spain 13,580 28.7 6.5 558,617
United Sates 26,980 19.0 0.8 2,708,150
Own Elaboration with data from: Selected World Development Indicators, World Development 
Report, 1997 from the World Bank.
* 1980, **From Elizondo's data in “la Fragilidad."
I FIs have expressed deep concern for the limited capacity of the Mexican State 
to extract resource to undertake its fundamental ’ tasks, including public 
spending for social programmes and infrastructure. This restrained revenue 
generating capacity is shown by Mexico’s low tax collection yield as a 
percentage of GDP. As result, the OECD has called the Mexican government 
to boost its tax-collection abilities to ease reliance on oil revenues and increase 
social spending. This organisation states that the low level of tax collection 
represents a debilitating factor in Mexico’s economic strategy, urging the 
country to increase its revenue generating capacity. 29 In the same lines, the 
IMF has stressed the negative effect of weak flows of tax revenues on 
macroeconomic stability and development in Latin America. In the case of 
Mexico, increasing tax collection was one of the most important conditions
29 The OECD recommended in a recent study to reinforce the tax system and accelerate the 
process of structural reform. See Mexico: Eonomic Survey.1999 and “Recomienda la OECD 
a Mexico, Reforzar el Sistema Tributario y Agilizar Reformas Estructurales, Financiero April
29th, 1999:1; “Mexico Told to Boost Tax Take.” The Financial Times April 30th, 1999, 3.
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required by the IMF 1995 stand by credit agreement.30 A view shared by the 
World Bank, its chief economist, William Perry, stated that in order to achieve a 
sustainable strategy of development Mexico should increase its fiscal effort, 
arguing that progress lies in making collection more effective and broadening 
the tax base.31
Inter-American Development Bank studies stress that “in most countries in 
Latin America the effectiveness of taxes remains weak,” 32 concluding that in 
the realm of taxation progress has been limited, despite multiple tax reforms 
that have been implemented in the region. The data show in particular Mexico’s 
poor performance.33 For lADB’s president, Enrique Iglesias, the low level of tax 
collection in Mexico is worrying, adding that tax reform is a top priority for the 
Bank. He pointed out the vast resources channelled to Latin American 
countries for this task.34 In the context of Latin America, Mexico stands as one 
of the weakest tax system in the region. This has moved ECLAC to call for a 
new fiscal pact, explaining that recent improvements in Latin America’s tax 
systems (including Mexico) represent just a marginal improvement in terms of 
revenue adequacy. The basic assumption of the proposal is that the State 
cannot systematically and efficiently carry out its functions with limited tax 
revenues. Thus, the international organisation calls for a renewed fiscal
30 Teresa Ter-Minassian and Gerd Schwartz, “The Role of Fiscal Policy in Sustainable 
Stabilization: Evidence from Latin America,” IMF Working Paper No. 94. August 1997 and Vito 
Tanzi, T h e  Impact of Macroeconomic Policies on the Level of Taxation and the Fiscal Balance 
in Developing Countries,” IMF Staff Papers. Vol. 36, num. 3 September, 1989. The 1995 IMF 
Standby Agreement with the Mexican government also called for a review on tax policies for 
the 1996 budget.
31 Interview, Barcelona, Spain, March 16th, 1997.
32 Lora, “A Decade”: 16.
33 Ibid.
34 Interview Barcelona, Spain, March 17th, 1997. See IADB loans to Latin American countries to 
improve tax administration.
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covenant that strengths public finance and legitimises the role of the State, and 
the scope of government responsibilities in the economic and social spheres.35
1.2.- The Consequences of an Inefficient Tax System
The tax system has failed to provide its main objective, a constant and stable 
flow of revenues to finance public spending. Now, limited tax revenues threaten 
fiscal equilibrium. The State’s difficulty in meeting its revenue targets, mainly 
because of a decrease in non-tax income, whether in the form of capital 
revenues, lower oil prices or lower sales volumes of products and services 
provided by the state, has led frequently to budget deficits and even to financial 
crisis.36 The OECD states that Mexico requires strengthening of its tax 
revenues to allow the funding of key spending programmes. For the country to 
improve equity through public spending, it is fundamental to enlarge the low
capacity for raising revenues.37 The government has solved the recurrent public;
i
finance imbalances by reducing public investment, lowering subsidies and 
cutting the budget in social programmes. However, in the words of the Under- J 
Secretary of Finance it is unsustainable to follow this strategy, and ultimately 
could undermine the State’s capacity to address the basic social demands and 
the infrastructure required for sustainable development.38
35 The objectives of the pact include strengthening tax revenues, raising the productivity of 
public expenditure, enhance transparency on tax expenditures and promoting social equity 
through the fiscal covenant. See El Pacto Fiscal: Fortalezas. Debilidades. Desafios. CEPAL, 
LC/G 1997/ Rev. 1, July 3rd, 1998, and Eugenia Lahera, “El Pacto Fiscal en America Latina: 
una Propuesta de la Cepal." Comercio Exterior Vol. 49 no. 6, Mexico, June 1999.
36 To Easterly, Rodriguez and Schmidt, large fiscal deficits are largely explained by conscious 
policy choices not by external shocks or by feedback from domestic economic conditions. For
•Macroeconomic consequences of public deficits, see William Easterly, Carlos A. Rodriguez, 
Klaus Schmidt-Habbel, Public Sector Deficits and Macroeconomic Performance (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), see also Vito Tanzi, The Political Economy of Fiscal Deficit - 
Reduction (Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 1994).
37 See Mexico Economic Survey 1999.
38 Interview Tom£s Ruiz, September 21st, 1999 and Ruiz, “Hacia”: 9.
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The size of the government has been drastically cut in the last two decades 
seeking to compensate for the lack of resources.39 In 1982, Mexico’s 
government total expenditure represented 44% of GDP, by 1998 it had 
declined to just 22% 40 While the federal budget (programmable expenditure) 
has drastically decreased in Mexico, in other countries it has increased 
significantly 41 In a period of ten years, programmable expenditures per capita 
shrank from 11.05 thousand pesos 1988 to 6.0 thousand in 1998.42 This helps 
to explain much of the increase in inequality in Mexico, which observers have 
noted since 1982.43
Graphic 1.3.- Government Expenditure 
(Programmable Expenditure as % GDP)
% G D P
M e x i c o  S p a i n  C h i l e  U n i t e d  F r a n c e
S t a t e s
Source: Secretariat of Finance and Public Debt, 1998.
In conclusion, the economic development of the country is threatened by a low 
yield in tax revenues. This handicap limits the resources the government can
39 For a good debate on the new role of the state see Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, State 
Reform in the 1990s: Logic and Control Mechanisms (Brasilia: MARE, 1997).
This figure includes the cost of financing public debt, see Ruiz, “Hacia,” 7.
4 According to ECLAC in the 1990s there was a marked resumption on social spending in Latin 
America. See Fiscal Covenant. In Mexico social spending has increased proportionally to the 
budget, in 1997 it was about 65% of the federal budget, proportionally above those budgets 
from Brazil or the US, however smaller in GDP terms. See Inqresos v Gestion Publica. official 
document by the Secretariat of Finance and Public Debt, 1998.
42 See Revision Sistema Fiscal Integral, official document by the Secretariat of Finance and 
Public Debt, 1998: 25.
43 See Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago: ECLAC, various years) 
and Economic and Social Progress in Latin America (Washington. DC: IDE, 1997).
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appropriate to promote its social agenda and maintain a macroeconomic 
balance. Current resources from taxation are insufficient to finance public 
spending, since tax revenues represent less than 50% of total government 
income. Putting together all revenues from the main tax sources, they 
contribute with only 74% of the total budget or 88% of the resources destined 
for social spending.44 In 1998, public spending reached the lowest level in 18 
years, despite the growing size of the population.
The government claims that it has succeeded in reducing the size of the 
government apparatus as well as improving its efficiency 45 However, the small 
tax revenue yield threatens the state capacity to address the growing social 
demands.46 International organisations such as the OECD and CEPAL, have 
remarked on the low level of public spending in Mexico, compared to other 
countries surveyed. Both highlight the declining trend in public spending at a 
time when the country is clearly lacking modern infrastructure and is lagging 
badly behind in regards to social investment47
44 Ruiz, “Hacia,” 8.
45 In a period of ten years almost a thousand state companies were privitised, decreasing from 
1155 in 1982 to 217 in 1992. For the process of divestiture of public companies see Jacques 
Rogozinski and Francisco J. Casas, “The Restructuring Process in Mexico,” in Public 
Administration in Mexico Today (M6xico: Secretaria de la Contraloria General de la Federacidn 
and Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1993) 21-48.
46 Speech delivered by Secretary of Finance, Jos§ Angel Gurria, on the opening of the forum 
“La Reforma Fiscal que Mexico Requiere,” Mexico city, November 5,1998.
47 CEPAL figures show that Mexico’s public spending is one of the lowest in the Latin American 
region, with 7.8% in 1997, the OECD rise the same concern but their figure is around 10%. See 
graphic 12, titled Gasto Publico Social como Porcentaje del PIB, in Economic Survey of Latin 
America and the Caribbean 1997-1998: and Ben6dicte Larre, “Mexico: Looking Forward with 
Caution.” Observer. OECD magazine, October 1st, 1999:14-17.
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Graphic 1.4.- Declining Trend in Government Expenditures
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Source: Revision Integral del Sistema Fiscal, SHCP, 1998.
The consequences of weak public finances spread to the political, social and 
economic arenas. The scarcity of resources spreads far beyond public 
finances. Economically, the lack of sustainable resources has led to under­
investment in public services and infrastructure. Additionally, weak public 
finances have left Mexico quite vulnerable to external shocks and the 
influences of foreign actors.48 Politically, the state's inability to finance itself 
raises the peril of inoperability49 In addition, it has promoted the progressive 
and widespread erosion of trust in the government and the promises of 
economic reform. In electoral terms, the inability of the government to deliver 
expected benefits of the economic reform has affected significantly the level of 
incumbents support. Socially, sinking revenues have taken a huge toll in 
society, by requiring a reduction in social spending. They have forced the 
sequestration of budget spending, in many of the basic programmes with a 
devastating social impact. The limited revenues are not sufficient to provide
48 A recent OECD survey on Mexico highlighted that relying to heavily on oil revenues made 
Mexico highly vulnerable to exogenous shocks, mainly short-term fluctuations on oil prices. At 
the same time the low capacity for raising revenue translated in low levels of public spending 
with a high social cost, see Mexico: Economic Survey, 1999.
49 Presentation made by Laurence Whitehead, “The Governability of the Mexican System since 
1970,” Oxford University Seminar on Mexico, January 1998.
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well-funded government programmes to fully address the great social needs in 
the country, particularly on education, health and poverty alleviation.50
As a result of low tax revenues, the government has increasingly relied on 
alternative means for financing spending, an unsustainable strategy in the long 
run and one that involves a huge social cost. Among those strategies used by 
the last five administrations are: internal and external borrowing, running 
government deficits, cutting social spending, inflationary financing, privatising 
state-owned companies, and relying on volatile capital flows.51 Directly or 
indirectly all of them have had a negative impact on the society, debilitating the 
reliance on tax revenues. As stated by Bird taxation is the lesser evil among the 
various means of financing the State.52 Printing money translates into inflation, 
affecting adversely the poorer groups of society. Borrowing is limited and 
carries big dangers as instability and international dependency. Although it is 
the most frequently used, the commitment to repay interest limits the capacity 
to undertake new programmes, and when resources dry up the consequences 
are devastating. Selling goods and services can rationalise access to facilities, 
they could also alienate poor people to use the facilities.53 These policies have 
delayed the process of fiscal reform, moving the government away from a more 
autonomous and reliable way of financing itself.
50 A World Bank staff appraisal report found that Mexico might be under-spending in health 
care and education, see Adjustment Lending Policies for Sustainable Growth (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 1990).
51 For the great variety of ways in which government finance their deficits see Easterly, 
Rodriguez, Schmidt-Habbel, Public Sector Deficits, and Tanzi, The Political Economy of Fiscal 
Deficit Reduction.
See Bird. Tax Policy and Economic Development.
53 For the discussion on alternative means for financing the State, see A. Shick, "Controlling 
Non Conventional Expenditure: Tax Expenditures and Loans, " no. 6 Public Budgeting and 
Finance. 1986: 3-19. Financing Public Expenditure Through User Charges (Paris: Occasional 
Paper in Public Management, OECD, 1990).
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The insufficient stream of revenue from taxation has increased the number and 
the social cost of structural adjustments. In general, the alternative strategies 
for government financing have been based on cutting expenditures, instead of 
raising income. If instead, the government had focused in increasing a stable 
tax stream of revenues, most structural adjustment policies would have been 
less stringent on the population. The most important aim under structural 
reform was balancing the budget. This was achieved by dramatic spending 
cuts, primarily in public spending and social programmes. Those strategies 
focused on increasing revenues have been either temporal, as privatisation or 
too costly in social terms, as increasing the price of goods and services 
provided by the public sector (which further contributed to inflationary 
pressures). Relying on foreign volatile capital flows had devastating 
consequences for the economy, resulting in the countries worst economic crisis 
in contemporary history.54
By looking at Mexico’s low generating tax revenue capacity, it would be easy to 
assume that government and society have largely ignored the tax issue. 
However, the record shows that a large number of changes and reforms have 
been implemented but without any significant maximisation of revenues.
1.3.- Neutral Reforms: No Revenue Gains after Thirty Years
Mexico’s tax revenue yield is not just very low by international standards but it 
has remained stagnated for the past 30 years, while around the world the tax
54 See Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University, 
1995) or Armando Jim6nez S.V. “Mexico’s 1994 Financial Crisis,” Masters degree thesis for the 
L.LM in Georgetwon University, 1995.
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effort has significantly increased. It is stunning that after almost 30 years of tax 
reforms, tax collection as a percentage of GDP in 1997 was just 9.8%, about 
the same amount (8.2%) that was collected in 1970. It is notable as well that in 
1970, as much as 90.3% of total revenues came from taxation, compared to 
just 74% in 1998.55 Tax reforms have failed to increase the tax effort, despite of 
high IFIs’ executives, including the President of IADB, Enrique Iglesias and the 
Chief Economist of the World Bank, William Perry, have praised them.56 
Studies supported by the World Bank, as the one made by Das-Gupta and 
Mookherjee on administrative reform in Mexico during the Salinas' term arej 
used as case models.57
According to Goode, tax reforms should provide improvements on the tax 
structure plus additional revenue. In the case of Mexico, they have 
concentrated just in the former. Mexican reforms have had neutral or negative 
effects in terms of revenues, notwithstanding the urgent need for fresh 
resources. To Goode it is incoherent that countries that need more revenues 
seek to implement neutral tax reforms.58 This contradiction applies to the 
Mexican case, where reforms have failed to generate more revenues despite 
the growing social requirements. The graph shows total tax collection as 
percentage of GDP, excluding special taxes from oil.59
55 See table VI.2 Ingresos del Gobierno Federal, 1959-1970, Antonio Ortiz Mena, El Desarrollo 
Estabilizador: Reflexiones sobre una Epoca (FCE and Colegio de Mexico: Mexico, 1998):165.
bb Interviews, Barcelona, March 17th and 16lh, 1997.
57 Arindam Das Gupta and Dilip Mookherjee, Incentives and Institution Reform in Tax 
Enforcement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 304-332.
bS Richard Goode, “Obstacles to Tax Reform in Developing Countries,” in Bird and OldmanJ 
121. J
59 According to tax authorities special taxes on gasoline (IEPS) distort tax revenue estimates. 
See Revisidn Fiscal lntearal.18.
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Source: Revision Integral Fiscal, SHCP, 1999 
The data from OECD Revenue Statistics shows that in the past thirty years the 
average tax burden has risen in almost every OECD country, especially in 
industrialised countries where higher tax levels increased from 29% in 1970 to 
38% in 1996. In very few exceptions, as the case of Mexico, the tax burden 
measured as percentage of GDP has fallen60 However, none of these 
countries suffers from such a poor yield of tax revenue as Mexico does.
In contrast with other Latin American countries, the process of reforms in 
Mexico has not translate in greater tax revenues. By the end of the 1980s an 
international wave of tax reform moved countries all over the world to 
undertake a full review of their tax systems. Latin America experienced a 
substantial increase in revenues in both income and add-valorem taxes after 
the implementation of reforms.61 Asian economies also improved slightly after 
the reform, particularly in income tax. In Latin America, the reforms 
implemented improved tax collection significantly.
60 Other countries where the tax level has declined are: Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. See Steven Clarck and Flip Kam, Taxes 
Revisited (Paris: OECD, 1998).
61 For the process of reform see Elizondo, "The Politics of Tax Reform in Latin America,” 
Dossier No. 32 (Mexico: CIDE, 1997) and Parthasarathi Shome “Recent Tax Policy Trends 
and Issues in Latin America,” in Andres Lara Resendez, ed., Policies for Growth: Latin 
American Experience (Washington, DC: IMF and the World Bank, 1995).
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The following table shows how between 1990 and 1994, Central America 
increased its tax revenue collection by 50%, moving from 10.5% to 15.1 % of 
GDP, while on South America’s percentage of collection increased by 25%, 
from 13.6 to 16.7% of GDP. It is noteworthy that Latin American countries 
improved collection almost on every front, income and consumption taxes. The 
improvements achieved by some countries in the region are remarkable.62 Peru 
increased its share of tax revenues coming from VAT from 1.1% of GDP in 
1990 to 5.6% by 1994.63 In comparison, Mexico’s VAT revenue decreased from 
3.6% to 2.7% of GDP, in the same period.
Table 1.2.- Sources of Tax Revenue 
(as percentage of GDP)
Total Income tax VAT
1990 1994 1990 1994 1990 1994
OECD 28.0 28.2 14.0 13.6 6.4 6.5
Asia 25.9 27.7 6.5 7.4 3.0 3.2
Central America 10.5 15.1 2.0 3.5 2.7 3.3
South America 13.6 16.7 1.1 4.2 3.5 5.4
Mexico64 13.7 14.0 4.7 5.1 3.6 2.7
Source: Evoluci6n del Sistema Fiscal, SHCP, 1999.
Despite significant reforms in the 1970s, such as the elimination of a cedularl 
system, and introducing computerised mechanisms for the administration of 
taxes, revenues decreased. Similarly, the reforms implemented between 1980- 
87, including the introduction of VAT and indexing taxes to inflation had no 
substantial effects on tax collection, it decreased again from 10.7% to 9.1% of : 
GDP. During Salinas' far reaching administrative and auditing reforms, income
See El Pacto Fiscal.
63 For a complete overview of Peru’s process of modernisation see Francisco Durand, “State 
Institutional Development: Assessing the Success of the Peruvian Tax Reform," University of 
Texas at San Antonio, 1998. Mimeo.
64 Total tax collection, differ from other figures here because the Secretariat of Finance includes 
special levies on gasoline (lEPs) and what would constitute the corporate income of Pemex.
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revenues increased just slightly from 9.2% to 9.77% of GDP, while during 
Zedillo's term revenues plunged further to 8.67% in 1997. Although this was 
attributable partly to the economic crisis, it was to a large extent also the result 
of a set of fiscal incentives introduced to foster investment and job creation. j\
The studies of the Secretariat of Finance estimated that fiscal reforms]
p i /
undertaken from 1980 to 1996, cost in government revenues approximately 
5.61% of GDP.65 Many of the revenue maximising reforms, including 
administrative and auditing measures, were introduced to compensate for the 
expected revenue loss. Tax authorities claim that they were conscious that 
transforming the fiscal system would not lead to increasing tax revenues.66 
According to the Secretary of Finance, “the government fully assumed the 
revenue cost, assessing that it was a fair price to pay for the modernisation of 
the economy.”67
Table 1.3.- Cost of the tax reforms in the last 20 years
Structural Reform up to 1994 2.90%
Additional Tax Reforms 1995-96 1.21%
Immediate deductions for small companies00 0.10%
Negative Tax on wage earners 0.34%
VAT 0.21%
Tax on Assets0* 0.25%
Tax Tariffs 0.31%
Social Security Reform 1.50%
Total 5.61%
Source: Evolution Sistema Fiscal, Official Document of the Secretariat of Finance,
1999.
65 See Tom£s Ruiz speech at the national consultations for a full scale fiscal reform: “La 
Reforma Fiscal que Mexico Requiere," Mexico, November 5th, 1998.
66 Interviews with tax authorities like Pedro Aspe, Alma Rosa Moreno and Tomas Ruiz.
67 Speech delivered by Secretary of Finance, Jose Angel Gurria, on the inaguration of the 
forum “La Reforma Fiscal que Mexico Requiere,” November 5,1998.
68 A reform in 1995, allowed small companies within the three large metropolitan areas the
opportunity to make immediate deductions on investments.
6 The rate on the assets tax was reduced from 2% to 1.8%, and small companies were
exempted from it.
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The decline in Mexico’s tax income is explained by the policy objectives 
pursued by tax authorities under the programme of economic modernisation. 
Tax authorities argue that the reforms implemented since the mid-1970s 
responded to a comprehensive process of profound economic change.70 After 
the mid 1980s, the objectives pursued by reformers included fiscal neutrality, 
reducing tax distortions that affected the economy, improving administrative 
efficiency and facilitating the economic transformation of the country. Tomas 
Ruiz argues that without such reforms, which included the elimination of special 
taxes and the reductions of the marginal rates, the Mexican economy would 
have not been prepared to successfully compete in a globalised world.71
1.4.- Has the Fragility of the Tax System Been Ignored the Past Three 
Decades?
At first glance, the stalemate of tax revenues and the consequently fragility of 
the public finances in the past three decades could suggest that the issue has 
been largely disregarded by public officials. It may be that Mexico’s tax system 
inefficiency in terms of revenue has generated little awareness among its socio­
economic groups. However, the evidence gathered in interviews with many of 
the most influential actors suggests the contrary. The low tax revenue yield has 
traditionally been a major concern for Secretaries of Finance, as well as socio­
economic leaders.72 Paradoxically, it appears at the top of the public agenda, 
even at times of abundant alternative resources.73
70 Interview, Tom£s Ruiz and Ruiz speech “Hacia.1998.
71 Ibid.
72 Please note that job titles reflect the position the interviewees held at the time of the 
interview.
73 A review of the presidential addresses to the nation, shows that the issue of fragile public 
finance and the urgent need for revenues has been at the top of the public agenda. It is 
particularly important during presidents Echeverrias’ and Salinas’ speeches, and the first
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In the words of Revenue under-secretary, Tomas Ruiz, there is no serious 
specialist who has not recognised the low level of tax collection in Mexico.74 
The evidence gathered here, shows that the concern for the country’s low tax 
collection level is not only recognised by specialists but also extends to the 
whole political and economic spectrum of the Mexican society.
Public officials at the Secretariat of Finance openly recognise the fragility of the 
government’s finance and the need to strengthen tax revenues, since the 
1970s. President Zedillo has repeatedly stressed that “tax collection in Mexico 
is very low and insufficient to address the great economic needs of the 
country.”75 Currently, tax revenues pay just three-quarters of total social 
spending; the rest is financed with oil revenues.76 Secretaries of Finance, from 
Ortiz Mena in the1960s to the current Secretary Jos6 Angel Gurria, ail have 
complained about the government’s insufficient tax capacity to address social 
development and infrastructure in the country.77 Strengthening tax revenues 
come up as a national priority on interviews with some former Secretaries of 
Finance in the past three decades, vgr. Ibarra (L6pez Portillo), Aspe (Salinas) 
and Ortiz and Gurria (Zedillo). Likewise, representatives from the socio­
economic spectrum all agree on the government’s need to boost tax revenues 
in order to increase stalemated social spending.
address to the nation given by President Zedillo. See various Informes de Gobierno. 
Presidencia de la Republica, various years.
74Tom^s Ruiz, “El Sistema Fiscal Mexicano: Avances y Retos," El Mercado de Valores. 
Nacional Financiera, July 7,1999:4.
75 In interview with Mr. Arizmendi one of the members of President Zedillo's media pool, he 
said that the president usually addresses this issue on his presidential tours to the provinces. 
For example, see Juan Arvizu and Gustavo Chavolla, “Rechaza EZ Exigencia de NL por M£s 
Dinero, “ El Universal. March 24th, 1999:1.
76 See Jos6 Angel Gurria’s “La Reforma que Mexico Requiere."
77 See Ortiz Mena.
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The need to raise tax revenues is a growing issue in the agenda of political 
parties. From the left of the political spectrum to the right, senior opposition 
politicians coincide on the need to increase revenues through taxation.78 From 
the right, former presidents of the PAN, Luis H. Alvarez, Castillo Peraza and 
Felipe Calderon have called for a tax system that fosters investment and 
growth, as well as one that is efficient in collection terms.79 Fiscal Federalism 
understood mostly as increasing revenue shares is among their core policies.80 
Vicente Fox, as PAN governor demanded greater tax powers and increasing 
federal revenue shares to states and municipalities. As presidential candidate 
for the same party, he campaigned on the need to increase tax collection to 
15% of GDP (not including oil revenues) and moving further to consumption 
taxes.81
On the other end of the political spectrum, former Mexico’s city mayor and 
three times presidential hopeful for the PRD, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, also 
complained on the grim resources channelled to the country’s capital, and the 
need to enhance tax revenues. He argued that a profound fiscal reform was 
needed to provide the state with urgent resources to address lagged social 
demands, plus a reform that would emancipate the country’s tax collection from
78 See article published by one of the leading PRD's deputies, Ricardo Garcia Sainz, “Reforma 
Fiscal Integral para Fortalecer los Ingresos Publicos,” El Mercado de Valores Nacional 
Financiera, July 1999:42-48.
79 Interview Luis H. Alvarez in London, May 1997; and Felipe Calderdn in Aguascalientes, June 
11th, 2000. In similar terms Carlos Castillo Peraza, another former president of the PAN 
strongly supported the idea of expanding the tax capacity of sub national governments. See 
Elisa Robledo, “Reforma Fiscal Callejera Propone Castillo Peraza.” Epoca June 23rd 1997: 23.
80 See PAN's political platform , and Vicente Fox, "Federalismo Fiscal” in Compromisos por la 
Nacion. See also chronicles of the two presidential debates, were one of the issues proposed 
was tax reform.
81 Comments made as governor in an interview in London in June 5th, 1997, as presidential 
candidate see Fox's pledge made at ITAM university, Mexico, January 11th, 2000.
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PEMEX's revenues. He vaguely suggested an overhaul to tax privileges for 
large companies and capital gains.82 Porfirio Munoz Ledo, bitterly complained 
as well, about the lack of resources for social programmes, and called for a 
new fiscal convention to re-design the tax system, involving fiscal authorities 
from the 31 states. 83 PRD former president, Lopez Obrador stood for 
eliminating the government support programmes, including Fobaproa, in order 
to cut VAT rates.84 Others PRD members have proposed an overhaul of the tax 
system to make it more efficient and equitable.85
The President of the PRI, Dulce Maria Sauri and former President, Santiago 
Onate, recognise that the official party lacks a proper tax agenda.86 Reforms 
are imposed from above, and little analysis has been made to discuss this 
issue. As Onate put it “the president orders the party and legislative leaders to 
vote in favour of the tax reforms. In exchange, all sorts of privileges were 
granted to interest groups. It is difficult to develop a tax agenda in such a 
clientelistic political system.” Nevertheless, there were attempts by the PRI to^ 
discuss this issue and proposed possible solutions to the country’s tax 
problems.87 PRI Presidential candidate, Francisco Labastida also stressed
82 In an interview in London he was very cautious by stating that this was not an attack to the 
powerful financial elite, but a mechanism to ensure greater equity among tax payers and 
recapture the distributional role of taxation. As presidential candidate, he continued to support 
these arguments, see conferences at ITAM on January 11th, 1999.
83 Interview in London, February 19th, 1998.
84 “Anular Apoyo Federal a IP para Compensar la Reduccibn del IVA, pide Lbpez Obrador," La 
Aficion August 15,1997:9.
65 Influential PRD members have made tax reform proposals, for example Ifigenia Martinez H., 
“Cambiar la Forma de Cobrar el IVA para Aumentar la Recaudacibn,” Nuevo Consultorio 
Fiscal. N.222. June. 1999.
55---------  thInterview Dulce Maria Sauri, President of the PRI, London, February 28 , 2000, and former 
president Santiago Onate, London, March 8th, 2000.
7 See PRI: Plataforma Electoral 2000-2006 (Mexico: Fundacion Colosio, 2000) and interview 
with Sen. Oscar Lopez Velarde, President of the Fundacion Colosio, the PRI’s think-tank, 
Mexico city, May 12 , 2000. Within the Fundacion Colosio there was a large working group 
specialised in taxation. For the names see Agenda Electoral (Mexico: Fundacibn Colosio, 
1999).
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repeatedly the need to increase the country’s tax revenue generating 
capacity.88
The idea of strengthening revenues appealed to all political denominations, butC 
none has laid down how it should be achieved. The issue is absent in theirJ 
party’s political platforms, but it became a very important issue in the 2000 
presidential campaign. Although, the issue frequently came up, possible 
solutions were addressed very vaguely. In interviews with the presidents of the 
three major political parties -PRD President, Amalia Garcia; PRI President,J 
Dulce Maria Sauri and PAN president, Felipe Bravo- all proposed to broaden 
the tax base, but avoided saying which privileges should be eliminated 89 They 
also defended the preferential treatment for agriculture, describing it as a 
national priority. None of them seem truly familiar with the topic, using 
arguments commonly put forward by public rhetoric. Bravo Mena demanded 
less taxes and more incentives to business, even accepted that such proposal 
represented a blunt contradiction to the policies seeking to eliminate tax 
privileges.90 All agree on the fact that tax policy making process has become 
highly politicised issue and on the need to review special tax privileges.
Representatives of the private sector, including leaders of business 
organisations and large business tycoons have highlighted the problem as well. 
Eduardo Bours, the president of the most important business organisation, the 
Businesses Co-ordinating Council (CCE), stated that the tax system is
88See Francisco Labastida. Que el Poder Sirva a la Gente (Mexico: Oceano, 2000).
89 Interview, Amalia Garcia, President of the PRD, London February 27th, 2000; Dulce Maria 
Sauri, President PRI, London February 28th, 2000, and Felipe Bravo, PAN’s President, London 
February 28th, 2000.
90 Interview Felipe Bravo Mena, PAN President, London February 28th, 2000.
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inefficient, lacks the capacity to provide sufficient resources to finance public 
expenditure programmes adequately. He adds that revenues should be 
sufficient to run government programmes, without relying on mounting deficits, 
excessive borrowing or oil revenues.91 Jorge Marin Santillan the leader of 
CONCAMIN, expressed that the industrial sector “recognises that the main 
objective of an overall fiscal reform should be strengthening the income of the 
public sector, but at the same time it should foster economic growth, 
investment and savings."92 In the same context, Carlos Slim, the richest 
Mexican businessmen, concedes that tax changes in the last decade implied a 
noteworthy administrative progress, but a significant potential remains to be 
realised in terms of collection.93 While Gutierrez Prieto another of the few 
Mexican billionaires expressed the need to consolidate a stable source of fiscal 
revenues to improve social conditions, public infrastructure and services. 94 For 
the director of ICI, head of one of the large multinational companies in the 
country, there is potential to increase revenues without increasing tax rates, by 
improving the administration of taxes 95
The impelling need to raise government revenues has reached even Mexican 
intellectuals, who recognising the fragility of public finances have expressed 
concern on the way the tax system is structured and managed. Aguilar Camin 
has described the tax system as the “nation’s invisible villain,” responsible for
91 Eduardo Bours Castello, “Hacia una Reforma Fiscal Integral,” Mercado de Valores July, 
1999:10-17. Interviews London October 13th and 14th, 1998.
92 “Lo que Sea Mejor para M6xico, es la Mision de CONCAMIN: Lie. Jorge Marin Santillan,” 
Industria CONCAMIN, Vol. 12 March 1999: 7, and interview London, October 14th, 1998. 
Interview, London, October 14th, 1998.
94 Interview London, June 9th, 1998.
95 Interview Ing. Manuel Diaz, President ICI Group Mexico, Canning House, February 1997 
London.
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recurrent economic crisis.96 With a similar position, Jorge Castaneda has 
depicted the system as unjust, unequal and inefficient, highlighting its limited 
revenue potential and the structural distortions caused by politics.97 Carlos 
Fuentes, focused his comments on the distributive side of tax reform, arguing 
that globalisation and the current economic strategy (neo-liberalism) has 
spread poverty excluding large sectors of the Mexican society. He also states 
how insufficient revenues have failed to respond to the economic demands of 
millions of Mexicans.98 For Carlos Monsivais attempts to redistribute wealth 
using taxation have been corrupted by political interests,99 while Rolando 
Cordera believes on a more progressive taxes system to prevent further 
concentration of wealth in few hands.100
The empirical evidence indicates that the pressing need to increase the low 
level of tax collection has always been in the official rhetoric, however little has 
been done to increase the yield of revenues. Most revenue maximising reformsj 
were implemented to compensate for those reforms that have reduced public 
income. As stated before, the reason that partially explains the limited revenue, 
maximising policies, is that less conflicting means for financing the state have 
always been at the disposal of the government. However, this would be a y 
simplistic answer to a very complex problem, since it fails to explain why some 
of the most important revenue maximising tax reforms were implemented at 
periods of abundant alternative resources.
96 Aguilar Camin, Proceso, 11th April, 1999:41.
97 Interview Madrid, March 11th, 1998.
98 Interview London, July 7th, 1999.
99 Interview London, November 19th, 1997.
100 Interview Madrid, March 10th, 1998.
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During L6pez Portillo's term the government arcades were flooded with 
revenues from the oil boom, nonetheless the government implemented 
important revenue maximising reforms, including the introduction of VAT. The 
Salinas administration also pursued significant reforms to strengthen tax 
receipts, regardless the fact that for the first time in two decades, the 
government experienced a surplus in public finances, thanks to the large 
proceeds coming from privatisation and volatile capital flows.
1.5.- Academic Attempts to Explain the Fragility of the Mexican Tax 
System and Factors that have Constrained its Development
The studies of the Mexican tax system and particularly the factors that have 
inhibited its development have received very little scholarly attention.101 In the 
last thirty years very few authors (Kaldor, Retchkiman, Aspe, Gil Diaz, 
Elizondo, Latapi) have examined Mexico’s fiscal fragility, epitomised by a tax 
system that has failed to provide the resources needed for the sustainable 
development of the country. These academics have predominantly sought to 
explain Mexico’s poor tax collection effort, but avoid explaining the reason 
hindering reform. Their analysis shows a complex set of social, economic and 
political factors shaping the tax system and inhibiting its development.
101 Important research has been made on the tax systems of selected Latin American countries, 
which has been enlightening for understanding of the Mexican tax system. See Shoups 
analysis of Venezuela, Musgrave of Colombia and Bolivia, and on Colombia the separate 
works by Bird and MacLure on Colombia. See Carl Shoup, “Taxes and Economic 
Development,” in Bird and Oldman, 37-45. Richard Bird, Taxation and Development: Lesson 
from Colombian Experience (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1970); Bird, Optimal: 
Richard Musgrave, Fiscal Reform for Colombia: Final Report and Staff Papers (Colombia: 
Comission on Tax Reform, 1971); Richard A. Musgrave, Reforma Fiscal en Bolivia: El Marco 
Econbmico General (La Paz: Secretarla de Finanzas, 1978); Ricahd A. Musgrave, Fiscal 
Reform in Bolivia: Final Report of the Bolivian Mission on Tax Reform (Cambridge: The Law 
School of Harvard University, 1980); Charles E. MacLure Tax Policy Lessons for LDC’s and 
Eastern Europe (San Francisco, Calf: ICS Press, 1992); Charles E. McLure The Taxation of 
Income from Business and Capital in Colombia (Durham: Duke, U.P., 1990).
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Commissioned by the Secretariat of Finance Kaldor made a very 
comprehensive study of Mexico’s tax structure, in the early 1960s. Then, he 
stated that there was “an urgent need for a radical and comprehensive reform 
of the tax system,” due to the fact that revenue from taxation was “inadequate 
for development needs and escalating population growth.”102 The large 
number of privileges given to specific sectors and activities, and particularly the 
numerous exemptions and deductions embedded in the tax legislation 
astonished him. 103 In the 1970s, Tanzi looked at the quantitative 
characteristics of the tax mix in Mexico as a way to explain the low revenue 
yield,104 while in the 1980s Solis examined the underperformance of the tax 
structure, highlighting the great number of tax havens and the preferential 
treatment.105
More recently, research done by Pedro Aspe and Francisco Gil Diaz has 
exposed the shortfalls of the tax system, after analysing the tax structure and 
the reforms implemented in the last two decades. The main conditioning 
variables studied by these authors have been economics and the model of 
development pursued by the different administrations.106 Maykanosky used an 
economic model to study the revenue and social impact of the 1983 fiscal
Kaldor. ReDorts. 214.
103 Nicholas Kaldor, “Las Reformas al Sistema Fiscal en Mexico," in Leopoldo Solis, La 
Economia Mexicana (Mdxico: Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 1973).
104 See Vito Tanzi, “Quantitative Characteristics of the Tax System of Developing Countries," in 
David Newbery and Nicholas Stern, The Theory of Taxation in Developing Countries (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987): 206-211.
105 Leopoldo Solis, Economic Policy in Mexico: A Case Study for Developing Countries (New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1981).
106 Pedro Aspe and Paul Sigmund, The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Mexico 
(New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984), Francisco Gil Diaz, “The Incidence of Taxes in Mexico: 
A Before and After Comparison,” in Aspe and Sigmund, 59-98. Francisco Gil Diaz, “Some 
Lessons for Mexico's Tax Reform," in Newbery and Stem.
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reforms. In the late 1990s, Latapf explored the weaknesses of the tax system 
and its negative socio-economic effects.107 These authors concentrated on 
examining the shortfalls of the tax system but little attempts was made to 
understand the forces that have inhibited reform.
Some authors explain the fragility of the tax system based in the process of 
economic policy making, arguing that it is subordinated to competing socio­
economic forces seeking selfish benefits.108 From a Marxist approach involving 
class struggle, Retchkiman asserts that it is the economic elite, the one who 
has hindered the development of the tax structure in Mexico. He argues that 
the Mexican State is subordinated to large businesses’ interests, and tax 
legislation depicts the way the State looks after the interests of property 
holders, while it disregards those of “the miserable mobs of Mexicans.”109 Other 
authors recognise the influence of the economic elite but include other powerful 
players. Cothran underlines the role of corporate actors within the PRI and their 
influence on fiscal policies, 110 though most analysts argue that since the early 
1980s corporate actors' influence has been rapidly declining.111
Elizondo gives the bureaucracy greater autonomy, but takes into account 
interest groups’ influence over tax policy making. He suggests that politics has
107 Mariano Latapl, La Realidad de los Impuestos en Mexico: 30 Anos de Perversion Fiscal
(Mbxico: Sistemas de Informacibn Contable y Administrativa Computarizados, 1998).
08 For the dynamics of socio-economic groups in struggle during economic reform in Latin 
America see Joan M. Nelson ed., Fragile Coalitions: the Politics of Economic Adjustment (New 
Brunswick; Oxford: Transactions, 1989) and S. Haggard and R. Kaufman, “The Politics of 
Stabilization and Structural Adjustment,” in J. Sachs ed., Developing Country Debt and 
Economic Performance: The International Financial Svstem (Chicago: Chicago U.P.. 1989). 
T0S~Retchkiman:18-19.---------------------------------------------- --------
110 See Cothran.
111 Interview John Womack, Harvard University, July 15th, 1998. For a general view of those 
competing forces see interview with Womack in “Mexico: Un Diagnbstico,” Nexos February 
1996:41-47.
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been the most important conditioning factor explaining the shape and limited 
attempts to reform the tax system.112 This author draws main three causes, 
which have constrained the reform process in Latin American tax systems, 
particularly in Mexico. First, the nature of the state, where three elements are 
considered: elite divisions within the state over taxation, the role of interest 
groups and the limited administrative capacity of the Latin American States. 
Secondly, government’s search of several policy objectives additional to raising 
revenues. Lastly, the use of alternative sources available to the State to finance 
its expenditures.113 Similarly, De La Garza concludes in his research that 
political factors predominantly explain the tax structure and its evolution.114
In the absence of a specialised tax literature on Mexico, the research turns to 
review international literature on the topic, to shed some light on the Mexican 
case. Sandford made a comparative analysis of the different aspects that 
influence tax reform in developed countries. Among the most resilient features 
were: the country's constitution and political practices, macroeconomic and tax 
reform background, the process of tax policy formulation and implementation, 
external influences, political will, the role of personalities and personal 
relationships.115 Peters places special attention to politics as the main driving 
force shaping the tax system, but he also highlights the role of institutions and 
international influences.116 Similarly, Bates and Hansen emphasise politics as
112 Elizondo, “In Search of Revenue": 159-190. Elizondo, “La Fragilidad”: 18-29, and Carlos 
Elizondo, The Politics of Tax Reform”.
113 Elizondo, The Politics. 3.
114 Jose Maria de la Garza Serna, "The Politics of Tax Reform in Mexico," PhD. Thesis, 
University of Essex, 1996.
115 Cedric Sandford, Successful Tax Reform. Lessons from an Analysis of Tax Reform in Six 
Countries (Bath: Fiscal Publication, 1993).
1lb B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Taxation: A Comparative Perspective (Blackwell: Oxford 
University, 1991).
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the driving force behind tax policy making.117 From a different approach, Tanzi 
puts forwards the relationship between economic structures and taxation, and 
how the earlier conditions tax policy.118 To Musgrave economic, political and 
social factors affect a country’s tax structure.119 While the importance of 
institutional and political variables in the formation of optimal taxation, is 
foregone by Geleotti and Marrelli.120 In general, though to a different degree, all 
authors seem to place special emphasis on politics as the main force shaping 
and holding back tax policy.
Regarding those forces that constrain the process of reform the literature 
shows a wide range of factors. Goode has laid down some of the obstacles to 
tax reform in developing countries, including analytical difficulties, 
administrative and compliance weaknesses, the shortage of local fiscal experts, 
unsuitable foreign advice, and political obstacles.121 The World Bank has 
examined some of the impediments to reform, signalling administrative capacity 
and political opposition as the most important constraint. 122 Bird highlights in 
particular the difficulties to reform posed by a weak administration, but 
recognises the obstacles posed by domestic politics.123 Retchkiman and 
Elizondo have concentrated on the study of the political obstacles. Their 
analysis is supported in Rose and Karran argument that tax reform is usually 
avoided because it implies a very high political cost, so politicians prefer to
117 Robert Bates, "Apolitical Scientist's View," in Malcolm Gillis ed. Tax Reform in Developing 
Countries (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989) and B. Hansen.
118 Vito Tanzi, “Forces that Shape Tax Policy,” in Herbert Stein ed., Tax Policy in the Twenty- 
First Century (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1988):267-277.
Musgrave, Fiscal Reform.
120 G. Geleotti and M.* Marrelli, Design and Reform of Taxation Policy (Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1992).
121 Goode, “Obstacles to Tax Reform”: 121-131.
122 World Development Report. 1997. (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997):144.
123 Bird, Tax Policy and Economic Development.
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make only marginal changes than significant reforms.124 However, the literature 
review does not explain why a full-scale overhaul of the tax structure has been 
evaded for more than three decades in Mexico. Although Elizondo's work 
provides valuable insights to this issue it requires to be studied in greater 
depth.
1.6.- Four Possible Explanations to the Constraints on Reform
After a detailed survey of the specialised tax literature, there are four possible 
hypotheses that may be put forward as the main constraints on reform in the 
past three decades in Mexico.
The first hypothesis proposes that structural weaknesses embedded in the 
economy and deeply rooted social attitudes have inhibited the potential for 
strengthening tax receipts. Among the economic factors are Mexico’s young 
population, extended poverty and low per capita income, which lead to small 
number of registered taxpayers. Other bounding factors include large income 
and regional disparities, tax evasion and avoidance, a large informal economy 
and heavy reliance on income from oil. Additionally, harmful practices deeply 
rooted in the Mexican society such as rampant corruption and very weak 
voluntary tax compliance adds to the structural deficiencies hindering 
collection.
Secondly, are those exogenous variables that determine, constrain or at least 
influence domestic tax policies. Tax reforms have been shaped by a worldwide 
tax reform movement, designed in industrialised countries to comply with global
124 Rose and Karran.
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interests rather than domestic ones. Globalisation has had a profound impact 
on the world’s tax systems, particularly in developing countries where fierce 
competition has developed to attract foreign investment. In addition, it has 
spread a style of tax reform shaped by a trend of thinking about tax policy in the 
world at large, not just locally.125 The economic crisis in Latin America during 
the 1980s reinforced the spread of this world trend. Due to the financial needs 
of many developing countries in the region, international agencies like the IMF 
and the World Bank become very influential in shaping the nature and direction 
of tax policy design. This has been done in various ways, either by the 
conditions attached to structural adjustment loans, by training hundreds of 
officials, providing technical assistance or simply by spreading a “universal" 
model of tax reform, applicable to all countries. Some policy actors claim that 
IFIs have promoted a tax reform receipt based on a “neo-liberal” model, which 
may not match Mexico’s true needs.126
The third hypothesis contends that countries are constrained to implement 
novel tax reforms proposals due to their limited administrative capacity. Some 
tax instruments may seem attractive in theory, but risk being inapplicable in 
reality due to the lack of institutional capacity.
Last but not least, politics is attributable to a considerable extent for the 
structural weaknesses in the tax system and best explains the elusive 
government attitude towards tax reform. Powerful vested interests explain the 
current shape of the tax system and constitute the main constraint to a
125 Bird and Oldman, 37-45.
126 Interview with Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, London, March 25th, 1999 and Porfirio Munoz Ledo, 
London February 19th, 1998.
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thorough fiscal reform. Mexico’s unique political system has been traditionally 
upheld by a fragile political coalition with the main socio-economic actors. This f * 
political agreement has for a long time has preserved the status quo and 
maintained a stable political regime, but at the same time it has hindered the I 
reform process. Political authorities still fear that any attempts to extract further 
resources from socio-economic actors, especially large businesses, could 
break the fragile socio-political coalition that upholds the regime.
This thesis argues that politics best explains the configuration of the tax system 
and contributes as no other hypothesis to understand the thrust behind the 
constraints on reform. Thus, the political variable is the main reason behinds] 
Mexico’s inefficient tax structure, being the uniqueness of the Mexican political 
system the most powerful constraint on tax reform. The remaining three 
hypotheses, however, cannot be disregarded, since they also play an important 
role. Any study that fails to recognise their influence would most likely be 
incomplete. These three alternative explanations would be examined 
throughout the thesis as complementary factors to the political hypothesis.
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Chapter II
Tax Fragility and State Autonomy: A Puzzling Paradox
“It is notable that a supposedly authoritarian regime such as 
Mexico, would have had such a difficulty in carrying out (tax) 
reforms that more democratic governments enact routinely.”
Cothran'27
This chapter explores the hypothesis of politics as the main constraint on tax 
reform questioning traditional paradigms about the Mexican State. I argue that 
tax policy making understood as a clientelistic process of political 
accommodation raises a conceptual paradox about the nature of the Mexican 
state. Assuming that tax reforms are not just the product of independent 
decisions of autonomous policy-makers, but the result of political 
accommodation resulting from pressures exercised by vested interests, then 
the limited reforms in the past 30 years and its inefficient revenue generating 
capacity portrays a rather weak Mexican state. Such argument contradicts the 
traditional literature that depicts it as autocratic and authoritarian. A thorough 
analysis of the literature on the autonomy of the Mexican state is presented 
here, concluding that the need to maintain a fragile political coalition largely 
limited the leverage of the State.
2.1.- Domestic Politics as the Main Constraint on Reform
The political hypothesis rests on the idea that tax policy making is imminently a 
political issue, dominated by interest groups competing to shape government 
policy design and outcome. Several scholars stress that politics is the key 
variable influencing tax policy making, since no other criterion carries so much 
weight. Peters argues that “political considerations will always dominate the
127 Cothran, 123.
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selection of tax policies, since all tax decisions are policy decisions, and 
therefore political ones. Therefore, the design and implementation of a tax 
policy are political actions.”128 He uses two other reasons to support his stance: 
first, by stating that the mere question of how the government will rise its taxes, 
and how it will spend the money are central political issues, and should 
therefore be addressed politically. Secondly, he underlines that tax proposals 
do not become policies unless government is willing to accept them and enact 
them into law through the political process.129 Peters acknowledges that 
economic and legal considerations may be used to initiate a discussion of tax 
policy, but it is politics that decides the outcome of the discussion and the final 
shape of the tax laws. 130 In his words “economists may have dominated the 
academic discussion of taxation, but political criterion appear to dominate tax 
policy making in the real world.” 131
The supremacy of politics over economics, ethics and administration in the tax 
policy making process, has been addressed by several scholars like Hansen, 
Steinmo, Robinson and Sandford, Hadenius, Goode, Peters, Rose and Karan, 
Atkinson.132 Even Bird who has concentrated on the constraints at the 
administrative front admits that “the administration of taxes is a political issue, 





132 Hansen; Seven Steinmo, ed., Tax Policy (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub., 1998); Ann 
Robinson and Cedric Sandford Tax Policy Making in the United Kingdom: A Study of 
Rationality. Ideology and Politics (London Heinemann Educational, 1983); Axel Hadenius A 
Crisis of the Welfare State?: Opinions About Taxes and Public Expenditure in Sweden 
(Stockholm: Almquvist & Wiksell International, 1986); Goode; Rose and Karran; A. B. Atkinson, 
Public Economics in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
Bird. Optimal. 411
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2.2.- Political Forces Opposing Reform
According to Atkinson politics frequently impedes tax reforms.134 This view is 
supported by I FIs, which argues that politics frequently represent the most 
important barrier to reform. The World Bank accurately points out that 
obstacles to reform may be embedded in the political regime itself.135 These 
include a clash of values or objectives among policy-makers, the desire of 
government leaders to remain in power, the activities of interest groups and the 
efforts of bureaucrats elite to retain and enhance their power and perquisites.136 
The empirical analysis in different periods will show that all these obstacles 
have risen in multiple occasions over the last three decades. More significant to 
our case, are the efforts made by government leaders to prolong the tenure of 
the PRI system by favouring their actual or potential supporters, or at least not 
alienating them.
Opposition to reform can be deeply rooted in the country's institution too. At any 
given time, the forces favouring the status quo are more likely to prevail, since 
it is easier for opponents to maintain the existing system.137 The experience 
shows that reformers usually have to face opposition from within, from both the 
bureaucratic and political elite. To the World Bank, conflicts exist among 
economic objectives and the stance of individual political leaders, these 
differences in priorities or disagreement about policies may derail tax reform 
efforts. 138 This can be seen through Mexico’s recent history. David Ibarra, 
Former Secretary of Finance recognises differences with President Lopez
134 r\See arguments about how a single reform can met very different objectives of diverse 
supporters and why politics impedes reform on Atkinson.
135 World Development Report. 1997.149.
136 Goode, 124
137 World Development Report. 1997.144.
138 Ibid.
47
Portillo over some tax policy decisions, including VAT.139 Carlos Tello, one of 
the economic key members of Echeverria’s sexenio recalls similar differences 
with the cabinet on tax and other related issues.140 More recently President 
Zedillo faced unprecedented overt opposition from his own party deputies over 
the proposal to increase the rate of VAT.141
Opposition can arise from the administrative front as well. Ascher brings to light 
the uncertainty caused by reform on tax administrators.142 In many cases, the 
World Bank observes “bureaucrats that run the risk of unemployment or losing 
prerogatives can thwart reform.”143 The very initiative of tax reform typically 
puts bureaucrats responsible for tax administration on the defensive, because it 
usually represents additional burdens to them. 144 When the institutions are 
corrupted the opposition is even greater, because changes may expose illegal 
practices.145 Former Finance Secretary Pedro Aspe, recalls the efforts 
undertaken to dismantle the administrative “mafia” within the Secretariat.146 In 
contrast the leader of the government unions, Deputy Carlos Jimenez argues 
that bureaucrats at the Secretary were not just co-operative in implementing 
reforms but the major force behind the policies aimed at “cleaning the
139 Interview with Ibarra and Gil Diaz over the struggles within the members of the economic 
cabinet. Both in Mexico City on September 25th, 1999 and March 25th, 1999 respectively.
140 Carlos Tello, La Politica Economica en Mexico: 1970-1976 (Mexico: Siglo XXI editores, 
1979) and interview Mexico, October 12th, 2000.
141 Former PRI's President Santiago Onate recalls the discontent of PRI deputies over the 
increase of VAT rate, tax authorities failed to explain and persuade PRI deputies over the true 
benefits of enacting the law authorising the reforms.
142 William Ascher, “Risk, Politics, and Tax Reform: Lessons from Some Latin American! 
Experiences," in Malcom Gillis ed., Tax Reform in Developing Countries: Fiscal Reform in the I 
Developing World (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989): 420.
World Development Report. 1997.146.
144 Ascher, 421.
145 See Francisco Durand, State Institutional Development: Assessing the Success of the 
Peruvian Tax Reform. San Antonio: University of Texas, 1997. Mimeo
14B Interview Pedro Aspe, September 20th, 2000.
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house.”147 However, despite the positive results in cracking down on corruption 
during Salinas term, the impetus to fight corruption from within faded away 
during Zedillo’s presidency.148
The heftier obstacle to tax reform is vested interests represented by highly 
organised groups. These groups are powerful enough to stop attempts to 
reform. In consequence, non decision making occurs because existing interests 
prevent changes from being debated or put into effect because that would be 
harmful to their material well being.149
The usual stereotype of tax politics is a process dominated by special interest 
groups seeking concessions and preferences for their members.150 To Bird tax 
reforms are not just the product of independent decisions of autonomous 
policy-makers, they reflect the pressure exercised by groups and vested 
interests.151 The role of interest groups -regional and sectional as well as 
economic and social- is present in the design of tax policies and ultimately play 
a significant role in shaping the tax system.152 Due to its technical nature, 
interest groups have more chances to influence tax policy than in other policy 
areas because its complex, technical character makes it easier for them to 
disguise their real influence in legal and economic jargon.153
147 Interview Deputy Carlos Jim6nez, July 28th, 2000.
148 Interview Diego Yrribarren, January 11th, 1998.
149 Rose and Karran, 11.
150 Alvin Rabushka, The Tax Revolt (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1982): 88.
151 Bird, Optimal. 36.
152Robert Dahl, Size and Democracy (Stanford, Calf.: Stanford University Press, 1973).
153Peters, 12.
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However, it is not easy to identify the vested interests of political actors. These 
actors have strong incentives to disguise their goals and strategies with regard 
to taxation behind a facade of ideology over broad statements about equity, 
fairness, and the public interests, because much of their work diverges from 
public preferences.154 Even when political actors show their true interest in tax 
policies, they may conflict with what the authorities consider to be in the public 
interest.
2.3.- Taxation and State Autonomy a Puzzling Paradox
The general perception around the world is that tax policy making is designed 
by a small and well-trained group of technocrats, versed in the models of cost- 
benefit analysis.155 Due its technical nature it would be easy to assume that 
decision-makers use analytical and rational process to decide which is the most 
appropriate alternative that best meets their goal based on the highest benefits 
to costs ratio. However, in reality the policies are contaminated in the design 
process by multiple political factors that change the nature and outcome of 
supposed rational policies.156
Rent seeking interest groups exercise a pernicious influence over government 
to shape tax policy, since they are oriented towards obtaining self-interested 
objectives rather than productive ones.157 The analysis of the Mexican system
154 Hansen, viii.
155 Goode.
156 For key forces shaping what the governments chooses to levy see J. Cullis and P. Jones, 
Public Finance and Public Choice (London: McGraw Hill, 1992) and F. Cowell, Cheating the 
Government (Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).
ii;The process by which interest groups appropriate monopoly rents is called rent seeking. See 
D. Mueller Public Choice II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 229. Interest 
groups appropriate monopoly rents, at the expense of other competing groups due to their 
monopoly position, in many cases artificially sustained by government officials. On literature on
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shows that in the end tax policy is more the reflection of the pressure of vested 
interests than rational decisions based on economic and administrative 
assessment. Tax policy becomes not the result of policy planning, but a series 
of small adjustments involving a process of accommodation and coalition 
building.158
This assumption raises a puzzling paradox, if tax policy in Mexico is the 
reflection of the pressure of vested interests and not the decision of 
autonomous policy-makers, then the Mexican State must be surprisingly weak. 
Contrary to the authoritarian depiction of the Mexican State, the evidence 
pictures a state ineffectual in extracting resources from the economic actors 
and feeble to resist the pressures of corporate actors, particularly before 
domestic and international capital.
Based on the literature, the Mexican case is characterised by a close decision 
making process with the president and the top bureaucracy as key actors.159 
Most students of Mexico have described the Mexican policy making process as 
authoritarian and corporate in nature,160 a system where the political power is
rent seeking and interest groups see G. Tullock, The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent 
Seeking (Boston: Kluwer, 1989); G. Rowley, R. Tollison and G. Tullock eds., The Political 
Economy of Rent-Seeking (Boston: Kluwer, 1988); T. Persson, Political Economic: Explaining 
Economic Policy (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1999); P.A. McNutt, The Economics of Public 
Choice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996). The influence of these groups depends largely on 
the number of members and total political expenditures. See W. Mitchell and M. Munger 
"Economic Theories of Interest Groups,” American Journal of Political Science. No. 35, 512- 
546.
158 Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: the World’s Political and Economic Systems 
(New York: Basic Books, 1977), Rose and Karran for the incrementalist approach in tax 
matters.
159 For the process of policy making in Mexico, see J. Teichman, Policy Making in Mexico from? /  
Boom to Crisis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1988). J
Laurence Whitehead, “An Elusive Transition: The Slow Motion Demise of Authoritarian 
Dominant Party Rule in Mexico,” Democratization Vol. 2, No. 3, Autumn 1995: 246-269: 
Giovani Sartori, “Parties”: George Philip, The Presidency in Mexican Politics (London:
Macmillan in Association with St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, 1991); George Philip,
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centralised in the office of the presidency: other fundamental parts of 
government such as the judicial and legislative branches are almost powerless 
regarding policymaking. According to Kaufman, public policy in Mexico has 
been dominated by three features of the Mexican state: 1) Centralisation of 
decision making in the presidency, 2) Big businesses and their capacity to 
create major economic disruptions through capital flight, 3) The PRI as a social 
control mechanism.161
For many students of Mexico, a centralised policy making process was almost 
“insulated” from interest groups, which if any, they had a very limited influence 
in the formulation of policy. Large business groups have been traditionally the 
most successful in bargaining with the State, been capable of eluding or 
changing the intent of government policymaking than those organisations 
representing peasants or labour.162 Clientelism and patronage characterise the 
relationship between state and society. Additionally, the absence of a 
professional bureaucracy has largely contributed to the development of rent- 
seeking policy making, politicising the process and wide spread corruption.
Democratisation and Social Conflict in Mexico (London: Research Institute for the Study of 
Conflict and Terrorism, 1999); George Philip, Politics in Mexico (London: Croom Helm, 1985). 
According to Purcell the basic elements of authoritarian politics are: centralisation of power, 
elite consensus, limited pluralism, low levels of political mobilisation and participation and 
patrimonial style of rulership, see Purcell Susan Kaufman, The Mexican Profit-Sharing 
Decision: Politics in an Authoritarian Regime (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). 
For the corporatist nature of the Mexican system see Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and 
National Development in Latin America (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1981) and Howard J. 
Wiarda, Coroortism and Comparative Politics: the other great “ism” (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1997). Wayne, Cornelius, Todd Eisenstadt & Jane Hindley eds., Subnational Politics and 
Democratization in Mexico (San Diego: University of California, 1999).
161 Kaufman, 100.
162 See Steve W. Hughes and Kenneth J. Mijeski, Politics and Public Policy in Latin America 
(London: Westview Press, 1984).
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This widely accepted view of the process of policy making in the literature fails 
to explain the frequent failures of presidential-inspired policies. In contrast to 
the popular view that saw almost no limits to the almighty power of the 
presidency, former President Miguel de la Madrid refered to the numerous 
constraints to presidential power, including those of a constitutional and of a 
political character, according to the former President “the role of the president 
was that of a mediator among conflicting interests.”163 Vernon also argues that 
Mexican presidents were constrained by the institutionalisation of power in the 
Mexican political system and public policy choices emerged as a result of 
conflicting interests within the official party.164
Some intellectuals state that the autonomy of interest groups in Mexico is 
severely circumscribed by government power. Among them, the most 
autonomous are business groups because they enjoy independent resources 
and organisational skills. Nevertheless, the government still had means to 
control businesses. Some of the most important business organisations like 
CONCANACO or CONCAMIN were created by the government and 
compulsory registration was required by law until very recently. But the most 
efficient way to keep businesses checked was through the control exercised by 
government over labour organisations and tax audits. Gonzalez Casanova 
signalled that other groups like peasants, urban labour, teachers, bureaucrats 
and middle class groups were less autonomous, being controlled by their 
affiliation to the PRI structure.165 However, these supposedly “restrained” policy
163 Interview, Mexico, November 3rd, 2000.
164 Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development: The Roles of the Private and 
Public Sector (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).
165 Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1970): 169-178.
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actors have been able to introduce a plethora of privileges to the tax legislation
benefiting them. In my opinion the bureaucracy is far less autonomous than
scholars believe. Confronted with the menace of capital flight the state is very.
vulnerable before domestic and international capital. However, corporate actors 
like peasants and labour, must not be disregarded since they have been able to 
maintain a preferential tax treatment.
If politics is considered as the main force shaping the tax system and tax policy 
as the reflection of the pressure of vested interests, then it is fundamental to 
determine the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the state.
2.4.- A Survey of the Literature on the Autonomy of the Mexican State in 
Policy Making
Determining the autonomy of the Mexican State is not an easy task, as has 
been pointed out by Geddes.166 She observed the difficulties faced by those 
attempting to do so.167 Authors such as Stepan, Linz, Grindle, Vernon, 
Bazahez, Hamilton, Haggard, Rueschemeyer, Evans, Lee, Maxfield and 
Kaufman have discussed this topic extensively.168 Kaufman summarises the 
position taken by the scholars trying to determine the autonomy of the Mexican 
government in the process of policy making:1691) Grindle argues that the state
166For an excellent debate on the difficulty for determining the state autonomy see Barbara! y
Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma. Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1994).
167The Political autonomy of the state is defined here in Bird terms, as the capacity to make 
decisions independent of the wishes of groups and interests in the society. See Bird, 24.
168 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1978); Hamilton 1982; Stephan Haggard, Chung H. Lee and Sylvia 
Maxfield, The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993); Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, States Versus Markets in the World Systems 
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1985); Susan Kaufman Purcell, Mexico in Transition: 
Implications for US Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988).
Kaufman, 1975:120.
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is autonomous in making economic policy, based on the political control 
exercised by the bureaucracy in Mexico.170 2) Vernon and Basanez believe that 
the state is constrained due to the competing forces of business and popular 
sector interests.171 3) Hamilton asserts that the state is capable of deflecting 
the pressures of popular constituency but it is vulnerable to pressures from the 
business sectors and IFIs.172 It is noteworthy that none of the scholars 
envisioned the Mexican state weak or seriously constrained in its ability to push 
his own agenda. In general there are two approaches those who believe the 
Mexican State to be autonomous and those who consider it “relatively 
autonomous.”
a) An Autonomous State
Scholars like Grindle, Purcell and Purcell, Bennett and Sharpe have stressed 
that the Mexican State is noted for its strong capacity to set rules for economic 
and political interaction and interest groups severely circumscribed by 
government power.173 Grindle has written that the state is autonomous in 
making economic policy, due to the political control exercised by the 
bureaucracy. 174 This author argues that the fact that a single party has
170 See Merilee S. Grindle, Bureaucrats. Politicians and Peasants in Mexico: A Case Study in 
Public Policy (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1977) and Merilee S. Grindle, “ 
Building Sustainable Capacity in the Public Sector: What Can be Done?" Public Administration 
and Development Vol. 15, 1995: 441-463.
Vernon, or Miguel Basanez, “20 Years of Crisis in Mexico, 1968-1988,” PhD thesis, London 
School of Economics, 1991 and Miguel Basanez, La Lucha por la Heaemonfa en Mexico 1968- 
1990 ( Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, 1990).
172 Hamilton.
173 Grindle, Bureaucrats: Purcell; Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe, Transnational 
Corporations Versus the State: The Political Economy of the Mexican Auto Industry (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985). Even Hamilton recognises the ample autonomy of the 
bureaucracy.
174Merilee S. Grindle, “Sustaining Economic Recovery in Latin America: State Capacity, 
Markets, and Politics,” in Graham Bird and Anna Helwege, Latin America’s Economic Future 
(Washington, DC: Academic Press, 1994): 303-323, and Merilee S. Grindle, Challenging the 
State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996).
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dominated elections expanded the power of the state to control social 
mobilisation and organisation.175 A study by Grindle and Thomas shows 
decision makers have the independence to define the public policies, 
accordingly to their ideology, professional training and experiences, although 
they have to shape the policies to make them politically and bureaucratically 
acceptable for the various interests groups in the system.176
Other authors like Findlay have also stressed the independence of the Mexican 
State from social forces.177 Anglade and Fortin state that although the influence 
of private capital is paramount in the Mexican political system, it allows a 
considerable degree of autonomy to the state as it was clearly shown by the 
country’s bank nationalisation. 178 Camp states that the Mexican government is 
committed to capitalist development but it does not appear to be dominated by 
the capitalist class, although it has considerable influence over it.179 For 
Callaghy Mexico had traditionally enjoyed high levels of bureaucratic state 
capability and insulation from political forces. This was achieved by a strong 
executive authority, which insulated the PRI from making significant 
contributions to policies.180
175 Grindle, Challenging the State. 11.
176Merilee S. Grindle and John W. Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political 
Economy of Reform in Developing Countries (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991).
Findlay's common conditions associated with “States’ independence from social forces” 
easily apply to the Mexican case: 1) low degree of organisation within society 2) authoritarian 
nature of existing political regime 3) control of the state by small elite. Ronald Findlay, The 
Roots of Divergence: Western Economic History in Comparative Perspective (New York: 
Columbia University, 1991) :18.
178 Anglade and Fortin, 271.
179 Roderic Camp, Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989): 7-8.
180Thomas M. Callaghy, “Toward State Capability and Embedded Liberalism in the Third World: 
Lessons for Adjustment,” in Nelson ed. Fragile Coalitions.
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Mexico is frequently described by political scientists as corporatist.181 Under 
such an assumption, PRI’s corporate actors (labour, peasants and small 
businesses and professionals) should play an important role in the 
government’s policy making. Nevertheless, several scholars question the 
influence of the corporate system in policy making. Story argues that the PRI 
was not a dominant actor in the process of policy decision making. To him the 
official party was more like an institution serving the executive branch.182 Bailey 
places bureaucrats with a large degree of autonomy from the PRI’s corporate 
structure and its patronage role. He highlights the dominance of the 
bureaucracy on public policy, resulting from of a highly centralised presidential 
system.183 Philip also stresses that the presidential system allowed greater 
autonomy to the bureaucrats responsible for policy making, since a strong 
executive is less exposed to influence from interest groups.184 Likewise, 
Centeno states that the corporatist sectors did not play a major role in policy 
making; their role was limited to supporting the legitimacy of decisions made in 
the bureaucracy.185
The state bureaucracy was free from the constraints placed by the political j 
machine, because the PRI and its predecessor never function as a political 
party but rather as a political control secretariat within the governing J
181 See Wiarda or Wayne Cornelieus, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith eds. Mexico’s 
Alternative Political Futures. (San Diego, Calif.: University of California, 1989) 
ia^Dale Storv. Industry, the State and Public Policy in Mexico (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1986): 131-132.
183 John Bailey, Governing Mexico.
184 Philip, The Presidency in Mexican Politics.
185The CTM was conformed to maintain labour acquiescence to government policies, and their 
influence declined with the replacement of Fidel Velazquez over the more independent union 
leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The incorporation of the National Confederation of Popular 
Organisations (CNOP) balanced the power of the two major sectors.
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bureaucracy.186 To Needier interest groups like small entrepreneurs, workers
i
and peasant organisations were relegated from the decision making process. 
Plus labour and agrarian rules allow the government a great deal of latitude 
against uncooperative labour and peasant leaders.187
For Kaufman the bargaining power of corporate sectors, especially the National 
Confederation of Peasants (CNC), was very limited in the process of policy 
making.188 Grindle who studied in great detailed the process of policy making 
involving bureaucrats, peasants and representatives from the CNC, came to a 
similar understanding, concluding that bureaucrats were the dominant actor in 
the policy process, despite been the peasant sector, one of the pillars of the 
party-government structure.189 For Middlebrook labour organisations have a 
minor role in policy making because they were largely dependent on state 
subsidies. He argues that the development of neo-liberal policies since the 
early 1980s have further weakened the power of labour to influence policies.190
In relation with the business sector, Smith believes that the Mexican state is 
autonomous and does not serve the interest of international and domestic 
capital.191 Camp, a student of the relationship between the state and the private 
sector in Mexico, argues that the government bureaucracy has traditionally
186 IMiguel Angel Centeno, Democracy with in Reason. Technocratic Revolution in Mexico 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1994) 51. >
Needier, 70-71.
188Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Mexico: Clientelism, Corporatism, and Political Stability," in Samuel 
N. Eisenstadt and Rener Lemarchand, eds„ Political Clientelism. Patronage, and Development 
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981):199.
89Grindle, Bureaucrats.
190 Kevin J. Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995).
191 Peter H. Smith, Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).
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dominated the relationship, and therefore the policy agenda. 192 Elizondo 
attributes to the economic elite a strong influence over the tax policy making 
process but believes that the bureaucracy still dominates the agenda. He 
makes the case that those emphasising the role of the economic elite as the 
governing force, underestimate the autonomy of the Mexican bureaucracy, in 
particular that of the President. 193 Kaufman, Badrezch and Heredia have 
written about the important role of national and foreign capital during the 
Salinas term, but attributed to the technocrats the dominant role in policy 
making.
b) A Relatively Autonomous State
From an opposing stance, various other scholars believe that the bureaucracy 
is constrained by internal actors such as corporatist and business interest 
groups, and external actors such as IFIs, foreign business and capital. Wiarda 
describes Mexico as an open corporatist system, largely constrained by socio­
economic actors.194 To Maxfield, macroeconomic policy patterns are shaped 
by interest coalitions, formed by particular state agents, sectors of the 
bourgeoisie, labour and other economic actors. These competing coalitions 
extend across state and society including both state actors and representatives 
of social groups.195 Cothran states that the Mexican political system is often 
called authoritarian, but is usually flexible in its response to group interests,
Camp, 239.
193 See Elizondo, “In Search,” 165.
194 Wiarda, Corporation and National Development.
195Sylvia Maxfield, “International Finance, The Sate and Capital Accumulation: Mexico in 
Comparative Perspective,” PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1988.
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especially business and to a lesser extent labour.196 To Philip, economic policy 
in Mexico after 1982 has been constrained by politics.197
Centeno believes in the "relative autonomy” of the bureaucrats in designing and 
implementing public polices without the intervention of interest groups. But 
since the opening of the economy, the degree of autonomy has been 
constrained by domestic and international capital.198 The PRI’s main function 
was to manage the patronage machine that compensated corporatist sectors 
for their support to the system.199 Fortin and Anglade have studied in depth the 
autonomy of the Latin American countries, given Mexico a degree of “relative 
autonomy.”200 To these authors the Mexican political system is based on a 
“symbiotic relationship between business and the state, with the ruling party 
playing the role of broker.”201 They argue that the influence of private capital 
remains paramount, allowing some degree of autonomy. Additionally, they 
place great importance on international financial centres.202
For Evans, policy reform in Mexico has been the result of a relative 
autonomous state. He argues that the phenomenon of policy change is usually 
the combination of internal autonomy and external dependency.203 In order to 
make policy reform possible, the state must have a significant degree of 
autonomy from social forces. He highlights the importance of a coherent
196 Cothran, 112.
197 Philip. “Democratisation”.
198 Centeno, Democracy within Reason.
199 After 1946 the Party function increasingly focused in managing the patronage machine on 
which political stability depended. Centeno, 54.
200 Anglade and Fortin, The State.
201 Anglade and Fortin, Vol. II, 271.
202 Ibid.
203 Evans 1992, 176.
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bureaucracy, strong enough to prevent rent seeking from defining policies and 
with the necessary contacts with the international policy structures.204 Internal] 
autonomy allows the state to break the alliances that maintain the status quo, 
whereas the external actors and their actions become a stimulus for the reform^ 
Haggard concurs with the idea that external influence provides the initial 
stimulus to both the flow of capital and ideas across borders.205
Multiple scholarly works have been written on the relationship between the 
state and capital. They can be classified in three groups, according to the limits 
posed by national and international capital on policy makers: (1) Mexican public 
policy has largely reflected the interest of international and national capital. (2) 
Two different factions of a dominating elite, one responsible of government 
institutions and the other for the control of national capital, where neither one 
dominates, albeit the interest of these groups often conflict. (3) That of “relative 
autonomy” which recognises the importance of capital, but gives the state a 
leeway of independence. The state and the private sector interact but the state 
is dominant in the process of policy making 206
It is generally agreed that business groups are the most influential actors in the 
process of policy making. To Hamilton the state seeks to exercise as much 
control as possible but it is constrained by the reactions and expectations of 
capital, adding that the business class enjoys powerful weapons to sabotage
204 Evans 1992,163-165.
205 Haggard 1990, 28.
206 Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post Revolutionary Mexico. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1982); Jorge Carribn and Alonso Aguilar, La Burauesla. la 
Oliaarauia v el Estado (Mbxico: Nuestro Tiempo, 1972); Roger Hansen, The Politics of Mexican 
Development (London: John Hopkins Press, 1980); Kaufman, The Mexican Profit-Sharing 
Decisions: Teichman, Policy Making from Boom to Crisis: James M. Cypher, State and Capital 
in Mexico: Development Policy since 1940 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); Maxfield, 1988.
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the policies it opposes.207 Other authors such as Freiden and Maxfield highlight 
the leading role of domestic and international capital in the design of economic 
policies. 208 Maxfield describes an alliance between bureaucrats and bankers, 
and how this has influenced economic policy.209 Lindblom stresses that that 
economic forces shape the balance of power in politics, and the organisational 
capacity of interest groups depends on their control upon economic resources.
The business elites have the capacity of economic disruption through capital1 
flight, thus the possibility to alter the economic agenda. Political leaders 
translate the demands of capital into concrete policy actions under the threat of 
capital flight.210 Reitchkman goes much further to argue that the tax system in 
Mexico reflects the interests of domestic capital and their influence to resist^ 
taxation.211
Haggard, Stallings and Maxfield emphasise the importance of international 
forces in the process of policy making.212 The state is constrained by the 
leverage of international capital and interest groups in the political arena. 213 
Concurring with this view, Stallings argues that international actors are crucial
Hamilton.
208 Frieden stresses that business political influence lies in their ability to influence directly 
policy making, organise lobbying and upset the economy through capital flight. The capacity to 
leave the domestic economy through the stock market, provide an important leverage to 
influences the state public polices. See Jeffrey A. Frieden, Debt Development, and Democracy: 
Modern Political Economy and Latin America. 1965-1985 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1991): 29.
209 Maxfield, Governing Capital international Finance and Mexican Politics.
210 Lindblom.
211 Retchkiman.
212 Maxfield Governing Capital: S.Haggard, Chung Lee and S. Maxfield, The Politcs of Finance 
in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell Universtiy Press, 1993); B. Stallings, “International 
Influence on Economic Policy: Debt Stabilization and Structural Reform,” in S. Haggard and R. 
Kaufman, eds, The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1992).
213 Haggard, Lee and Maxfield, 312.
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in explaining the changes in policies during the 1980s.214 According to LipsonJ 
international capital has become one of the major policy actors in setting the 
policy agenda and imposing the policies upon the governments215 This 
academic describes international capital as a coherent organisation composed 
by interdependent and co-ordinated structures of financial institutions, which 
allows them to influence the policies undertaken by the debtor states.216
Even Grindle a defender of an autonomous bureaucracy contends that the 
state can not ignore the implicit demands of international capital when making 
public decisions.217 Levi estimates that the globalisation of the economy 
increased the power of Transnational Corporations reducing the relative 
bargaining power of national states over corporate tax levels.218 Furthermore, 
many authors (Pastor, Williamson, Sachs, Mosley, Haggard, Kahler, Kaufman, 
Remmer, Edwards, Durnsbuch, Thorp and Whitehead, Vietmeyer) have 
pointed out the significant leverage that I FIs exercise in debtor countries’ 
agendas through the conditionality attached to structural adjustment loans 219
2.5.- State Autonomy in the Light of Tax Policy Making
The tax literature seems to support the assumption that tax policies are the 
outcome of political bargaining of interested groups, although there are a few
214 Stalling.
215 Lipson 1988, 44.
216 Ibid.217Maxfield, Governing Capital. 53.
218 Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
219 See Manuel Pastor, The International Monetary Fund and Latin America (Boulder, Colo: 
Westview Press, 1987; Adjustment Lending: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Experience 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1988); Joan Nelson, ed. Economic Crisis and Policy 
Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in Developing Countries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, “The Politics of Stabilization 
and Adjustments in Jeffrey D. Sachs, ed. Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989): 209-254.
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who argue that tax policy making is an independent and rational process 
undertaken by a very compact elite bureaucracy.220 In general, authors^ 
following the pluralist and rent seeking traditions maintain that tax policy 
decisions are the result of the competition of interest groups, which try to 
influence policy making in order to extract benefits from the state221 This 
hypothesis has been used to explain tax policy making in developed countries.y 
To Peters and Mucciciaroni the tax structure in the US reflects a classic case of 
"client politics” with a pattern of concentrated benefits and diffused costs.222 
The benefits are concentrated on those who pressure tax policy-makers.
Lindblom’s incremental approach states that policy is made not by planning, but 
by a series of small adjustments to the tax structure, involving a process of 
mutual accommodation and coalition-building. This theory also shows the 
power on tax policy making of pressure groups and vested interests.223 Aron 
and Gulper also refer to the “forces” which shape the tax structure, causing tax 
favouritism in the US. These forces concentrate the benefits on a small minority 
of all taxpayers, while diffuse costs on the general taxpayers.224
Geleotti and Marelli argue that fiscal variables are determined by the political 
machinery in the decision making process.225 But according to Haggard this 
theory is not very useful for developing countries, because the political elite
^ S e e  David Good, The Politics of Anticipation: Making Canadian Federal Tax Policy (Ottawa: 
Carleton University, 1980).
221 See Dahl; Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Theda Skcopol, Bringing the State 
Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Frieden.
222Peters, Gary Mucciaroni, “Public Policy and the Politics of Comprehensive Tax Reform,” 
Governance vol. 3,1990.
^Lindblom.
224“The Politics of Tax Reform” in Henry J. Aaron and Harvey Gulper, Assessing Tax Reform 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985): 129-139.
5 Galeotti and Marrelli.
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usually has built these organisational structures.226 The best way to explain the 
political influence of social and political forces in policy making is to weigh their 
power to resist change.227 Levi believes that rulers act as rational self- 
interested actors, although there are constraints to their relative bargaining 
power from international actors and capital228 Similarly, Peters believes that 
the growing power of international corporations reduced the bargaining power 
of national governments in tax matters.229
The few authors who have studied the Mexican tax policy making process, like 
Solis, Reitchkmen, Gil Diaz, Elizondo and Aspe give the dominant role to the 
bureaucracy, but they also assign significant influence to other attemptive 
actors who try to influences the process, like capital, corporate groups and 
international actors. It has been argued in this thesis, that such actors’ role and 
influence has experienced important changes in the last thirty years, thus any 
generalisation which does not differentiate dissimilar periods could be 
misleading. Hence, the importance in dividing the thesis into periods looking at 
the particular economic and political conditions, plus those fundamental 
variables that have determine the shape and nature of the tax policies.
The evidence shows that the influence of corporate actors has plummeted in 
the last three decades, but I argue that they are still influential. The best 
example of their prevailing influences is better understood not in terms of the 
changes they made to tax policy in the past decades, but in how these powerful
Haggard, 3.
227 For a view on the weight of social forces see Skocpol, 9.
228 M. Levi.
65
interest groups have been able to resist changes in the tax system that may 
affect their interests. Tax bureaucrats have been unable to break powerful] 
resistance to policy changes organised by these interest groups and the force 
to be reckoned with is the economic elite and their ability to move capital, 
abroad.
For Cothran the causes of Mexico’s economic problems are found partly in its 
position as a relatively poor country that is highly dependent on world and 
domestic capital that can easily find outlets elsewhere, thus the government 
must be careful about frightening capitalists.230 Policy positions unacceptable to 
domestic and international capital can lead to a sudden loss of needed 
investment. This limits the policies that Mexican government can pursue.
2.6.- The Power of the Economic Elite and Taxation
Elizondo proposes four reasons why the government has implemented only 
mild reforms until the Salinas administration. First, the collusion between some 
members of the government and those groups benefiting from fiscal privileges, 
usually politically important and capable to mobilise large groups. Political 
support was secured in exchange for tax exemptions. Secondly, the 
government philosophy of industrialisation implied giving tax privileges to 
induce capitalists to invest in Mexico. Thirdly, the threat of large businesses 
starting a speculative attack against the peso, by pulling their capital out of the 
country if taxes were raised. Fourthly, the financial power of the economic elite 
and the need to seduce capital holders, in order to maintain their voluntary
230 Cothran, 122-123.
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savings deposited in the Mexican financial system to continue to finance the 
public deficit in a non-inflationary way.231
Elizondo seems to underscore the power of interest groups, but brings to light 
the huge political power of the economic elite, mainly through their ability to 
transfer capital abroad. He draws attention to the ample autonomy of the 
Mexican bureaucracy and in particularly to the power of the President in order 
to make reform possible. Other scholars like Maxfield contest this view, 
emphasising the power of the economic elite,232 or Reitchkman who goes 
further to state that the economic oligarchy has traditionally controlled the 
process of tax policy making. There are two resilient characteristics in the 
symbiotic relationship between the government and the country’s economic! 
elite: a tacit agreement that governs the economic and political relationship and 
the enormous power of the economic elite to mobilise their capital.
Several scholars refer to a such tacit agreement between the state and the 
business elite. 233 Such agreement assured the business elite guaranteed 
profits secured by a captive market, high subsidies, ample resources through 
industrial development programmes and more importantly low taxes. In return 
business organisations had to stay away from politics.234 Though business 'j
could defend their professional interests, they lack the political freedom to 
express their views on the state or its development strategy.235
231 Elizondo, “In Search," 163-165.
232 Maxfield, Governing Capital.
233 Cothran, 125.
234 See Rolando Cordera and Carlos Tello. Mexico, la Disputa por la Nacidn: Perspectives v 
Opciones del Desarrollo (Mexico: Siglo XXI editores, 1981)
Carlos Arriola, “Las Organizaciones Empresariales Contempordneas,” in Lecturas de Politica 
Econdmica (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1977).
67
Tax privileges and incentives were used as a political tool for maintaining a 
fragile political coalition with the business community. Cothran argues that the 
government fostered economic growth, largely through policies designed to 
favour business and avoiding policies that would have alienated business 
support. He highlights that the continuity of the regime in power depended 
largely on the support from businesses, thus the government kept the business 
sector happy with preferential tax, subsidy and tariff policies to ensure them 
predictable profits. 236 In addition, government feared that a higher tax burden 
would diminish incentives to invest, therefore affecting growth.
This agreement allowed the economic elite to enjoy phenomenal profits, in a 
market secured by the ISI strategy. The economic elite benefited with the 
arrangement accumulating great capital. But soon their vast resources became 
strategic for funding Mexico's public finance. The excessive dependence on the 
savings of the economic elite has been raised by Maxfield 237 This dependency 
created a vicious circle, where the government's inability to strengthen its fiscal 
income made it rely increasingly on voluntary savings deposited in the Mexican 
financial system. The greater the government depends on these savings the 
more difficult it became to impose taxation that would affect holders of capital in 
Mexico.
Capital flight has become the key constraint for government policies designed 




capital flight has been used by the economic elite as a political lever for 
influencing economic policy. The vehicles used to transfer resources include 
the purchasing of foreign currency, authorised capital transfers and 
misinvoicing.238 In the last two decades, globalisation increased these means to 
relocate capital abroad further empowering capital holders' influence over tax 
policies.
The proclivity to send capital assets abroad has proved to have devastating 
effects in the economy, as shown by the recurrent economic crisis. According 
to Dornbusch there are three types of costs of capital flight. First, capital flight 
destabilises macroeconomic management. Second, it undermines tax morality, 
a common practice as underinvoicing of exports invariably reflects in reduced 
tax payments. Third, when a certain percentage of GNP is transferred abroad 
year after year, fewer resources are available for domestic investment. This 
means that savings are not available for domestic capital formation and 
reduced capital formation implies slower growth and less rapid increase in the 
standard of living.239 The Mexican economy has experienced these types of 
costs, made worse by the absence of a stable source of tax income.
Several authors, including Dornsbusch, Solis, Zedillo, Gurrla and Fadl, Cumby, 
and Williamson have estimated the magnitude of the resources legally 
transferred abroad, as well as the motives and vehicles behind capital flight in
238See Rudiger Dornbusch, Capital Flight: Theory. Measurement, and Policy Issues. 
Occasional Papers 2, (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1990); see also 
Jos6 A. Gurria and Ricardo S. Fadl, Estimacidn de la Fuaa de Capitales en Mexico. 1970-1990! 
(Washington, DC: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 1991): 9-11.
39 See Dornbusch, Capital Flight. 19-20.
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Mexico.240 Different methods to quantify the total amount of capital flight have 
been used providing contrasting results, which nevertheless disclose the 
magnitude of the problem. In 1991, Williamson estimated that around USD $ 80 
billion had flown from Mexico since the early 1980s 241 During 1994 alone, an 
estimated USD $ 29 billion dollars fled out from the Mexican economy in just 
one year.242 The following table, elaborated by Gurria and Fadl presents a 
summary of the principal studies on this issue.
Table 2.1.- Estimates of Capital Flight from Mexico 
(millions of dollars)
Source 1970-1985 1976-1984 1981-1987 1977-1987
Gurria & Fadl 27,095 26,223 19,616 20,460







Source: Gurria and Fadl, 7.
Regarding the motives behind capital flight, these range from the legitimate 
concern of entrepreneurs to diversify asset holdings, to protect capital in 
expectation of major changes in the exchange rate or political risk, to financial 
repression or tax considerations, including tax fraud. These authors have 
studied the political issues that induced capital flight, particularly in the case of
240 See Domsbusch, Capital Flight: D. Lessard and John J. Williamson eds., Capital Flight: The 
Problem and Policy Response (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1987); 
Leopoldo Solis and Ernesto Zedillo, “The Foreign Debt of Mexico,” in G. Smith and J. 
Cuddington eds., International Debt and Developing Countries ( Washington, DC: World Bank, 
1985); Ernesto Zedillo, “The Mexican Case,” in D. Lessard and John Williamson, eds., Capital 
Flight and Third World Debt (Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics, 1987); 
Gurria and Fadl; R. Cumby and R. Levich, On the Definition and Magnitude of Recent Capital 
Flight (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1987); Morgan Guaranty 
Trust. LDC Debt Reduction: A Critical Appraisal, World Financial Markets December 1988: 1- 
12.
241 Williamson, How Much has Happened. 63.
242 Mark Fineman, “Some Fear Zedillo Can't Pull Mexico from Mire,“ Los Anoeles Times 
January 11th, 1995: A6.
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changes in the regime or shifts in the economic orientation of the home 
country. In ail the cases, capital holders act in response to uncertainty to 
protect their assets.
None of these authors mentioned have risen the argument I put forward here, 
that the transfer of capital abroad can been used as a powerful political tool to 
manipulate economic policy making, in particular tax policies. In Mexico, the 
menace of capital flight has been a major deterrent on government policies 
aimed at reforming the tax system.
Conclusion
Mexico is a typical case where politics has shaped the tax system. Based on 
Peters’ study of the patterns of taxation in OECD countries, Mexico’s tax 
system closely resembles those where the tax pattern is not selected 
consciously by the government, but appears rather to emerge from the political 
and economic systems within, which the policy choices are being made. He 
argues that these types of countries adopted certain tax strategies in part 
because of the impact of corporatist political structures, and the consequent 
need to raise revenue without offending major social interests. 243
Political accommodation limited the possibilities of reforming the tax system. 
Due to the high political cost involved in tax reform, politicians prefer to make 
only marginal changes rather than significant reforms that would affect their 
political position. The absence of an overall tax reform in the past three 
decades could be explained by the Rose and Karran theory of political inertia,
243 Peters, 62.
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where tax reforms stagnated due to the fear of negative political effects. These 
authors argue that politicians follow the basic axiom of politics of taxation which 
states that non decision-making is preferred to decision-making.244 The theory 
builds on the idea that keeping out of trouble is one of the basic rules of politics 
and increasing taxation is likely to invite political trouble. Ascher unveils two" 
intrinsic political risks rooted in any tax reform in Latin America; the sacrifice of \ 
political capital to gather support for the reform and the fact that it may led to 
adverse economic reactions from non-governmental actors, the most significant 
being capital flight245 In the Mexican case the risk was much higher, breaking 
the social pact that legitimised the political regime.
The government has shown to lack the autonomy necessary to increase the 
fiscal burden on certain groups, continuously been confronted by political 
resistance and threats to boycott the economy and break up the fragile political 
pact. The analysis will show a constrained State, particularly vis-a-vis domestic 
and international capital. The menace of capital flight has given the economic 
elite the most powerful instrument to oppose and sometimes reverse 
government's economic policies. Paradoxically, the economic elite's ability to^ 
transfer capital abroad represents such a powerful weapon, only because 
Mexico lacks a stable and sufficient flow of tax revenues. Ironically, the 
devastating effect of capital flight in the economy could only be reduced ifj  
Mexico strengthens its tax revenue income.




The Anatomy of Tax Policy Making: Main Actors and their Influence
"It is not an easy task to identify the main tax policy actors, 
usually they operate secretive and in a disarticulated manner.
However; they remain very effective in maximising tax benefits."
Jose Luis Medina Guiar,
President of the Public Finance Committee of the Senate
In this chapter my objective is to disclose the anatomy of tax policy making by 
identifying the main actors in the process as well as how they interact with each 
other to shape tax policy. This thesis follows the argument that tax policy 
making is a combination of rational economic calculations, incremental 
adjustments to existing policies, and attempts by interest groups to maximise 
political gains. Thus, the outcome of tax policy-making arises from the 
maximising efforts of political and social actors rather than just economics. On 
this issue, Peters argues that tax policy outcomes are not entirely the product 
of conscious economic considerations, rather they are the result of a highly 
politicised bargaining process.246 For Bird the tax structure reflects the past 
equilibration of political forces, as constrained by economic structure and 
scarce administrative resources.247 Tax policy decisions must satisfy both 
political and economic constraints, and politics is most likely to be the dominant 
consideration in the formulation of tax policy.248
In addition tax policy is like any other public policy: a mixture of political choices 
and older inheritances 249 The result is that most national tax policies have not 
been planned or designed, they have just grown over time through the
246Peters, 70.




accumulation of historical happenstance and passing political expediency. 250 
Rose and Karran claim that tax policy is driven by "inertia,” stressing the forces 
of continuity in the policy making process. Policy is made not by any process of 
synoptic planning but by a series of small adjustments to the status quo, 
involving mutual accommodation and coalition-building.251
Analysis of the process of tax policy-making requires a clear identification of the 
bargaining units.252 However, it is not a simple task to identify the interest 
groups likely to have a common interest in influencing the tax structure,253 since 
those most visible in policy-making may not be the most influential. Due to the 
technical and specialised nature of this field, the process usually takes place 
within a small circle of specialists or behind closed doors. In this chapter, I have 
followed the model offered by Forte and Peacock for understanding the 
anatomy of tax policy-making. However, I have adjusted it to conform to the 
Mexican situation.
The anatomy of tax policy-making helps to identify the principal actors in 
political bargaining. This is relevant to tax reform because the empiricial 
evidence suggests that there has been a transformation in the actors as well as 
in the environment surrounding the process of tax policy-making in Mexico. 
Changes in economic and political conditions affecting Mexico in the last three 
decades have reshaped the system. Clearly, there has been a new 
configuration of actors, as well as a changing pattern in their relations and their
250Bird, Tax Policy and Economic.
251 Rose and Karran.
252 Peacock and Forte, 12.
253 Ibid.
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capacity to influence the tax system. New and powerful actors have emerged 
while others have lost their bargaining power. Thus, in order to understand the 
process and the changes that have taken place, it is necessary to identify the 
various actors and their roles.
Peacock and Forte have proposed a useful model for understanding the 
dynamic of tax structure on what they call the process of "tax planning.” This 
model classified the actors involved as the "planners”: interest groups 
representing the personal and corporate interests of tax payers; the "agents” as 
those whom the tax payers employed to promote their tax interests, and the 
"suppliers” of tax decisions makers as legislators, bureaucrats and the 
judiciary.254 This model, at least for Mexico, leaves out other very important 
actors who play a major role in the dynamics of tax policy-making process, like 
external and political actors. Although these actors do not represent a tax group 
per se, they also seek to influence the tax system, and further analysis will 
show they have been able to influence it.





254 Peacock and Forte, 5.
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3.1.- The Planners
Tax payers are divided into personal and corporate. Personal tax payers are 
categorised as working and self-employed.255 Corporate groups include private 
sector companies, public sector companies and international companies. In 
Mexico the total number of taxpayers included in the 1999 census numbered 
approximately 17.2 million entries, most of them salaried workers.256 However, 
as indicated in Chapter 1, the great majority do not pay taxes. Of the 2.5 million 
businesses identified in the census only one fifth are registered tax payers. The 
organization of taxpayers’ interests for collective action poses great difficulties, 
mainly because “tax payers” is a very broad classification. Olson was the first to 
point out the difficulties of organising tax payers, due to the fact that their 
individual tax situations make each one have different campaign priorities 257
3.1.1.- Personal Tax Payers
a) Workers
This includes captive wage earners. Less than a quarter of those employed pay 
income taxes. Workers are obliged to contribute to the fiscus in two ways: 
direct and indirect taxation. Wage earners pay direct taxes (income taxes) only 
when their income is above 3.2 times the monthly minimum wage. But, only 
one in four salaried workers has an income above this threshold. Income tax is 
withheld by employers and then paid directly to the Treasury. On the other 
hand, all workers pay indirect taxes such as VAT and excise taxes on tobacco
255 Peacock and Forte also include non-working tax payer, but since there is not a social 
security pension for those unemployed in Mexico, this category is not applicable.
256 Francisco Gil Diaz, "Rehabilitation of Public Finance and the New Tax System,” in Public] 
Administration Today in Mexico Today (Mexico: Secretaria de la Contraloria General de lai 
Federacidn y el Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 1993): 189.
257 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1965).
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and liquor. Thus, wage earners can be affected by changes in tax composition, 
especially cuts in the products exempt from VAT or increases in rates of 
indirect taxes. Salaried workers are organised through their unions, and use 
their legislative representatives to fight for their tax interests. Collective action is 
reactive, responding to changes that they consider a threat. The actions of 
salaried workers’ representatives are usually directed to obtain tax privileges or 
maintain the current conditions by opposing to changes in the tax system that 
may affect them.
b) Self- Employed
This group is classified by working activity. In 1993 the tax register counted 
approximately 4,200,000 self employed.258 This classification of tax payers 
covers a wide range of activities that range from professional groups such as 
doctors, accountants, lawyers, etc., to private individuals engaged in 
entrepreneurial activities such as salesmen, peasants and farmers. This group 
is not well regulated and it is very difficult to tax; many remain out of the tax net 
and their income is difficult to register or calculate. In this group, the 
professionals are those easier to tax, however Fitzgerald asserts that 
professional groups have always been lightly taxed in Latin America.259 These 
groups are mostly represented by a variety of professional associations of 
lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc., whose activities are sometimes difficult to 
measure.
258 Carlos Rojas Gutierrez, "The National Solidaritary and the Restructuring of Participative 
Social Management,” in Public Administration in Mexico Today (Mexico: Secretarla de la 
Contraloria General de la Federation y el Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 1993): 161.
259E.V.K Fitzgerald, "The Fiscal Crisis of the Latin American State," in Jhon F.J. Toye ed., 
Taxation and Economic Development (London: F. Cass, 1978): 133.
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Among the self-employed, there are some sectors Identified as being almost 
off-limits for the tax net, usually due to their traditional political power and/or the 
difficulty of collection. Among these are the "sacred cows” of taxation, they 
enjoy preferential treatment and usually cannot be touched for political reasons. 
These groups raise strong resistance to any tax reform that could affect their 
privileged status. One such group is the agricultural sector. This sector 
contributes very little to the tax indices, but as in many other countries the 
agricultural sector enjoys big privileges. Large farmers have benefited from the 
privilege that most peasants and farmers do not pay taxes, and very few efforts 
have been made to collect taxes from them. The privileged tax position enjoyed 
by some of these organizations reflects their real power in the political 
structure. Peasants and farmers are organized through the National 
Confederation of Peasants (CNC), one of the three pillars of the PRI, and 
probably the most important one, since the rural vote constitutes around 60% of 
total presidential votes for the PRI.260
Agricultural sector influence is felt in the public policy making process. Grindle 
has made an excellent analysis of the organisational alliance between 
bureaucrats and the agricultural sector261 The alliance with the party structure 
has developed via large subsidies and tax exemptions for the agricultural 
sector. Another group which enjoys a privileged tax position is the fishery 
sector262 These two sectors enjoy special treatment, which includes large
260 Interview former national leader of CNC, Hector Hugo Olivares Ventura, March 14th, 1998.
261 For a detailed study of the peasant sector, how its organise and how it interact with 
bureaucrats, see Grindle, Bureaucrats.
262lnterview with former Under-Secretary of Fishery, Oscar Gonzalez Rodriguez, 
Aguascalientes April 18th, 1999.
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subsidies and tax exemptions to encourage investment in these areas 
considered fundamental for the country’s development.
Another very important group outside the tax net is the informal economy. The 
most obvious consequence of the existence of the informal economy is that 
income goes untaxed, plus other indirect taxes such as VAT and excise duties 
are evaded. 263 This ultimately translates into large revenue losses for the state. 
In addition, the black economy distorts information about measured output, 
unemployment and inflation. 264 According to the INEGI, 30% of the 
economically active population (EAP) is under-employed.265 These groups do 
not pay taxes but are politically well organised. They exercise collective action 
to maintain their privileged status by pressuring politicians, bureaucrats and 
party leaders.266 Programmes to incorporate a million street vendors into the 
tax net have failed and raised political turmoil. 267
3.1.2.-Corporate Taxpayers
To organise corporations according to their tax interest is not an easy task 
either. Corporations are typically organised "functionally” within industries and 
aggregated through an umbrella organisation. This includes functional sectors 
such as manufacturing, agriculture, banking, mining, etc. The difficulties for
263 David J. Pvle. Tax Evasion and the Black Economy (London : Macmillan, 1989): 131.
264 Pyle, 141.
265 Estadisticas Generates del Empleo (Aguascalientes: INEGI, 1994): 34.
266 Cuauhtemoc Cardenas argues that these are political arms of the PRI, politically motivated 
in their collective action. But PRI officials accuse these groups to be clientelistic structures tied 
to the PRD structure. Interview Dulce Maria Sauri, London, February 28th, 2000.
267 In 1993 attempts were made to demand street vendors the introduction of cash registers 
certified by the revenue office, the program did not succeed due to the political resistance of 
these highly politicised groups.
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effective collection action arise because these numerous groups could be 
affected very differently by a tax policy.
In general, these groups petition for more favourable tax treatment, and 
particularly an increase in fiscal incentives for the reduction of rates, red tape 
and particular tax regulations.268 Corporate taxpayers rarely fight for a 
fundamental change in tax policy, since they pursue different interests 
according to their particular circumstances. The business sector is not 
homogeneous, and it does not act as a block. Even within the same sector 
there could be differing priorities depending on size or their relationship with the 
government. However, despite the differences in its constituency it has a strong 
interest in pursuing a common strategy to reinforce its position.
a) Private Businesses
Businesses participate through their existing trade and industrial associations 
and have a common interest in promoting tax advantages for their members. In 
Mexico, micro, small and medium companies compromise 98% of the total 
companies in the country, numbering about 1,316,952 in 1993. Surprisingly, 
according to Nafinsa, micro-companies constituted 97% of the total.269 In 
Mexico there are approximately 2.2 million businesses registered in the tax 
census.270 But just 2000 large companies account for almost 64% of the total
268 Propuesta Final de Reforma Fiscal Integral (Mexico: CANAC0.1999).
269 Red de Apovos Publicos v Privados Hacia la Competitividad de las PYMES (Mexico: 
Nacional Financiera, 1995), 151.
270 Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicano (Aguascalientes: INEGI, 1998).
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corporate income tax,271 whereas small and micro businesses contribute very 
little to total corporate income tax receipts.
Due to the large contribution made by big businesses to state revenues, they 
stand in a better position to demand improved or preferential tax treatment.272 
There are multiple accounts of abuses and preferential treatment.273 Small and 
micro businesses, although large in numbers are less well organised. They 
have been traditionally constrained by government created corporate 
organisations. The large diversity of functions and sizes makes it very difficult 
for them to join together in a common cause.274 To Loeza, small entrepreneurs 
groups began to mobilise politically after the nationalisation of the banks in 
1982, an expropriation which directly affected them. They sought to enhance 
their influence and voice their protest against the intrusion of the government 
into the private sector domain, using the political structure of the PAN to 
empower their demands and agenda. 275 In contrast, large businesses rapidly 
came to terms with the nationalisation, quickly building new bridges with the 
State.276
271 Interview Tomds Ruiz, Under Secretary of Finance March 25th, 1999.
272 Interview Gutierrez Prieto, owner of one of the 10 largest conglomerate of business in 
Mexico, London, August 22nd, 1999.
273 Recently businessmen complained that a media mogul was given exemptions for the import 
of two planes and 6 luxury armoured cars, see Miguel Badillo, “La Facultad descrecional de 
Gurria para Condonar Deudas”, El Universal February 28th, 2000. Similarly, a group of popular 
artists complained because tax authorities cancelled fines of up to USD $ 1.25 million for Juan 
Gabriel, a famous singer. See Juan Ruiz Healy, “A Fondo,” Novedades 10th February, 2000
274 Interview Eduardo Garcia, General Director, CANACO, Mexico September 23rd, 1999.
275 This boosted the vote of PAN votes during the 1980s. See Soledad Loeza, Seminar on 
Mexico at the LSE, February 8th, 2000 and Soledad Loeza, El Partido Accidn Nacional: La 
Laraa Marcha. 1939-1994 (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 1999).
See Carlos Elizondo, “Property Rights in Mexico: Government and Business After the 1982 
Bank Nationalisation,” PhD Dissertation, Nuffield College, Oxford, December 1992.
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There has been an evolving relationship between the private sector and the 
government. The private sector had traditionally relied on the state for cheap 
services supplied by the state-owned companies, low tariffs, tax exemptions, 
subsidies and government assistance in moderating labour demands, creating 
an interest driven coalition that benefited both parties. In exchange for 
government patronage, business political activism was to a large extent 
constrained. In addition, a large proportion of big businesses presented no 
threat to the government since they had close ties with the political structure,277 
and some even developed close relationships at the personal level.278 
However, there have been many strains in the relationship between the 
economic and political elite in Mexico.
Many of the large Mexican conglomerates have developed to a large extent 
thanks to government-personalised support and official licenses.279 Derossi, 
Luna, Tirado, Valdes, Cordero, Santin and Tirado have studied the avenues of 
development of Mexican business groups.280 Particularly illustrative is Matilde 
Luna’s insight into relations and struggles between entrepreneurial and political 
interests. The literature on this topic divides the business sector into segments, 
according to their relationship with the government. The Northern segment or
277 See Roderic A. Camp, Entrepreneurs and Ren6 Millan, Los Empresarios ante el Estado v 
la Sociedad (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1988).
2/8 See Camp, Entrepreneurs. 229.
279 Bailey.
280 Flavia Derrosi, The Mexican Entrepreneur (Paris: Development Centre of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1971); Salvador Cordero, Rafael Santin and 
Ricardo Tirado, El Poder Empresarial en Mexico (Mexico: Terra Nova, 1983); Matilde Luna, 
Ricardo Tirado and Francisco Valdes, “Business and Politics in Mexico, 1982-1986,” in Ricardo 
Anzaldua Montoya and Silvia Maxfield, eds., Government and Private Sector in Contemporary 
Mexico (California: Center for US Mexican Studies, 1987):13-44; Matilde Luna, Los 
Empresarios v el Cambio Politico: Mexico 1970-1980 (M6xico: Era and IIS-UNAM, 1992); 
Matilde Luna “Entrepreneurial Interests and Political Action in Mexico: Facing the Demands of 
Economic Modernization," in Riordan Roett ed., The Challenge of Institutional Reform in 
Mexico (London: Lynner Reinner, 1995): 77-94.
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Monterrey group is distant from the power elite, the central segment closely 
related to power and the Aleman segment was itself once part of the political 
group in power. Some include a Salinas segment, a new group of 
entrepreneurs that accumulated unprecedented capital and power during 
president Salinas’ administration.281 However, Vernon has rightly pointed out 
that the relationship between the private sector and the state varies significantly 
between one public organisation and another and from one presidential 
administration to the next282
There are elite organisations with a very limited membership, usually including 
the most powerful business groups. The Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de 
Negocios (CMHN) is part of the CCE structure, embracing 30 or so of the most 
influential Mexican entrepreneurs. However, big businesses prefer to lobby 
individually rather than in groups; their comments and complaints are made 
personally to high-ranking tax authorities, or even directly to the President283 
Camp argues that decision-makers listen to demands from business groups 
more through informal internal channels than through formal public channels.284 
The elite organisations have the economic means and the organisational 
capacity to mobilise their members and public opinion to effectively influence 
policy decisions at the bureaucratic level.
281 For an overview of Mexican business clusters and evolution see Alejandra Salas, “The j^ 
Mexican Business Class and the Process of Globalisation: Trends and Counter Trends, PhD,/ 
thesis, London School of Economics, 1998.
282Vemon, 26.
283 Interview A. Gutierrez Prieto, August 22nd, 1999 and Carlos Slim, October 14th, 1998. n
284Camp, 143. Camp also provides examples on the process of consultation of fiscal authorities 
with the business sector. See former Secretary of Finance Ortiz Mena in Camp 1987:116. —
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During the period of liberalisation of the economy the power of large companies 
grew enormously. The opening up of the economy was accompanied by an 
improving relationship with the business sector, especially during the Salinas 
administration (88-94). Representatives of large companies had close ties with 
government technocrats. This close relationship with the government allowed 
them to enjoyed personalised support, as is the case of FICORCA and 
FOBAPROA, two public bail out programmes. ,285
b) Public corporations
Revenues from state owned companies constitute an important part of the 
country’s total income. In 1996 Pemex contributed 2.9% of GDP, the Social 
Security Institute (IMSS) 1.9%, the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) 1.6% 
and others like ISSSTE, FERRONALES, CONASUPO, ASA, CAPUFE, PIPSA, 
LyFC, and LOTENAL together supplied another 1.3 %of GDP.286 However, 
public enterprises’ role and influence has lessened in the last two decades. The 
overwhelming role of the state as producer was one of the most salient 
characteristics of Mexico's development strategy and as result, state owned 
companies played a major political and economic role. But the new 
development strategy based on the principle of reducing the role of the
285 A small committee of technocrats enjoyed almost full discretion in deciding the beneficiaries 
of government support programmes to businesses. At the beginning of the 1980s FICORCA 
(Fideicomiso para la Cobertura del Riesgo Cambiario) provided resources of USD$ 12bn to bail 
out large companies in risk of bankruptcy after the devaluation. In the mid 1990s FOBAPROA 
(Fondo Bancario de Proteccion al Ahorro) provided more than USD$ 50bn to bail out 14 banks 
after the 1995 liquidity crisis. President Zedillo was the head of the first programme and/IJ 
authorised the second scheme as President. Some of the large entrepreneurs have benefited 
twice, like Eugenio Garza Laguera and Adrian Sada Gonzalez, first with Visa and Vitro and 
later with Bancomer and Serfin. Other beneficiaries are Marcelo and Lorenzo Zambrano from 
Cemex, and Imesa owned by Eugenio Clariond. See Antonio J£quez, “Hace 15 anos con 
Ficorca, Zedillo Salv6 de la Quiebra a Industrials que, convertidos en Banqueros son otra vez 
Salvados por 61 con el Fobaproa,” Proceso May24l 1998,7-10.
286 See Politica de Ingresos, Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Mexico, 1997.
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government in the economy plus the divestiture programme, reduced 
significantly the government influence.287 The number of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) was curtailed from 1,155 in 1982 to 204 in 1995 288
Despite the divestiture efforts SOE continue to provide an important flow of 
revenue to the state. But their contribution to taxation is very limited, with the 
exception of the Mexican Oil Company (Pemex) which has such a heavy tax 
load that some years has to borrow in the market just to pay taxes. By law 
nearly 75% of Pemex’s annual profits are relinquished to the revenue office as 
levies. It contributes alone 37% of the country’s total tax income. Since the 
1980s oil is the most important source of tax revenue for the State.289 
According to Pemex former Director General, Adrian Lajous, the companies 
influence in the design of tax policies is very limited, and they were rarely 
consulted despite shifts on policy which had a direct impact on the company’s 
finance. 290
c) Foreign firms
The majority of the largest 100 companies in Mexico are partly owned by 
foreign firms; about half of them are almost 100% foreign owned.291 It is logical 
to suppose that the foreign companies may have a common interest to 
influence their tax treatment and pressure the government to sign favourable
287 See Jacques Rogozinski and Francisco Javier Casas Guzman, “The Restructuring Process 
in Mexico,” in Public Administration in Mexico Today (Mexico: SECODAM and FCE, 1993):21- 
48.
288 The Mexican Economy 1996 (Mexico: Banco de Mexico, 1997): 84
289 See George Philip, The Political Contraints on Economic Policy in Post-1982 Mexico: The 
Case of Pemex." Bulletin of Latin American Research Vol. 18 No.1, 1999; 35-50.
290 Interview in London March 3ra, 2000.
291 Interview Luis Felipe Vilches, Director of Foreign Investment, Bancomext, November 11th, 
1999.
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tax treaties with their host country. They demand at least the same favourable 
tax conditions that they would receive in the developed world.292 In Mexico, 
foreigners are forbidden to enter politics, so their executives, when not 
nationals, would operate through representatives. In general they would be 
very discreet regarding dealings with government authorities. These large 
actors, either executives or representatives, may bargain directly with tax 
policy-makers at the Secretariat of Finance.293 However, they usually lobby 
through their business organisations. According to Lindblom, the major US 
corporations use their economic power to influence public policies. During the 
1960s and 1970s Multinational Corporations (MNC) were extremely powerful in 
shaping policy in developing countries, through their direct investment 294 In 
the 1980s, MNC actively participated in making the world tax reform wave 
possible.295 At the beginning of the third millennium, 75% of the world’s total 
trade occurs through the 100 largest MNC 296 Many of these companies had 
subsidiaries in Mexico and may have pressured the government to adopt 
similar measures as those undertaken in their own countries.
Some MNCs have played an important role in Mexico, for example the 
automobile companies, but in general their influence on policy is variable and 
very difficult to determine because they operate behind closed doors, dealing 
directly with top policy-makers. Former Secretary of Finance, Pedro Aspe,
292 Interview Anthony Westnedge, former representative of Johny Walkers in Mexico, London, 
October 13th, 1999.
293 Interview Mexico September 13th, 1999 with an official at the Secretary of Finance who 
asked no to be quoted.
294 Bates, 7.
295Peters.
296See Roberto Gonzalez Amador, “Equivalen a 75.5% del Comercio Global Ventas de 100 
Transnacionales,” La Jornada February 6th 2000:1.
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insists that MNC were treated in the same way as national companies.297 
However, tax authorities recognise that sometimes “special” treatment is given 
to large companies, as a means of facilitating their activities.298 Unfortunately, 
there are not many studies on the pressure exercised by multinational 
corporations in the process of tax policy making in Mexico. But as an example, 
car manufacturers were successful in abolishing the tax on the purchase of 
new vehicles to induce demand after the crisis of 1995.2"
Taxation is a very important factor in determining foreign investment, and 
remains a very powerful hook to lure investors. Changes in taxation may push 
foreign investment out of the country, thus countries must be cautious in the 
design of their policies. Foreign investment is a very sensitive issue for a 
government like Mexico, which relies so heavily on both direct and portfolio 
investment to finance its current account. Due to the financial liberalisation of 
the last two decades, private financial institutions like investment banks and 
management funds have taken the place of multinational industries as the most 
influential exogenous actor. A few private financial institutions control the huge 
flow of portfolio investment around the world. As an example, in 1998, assets 
under the management of Merrill Lynch surpassed US$ 501 billion, while its 
private client assets are estimated at around USD$1.4 trillion (the total Mexican 
GDP is about a third of the latter figure). As an example, private financial 
institutions have been able to deter governments from taxing a variety of 
financial instruments.
297 Interview Aspe, September 20th, 1999.
298 Interview Ruiz, March 22nd,1999 .
299 The levy on the purchase of new cars was cancelled for the 1996 fiscal year. See "Politica 
de Ingresos," Secretaria de Hacienda y Cr6dito Publico, 1996, 5. Mimeo.
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3.2.- The Agents
Taxpayers recruit “agents” to protect their individual interests and campaign in 
favour of those whom they represent. They have many different means of 
influencing the government, from studies detailing the pros and cons of tax 
reforms to lobbying and political pressure. Agents provide information on a 
certain group’s tax position and on how to use the tax structure to the fullest 
advantage. At other times, they organise lobbying and political action aimed at 
pressuring tax authorities for favourable changes in tax legislation.
There are three types of agents entrusted with the task of obtaining tax 
advantages: Professional Associations (lawyers, accountants and economists), 
Unions, and Industrial and Trade Associations.300 The latter groups usually 
have specialised individuals or groups to defend their associates’ interests in 
tax matters.
a) Professional Associations
Professionals specialised in tax matters assist their clients by informing them 
of how to take the best advantage of the current tax structure or warning them 
of the risks of reforms. At other times they act by voicing the demands of the 
tax payers. Professionals organisations’ technical expertise allows them to 
anticipate the effects of reforms and suggest possible alternatives. Their input 
and influence has been very limited, though by law they have to be consulted 
by the government on matters concerning their members. Professional
300 Forte and Peacock only include trade associations.
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associations’ main role is that of advisors, but due to the recent political 
changes new opportunities for consultancy and lobbying have developed.301 
These groups organise forums for discussion of tax matters, and elaborate 
studies usually in coordination with trade and industrial organisations.302 The 
more influential professional associations are the Mexican Institute of Finance 
Executives (IMEF) and the Mexican Institute of Public Accountants (IMPC).303
According to Good, tax professionals rarely influence tax policies but have a 
considerable effect on technical provisions.304 This argument applies to IMCP, 
since this organisation issues the guidelines on accounting principles and 
auditing standards in accordance with the accounting requirements of tax 
authorities. There are other groups such as lawyers specialised in public 
finances and taxes who are also active players.305
b) Unions
Industrialised countries’ unions may act only as intermediaries between 
workers and independent consultants, but in corporatist systems such as 
Mexico they play a greater role. Ascher asserts that due to the complexity and
301 See interview with Antonio G6mez Espinera, President of the Mexican Institute of Public 
Accountants, on the new role of the organisation in Silvia Meave Avila, “El Burocratismo Causa 
la Evasi6n Fiscal.” Siemore December 10th.1998:14-16.
302 1The IMEF holds an annual meeting where many of the tax issues of the moment are 
debated.
303 These two organisations had a very active role in the VAT debate. For some examples of 
these two outspoken groups see Guadalupe Hernandez and Juan Arvizu " Piden a EZ Ampliar 
IVA a Alimentos y Medicina," El Universal November 19th' 1999: 1; Adolfo Sanchez, " 
Enfrentan las Finanzas Publicas Debilidad en Ingresos y Rigidbz en Egresos: IMEF," Excelsior 
February 8th’ 1999: 1. For IMCP see Hector Rendbn, Alicia Diaz and Jorge Thomas, "Endurece 
Hacienda Cobro de Impuestos, Antonio Gomez, Presidente IMCP," Reforma January 7th, 
1999: 1. For a harsh crticism to the tax system from IMCP see Silvia Maeva, "El Burocratismo 
Causa la Evasibn Fiscal," Siempre December 10th, 1998:14-15.
304 Good, xv.
305 See comments made by the President of tax legislation at the Lawyers-Bar Association, 
Cuauhtbmoc Resendez, Leonor Flores and Luis Fabre, "Arrecia Potemica en Tomo al Sistema 
Fiscal, es Corto Placista," El Financero January 11th, 1999.
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the apparent indirectness of impact, organised labour in Latin America exerts 
little effort over tax issues unless there is a clear danger, as opposed to an 
opportunity. 306 This was the case in Mexico; changes in the tax structure were 
usually seen by unions as a high political risk that jeopardised their privileges 
and tax exemptions.307
Unions were closely linked to the government structure. According to NeedlerTl 
in most Latin American countries, unions have generally been organised under 
government guidance in order to provide the ruling regime with a base of 
support and control over the labour movement. Over half of all industrial; 
workers in Mexico are unionised and belong to one of the nine large labour 
federations. Approximately 85% of union workers belong to nation-wide 
organizations; the other 15% belong to single company unions.308 Most labour 
unions have traditionally been affiliated with the official party (PRI) through the 
Mexican Confederation of Workers (CTM). The CTM is associated with some 
smaller independent unions and federations in an organisation known as 
Labour Congress (CT), which constitutes the labour sector of the PRI.309 The 
CT claimed to represent 90% of Mexico's organised labour force, however their 
numbers have declined significantly after the death of the long-standing CTM 
leader, Fidel Velazquez.310 The CT includes the CTM, the Regional
306 William Ascher and Malcom Gillis ed. Tax Reform in Developing Countries (London: 
Durham & London, 1989): 463.
307 Rodriguez stated "you can not raise the profile of the tax exemptions too much because you 
could raise unwanted attention, and end up losing some of the privileges you already have.” 
Interview with Senator Jorge Rodriguez regional CTM leader, Aguascalientes, Sptember 29th, 
1999.
308 Doing Business in Mexico (Mexico: Nafinsa, 1998): 29
309Needler, 58-59.
310 In November 1997, two hundred unions with more than a million and a half members, 
created the National Union of Workers (UNT), separating from the CT structure. See Guillermo 
Correa, "Los Foristas Crean su Propia Central Obrera, Bajo el Compromiso de Hernandez
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Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM), the oldest labour organisation in 
Mexico, and several other union groups. The Workers and Peasants 
Revolutionary Confederation, the leading opposition faction, is made up 
predominantly by unions in the textile, restaurant and shoe industries. The 
Federacion de Sindicatos de Trabajadores del Estado (FSTSE) is the major 
association of government workers. This is affiliated to the PRI through the 
popular sector (CNOP) which is supposed to represent the middle class and 
small business.
Traditionally, unions did not present a threat to tax policies or the tax structure, 
since there was a symbiotic relationship of mutual dependency between the 
government and unions. The government needed the political support of union 
leaders during elections as well as their unconditional commitment to control 
workers’ demands for wage increases. Successive rise and fall of union leaders 
was closely connected with government favour. A combination of political 
favours, payment of union leaders, quotas for administrative and political 
positions and coercion have achieved Mexico’s relatively peaceful labour 
relations.311 However, "quotas” for political positions (governorships and 
legislative posts) offered to union leaders were the most effective and frequent 
way to secure unions support.312
Juarez: “Nacemos sin Patrocinio Gubernamental ni Empresarial,”" Proceso November 23rd, 
1997: 32.
311 See Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution and K. Middlebrook ed., Unions. Workers and^ . ✓ 
the State in Mexico (San Diego: University of California, 1991). J
31 ^  Interview with former federal deputy and union leader Alfredo Gonzalez, September 28th, 
1999.
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CTM representatives had different ways of influencing the tax structure and 
approaching tax policy decision-makers for this end. However, labour has 
suffered from an acute decline in policy influence. One way to voice their 
demands was by using the PRI's leadership or during the negotiations of the 
“Pactos”. Through the leadership of the PRI, union leaders expressed their 
concerns on tax matters, expecting the PRI president to discuss these issues 
on their behalf with the President or the member of the economic cabinet.313 
Another way to discuss tax concerns was through Labour Secretary, or 
alternatively by asking their elected representatives such as deputies, senators 
and governors to discuss tax changes directly with tax authorities.314 When the 
“Pactos” were introduced they became a new mechanism for socio-economic 
actors to voice their tax demands, but the open nature of the debate and 
negotiations, limited corporate groups’ ability to demand special treatment.315 
According to Aspe those regular meetings to evaluate the “pactos” were a good 
time for social representatives to express their concerns over tax matters. Prior 
to the negotiations, the actors would usually try to put forward their tax 
proposals.316 With time, this important forum for economic policy “bargaining” 
become more a formality than a true space for negotiations.
We can include within the corporate organisations, the National Peasants 
Confederation, a corporate group with hefty leverage during the time of the 
inward development model. According to former Secretary for Agricultural
313 Interview with former PRI’s president Santiago Onate, London March 8th, 2000 as well as 
PRI president Dulce Marla Sauri, London February 28th, 2000, on how union leaders used to 
express their concerns.
314 Interview Alfredo Gonzalez, February 28th, 1999.
315To learn about the “pactos” see Aspe in the Mexican Wav or Lustig, The Remaking of an 
Economy.
516 Interview Aspe September 20th, 1999; see also Aspe in the Mexican Wav.
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Reform, the agrarian movement was the political force that propelled 
Echeverria to the presidency, “in those times rural leaders were very 
influential.”317 The evidence shows that rural leaders’ political clout has
declined; however, they have managed to maintain much of their privileged tax 
treatment.318
c) Trade and Industrial Associations
They are organised by activity, not by economic sector. Among their objectives 
is the acquisition tax advantages for members as a whole, rather than for 
individual companies.319 These association are recognised by law as formal 
consultants regarding economic policy. They make public statements, making 
their views known and their influence felt on matters affecting them 
economically. They provide data about economic and political trends, as well 
as ideological guidance for their members. Representatives from the trade and 
industrial associations periodically have public and private meetings with 
government officials.
The power of entrepreneurial associations has traditionally been far greater 
than other functional corporate groups such as labour and peasants 320 For 
some authors, businesses are a countervailing force to authoritarian policy 
making.321 However, as expressed by Bailey, it is difficult for the top
317Former Secretary of Agricultural Land Reform, Deputy G6mez Villanueva, Mexico, 
September 26th, 1999.
318 Maximiliano Silerio, current president of CNC, and former president Beatriz Paredes agreed 




321 See Camp, Entrepeuners.
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associations to reach a clear-cut position on specific issues, due to their 
diversity, and some concerns such as tax incentives.322 Some of these 
business organisations have sections that study the impact of taxation on their 
members, such as the Fiscal Commission in COPARMEX and CONCAMIN, 
and the Centre of Economic Studies of the Private Sector at the CCE. The lack 
of official data regarding tax issues accounts for the limited extent and depth of 
these organisations’ studies in fiscal matters.323
These are some of the most important business organisations in Mexico: 
1-.CCE-(Entrepreneurs Co-ordinating Council),
2.-CONCAI (National Confederation of Chambers of Industry)
3.-CONCANACO (National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce)*
4.-COPARMEX (Association of Mexican Employers)
5.-CANACINTRA (National Chambers of Transformation Industries)
6.-CONCAMIN (National Confederation of Chambers of Industry,
Manufacturers Associations)*
7.- CMHN (Mexican Council of Businessman)
8.-ABM (Mexican Banks Association)
9.- AMIS (Mexican Association of Insurance Companies)
10.- CNG (Nation Confederation of Cattlemen).
11 .-CNPP (National Confederation of Small Farmers)
12.-CNPC (National Confederation of Small Merchants)
*Until 1998 these required mandatory enrolment.
Bailey, 133-137.
323 Interview with Rub6n Gonzalez, technical secretary of the Fiscal Commission CONCAMIN, 
Mexico, September 22nd, 1999.
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According to Grindle, business groups lobby formally and informally outside the 
structure of political parties.324 Business associations strictly observe a policy of 
non-partisanship, but there are some marked tendencies in their relations with 
the government. Bailey provides an interesting analysis of the general lines of I 
their relationship with the government. CONCAMIN and CANACINTRA325 have j 
a moderately critical stance towards the government, while a hard-line criticism 
characterises COPARMEX and CANACO. Other organisations such as CCE, 
CMHN, AMIS, CNG oscillate between moderate and hard criticism, while the 
CNPP and the CNPC both belong to the popular sector of the PRI and typically 
support the government.326
The government tends to exercise greater influence in the leadership selection 
of what until recently were obligatory bodies (CONCAMIN, CANCINTRA, 
CONCANACO). COPARMEX frequently takes a harder line in government- 
business relations, being funded as a voluntary association embracing all fields 
of enterprise, including finance. It is legally organised under labour legislation 
as an employers’ union. The members belong to one or other of the bodies. 
Another very influential organisation is CCE, the chief spokesman of the private 
sector. The Business Council Coordination was created in 1975 to orchestrate 
a business response to Echeverria’s anti-business rhetoric and actions. It is 
comprised of the top associations, and it has become the major entrepreneurial 
organisation used for state consultations on economic policy. The CMHN is 
part of the CCE structure; it embraces 30 or so of the most influential Mexican 
entrepreneurs and was founded in 1962 as a reaction to the reforms introduced
324 Grindle, Challenging the State: 49.
325 CANACINTRA belongs to the structure of CONCAMIN.
326Bailey, 133-137.
by President Lopez Mateos. These organisations’ relative independence is 
clear; COPARMEX even helped to fund the PAN, and a former CCE president, 
Manuel Clouthier, ran as the PAN’s presidential candidate in1988.327
CONCANACO, and particularly those delegations in Mexico City, Monterrey 
and Guadalajara, are quite powerful in influencing or at least raising the debate 
over tax issues that have a direct effect on them. CANACO Monterrey was at 
the forefront of the national mobilisation for the overhaul of the tax system in 
1999.328 Mexico City’s CANACO is the largest business organisation in the 
country at the state level, with more than 1 million members, most of them 
small companies. This business representation has strongly advocated a policy 
of incorporation of the informal economy into the tax net. They can be credited 
with the policies of cracking down on tax evaders in the informal economy, 
implemented by the Secretariat of Finance, and Mexico City’s government’s 
attempts to relocate street vendors and regulate this illegal activity. Other 
smaller business organisations complain that their concerns are not taken into 
account by authorities.329
327Since 1988 entrepreneurs have expanded their action to political participation, mostly as 
members and candidates of the PAN. Examples of entrepreneurs involved in politics are the 
Pan Governors: Jalisco-Cardenas Jim6nez, Guanajuato-Vicente Fox, Aguascalientes-Felipe 
Gonzalez, Nuevo Le6n-Canales Clariond.
328 Juan Carlos P6rez Gdngora, President of CANACO Monterrey, was behind the first national 
effort to open a public debate on fiscal matters, during a national consultation for the overhaul 
of the fiscal system. See Propuesta de Reforma Fiscal Integral 1999.
329 Interview Refael Escudero, President of Small Businesses in Mexico City, May 4th, 2000.
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3.3.- The Suppliers or Decision Makers
The decision-makers in tax matters are public servants, the legislature and the 
courts, but the executive has dominated the process. 330 The Mexican political 
system, as no other, was for many decades an executive-dominated system. 
Political power was highly concentrated in the presidency. The Mexican 
presidential system was institutionalised by depersonalising the office from the 
holder, while the Constitution prohibits re-election. In the absence of a civil 
service, the president appoints all the top positions in the bureaucracy.331
J
Moreover, as leader of the party, he used to select all the candidates for 
electoral positions, giving him extraordinary power, in a country governed by an 
hegemonic party. Thus, upward political mobility within the system depended 
on the president. Mexican historian Daniel Cosio Villegas described the1 
Presidency as a “six year dictatorship,”332 Krauze as “imperial; 
presidentialism”333. Other political analysts like, Philip or Whitehead, have taken 
a more moderate approach, stating that the power of the presidency is also 
constrained by the written and unwritten rules of the political system.334 
Whatever the description, the President is the key decision maker and sets the 
tone for policy direction. Policy-making flows from the top down and the
330Forte and Peacock include Central and State legislature, as well as Central and State Public 
Servants. They also include the Supra national organisations, which in the Mexican case does 
not apply.
Smith, Labyrinths of Power.
332 Daniel Cosio Villegas, El Sistema Politico Mexicano las Posibilidades de Cambio (M6xico: 
Joaquin Mortiz, 1972).
333 Krauze, La Presidencia.
334 George Philip, The Presidency. Another author studying the role of the presidency are 
C6sar Cansino, “Mexico: the Challenge of Democracy,” Government and Opposition Vol. 30, 
No.1, 60-73.
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process is closed to very few actors. However, 1997 Congressional elections 
changed the way policy is made.335
The executive branch has often been portrayed as the principal legislator of the 
country, despite the fact that legislation allows bills to be introduced by either 
the Executive, both chambers of Congress and the states’ legislatures. For 
almost seven decades the President had total control of the production of the 
Federal Budget, vis-a-vis Congress, which operated more in a rubber stamping 
capacity, than as a separate entity.336 Since its foundation in 1929, the PRI has 
dominated both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Practically all bills 
proposed by the Executive to Congress were approved by an overwhelming 
majority of PRI legislators in both chambers. Legislators cast their votes as the 
PRI leadership told them to. But the traditional pattern of hegemonic party rule 
in Congress was broken in July 1997 when the PRI lost its absolute majority of 
the lower Chamber, with only 39.1% of the votes.337 This event, drastically 
altered the traditional formula of policy-making and substantially eroded the 
extraordinary power of the presidential office.338
335 The leaders of the LVII Legislature called 1997 a watershed that put an end to the 
domination of presidential control of the legislative branch. See Carlos Acosta and Francisco 
Ortiz, “Legisladores de Opisicidn Advierten : En Polltica Econdmica se Acabo el Absolutismo 
Presidencial,” Proceso August 31st 1997: 12-16, and in the same issue see Gerardo Albarrdn, 
“En la Camara el Choque entre Oposicion y Regimen se Convirtio ya en Autdntica Disputa por 
el Poder,” 6-10.
336Some authors believe in the relative autonomy of Congress, emphasising a process of 
consensus building, see Alicia Herndndez Chdvez and Marfa Luna Argudfn, La Nueva 
Relacidn Entre Leaislativo v Eiecutivo: La Polltica Economica 1982-1997 (Mexico: El Colegio 
de Mdxico, Institute de Investigaciones Legislativas de la Cdmara de Diputados, Institute 
Politdcnico Nacional and Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1998).
337 The right-wing PAN obtained 26.6%, the left wing PRD 25.7% and the remaining 8.6% was 
divided between minority parties including PVEM and PT.
338 For the declining power of the presidential office see Samuel Schmidt, The Deterioration of 
the Mexican Presidency: The Years of Luis Echeverrfa (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 
1991) and George Philip, “The Lawless Presidency”, or Whitehead. .
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a) Public Servants (Bureaucrats)
Grindle argues that in developing countries policy-making is centred in the 
executive branch of the state, which includes political leaders and high-level 
administrators.339 For Haggard, bureaucrats in developing countries are the 
most active actors in shaping policy making, not legislators.340 Most analysis of 
tax policy-making give bureaucrats the leading role in the development of tax 
policies. There are excellent works done in this field, like: Wilkies who analyses 
tax policy making in Australia,341 Hansen, Peachman and Tanzi in the US,342 
Robinson and Sandford in the United Kingdom, 343 and Good in Canada.344 
Only broad studies have included the cases of developing countries.345 But, 
regardless of the country, all scholars agree that politics play a fundamental 
role in the process of tax policy making.
Bureaucrats are powerful forces in the policy process, particularly in a highly 
centralised presidential system like Mexico. The economic bureaucracy is 
important in the formulation and implementation of economic polices.346 Grindle 
suggests that public policy in Mexico is the product of the bureaucratic elite and 
political interaction.347 The bureaucracy is highly politicised; and will frequently 
use their position to advance their political careers and individual interests.
339Grindle and Thomas, 52.
340 Haggard, 238.
341 J. Wilkies, The Politics of Taxation (Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton, 1980).
342 Hansen, The Politics of Taxation. Tanzi, "Forces that Shape Tax“: 266-278. Matrio S. 
Brodersohn, "Developing Countries’ Delicate Balances," in Herbert Stein ed., Tax Policy in the 
21 Century. 118-125. Joseph A. Peachman, Federal Tax Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1971).
343 Robinson and Sandford, Tax Policy Making in the United Kingdom.
344 Good.
345Gerald M. Meier, Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries (San Francisco: 
International Center for Economic Growth, 1991).
346 Benent and Sharpe, Grindle, Challenging the State. Vemon.
347 Grindle, Challenging the State.
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Their wide range of discretionary powers has allowed the top bureaucracy to 
build strong ties with political and interest groups, particularly the economic 
elite. Evans supports the idea of a bureaucracy in close connection with the 
productive sector of the society (industrialists) in order to enhance 
development, however warns over close ties between bureaucracy and the 
private sector since can develop into corruption.348
According to Good, tax policy-making is an internal and private affair. A handful 
of economic and tax advisors operate in a tight community, who share similar 
perceptions about what is a tax issue, how it should be conceptualised, what 
alternatives and consequences are to be considered, and how decisions should 
be taken.349 Because taxation is a highly technical subject experts in the public 
bureaucracy dominate the policy making process. They apply their own 
particular vision of the world to tax policy, at least in theory with some input 
from different sectors of the economy. However, politics end up governing it, 
the tax community ultimately relies upon the assessment of "political climate” to 




350 According to Williamson the first precondition for good economic policy is that technocrats 
be in charge of making it. But Bates argues that technocrats are generally academics and 
normally lack the prerequisites of political influence: wealth and power. Usually the power they 
possess is given to them by politicians. The relationship between good policy and technocratic 
power is the result of the decision of politicians to delegate political power to otherwise 
powerless experts so as to secure economically superior public policy. See Bates, The 
Political Economy of Policy Reform. 11-33.
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b) Legislative Branch
Traditionally, the legislative power did not play a significant role in the process 
of policy making in Mexico. The legislative power’s role in the process of policy 
making was until very recently almost symbolic. Mexico’s presidential system, 
together with the continuous hegemonic control of the PRI over the two 
chambers, enormously facilitated the passing of any tax law without opposition.
The overwhelming majority of PRI representatives at the Chamber of Deputies 
allowed tax authorities to pass tax legislation easily with almost no debate or 
opposition. Party discipline assured that no PRI representatives would oppose 
the suggested tax policies, even when these polices affect their constituencies’ 
interest or contradicted their own views on the matter. Party discipline was 
reinforced by a centralised party system, where the President as the leader of 
the party had the power to decide the party’s nominations. Other means like 
clientelism and patronage also helped to secure the legislators support.351
c) The Courts
The Judicial Power has also been subordinated to the executive, although in 
1995 constitutional reforms were made to strengthen the independence and 
autonomy of the federal judiciary. In Mexico, a Supreme Court ruling only 
applies to those cases which have been put into its consideration. When tax 
payers believe that an administrative decision from tax authorities is contrary to 
their rights, they may file an administrative appeal with the Treasury
351 See Scott Mainwaring and Arturo Valenzuela Politics. Society and Democracy: Latin America 
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1998).
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Department, or appeal to the Federal Tax Court or the Supreme Court as their 
last resort.
The role of the Judicial Power as a decision maker in the tax policy making 
process is only occasional, but is evolving rapidly. A good example is the 2% 
tax on assets. The Supreme Court has ruled five consecutive times declaring 
this to be unconstitutional. According to the constitution, a ruling from the 
Supreme Court the same way five consecutive times becomes law, and it 
applies to all cases which fit the same circumstances. The problem is that the 
taxpayer would only benefit from this ruling if they undergo through a lengthy 
trial. As a result not many businesses have benefited from such Supreme Court 
ruling.352
3.4.-Other Attemptive Actors
In order to adjust this model to the Mexican case, Good’s classification of 
"attemptive actors” is used. Under this category, the author includes all other 
actors interested in participating in the tax policy-making process, beside the 
bureaucracy.
Deep changes in the Mexican political system in recent years have altered the
configuration of actors involved in the process of policy-making. The process of
democratisation has incorporated new political players, that pledge to represent
the interests of taxpayers. Among these actors previously dormant are political
parties, independent legislators and state governors. In addition, there are
352For recent Supreme Court rulings over tax matters, see Agustin Ambriz, “Dotada de un 
Autoridad Desmedida, Hacienda Aplica Disposiciones Fiscales Inconstitucionales Segun Fallos 
de la Suprema Corte," Proceso November 22nd, 1998:10.
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exogenous actors that operate outside the taxpayer framework, but that have 




Political Parties are the organisational representatives of voters and they play 
an important role in defending their constituents tax agenda. Individuals who 
are not part of the organisation can voice their main concerns by casting their 
votes. Political parties seeking office may design their electoral campaigns to 
include programs and promises related to the payment of taxes. Such 
strategies are aimed at gaining the vote of taxpayers. In the industrialised world 
during the 1980s, many successful candidates campaigned on tax issues.353 In 
Mexico taxation did not dominate the campaign debate until 1997. Opposition 
parties won congressional elections with the pledge to cut the VAT rate. There 
was no precedent in previous political campaigns of such heated tax debate.
One of the characteristics of Mexico’s regime was the political monopoly of a 
hegemonic party system. Sartori characterises Mexico’s political system as one 
governed by an hegemonic party system, in which moderate dissension and 
political competition were tolerated as long as it did not threaten the PRI 
hegemony.354
353 In the 1980s, tax reform was an important item on the political agenda on many 
conservatives parties. Candidates campaigned vigorously with tax reform as part of their 
political agenda, examples are Ronald Reagan in US, Helmut Kohl in Germany and Margaret 
Tacher in the U.K. or Mulroney in Canada.
354 Sartori, 236.
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The role of the PRI in the policy-making process is very controversial. There is 
disagreement as to whether the PRI was an autonomous actor or an extension 
of the government itself. To some, it was difficult to separate the President’s 
policy-making role from concerns over the stance of the official party. In a 
corporate structure, where the main social actors are agglutinated in a political 
party, such institution in theory should be very influential in policy making. To 
others the PRI is just a control device for facilitating acquiescence in 
government decisions, and a tool to achieve compliance with government 
policy initiatives.
It also can be argued that the partnership between government and PRI, was 
an effective mechanism to legitimise and provide flexibility to accommodate 
changing political circumstances. Political control was based on the Presidents' 
written and unwritten powers and on the party's machinery as the mechanism 
to organise electoral process and provide patronage and clientelism.However, 
since the last three administrations the PRI has experienced a rapid demise of 
its hegemony.355
The empirical evidence suggests that despite the PRI's role as a melting pot,
where all political forces amalgamated together, it only exercised a negligible
role in the policy making process. The analysis suggests it is far from being a
key actor in the process of policymaking, not even in the consultation stage.
Grindle found in her study of agricultural policies during the Echeverria
administration that neither the legislature nor officials of the PRI, even at high
355 Francisco E. Gonzalez, “Mexico's Politcal Liberalization: the Demise of an Hegemonic Party 
System,” Paper for the Seminar on Mexico at the Latin American Centre in Oxford University, 
1998:18.
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levels, were directly involved or consulted in the formulation of agricultural 
policies.356 In recent years, the PRI experienced a rapid power decline, not only 
in the electoral arena but also in its relation with the technocratic governing 
elite, reducing further their indirect influence. However, PRI leaders insisted 
that they still provided relevant input in the process of economic policy 
making.357
The power of opposition parties to influence the policy making process was 
even less significant. This condition changed in 1997, when opposition 
conquered the control of the majority of the seats at the Chamber of Deputies, 
becoming active policymakers, but this new role is evolving slowly. Not until the 
2000 budget, were they able to reshape those policy proposals presented by 
the executive.
b) Legislators
Legislators are seen as "constituency delegates” ensuring that those they 
represent receive a fair share of the tax benefits and burdens. They have a 
strong interest in tax provisions when the effects are regionally concentrated.358 
Electoral reforms and more recently democratisation have substantially 
increased the number of legislators from opposition parties. One of the issues 
widely debated on the floor of the lower chamber is taxation and the allocation 
of the budget. Every year congressmen have to debate the nature of the tax 
structure in the Revenue Law, as well as how federal resources are going to 
be spent and distributed in the Budget. The increased participation of
356 Grindle, Bureaucrats. 548.
357 Interview Dulce Maria Sauri, February 28th, 2000.
358 Good, xv.
legislators in the tax debate has not been limited just to opposition 
representatives, a clusters of congressmen in the lower chamber formed as 
common cause to push for policy reforms including taxation. The so called 
"Reflexion Group" has taken a different position to the PRI's guidelines over 
taxation.359 While in the Senate another group of PRI members was formed, 
calling themselves the “Galileo Group,” with an independent policy proposal to 
those of the PRI's hierarchy.360
c) Governors
Governors represent the interests of those tax payers within the state. In a 
period of ten years the power of governors has changed dramatically, having 
been previously subordinated to the federal government. In 1989, the PAN won 
the first governorship election. By 1998, seven PAN governors had been 
elected and one arrived in office due to negotiations between the PRI and 
PAN.361 There were also two elected governors from the PRD, including the 
powerful governor of Mexico city. PAN governors began to demand changes in 
the system of tax collection, and specially on the allocation of revenues to the 
states. A loud campaigner for a new distribution of resources under the 
framework of New Federalism had been Guanajuato’s Governor Vicente 
Fox.362 The Governor of the State of Nuevo Leon, Fernando Canales Claribn, 
entered into a fight with the federal government demanding more resources for
359 Interview Oscar Gonzalez, on Reflexi6n proposals for tax reform, Aguascalientes April 18th, 
1999. See also "Propuestas Sobre la Reforma Fiscal del Grupo Reflexidn," Camara de 
Diputados, 1999. Mimeo.
36 Interview with one of their leaders Senator Eloy Cantu, London, January 6th, 2000.
361 Median Plascencia, former mayor of Leon was chosen as provisional governor after the 
dispute over the electoral result between the PRI and the PAN.
362Fox stressed the need to change the tax structure and redesigned the redistribution of 
financial resources to the state. He considered the system highly centralised and unfair, 
London, June 5th, 1997.
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his state, the richest in the country. To Governor Canales revenue shares 
should match more closely the states tax collection ratio.
PRI governors have also expressed their interest in redefining the rules for the 
distribution of resources, complaining that Canales’ formula would affect the 
poorest states.363 From the Left, Zacatecas’ Governor Ricardo Monreal became 
the new champion of federalism, trying to organise the 11 opposition governors 
to form a common front in tax matters. Monreal argued that the federalist model 
only exists in the letter of the Constitution, and governors should demand more 
political and economic freedoms, including the powers to manage some of the 
federal taxes.364 The richer states, many governed by the PAN, proposed a 
new formula based on regional collection, but the governors of poorer states 
argued it would accentuate regional economic disparities further.
3.4.2.- External Actors
External actors have been very influential particularly during the so called neo­
liberal period. The US dominates IFIs in the sense that it controls the decision 
making process within these organisations. Voting power in multilateral 
institutions is directly related to the contribution made by members to the 
provision of funds. The US domination of international lending organisations 
translates in tangible influence to change recipient country’s economic policy. 
Although in theory the IFIs provide only advice to countries in matters related to
363 Oaxaca's Governor Jos6 Murat has been campaigning for a new formula for the the 
distribution of resources.
364 Interview Zacatecas’ Governor Ricardo Monreal, London, Febrruary 4th, 2000.
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their fiscal affairs, in practice these institutions have played a major role in the 
design and implementation of tax reforms.365
a) The US Government
The US government has always been an influential actor in Mexico’s 
economy.366 It is, by far Mexico’s most important trade partner, with 83% of 
Mexico’s exports going to the US market. It is the origin of 70% of the country’s 
foreign investment and its first creditor. Authors like Kaufman have highlighted 
the importance of the US government in Mexican stability, and its influence 
over domestic policy making.367
In tax matters this influence is evident, the Mexican government followed the 
US tax reform recipe to the letter, implementing all its main features, such as 
broadening the tax base, cutting the income and corporate tax rates, etc. 
Although the Salinas’ tax reform process began almost five years before the 
implementation of the NAFTA,368 the potential of the treaty provided the 
impetus for the tax reforms. Globalisation and the possibility of economic 
integration convinced Mexican authorities of the need to homogenise tax 
legislation as much as possible, in order to meet international standards, 
particularly those of the USA.
365 In November 1996, IMF officials visited the Treasury to learn more about the SAT 
programme, the official visit was chaired by Dr. Carlos Silvani from the Fiscal Affairs Office. 
See “La Reunibn De Validacibn y Evaluacibn: SAT”, Secretarfa de Hacienda y Crbdito Publico, 
internal document, September 12th, 1996.
366 For the new relationship under NAFTA, see Victor Bulmer -Thomas and James Dunkerley, 
The US and Latin America: The New Agenda (Cambridge, MA: David Rockefeller Centre for 
Latin American Studies, ILAS, and Harvard University Press, 2000).
367 Kaufman, 109.
368To learn more about NAFTA and its impact in Mexico see Georgina Kessel, ed. Lo 
Neoociado del TLC (MacGraw Hill and ITAM, 1994). For its impact in US companies see Nora 
Lustig, Barrry P. Bosworth and Robert Z. Lawrence, ed. Assessing the Impact: North American 
Free Trade (Washington, D .C .: The Brooking Institutions, 1992).
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Tax authorities accept they received policy advice and suggestions regarding 
the use of tax instruments after the 1994 crisis.369 Despite its notorious 
influence the USA seldom acts directly, rather it uses the advisory and 
negotiating power of IFIs.
b) International Financial Institutions
IFIs have played an important role in spreading economic ideas into domestic 
policy decisions. In theory, IFIs play just an advisory role regarding tax matters. 
Foreign tax missions contribute by preparing domestic experts, and 
background analysis, to be available when the domestic political and economic 
conditions are favourable for reform.370 But in reality, tax reform was at the top 
of Latin American’s government agenda because it was a "must" for obtaining 
fresh loans, attached to financial packages. These clauses required policy 
reforms in exchange for fresh resources to debtor countries.371
To Maxfield and Stallings the need for international capital after the 1980s debt 
crisis, provided IFIs with the power to shape policy reforms in countries heavily 
reliant on foreign capital.372 The conditionality attached to stand-by credits 
shows that IFIs pushed tax reform as one of the core policies of structural 
adjustments into the developing countries’ agenda. According to World Bank 
data, about 250 structural and sectorial adjustment loans to 86 countries
369 Interview with Diego Yrribarren economic advisor to the Under-Secretary of Revenue, 
Septemberth 24th, 1999.
370 Stotsky, 279-284.
371 According to the World Bank structural adjustment loans (SALs) and sectorial adjustment 
loans (SECALs) are both instrument for policy reform, in which tax reform was included. See 
Structural and Sectorial Adjustment: World Bank Experience. 1980-92.107.
' Maxfield Governing Capital. Stallings 1992.
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between 1979 and 1994, included fiscal reform components.373 The World 
Bank clearly states that tax reform is at the "heart of stabilisation and 
adjustment process."374 The first World Bank paper dealing with issues of 
general tax policy, reviews the Bank's growing provisions of advice on tax 
reform and the increasing use of loan conditions related to tax reform.375
The official objectives of tax reform according to the document were: to 
increase insufficient government revenues, reduce the distortions and 
inequities caused by taxation, and eliminate administrative problems facing 
developing countries.376 Specifically, the World Bank recipe for tax reform in 
four specific semi-industrial countries (Colombia, Korea, Mexico and Thailand) 
includes the following policy actions: 1) Lower marginal tax rates, would not 
necessarily produce lower revenues, since the tax base may be expanded to 
compensate for the lower rates. 2) Broadening and consolidating the tax base. 
3) Exempting savings from the tax base to eliminate bias of income taxes in 
favour of current consumption. 4) Bring down the rate of inflation but if it’s 
politically infeasible try to index the tax system and limit the distortions 
introduce by high inflation. 5) Restructure (reduce rates) corporate taxes and 
improve the nature of incentives for investments. 6) Eliminate tax preferences. 
7) Replace turnover taxes with taxes with a rational base as VAT; where VAT is 
implemented exemptions should be granted to investments goods generally, 
and replace domestic taxes with excise taxes. 8) Full tax rebates and duty
373 About 48% of conditions stipulated specific statutory changes in the tax legislation. For a 
review of the tax conditionality by IFIs and their mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation see 
Fiscal Management in Adjustment Lending (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996). 
a'4Adiustment Lending Policies for Sustainable Growth.
375 See World Bank Advice and Adjustment Lending. Lessons of Tax Reform (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 1991): 64-75.
376 Lessons of Tax Reform. 3-4.
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drawbacks for exporters to compensate them for the increase in the cost of 
purchased inputs. 377 Each one of these policies was implemented to the letter 
by the Mexican authorities.378
Similarly, the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department offers technical assistance on tax 
policy linked to structural adjustment programs.379 Among the typical IMF 
recommendations are that taxes on consumption (VAT) must be kept to a 
single rate from 10 to 20% and exemptions kept to a minimum. It also advised 
the use of excise taxes, and against the reliance on import and export taxes. In 
relation to income taxes, the emphasis has been on reducing the marginal 
rates and broadening the base, while corporation tax is held within 30-40% to 
enhance the efficient allocation of capital.380
According to the World Bank, the IMF tends to take the lead on issues relating 
to taxes and the aggregate level of spending, whereas the World Bank leads on 
sectorial spending issues.381 Former Secretary of Finance Pedro Aspe argues 
that the World Bank had a much more active role in providing advice during the 
Salinas term, while Martin Werner referred to the IMF, particularly the Fiscal 
Affairs Unit as the most important external influence during the Zedillo's 
administration.382 The difference may be explained, by the fact that at the start
377 Chad Leechor, Tax Policy and Tax Reform in Semi-industrial Countries (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 1986): 7-8.
378 Pedro Aspe, "Balance de la Transformation Economica Durante la Administracion dely, 
Presidente Carlos Salinas de Gortari," Informe Hacendario. July-Septiembre 1994 Vol.2 No7. '
379 Stotsky, 279-284.
380 Stotsky, 281-282.
381 Fiscal Management in Adjustment Lending. As a matter of fact, the World Bank's Policy 
Research Analysis, moved from tax analysis in October 1994 to concentrate on expenditure 
issues.
382 Interview Aspe September 20th, 2000, Martin Wemer, Undersecretary of Finance, London, 
May 15th, 1998.
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Zedillo's administration it faced financial turmoil. To cope with it the IMF offered 
a loan in excess of USD$ 17.5 bn, the largest ever given to that date, while 
during the Salinas term the IMF mostly renewed loans previously committed. 
Complying with such assumption is the fact that IMF loans are for countries 
with fiscal equilibrium problems, while World Bank loans are for fostering 
development.
Conclusion
Tax policy is a political activity that involves negotiations among interested 
actors. The task of politics is to reconcile these conflicting interests in order to 
bring about acceptable and workable solutions for the interested parties. In tax 
matters, rent seeking activities of individual citizens are directed towards 
exploiting what opportunities are available to influence the decision makers, 
meaning those who apply the law, the bureaucracy and the courts.
This chapter identified within the Mexican context, the "planners" or interest 
groups representing personal and corporate interest of tax payers, the "agents" 
or those used by tax payers promoting their proposal or acting in their behalf as 
representatives. We also identified the suppliers, or those who ultimately make 
the tax policy decisions. I have included in the research "other attemptive 
actors," which I consider to be of great influence in the tax policy making 
process in Mexico, without them the analysis would have been incomplete. 
Analysing each one gives the reader a sense of their political influences. In the 
next chapter, I will show some examples of how these vested interests have 
influenced the tax structure.
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There is a well-known tradition in the analysis of tax structure that employs the 
concept of group interest as a vital element in the determination of tax policy. 
For Forte and Peacock the individual taxpayer is just a passive adjuster to 
changes in the tax structure. Since the range of options open to individual tax 
payers are narrow, so they recourse to organising pressure groups.383 Interest 
groups know that the tax system can be altered as a result of pressure on 
decision makers.384 This assumption attracts interest groups to organise 
themselves and seek to alter the system in order to maximise their welfare.
In this context, client politics best describes the politics of tax policy-making.385 
Interest groups seek special concessions for their members trying to pass on 
the cost of taxation to other groups, or among all tax payers. The process is 
dominated by selfish interest in a zero-sum game. Usually the group obtaining 
substantial tax concession does at the cost of other groups.
383 Peacock and Forte, 11
384 Ibid.
385 James Q. Wilson ed., The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
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Chapter IV
Deconstructing the Tax Structure in Search of the Loopholes and Benefits
Created by Vested Interests
"The Mexican tax code is full of holes like in a gruyere cheese, 
draining away all tax collection efforts/386
Secretary of Finance, Jose Angel Gurria
This chapter discloses how the influence of interest groups plays a major role in 
explaining how loopholes and tax expenditures have developed in the Mexican tax 
system. The erosive effects of preferential tax regimes and exemptions built up 
over the years are responsible for the low level of tax collection. Such harmful 
preferences constitute the greatest obstacle to reform, since changes would take 
away vested interests’ privileges. These harmful preferential tax practices are 
deeply rooted in the tax legislation (the amount of tax collected is invariably 
affected not just by changes in tax rates, but by the statutory definition of tax 
bases). These perverse incentives are the result of political trade offs that unfairly 
differentiate among taxpayers.
4.1.- Tax Expenditure: the Erosive Effects of Harmful Preferential Tax 
Regimes and Exemptions
Tax expenditures represent the way governments spend through concessions that 
are embedded in the tax system. These tax incentives and benefits constitute 
subsidies with lower visibility, which dilute tax revenues and create economic
386 See Secretary of Finance, Jose A. Gurrfa’s speech to the Businessmen's Co-ordinating 
Council, Mexico City on November 4th, 1999.
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distortions. Tax expenditures distort consumption, savings and investment 
decisions, and introduce added complexity to the tax system. Furthermore, their 
efficiency is difficult to determine because of their lack of transparency or regular 
evaluation of the fulfilment of their original objectives.387
To ECLAC tax expenditures introduce opacity into the design and implementation 
of fiscal policy, since governments lack estimates of the volume of tax revenue 
they are forgoing and the true extent of the benefits. Moreover, tax concessions 
tend to become vehicles for rent-seeking and corruption. They conclude that the 
use of tax incentives not only undercuts revenue adequacy, but jeopardises the 
principle of equity.388
In the Mexican tax system there are a vast number of exemptions and preferential 
treatments for certain sectors. Kaldor in the 1960s wrote that “partial or full 
exemption for profit taxation was an inappropriate instrument for promoting 
industrial growth and its efficiency doubtful, thus should be terminated as soon as 
possible."389 Four decades later many of those exemptions still embedded in the 
tax legislation.
The tax system confines special tax treatment to some taxpayers depending on 
the economic sector, the type of income, or in the case of indirect taxes, according
387 New accounting procedures have been incorporated in OECD countries to estimate revenues 
forgone from tax concessions. See Spending Via the Tax System (Paris: OECD, 1997).
388 See Fiscal Convent.
389 Kaldor, Reports.
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to the kind of product. The latest OECD report on Mexico states that "the tax 
system contains several major deficiencies, which make the system inequitable in 
terms of incidence across different types of income and activities and contribute to 
keeping tax revenues low."390 Among the large number of preferential regimes is 
the vast number of exempt goods and services in the VAT regime, specific sectors 
with preferential treatment in the taxation of corporate income, and the exemption 
of fringe benefits in the taxation of individual incomes. The document stresses 
that the main priority in a reform of the tax system must be to broaden the tax base 
by reducing to a minimum these major preferential regimes. The ill effects they 
cause, besides diluting revenue and complicating tax administration, include 
horizontal inequity and loopholes, and they also help to facilitate evasion.391
Tax authorities are well aware of the negative effects of preferential regimes. To 
the president of the SAT, all the exemptions, including those special regimes and 
the preferential treatment of sectors described in the tax legislation, represent the 
greatest constraint to strengthening tax revenues.392 Finance Secretary Jose 
Gurrla has pointed out that the tax code is plagued with benefits and exemptions, 
draining revenues. 393 For Tomas Ruiz, Under-Secretary of Finance, Mexico’s low 
percentage of tax collection effort has resulted from the slow but continuous 
incorporation of fiscal benefits in the legislation through time. He adds that 
“preferential treatment has ultimately ended up eating the positive benefits of
390 Economic Survey.
391 Economic Survey.
392 Alma Rosa Moreno, interview, Mexico City, September 25th, 1999.
393 See Gurria's speech 4th November.
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reforms and now it represents an obstacle to strengthening tax revenues and the 
modernisation of the tax system.” 394
Special regimes in the legislation have created unjustified benefits among the 
various economic sectors, ultimately creating major problems of horizontal 
inequity. These policies were conceived under a different strategy of economic 
development in vogue three decades ago, policies that contradict the philosophy 
of the current economic model. Such polices do not match the logic of a 
competitive and open economy. The Secretary of Finance has declared “it is 
impossible to justify (abroad) the large number of exemptions embedded in the tax 
system.”395 Cross comparative studies from 32 countries show that Mexico has the 
largest range of sectors and products receiving special tax treatment. Among 
those areas benefited are the financial, medical and educational services, plus 
whole sectors such as newspapers and publishing, agriculture, fishery and 
livestock. With regard to consumption taxes, Mexico stands out internationally for 
the vast number of products exempted.396
Privileged treatment, when extended to various sectors, is considered to have 
negative effects on the tax system, both in administratively and in terms of 
collection. Treating the same kind of income differently causes inequality and 
reduces the taxable base, forcing authorities to maintain high rates on medium 
income levels. This practice tends to cause economic distortion in the composition
394lnterview Ruiz, Mexico City, September 25th, 1999.
395See Gurrla 4th of November speach.
396 Interview Ruiz, Mexico City, September 25th, 1999.
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of wages. 397 Tax authorities recognise that differential treatment of income in 
Mexico has created heavy marginal tax rates on middle income levels.398
International studies show that a tax system with a large number of exceptions, 
fiscal incentives and privileged regimes offers more opportunities for tax evasion 
and avoidance than a broadly applied system. Evasion increases if taxpayers 
perceive the system to be unequal. Voluntary tax compliance decreases when 
taxpayers with similar income receive different treatment, or those with greater 
economic capacity receive a more favourable treatment. 399 With regard to tax 
avoidance, a differentiated treatment may induce companies with investment in 
multiple sectors to translate profits to the company under the preferential tax 
regime.400
In addition, there are numerous fiscal incentives to businesses and individuals, 
which have an additional erosive effect on revenues. Contrary to the perception of 
Mexican business,401 a plethora of fiscal incentives for companies exist in the tax 
legislation, despite the fact that OECD studies have shown that fiscal incentives 
have a very limited impact on investment.402 For SAT president, Alma Rosa
397 Ruiz, "El Sistema Fiscal Mexicano, 55.
398lnterview Ruiz, Mexico City, September 25th, 1999.
399R u iz , “El Sistema Fiscal,” 5.
400lbid.
401 Business organisations frequently claim that there are not sufficient tax incentives in the 
legislation, See Memorias Foros de Consulta Reaionales CANACO, Monterrey, 1998 (varios 
issues). Particularly, Memorias: Primer Foro Regional Zona Noreste: Consulta Nacional Sobre La 
Reforma Fiscal Integral. CANACO, Monterrey, 1998, and Propuesta Final: Reforma Fiscal Integral. 
1999.
402 To see the vast number of incentives see Estudios Economicos de la OECD (Mexico: OECD, 
1999): 179-188.
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Moreno, it is “ironic” that the private sector still perceives that the tax system does 
not offer enough incentives despite so many of them being included in the tax 
code. Businesses’ misleading perception may be explained by the fact that those 
enjoying these types of benefits are usually large companies. Small companies 
usually lack sufficient information or expertise to take advantage of such 
incentives. 403 Paradoxically, despite tax officials acute criticism to the so called 
fiscal incentives and preferential regimes, a significant number of new fiscal 
incentives were introduced during the last administration, while the world’s trend 
seems to go in the opposite direction 404
The next section looks at the profile of the tax base for traces of rent-seeking 
effects in the process of tax policy making. It then explores the main tax 
instruments in order to determine the effect of vested interests on their tax base. 
The analysis clearly shows the influence of interested groups.
4.2.- Deconstructing the Tax Structure
Of the various reasons put forward to explain Mexico’s low tax yield, international 
studies place particular emphasis on the tax structure and the composition of the 
tax profile 405 A country’s tax mix shows the difficulties governments face in 
collecting taxes directly from their citizens. In countries where the population is
403 Alma Rosa Moreno, “Promocion de las Actividades Productivas y el Ahorro Interno,” La 
Reforma Fiscal que Mexico Requiere, speech delivered November 5th 1998.
404 See the example of Sweden or the policy reversal towards fiscal incentives during President 
Reagan’s administration in the US.
405 See World Bank country studies, such as Argentina: Polftica Tributaria para la Estabilizacion v 
la Recuperation Economica (Washington DC: Banco Mundial, 1990).
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uncooperative in paying direct taxes and the pattern of tax administration 
facilitates evasion, governments are forced to find other means of collecting the 
revenues they need. Using Peters’ study on the influence of politics in policy 
choices, the Mexican tax profile reflects a “broad based” tax system. 406 This type 
of system shows the impact of corporatist political structures and the need to raise 
revenue without offending major economic or social interests. The policy outcome 
reflects the bargaining process amongst interest groups.
Mexico’s federal tax structure includes both indirect and direct taxes. Direct taxes 
represent the largest source of income, and include corporate and personal 
income tax. The corporate tax is levied at a flat rate of 34% (30% if reinvested) 
and the global individual tax is levied at a progressive rate, escalating from a 
negative tax to a marginal tax rate of 35%.
Indirect taxes include specific consumption taxes for fuel, tobacco and beverages, 
as well as the value-added tax, which is levied at a rate of 15% (10% on the 
border) on the sales of goods and services. There are a large number of 
exemptions and reduced rates for consumer goods. After tax sharing, income 
taxes and VAT constitute 80% of total tax revenues, but the total tax income only 
amounts to about 45.5% of the total net income. 407
^  Peters, 64.
407 These figures contrast sharply with those of the private sector, made by the Centro de Estudios 
Economicos del Sector Privado (CEESP) See Bours, “Hacia una Reforma Fiscal Integral", 10-17.
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Table 4.1.- Composition of Tax Revenues 
(Percentage of total)
1991 1995 1998
Incom e Tax 47.6 52.3 52.1
Value Added Tax 31.2 28.9 37.8
Excise Taxes 6.3 5.1 3.8
Foreign Trade 11.0 7.8 6.4
Other 3.9 5.9
Source: SHCP for 1991, 1995 and Vinculacion entre Ingresos y Gasto, SHCP for 1998.
Tax literature has been dominated by the desire to define an optimal tax 
structure.408 In Mexico, Jaime Serra Puche and Ernesto Maykanosky have 
proposed economic models comprising particular tax mixtures and optimal 
rates 409 Although Bird argues there is no such thing as an optimal tax structure 
that fits all countries 410 developed countries share some general characteristics in 
their tax structures. The analysis of the tax mixture or tax profile has helped 
academics to determine the modernity of the tax system 411 The tax structure 
profile of developed countries has evolved, moving from heavy reliance on 
traditional direct taxes on land, through taxes on trade, to reliance on modem 
direct tax on income.412 In the last decade there has been a rapid increase in
408 See Richard Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959).
409 Ernesto Maykanosky, Diseno de una Reforma Fiscal Optima: el Caso de Mexico (Mexico: 
Colegio de Mexico, 1985).
410 Bird, Optimal.
411 See Enrique Mendoza, Assaf Razin and Linda L. Tesar, “A Comparative Analysis of the 
Structure of Tax Systems in Industrial Countries,” IMF Working Paper No.14 (Washington, DC: 
IMF, 1993); Eric Sidgwick, “Tax Revenue Structures: Across Sectional Statistical Analysis for 1980- 
1988,” Fiscal Affairs Department Working Paper. No.1 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1991) and Tanzi, 
“Quantitative.”
412 For the evolution of the tax structures during development see Harley H. Hinrichs, A General 
Theory of Tax Structure: Change During Economic Development (Cambridge MA; Harvard Law 
School, International Tax Programme, 1968). For hard data see Revenue Statistics 1965/1998  
(Paris: O EC D ,1999).
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consumption taxes.413 However, Kaldor argued that the tax structure that existed 
in developing countries was inappropriate, because it did not rely sufficiently on 
income tax 414
A recent analysis by OECD of trends in taxation concluded that some important 
changes have taken place in its countries’ tax mixture (share of main taxes in total 
revenues). Affected by globalisation, tax burdens on profits fell, excises and 
import duties halved and general consumption taxes have been the fastest 
growing revenue source 415 World Bank data shows a dramatic growth in countries 
using VAT in the last two decades. The wave of tax reform pushed countries to 
rely further on consumption taxes.416 The World Bank’s 1997 Report states that 
increased global integration has affected the way developing countries raise tax 
revenues. On the one hand, the internationalisation of businesses and the 
relentless competition for foreign investment have curtailed the marginal tax rates 
on individuals and corporations. In addition economic liberalisation has reduced 
the collection of border taxes. Faced with these constraints many have turned 
towards consumption taxes.417 Mexico's tax profile corresponds to one of a 
modern tax system, since the largest portion of income originates from income and
413 Consumption taxes are easily collected plus indirectly through consumption levy (those in the 
informal sector). But they disproportionately hit lower-income households, which consume a larger 
part of their disposable income.
414 Kaldor.Taxation.
415 See A World of Taxes (Paris: OECD, 1997).
416 See Vito Tanzi, Taxation in an Integrating World (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1995)
417 World Development Report. 1997: 48.
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value added taxes.418 The following table sets forth the composition of the
government's tax revenues for the periods indicated 419
Table 4.2.- Evolution of Tax Mix 1925-1999 
(Percentage of Total Tax Revenues)
Taxes 1925-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90
Natural Resources 7.61% 4.72% 2.59% 2.58% 2.85%
Industry 26.22% 14.06%
Production 16.85% 18.56% 17.66% 16.11%
International Trade 35.94% 27.22% 30.30% 18.47% 15.42% 23.85%
Incom e Tax 12.05% 21.04% 35.81% 42.24% 43.03% 33.76%
Pay Rolls 1.93% 0.98% 0.77%
Stam ps 9.73% 1.15% 2.06% 0.16%
Com m erce 2.11% 9.67% 9.60%
M ercantile Incom e 13.33% 18.66%
VAT 21.6%
Lottery 1.20% 0.11% 0.36%
Im m igration 0.27% 0.27% 0.06%
O ther 6.34% 22.14% 1.31% 2.35% 1.86% 1.01%
Source: Own elaboration with cata from the Secretariat of "inance
The table shows the evolution of the tax profile in the post-revolutionary period. In 
the last thirty years, the number of taxes has been curtailed. The significance of 
income tax has declined considerably, but it was compensated for by the 
introduction of VAT and the elimination of some excise taxes. As in the rest of the 
world, VAT has become one of the main sources of revenue. Taxes on trade 
declined very rapidly after the mid 1980s, when the country moved towards an 
open economy.
418 ECLAC has praised Mexico's tax structure as one of the three most balanced among Latin 
American nations, with direct taxes accounting between 40 and 50 % of all tax revenues. See 
Fiscal Covent. In other developing countries excises and import duties are prominent in the 
revenue systems.
419 For an interesting overview of 22 OECD countries and their patterns of taxation and main 
characteristics see Peters. For the evolution of the tax systems in Latin America see Shome and 
Elizondo, The Politics of Tax Reform. Rodriguez and Richard Bird, “Tax Reform in Latin America: A 
Review of some Recent Experiences,” Latin American Research Review Vol. 27. No. 3.
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The OECD's review of Mexico's tax structure depicts the Mexican tax system as 
relatively neutral in terms of its impact on investment, savings and work. It shows a 
system where average effective tax rates on consumption, labour and capital are 
low compared with other OECD countries; moreover, statutory marginal tax 
wedges on labour income are modest for most wage levels and family types.420 
Marginal tax rates are very competitive, and the tax legislation offers special 
schemes for deduction of some categories of investment and corporate 
consolidation rules. Additionally, personal and corporate income taxes are 
integrated so as to avoid double taxation of dividends and distributed profits. The 
study also underlines that major preferential regimes make the system inequitable 
in terms of incidence across different types of income and activities, creating 
horizontal inequity. The OECD recommends eliminating exemptions and 
preferential regimes from the VAT regime. In the corporate tax system, it contends 
that favourable regimes for certain sectors, including agriculture, fisheries, land 
transportation and publishing should be abolished, plus a further tightening of 
consolidation rules would limit tax avoidance. Regarding income tax on individuals, 
the suggestion is to eliminate the fiscal subsidy and tax fringe benefits. If these 
reforms are implemented altogether, these initiatives could raise tax revenue by 
some 3% of GDP. 421
A study from the Secretary of Finance concludes that the country’s low tax 
collection problem is explained by the composition of the tax structure itself, and
420 See Mexico Economic Survey 1999.
421 Mexico Economic Survey. 1999.
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particularly by the reduced taxable base of the main tax instruments.422 The 
reduced real tax rates for corporate and individual income tax show the power to 
resist taxation of businesses and those better off.
4.3.- Income Tax
Mexico’s tax system compares very favourably with the tax rates of most 
industrialised and developing countries. The marginal tax rate on individuals at 
40% is considered competitive internationally. For the low wage earner there is a 
fiscal subsidy. On the other hand, Mexico has a tax system that taxes corporate 
earnings at a flat rate of 34%, and if profits are re-invested the rate is as low as 
30%, and the difference deferred until the time of profit-sharing. A rate of 30% on j  
retained earnings, starting in the year 2000, was a move harshly criticised by the 
OECD, which stated that the "lowering of corporate statutory rates did not seem 
strictly necessary in light of Mexico's low taxation of capital and the need to raise I 
revenues."423 This is the total rate paid by companies, since the federal legislation J 
restricts state and municipal taxes on income. The tax laws do not impose a tax on 
undistributed profits,424 and allow the remittances of dividends and other 
distributions to shareholders without further taxation 425
422 Evaluation del Impuesto al Valor Agregado, Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, 
November 1998. (internal document).
423 Mexico Economic Survey. 1999.
424 In a 1995 cross country comparison with some developed countries made by an accounting firm 
showed that Mexico stands quite competitive on the taxation of dividends, interests, royalties, 
rental payment and capital gains. See “Tax and Financial Aspects of Doing Business in Mexico 
1995,” Mexico, Arthur Andersen, 1996:22.
425 In principal, those companies that distribute dividends must pay a tax on such distributions at a 
rate in excess of 34%. But if such company maintains a tax free Net Fiscal Profit Account (Cuenta) 
de Utilidad Fiscal Neta) the tax on such distributions will be zero.
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The following graphic shows that Mexico has one of the most competitive 
corporate tax rates in the world.
Graphic 4.1.- Corporate Tax Rate International Comparison
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Source: Ingresos Gestion Publica, SHCP and OECD Revenue Statistics 1998 
In addition, Mexico has integrated its personal and corporate tax system to avoid
t
double taxation on income from capital organised in corporate form. This has 
increased the appeal for foreign investment. However, it has resulted in a very 
large loss in tax revenues.426
The multiplicity of special regimes, seen in the following table, accounts for one of 
the most erosive effects on revenues. The legislation provides tax breaks for 
taxpayers in the agricultural and forestry sectors, under a s im p lified  regim e. This 
benefit is also granted to taxpayers whose business activity is land transportation
426 Interview Alma Rosa Moreno, Mexico City March 25th, 1999.
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of persons and goods. 427 The consolidated regime allows corporate groups to be 
taxed on a consolidated basis, giving a significant advantage to large businesses. 
Losses of some groups' companies can be offset against the profits made by 
other companies, significantly reducing the taxes paid by the group as a whole 428 
The small tax payers regime enjoys a very simplified accounting system, together 
with an extremely low tax rate, at a maximum rate of 2.5% on total income 429 
Unfortunately, many companies improperly contribute under these regimes, 
unfairly seeking to appropriate the benefits.430 Nevertheless, even when 
preferential regimes are not abused, they still exact a large toll on revenues.
Table 4.3.- Types of Fiscal Regimes According to Activity
General Regime Corporate entities Individuals involved in 
entrepreneurial activities
General Regime by Law
Mexican and foreign companies 
operating in the country
Those with income above 2.3  
million pesos, including 




Those companies involved in 
activities such as agriculture, 
livestock, fishery, forestry,
Land transport including people 
and cargo.
Empresas Integradoras 
(some kind of holdings)
Those involved in activities such 
as agriculture, livestock, fishery, 
forestry
land transport including people 
and cargo.
Optionally craftsmen
427 There are proposals to extend this regime to micro, small and medium companies. See Jose 
Alarcon, Guillermo Castillo and Octavio Perez, “Regimen Simplificado en Empresas Micros, 
Pequenas y Medianas,” No 222, June, Nuevo Consultorio Fiscal: 21-24, 1998.
428 At least 10 out of the 42 largest companies in Mexico are holdings operating under the 
consolidated regime. See Carlos A. de Juan and Joshua Chaffin, “The Top Companies Shaping 
Business in Mexico Today,” Mexico Business July-August 1996: 48-55. There are around 9,500  
companies (300 large holdings) under this fiscal regime; together they produce nearly 80% of the 
national output. See Mariano Latapi, “Nuevo Regimen de Consolidacion Fiscal,” in PaF. Vol 19, 19 
April, 1999:103-106.
42 The income in Mexican pesos for 1999 are: From 0 to 132,276 ( 0%), 132,276-250,000 (0.25% ), 
250,000-350,000 (0.50%), 350,000-500,000 (0.50%), 500,000-750,000 (1.50% ), 750,000- 
1,000,000 (2.50% ).
430 See Jorge Santamaria Garcia, “Pequenos Contribuyentes: Simulaciones Juridicas y 
Defraudacion Fiscal." PaF. No. 239, October 13th, 1999:37-40.
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b) Fiscal Consolidation Regime Large Corporate Holdings
c) Small Taxpayers Regime
Individuals involved in 
entrepreneurial activities with 
income smaller than 2.3 million 
pesos
Source: Ley de Impuesto Sobre la Renta, 1999. 
a) Tax Incentives for Companies
There are a considerable number of fiscal incentives granted by the Secretariat of 
Finance to companies and individuals. According to the tax authorities, Mexican 
corporate taxpayers enjoy one of the highest deductible depreciation schemes in 
the world. In 1992, the maximum deductibility for capital investment in the first year 
was 91% in Mexico, compared with 33.3% in the US and 35% in Canada.431 Tax 
law allows deductions of nearly the total amount of the investment depreciation, 
either in the year in which the investment is made or when the new fixed asset is 
placed in service. A programme of immediate deduction of investments is also 
applicable.
Tax incentives for companies include:
•  Allowance for adjustment of initial investment cost on real estate and shares of 
a Mexican corporation that will reduce or eliminate the impact of capital gains 
taxes,
•  Low withholding taxes on royalties and technical assistance,
•  Allowance for accelerated deductions on inventory purchases and production 
costs as they are acquired or incurred;
431 Aspe, El Camino Mexicano. 99.
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•  Optional lump-sum depreciation deductions for new fixed assets
•  A ten year net operating loss carry-over is allowed with a five year extension 
available if such losses are not used to the extent the loss was recognised for 
financial purposes.
•  Environment deductions to research, development and implementation of 
pollution abatement, energy saving and alternative fuel technology, sustainable 
water use and pollution prevention, relocation of industries and the 
establishment, administration and oversight of natural protected areas.
•  To promote investment in areas of research and technological development, 
there are fiscal credits for investment in Research and Development.
•  Employee profit sharing is also deductible.
•  The tax legislation allows deferment of the payment of corporate taxes for up 
to two years for future investments in training and technology.
In addition there are a number of programmes designed to support export 
activities and to provide fiscal incentives to investors to establish companies in 
Mexico. In general tax incentives include deductibility of expenses from imports of 
machinery for producing export goods and a zero VAT rate for equipment and 
goods used for the maintenance of such machinery. Among the specific export 
programmes are:
•  The Temporary Import Programme to Produce Export Goods (PITEX), allows 
companies to import duty-free goods provided that the merchandise imported
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will be directly or indirectly exported later. Some of the benefits include no 
import duties, no value added taxes, lower customs fees.
•  The Inbound Industry Programme, known as “Maquiladora”, also permits the 
temporary duty-free import of raw materials, parts components and 
accessories for basic production. Under certain conditions PITEX and 
“Maquiladora” companies can purchase products from national suppliers 
without paying VAT.
•  Temporary Imports Programmes for Integrated Services to Exports, where 
export related services can temporarily import machinery and equipment.432
•  The drawback of ad-valorem duty paid on goods which are later 
incorporated into export products 433
b) Tax Incentives for Individuals
Individuals are entitled to a personal tax credit, which diminishes as their level of 
income increases.434 In addition, there is a tax subsidy against their tax liability,!7 
which as well marginally diminishes as their income increases. Some types of 
income are exempted from individual taxation, including pension, disability and 
death benefits 435 and fringe benefits (provided to all employees on a non- 
discriminatory basis if they do not exceed specified levels). In addition, payments 
received at the time of termination of employment, if they do not exceed 90 times
432 Official Gazette. Mexico April 11th, 1997.
433 Drawback is a mechanism by which the ad valorem duty paid on certain imported goods can bel 
refunded. J
434The 1994 is by agreement on wage policy included a 3% increase through an income tax credit 
for workers with incomes not more than two minimun salaries. Employers were allowed to 
supplement wages of those earning up to twice the minimum wage and claim corresponding credit. 
See “IMF Approves US$ 17.8 Billion”.
435Unless they exceed nine times the daily minimum salary.
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the daily minimum wage each year of service rendered, are also exempt. Among 
the deductions for individuals are medical, dental fees and hospital expenses; 
charitable contributions to public institutions, teaching, research and religious 
establishments; or deposits in special interest bearing savings accounts. Those 
who earn the most enjoy the tax benefits designed to promote savings. There are 
no taxes for gains in the stock market, or for interest earned on instruments which 
take over a year to mature. There is only a low rate of interest on banking 
accounts or debt instruments which mature in under a year. Many authors believe 
there is no reason to suppose that the exemptions effectively promote the process 
of investment and savings. To Kaldor “the exemption of capital gains from taxation 
is the single most glaring feature of one law for the rich and another law for the 
poor,” being no less objectionable because it is widespread among western 
nations.436
As a result of the exemptions and various incentives, the effective tax rate on 
capital income in Mexico is the lowest in the world, after Switzerland.437 The table 
number shows the effective income-tax rate, opposed to the statutory one. 
Mexico’s effective rate is less than one third of the average rate in Asia, and half of 
that of Latin America. Many of the tax reforms were justified as necessary to 
maintain a competitive effective tax rate, but they have had a devastating effect on 
the government income. While our NAFTA trade partners Canada and the US,
436 Kaldor, 247.
^ T h e  effective rate on income taxes includes the corporate income tax, taxable base, including 
immediate deductions on investments, purchases, an inflationary adjustments, and desgravation of 
dividends.
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respond to an effective income tax rate on capital of 56.6% and 51.7%  
respectively, in Mexico it amounts to only 12.1%.













Source: Ruiz, Evolucion del Sistema Fiscal, 1999.
4.4.- Value Added Tax
The value added tax is the second most important source of income. However, it 
finances just 38% of the budget for social spending, while in Spain it pays as much 
as 95% of the budget and in Chile 91 %.438 The general statutory tax rate is 15% 
(10% on borders), but due to the multiple exemptions, the effective tax rate is 
reduced to just 8%.439 Multiple preferential rates have caused economic distortions
438 See Vinculacion entre Inqresos v Gasto. 50
439 Interview Alma Rosa Moreno, Mexico City September 25th, 1999.
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and brought about a high administrative cost.440 In addition, VAT has proved to be 
an inefficient tool for redistributing income.441 Because income is highly 
concentrated in Mexico, VAT represents an inefficient mechanism to foster 
equality. In order to benefit those groups with limited income, the state has to 
subsidise those with higher income.442
A cross-country comparison shows that Mexico has a low marginal VAT rate, but 
the large number of tax exemptions has deteriorated its taxable base. The table 
shows numerous exemptions, compared to other countries. The OECD has 
suggested broadening the VAT base, by eliminating the zero rating on agriculture 
and fisheries, as well as the exemption on land transportation. In addition, the 
border rate of 10% should be brought into line with the standard rate. Zero-rated 
goods should be limited to at most a few basic staples. The OECD argues that 
selecting exempting goods and services from consumption is not an efficient way 
to achieve equity objectives, but dilutes revenues.443
Table 4.5.- International Comparisons: VAT base
Financial Medical Education News­ Inter. Agriculture Food Medicines
Services Attention papers Transfers Fishing, staffs
440 See Mario Calderon Dannel, “Estudio Sobre el IVA”, Internal Document of the Secretary of 
Finance. 1998.
A A A
According to Green, VAT is regressive, costing the poor more than the rich since they spend a 
larger portion of their income on buying goods and services. Green, The Silent Revolution.
442 See “Evaluation del Impuesto al Valor Agregado,” SHCP, 1998. Boltkvinik made a quantitative 
analysis of how VAT affects economic groups. The 10% of the population with the lowest income 
pay 1.1% of the VAT collected, versus 41.21%  paid by the 10% with the highest income. However, 
approximately 43% of the highest income group is exempted from VAT. See Julio Boltvinik, El 
Impactodel IVA.”La Jornada August 2nd. 1997:16.
443 The OECD recommends that lower income groups should be compensated for the cuts in 





Canada EX EX EX 0 % 0% 0% 0%
Chile
Spain EX EX
France EX EX EX
Mexico EX EX EX EX 0% 0% 0% 0%
Switzerland EX EX EX
Venezuela EX EX EX EX
Source: Evaluation al Impuesto Agregado, Secretariat of Finance, 1998.
International comparisons indicate that Mexico is one of the countries which 
extracts the least from value added taxes. Contrary to the world trend in the 
1990s, VAT revenues decreased in Mexico. In comparison to South America 
revenues from this source increased from 3.5% of GDP in 1990 to 5.4% in 1994. 
The statistics from a comparative study of VAT made by the Under-Secretary of 
Finance show that VAT has increased as a percentage of total tax collection in the 
last two decades in OECD countries. It also shows that in most OECD countries 
tax rates are above 20%, while in Latin America the average is 15%.444
Table 4.6.- International Comparison of VAT 




Central America 2.7 3.3




Source: Evaluation al Impuesto al Valor Agregado, SPF.1998
Limited revenues from VAT respond to its low productivity, which is attributable to 
the fact that Mexico has a small tax base, resulting from a large number of goods
444 See “Evaluation del Impuesto al Valor Agregado,” 85-86.
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and services being either exempt or having a zero rate. According to the IADB, 
Mexico is the country in Latin America which collects the least for each point of 
VAT rate (0.2% of GDP).445 Productivity of value added tax is defined as the 
relationship between the basic tax and the amount collected expressed as a 
percentage of GDP.446
Graphic 4.2.- Productivity of VAT
Source: Evaluation al Impuesto al Valor Agregado, SHCP, 1998.
Tax evasion has also been put forward as one of the main reasons behind the 
country’s low tax collection level. Although tax authorities do not deny that tax 
evasion represents one of the most important structural weakness of the tax 
system, by itself this does not explain the country’s low VAT collection. To support
445 This indicator is used to measure the effectiveness of VAT tax systems.
446 Lora, “A Decade of Structural Reforms,” 15.
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this argument they present a comparative analysis on the rates of VAT evasion in 
Latin America.447
The graph below shows that Mexico’s tax evasion of 37% is about average in the 
region. However but collects the least for each base point in the tax rate in the 
whole of Latin America. Even countries like Peru with almost double the rate of 
tax evasion (68%) collect more for each point base. As stated previously, the 
reason is that Mexico has the least inclusive tax base, leaving entire sectors and 
large numbers of goods and services out.448
Graphic 4.3.- VAT Evasion
Source: Ingresos y Gestion Publica, SHCP, 1998
According to IADB, VAT's real collection rates are far lower than their statutory 
rates, “due to exclusion of many final goods and services from the tax base and 
problems with management and control.” 449 VAT is levied differently accordingly to 
the product and to where consumption takes place (e.g. 10% the rate at the 
border). The unequal treatment of products and services has eroded the tax
447 See Evaluation del Impuesto al Valor Agregado.
448 Ruiz, “La Reforma que Mexico,” 39-40.
449 Lora, “A Decade Reforms.”
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system revenue potential, its administrative simplicity and economic efficiency. 
Originally there were few items exempted from VAT, and only exports enjoyed a 
0% rate.450 Nowadays, as many as 40% of domestic activities have a 0% VAT 
rate. Among many others, those products exempted from VAT are basic food 
stuffs and medicines.451 A study from the Secretary of Finance concluded that 
Mexico has one of the smallest taxable base in Latin America, while the tax base 
in Chile includes 92% of total consumption, in Mexico it is just 55%.452
Graph 4.4.- Taxable Base of VAT







Chile Bolivia Argentina Mexico
Source: Ingresos y Gestion Publica, SHCP, 1998
450 In 1980 those products exempted were basic products, agricultural equipment, machinery and 
fertilisers. According to Ibarra, when the tax was introduced it contained only a few exemptions.
451 For a detailed account of those activities exempted and those with a zero tax rate see Lev de 
Impuesto al IVA. (Mexico: SHCP, 1998).
See “Evalaucion del Impuesto de! IVA,” 90.
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4.5.- Special Taxes: IEPS
Special taxes are levied on alcohol and alcoholic beverages, beer, manufactured 
tobacco and some fuels. Other special taxes include the tax on the sale of new 
vehicles (ISAN). Green taxes are not fully developed in Mexico, but as shown 
before there are some fiscal incentives tied to investment in anti-pollution 
equipment. To Quadri, director of the Center for Economic Studies at the 
Coordinative Council, green taxes could substitude income taxes. As mentioned 
by the ECLAC, expanding the use of green taxes offers a lot of potential for 
development in Latin American countries. 453
Graphic 4.5.- IEPES as percentage of GDP
IEPS as Percenage of GDP
Source:lngresos, Secretaria de Hacienda, 1999.
453 The Fiscal Covenant.
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In total, special taxes represent only about 4 % of total revenues, if taxes on 
gasoline are not included. The fact that there is a relatively small revenue yield is 
because these taxes affect well organised groups able to resist taxation. They 
affect the economic interests of usually large transnational companies, like the car 
manufacturers, brewers and telephone companies. After the 1995 crisis the 
Association of Car Makers negotiated with the government to eliminate the tax on 
new vehicles for a year in order to stimulate car sales, since then it has lobbied 
strongly to remove the levy permanently, but failed to succeed.454 They argued 
that the levy was a major obstacle to car sales. 455 Another battle they lost was the 
legalisation of illegaly imported USA used cars 456 Initially tax authorities strongly 
opposed the proposal supporting car manufactures, since there were more than 
two million illegal cars in the country. At the end, after much political pressure they 
accepted the registration of those cars with more than ten years of use.
Another example of effective lobbying is that of the beverage industry which 
opposes successfully to the sharp increase in levies to beer and alcoholic 
beverages from 15% to 30% 457 National and international companies campaigned 
together to reduce the levy, arguing that it would boost counterfeiting and thus tax
454 Sergio Ramirez, “Piden a Hacienda Anular el Impuesto sobre Autos Nuevos," Diario de Mexico. 
July 22nd, 1997: 11; Mario Cappi, "Quitar Impuestos a los Autos Nuevos, Exigen Industriales," El 
Financiero June 22nd, 1997: 10; "GM" Pide Reducir el ISAN," Novedades June 26th, 1997: 6; Victor 
Sanchez, "Ford Demanda Dsiminucion de Impuestos al Gobierno," El Heraldo July 15th, 1997, 2; 
Jos6 Antonio Duran, "Solicitan las Automotrices Reduccion de Impuestos para Reactivar las 
Ventas." El Financiero July 15th, 1997: 21.
455 See Isabel Becerril, “ISAN: El Mayor Obstaculo para la Venta de Automoviles," El Financiero 
July 21st, 1997: 36 and Omar Zuniga, "Propone Eliminar el Impuesto Sobre Autos Nuevos para 
Permitir el Repunte de Ventas," El Sol de Mexico June 25th, 1997: 8.
456 "Se Oponen a la Legalization de Autos Extranjeros," Infosel Service. December 7th, 1999.
457 For the lobby of this industry at the Chamber of Deputies see Hector Rendon, "Reconocen El 
Error en Impuestos," El Universal December 30th, 1997:12.
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evasion.458 Most recent, is the case of a new tax on telephone companies which 
few proposed for the 1999 Revenue Law. After fierce opposition by large 
telephone companies, it was withdrawn from the revenue law.
a) Import Duties
Revenues from levies and duties on international trade are declining rapidly with 
the growing process of integration and economic liberalisation, despite a huge 
increase in foreign trade registered in the last two decades. In a period of 10 
years, Mexico moved from been the 15th largest exporter world-wide in 1987 to the 
7th largest in 1999 459 Foreign trade grew from 22 billion in 1986 to an estimated 
145 billion by 2000. Imports increased seven fold from USD $19.3 billion in 1980 
to almost USD$ 145 billion by 2000 460 Tax revenues from import levies have not 
increased proportionally due to the fact that Mexico has entered into various trade 
agreements aimed at reducing tariffs and customs duties. In 1986 Mexico joined 
GATT, unilaterally reducing up to 80% of its tariffs. On January 1st 1994, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the US and Canada came into 
force, in a phased programme of cuts on duties on imports and tariffs, which 
ranged from immediate reductions to reductions after periods of five or ten years 
for sensitive sectors 461 NAFTA is particularly important because 83% of Mexico’s 
foreign trade is concentrated with just one of its NAFTA partners, the US. In 
addition, Mexico has entered into bilateral trade agreements with duty preference
458 Inteview Arturo Astaburuaga, Moctezuma Beer's representative in Europe, London March 27th, 
2000.
459 Interview Perez Mota, representative SECOFI in Europe, London February 29th, 2000.
460 Bancomext estimates, from its office in London.
461 See Georgina Kessel, ed., Lo Neaociado del TLC (Mexico: ITAM and McGraw-Hill, 1994).
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for goods coming from Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Venezuela, 
Nicaragua and recently the European Union.462 The following table shows the 
large increase of exports as result of NAFTA.
Graphic 4.6.- Mexico Exports Growth
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The following graphic shows the fluctuation of tax revenues from international 
trade as a result of trade liberalisation after entering GATT in 1986. In addition, 
foreign trade was affected by distortions in consumption caused by sharp 
devaluations of the peso aimed balancing budgets, especially during 1982, 1988 
and 1994. Internal data from the Secretary of Finance shows how in peso terms 
tax revenues from import duties declined sharply, both as a result of the reduced 
consumption of imports because of the “end of sexenio crisis” and because 
NAFTA came into effect reducing government income in the form of tariffs.
462 By 1999 Mexico was negotiating trade treaties with a group composed by El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras, and bilateral agreements with Panama, Peru, Belize, Trinidad y Tobago, 
Dominican Republic and Israel.
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Graphic 4.7.- Foreign Trade Revenues Graphic 4.8.- Revenue from Taxes
on Exports











Source: Elaborated with data from Revision Fiscal Integral.
b) Tax on Fixed Assets (TA)
There is a federal tax on corporate assets, of 1.8% of the annual average value of 
the fixed and financial assets of the company. This has been one of the most 
contested taxes ever, although very few have to pay it. This tax only applies if the 
total amount exceeds the amount of the tax on profits, in which case the 
corresponding difference must be paid. The Tax on Assets law offers a credit for 
income tax that allows carry forward and carry back. The decreasing rate of tax 
and the large sectors exempted show the concessions that the government had to 
make to industrial organisations. First the rate was reduced from 2% to 1.8%, and 
later small and medium companies were exempted from this levy.463
463 On January 1st, 1995, the tax on assets was reduced from 2% to 1.8%.
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This tax produces little revenues and was originally introduced as a mechanism to 
expose and deter income tax evasion. According to Former Secretary of Finance, 
Pedro Aspe, the TA was envisaged as such a mechanism, after many companies 
managed to avoid paying taxes by reporting losses for more than 10 years.464
c) Payroll taxes
The federal government taxes corporations with social security fees that amount to 
a minimum of 8.95% of the payroll to be paid by the employer to provide for old 
age, death, child care, retirement and disability. In addition, the employer must 
contribute 5% of each worker’s salary to the National Fund for Worker Housing. 
The payroll tax is lower than most OECD countries, but for the benefit of Mexican 
employers, payroll taxes and fees are deductible for corporate income tax 
purposes.
Conclusion
Analysis of the most important tax instruments shows that the tax system is 
plagued with exemption and tax privileges reducing the taxable base and thus 
eroding tax revenues. The composition of the Mexican tax mix fits Peters' 
description of a tax system heavily influenced by corporate actors and seriously 
concern with not offending the interests of politically worthy groups. The country’s 
tax mix shows the impact of corporatist political structures and the result of the 
bargaining process between the State and interest groups. The influence of
464 Interview Pedro Aspe, September, 20th, 1999.
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interest groups is shown by the multiple loopholes and tax exemption in the tax 
system.
The low income tax rates for corporate and high-income earners show their 
success in maintaining a low burden of taxation and their influence to move the 
system towards indirect taxes. Similarly, the low burden on special taxes shows 
the capacity of large national and international corporations to resist taxation. On 
the other hand, “special regimes” for those in rural activities and transport industry 
show the power of corporatist actors, as well as the numerous products exempted 
from the VAT reflect the concessions given to organised labour and the working 
classes. Finally, it is noteworthy that despite the vehement rhetoric by public 
officials against tax exemptions and privileges, no serious public action has been 




“Large capital holders do not wish to invest and pay taxes in 
Mexico, they distruss the government and the country's 
future.’465
Former President Luis Echeverria
This chapter examines tax reforms during the span of two presidential terms: 
President Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) and President Jose Lopez Portillo (1976- 
1982). Evans argues that although the cumulative effects caused by incremental 
tax reforms between 1970 and 1982 are significant, they have been largely 
underestimated, particularly those undertaken by the Lopez Portillo 
administration.466 For analytical purposes, I have drawn upon common 
characteristics from both presidential terms, as well as those ones that 
differentiate them. The resilient characteristics of this period are: 1) An economic 
agenda dominated by political concerns, in what has been described by the 
literature as “macroeconomic populism” 2)Both Presidents shared a common view 
of the strategy of economic development where the State is the main engine of 
development and growth. 3) A period of easy alternative means for the state to 
finance itself. 4) A relationship of patronage between the state and socio-economic 
actors, where the corporate actors are influential in economic policy making, while
465 Interview, Former President, Luis Echeverria, Mexico City, October 12th, 2000.
466 See John S. Evans, The Evolution of the Mexican Tax System since 1970. Technical Paper 
Series, No. 34 (Austin: Office for Public Sector Studies, Institute of Latin American Studies, 
University of Texas, 1982).
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the business elite is largely alienated; and 5) A period of bonanz, with high 
rates of economic growth for a sustained period of time.
5.1.- Characteristics of this Period
a) Macroeconomic Populism
During this period politics dominated the economic policy agenda and tax 
reforms were largely influenced by corporate actors. The ultimate objective was 
to preserve the political system, using the economy as an instrument for this 
goal. Bazdresch and Levy has classified this period as one of “populist 
macroeconomic policies,” since economic polices concentrated on political 
goals at the expense of economic equilibrium.467 Both administrations pursued 
a set of economic policies designed to achieve specific political goals, while 
disregarding the economic disequilibrium they may cause.468 For Krauze these 
years show an unprecedented politicisation of economic policies which 
ultimately ended in catastrophic economic outcomes 469
Those political aims range from mobilising support within organised labour and 
lower middle class groups, to politically alienating rural oligarchy, foreign 
enterprises, and large scale domestic industrial elites. To Kaufman and 
Stalling, the typical economic policies pursued by these kind of regimes are: 1) 
a budget deficit to stimulate domestic demand, 2) nominal wage increases, plus
^C arlos Bazdresch and Santiago Levy, "Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico," 1970-82, 
in Durnsbusch and Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1991) :223.
468 Durnsbusch and Edwards define populism in economic terms as an approach to economics 
that emphasises growth and income redistribution and demphasises the risk of inflation and 
deficit finance, external constraints and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive non- 
market policies. Domsbusch and Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America.
469 Enrique Krauze, La Presidencia Imperial (Mexico: Tusquest ed., 1997) and Enrique Krauze, 
Por una Democracia sin Adietivos (Mexico: Joaquin Mortiz-Planetta, 1986).
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price controls to effect income distribution, and 3) exchange rate controls or 
appreciation to cut inflation and to raise wages and profits in non traded-goods 
sectors.470 Historical evidence confirms that each one of these policy actions 
was pursued during this period. Sheahan also outlines the common features of 
populist policy-makers, which seem to apply to our subject. Populist 
governments committed, at least in the public rhetoric, to protection of workers 
and wages, to industrialisation, to nationalism, to policies of subsidised food for 
urban consumers and to favours for groups with political influence 471
The origins of macroeconomic populism are found in the crisis of legitimacy 
that the Mexican state suffered at the end of the 1960s. The political events 
that preceded Echeverrfa's term drastically shifted the direction of government 
policies, given an unequivocal “populist” hallmark to the following two 
presidential administrations. The 1968 movement reshaped the following 
administrations' political style and social approach.
For the first time in the post war period, Mexico experienced political instability 
by the end of the 1960s, jeopardising the existence of this long-lived political 
regime. On the 2nd of October 1968 the government suppressed with brutal 
force a student demonstration in Tlatelolco, an event that would have future 
political implications in policy making 472 This sad episode in Mexican history
470 Robert P. Kaufman and Barbara Stallings, "The Political Economy of Latin American 
Populism," in Dornbusch and Edwards.
471 See J. Sheahan, Patterns of Development in Latin America: Poverty. Repression and 
Economic Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987): 316.
For a brief analysis of the Tlatelolco crisis, and the political and economic response from 
government see Cothran, 91-129. See also Samuel Schmuidt, The Deterioration of the 
Mexican Presidency: The Years of Luis Echeverria (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 
1991).
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suddenly broke the image of the “Mexican miracle” and, according to multiple 
scholars, disrupted the traditionally stable Mexican political system.473 For 
Federico Reyes Heroles the government’s brutal repression to silence the 
student movement shook the nation’s political conscience, triggering changes 
that would have an important effect in future social policies 474 Because the 
challenge came from leftist groups, public policies moved towards the left of the 
political spectrum. Echeverrria decided to counteract the public anger against 
the state, pursuing a “populist” style of patronage and paternalism in an attempt 
to legitimise his administration 475
b) Expansionary Strategy
Both Presidents believed in increasing the sphere of action of the government 
in the economy. They were strongly committed to the expansion of the public 
sector in strategic areas, and chose an inward bias of industrialisation focused 
in developing local industry. The ultimate aim was to become economically 
independent. Both presidents shared the dislike of the traditional dominance 
economic elite and the influence of foreign investment. Interviews with key 
policy actors of the period and the relevant literature shows that the 
government sought to become financially independent and consequently more 
autonomous in economic decision making. Paradoxically, the economic
473 For Helman president Echeverria was well aware of the political crisis that his government 
was facing at the beginning of his term and acted in response. See Judith Adler Helman, 
Mexico in Crisis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978): 187-188. Garrido also agrees that the 
presidential system was in crisis, see Luis Javier Garrido, “The Crisis of Presidentialism,” in 
Cornellius, Gentrleman and Smith. 417-434.
474 Federico Reyes Heroles, El Poder: La Democracia Dificil (M6xico: Grijalbo, 1991):148.
475 For an overview of populism in Mexico, see Alan Knight, “Populism and Neo-Populism in 
Latin America, especially Mexico.” Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 13, no.2, 303-312.
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strategy they pursued made the Mexican state economically vulnerable and 
more dependent on international and domestic capital.
Expansionary policies were aimed at raising social expenditure and general 
levels of income. In a departure from the previous economic policies of 
conservatism,476 the government embarked in a relentless spending spree. As 
a result of the lack of fiscal discipline, large deficits developed leading to a loss 
the fiscal equilibrium. During Echeverrla’s term the fiscal deficit reached 10% of 
GDP, while during Lopez Portillo it reached almost 17%. 477
c) Easier Financial Means than Taxation
During most of the twelve year period, Mexico enjoyed access to ample 
international resources, giving the government easier means to finance the 
state than through taxation. International events had a considerable effect in 
Mexico. The most notable factor was the steep rise in oil prices, especially 
significant after the discovery of vast oil reserves in Mexican territory in the mid 
1970s. Another, relevant international event that had a large impact on Mexico 
was the abundant availability of foreign resources to developing countries in the 
early 1970s. Commercial banks were flush with petrodollars deposits from oil 
exporting Arab nations. These banks in turn recycled their dollars to developing 
countries like Mexico, South Korea or Brazil, countries that enjoyed high growth 
rates in those years.478 As a result of these ample and inexpensive resources, 
Mexico’s international indebtedness expanded. Mexico was an especially
476 For the fiscal austerity followed during stabilising development period, see Antonio Ortiz 
Mena, El Desarrollo Estabilizador: Reflexiones Sobre una Epoca.
477 See Banco de Mexico, yearly statistics.
478 Jaime Ross, “Mexico from the Oil Boom to the Debt Crisis An Analysis of Policy Response 
to External Shocks “ Rose Mary Thorp and Laurence Whitehead, eds., The Latin American 
Debt Crisis. (London: Macmillan, 1986).
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attractive borrower to commercial banks, because in addition to the growing 
expansion of the Mexican economy it became a major oil-exporting nation. The 
government also pursued alternative means to finance the state like printing 
money, running deficits and inflation, all with devastating effects on the 
economy.
d) Redefining the Relationship among Policy Actors
The set of macroeconomic policies implemented by President Echeverria 
polarised the fragile and symbiotic relationship between the state and the 
business sector. Both governments supported the idea that economic growth 
and development could only be reached via state intervention of the market. 
The greater government incursion into the economy strained the relationship 
with the private sector, which saw it as an invasion to their domain. An 
antagonistic relationship developed with the business community and although 
it improved at the beginning of the Lopez Portillo administration, it ended with 
the nationalisation of the banking system in response to massive capital flight. 
After 40 years of supporting the government’s economic policies, the business 
elite began to challenge their nature and direction. The financial fragility of the 
Mexican state made the economic elite realise the enormous power behind 
their ability to move capital abroad and its possible use as an instrument to 
resist policies that would affect them. The large dependency on private capital 
and the government’s inability to implement some of the desired tax reforms 
shows a rather weak state, in direct contradiction to the literature that depicts it 
as an authoritarian and almost omnipotent state.
150
During this period the Mexican state was not only responsive to the economic 
elite, but had to deal with a strong corporatist legacy, particularly organised 
labour. The large expansion of the public sector in the economy reinforced 
further the power of organised labour. In order to rally political support from 
corporate actors, both governments adopted populist economic policies and 
clientelism, through the use of subsidies to agricultural development, water, 
transportation, food stuffs and many public services provided by the state. For 
Middlebrook, during the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo terms, clientelism, 
patronage, subsidies and coercion governed the relations between organised 
groups and the state.479
The state sought to consolidate its political power by undertaking an 
interventionist and paternalistic role. Corporatist groups, pillars of the 
hegemonic party, consolidated and expanded their influence during this period. 
Handouts and privileges (various kinds of subsidies) were given to all sectors 
and groups in exchange for loyalty to the regime. The role of the corporatist 
sectors was particularly important for the system because they provided the 
“bedrock vote” needed to legitimise the government480 This paternalistic 
attitude expanded during most of Lopez Portillo’s administration, fuelled thanks 
to the abundant oil revenues during his term.
479 For an excellent review of labour development and its role with the state see Middlebrook, 
The Paradox of Revolution.
480 According to Middlebrook, government-allied unions constituted a base of mass support for 
ruling party candidates in urban and industrial areas. Organised labour political discipline 
during presidential elections was a crucial element in the survival of a closed presidential 
succession process. Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution. 153.
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e) High Rates of Economic Growth
Both presidents were well aware that in order to legitimise the regime they 
needed big economic growth rates. Although growth rates only dropped slightly 
compared to the previous development period known as “stabilising 
development” (Desarrollo Estabilizador), economic expansion continued to 
remain noticeably high.481 During the Echeverria’s administration the average 
growth rate for the sexenio was 8.7%, while for Lopez Portillo’s term it was 
6% 482 This high trend of economic growth was maintained at the expense of 
macroeconomic disequilibrium, caused by failing to match growing 
expenditures with income. Ultimately, divorcing income from expenditure had a 
devastating effect on the economy. Both presidents ended their respective 
terms facing acute economic crisis, resulting from the macroeconomic 
instability that had been triggered by the accumulation of huge fiscal deficits 
and the stampede of capital flight.
Among the most significant differences is the fact that Echeverria's tax reforms 
ended up as mere adjustments, while Lopez Portillo’s reforms were carried out 
successfully. Notable are the differences in approach, scope and direction of 
the proposed tax reforms. Also significant are the abundant oil revenues during 
the Lopez Portillo term, which provided for a short period of time, the long 
desired financial self-sufficiency of the state. It is clear that the motives behind 
the style of economic populism varied while Echeverria’s underlying objective 
was to solve a political crisis, Lopez Portillo sought to please various sectors of 
society and achieve financial self-sufficiency. At last, the relationship with the
481 See Ortiz Mena.
482 Banco de Mexico various issues.
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private sector and the official rhetoric differed substantially between these two 
presidents. Echeverrfa’s term was characterised by harsh criticism of 
entrepreneurs, while Lopez Portillo tried to co-opt them with subsidies. But 
when the economic crisis erupted at the end of the sexenio, L6pez Portillo’s 
rhetoric changed dramatically, to resemblieng that of his predecessor.
5.2.- Echeverria (1970-76): The Pursuit of Equity through Deficit Spending
“A feud between the President and the economic eiite developed 
over the role of the state and the strategy of development Neither 
of them won.’483
Emesto Gil, Echeverria's Private Secretary
Echeverria came to power with the objective of legitimising the government 
after the political crisis that originated with the massacre at Tlatelolco484. As a 
result, political objectives overshadowed the economic ones. He attempted to 
win popular support by promising a better distribution of wealth. His team 
believed that this could be achieved by increasing the role of the state in the 
economy and through the tax system 485 Populist macro-economic policies 
created large public sector deficits, while inflation and foreign borrowing 
provided easy ways to finance the expansionary policies of the state.
These populist policies and the government’s contentious rhetoric against the 
private sector rapidly deteriorated the relationship, which soon escalated from 
antagonistic to confrontational. Not only did the private sector oppose the
483 Interview, Ernesto Gil Elourdy former, Private secretary to President Echeverria, Manila, 
Philipines, July 28th, 2000.
484 It is important to remember that during the late 1960s and early during the 1970s a wave of 
political unrest swept the world. Young people, usually students demonstrated against their 
governments in France, US, Italy and Germany.
Interview Ernesto Gil Elourdy, Manila, Philipines July 28th, 2000.
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populist policies but it openly challenged the nature and direction of economic 
policy.
Most relevant to our case are Echeverria’s attempts to increase revenue 
through failed fiscal reforms, which further enhanced the conflict with capital 
holders. Fitzgerald argues that the tax reform proposals in 1972 broke the tacit 
agreement between the financial sector and the Mexican Treasury to finance 
the modest fiscal deficits in return for no tax reform.486 Echeverria’s ambitious 
tax proposals ended up as mere adjustments, with only a slight increase in tax 
revenues, but at the expense of further eroding the confidence of the private 
sector, who opted for reallocating their capital out of the Mexican economy. The 
Echeverria sexenio culminated with a sharp devaluation of the peso, large 
public debt, and a huge and inefficient para-statal sector. Overall very little 
income redistribution was achieved.
5 .2 .1 Economic and Political Conditions: When Politics takes precedent
a) Responding to Political Instability
Cothran states that by 1970 support for the Mexican regime had weakened 
considerably 487 The 1968 student-led protest and its brutal repression by the 
government brought the erosion of the government’s legitimacy488 This 
incident triggered a profound change in the political priorities at the top of 
government’s agenda. As a result, the final aim was preserving the political
486 E.V.K. Fitzgerald "Stabilization Policy in Mexico: The Fiscal Deficit and Macroeconomic I 
Equilibrium,” in Rosemary Thorp and Laurence Whitehead, Inflation and Stabilisation in Latin
America (Oxford: Macmillan and Oxford University Press, 1979): 39. 
w  Cothran, 100.
488 Echeverria believed that the fundamental problem of the government was the loss of 
legitimacy that the regime has suffered after Tlatelolco. Cothran, 101.
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system, using the economy as an instrument for this goal.489 Economic policy 
was directed to strengthen the financial autonomy of the state and gain scarce 
popular support. Many authors follow this reasoning. According to Looney, the 
economic strategy adopted by Echeverria responded to a number of urgent 
political pressures rather than economic concerns. Similarly, Bazdresch and 
Levy argue that political concerns dominated the agenda, while the economic 
ones became subordinated to the government’s attempt to legitimise itself490
The consensus within government was that the political crisis should be tackled 
by more state activism491 The state would expand its participation in the 
economy, in order to reduce poverty and the influence of foreign firms in the 
economy. Towards this objective, the state would increase public investment in 
areas where private investment was not forthcoming 492 To rally political 
support, Echeverria’s government extensively expanded state subsidies in 
general, and specific subsidies were tailored to politically worthy groups. The 
largest general subsidies were concentrated on reducing the price of oil, 
electricity and fuel, operating the railroad system and lowering food prices 493 
Subsidies to specific sectors usually included tax exemptions.
Because the challenge to the regime came from the left, Echeverria took a pro­
labour, pro-agrarian policy line, accompanied by a belligerent political rhetoric
489 Cothran argues that Echevema's major concern was political stability and like previous 
presidents he looked at the economy as the solution of the problem. Cothran, 106.
490 Bazdresch and Levy, 237-238.
491 Confirmed by Gil Elourdy in an interview, Manila, 28th of July 2000 and Jorge Nuno, close 
collaborator to President Echeverria.
492 Bazdresch and Levy, 237-238.
493 The operations of CONASUPO (National Staple Products Corporation) expanded 
significicatly bringing agricultural products at guaranteed prices and the marketing of such 
products extended through the enlargement of the number of retail stores that sold goods at 
subsidised prices.
155
against the private sector that was aimed to win the support of the leaders of 
the left wing movement. 494 To complicate things further, his attempts to 
increase revenues through taxation caused the relationship between 
Echeverria and the private sector to be at odds, forcing him to look for political 
support within the system’s corporate actors. At the end of his term, the 
deterioration of the economic conditions was so bad that the support of those 
groups eroded as well.
b) Using the Economy as a Political Tool
The economic strategy adopted during Echeverria’s term responded to urgent 
political concerns rather than economic ones. This term is characterised by the 
large role of the state in the economy and the full use of the state apparatus as 
a political tool. Echeverria's cabinet saw the public sector as the main vehicle 
for economic growth. The role of the state was to improve income distribution, 
orient industrial production and develop the national infant industry throughout 
an inward industrialisation strategy. This was attempted by the expansion of the 
state in the economy. The goals of the administration were increasing job 
creation capacity, decreasing external dependency by improving local industry 
capacity to substitute imports, and reorienting industrial production towards the 
needs of the great majority of the population.495
In his last presidential address to the nation, Echeverria stated that his 
presidency has been devoted to improving Mexico’s inequitable income
494 Needier, 34.
495 Robert E. Looney, Bulletin of Latin American Research. Oxford: May 1993: 57
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distribution.496 The paramount goal of public policies was the pursuit of equality, 
through distributional policies (including taxation). The sexenio economic 
development strategy was called "shared development” and it was largely 
focused on rectifying income distribution disparities, using the state to correct 
economic deficiencies. By the end of this term little change had been achieved. 
However, it is important to bring into light the pursuit of a more equal 
distribution of income, because it helps to explain the orientation of tax reform 
attempts during his government.
The main features of Echeverna's term were: the massive expansion of the 
public sector in the economy, a public spending spree and an outburst in state 
owned enterprises (SOE), as well as the proliferation of large subsidies to 
SOEs, the general public and corporate sectors. The spending spree soon 
translated into large public sector deficits and escalating foreign debts, ending 
in severe economic turmoil. Solis has very accurately described Echeverna’s 
term as “the pursuit of equity through deficit spending.”497
c) Massive expansion of the public sector in economic activity 
The political objectives of Echeverna’s sexenio called for a larger role of the 
state in the economy. The number of state owned companies grew from 84 in 
1970 to 845 in 1976, and the number of employees doubled to more than a
496 See “Sexto Informe de Gobiemo,” Mexico, Presidencia de la Republica, 1976. For a good 
overview of Echeverrias Policies see Leopoldo Solis, Economic Policy Reform in Mexico In his 
inaugural address President Echeverria promised to reduce poverty and income inequality. 
See Primer Informe de Gobierno. Mexico, Presidencia de la Republica 1970. Aspe and 
Sigmund show that President Echeverria's efforts to improve Mexico's inequitable income 
distribution achieved very little. See Aspe and Sigmund.
497 See Solis, Economic.
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million.498 The government expanded to areas such as electricity, oil, banking, 
transportation, communications, steel and petrochemicals. The expansion of 
the state was justified as being necessary for correcting the deficiencies in the 
provision of services to lower income groups, and compensating for the 
shortfalls of private sector investment. However, ISI created an over protected 
and inefficient domestic industry with an anti-export bias, with national products 
overpriced compared to international standards. By the end of the Echeverria’s 
sexenio, the state had become obese and inefficient, public sector accounted 
for as much of 45% of GDP 499
d) Increase in Public Spending
Government spending increased with the expansion of the state in the 
economy500 and the desire to appease mounting political unrest. Public sector 
expenditure increased from less than 6% of GDP during the second half of the 
1960s to 17% of GDP in the last two years of Echeverria's sexenio.The current 
capital expenditure of the public sector rose from 22% in 1968 to 29% in 1976, 
without a parallel increase in income. 501 Although public sector revenues 
increased, they lagged far behind the increase in expenditure. The ratio of 
current expenditures to current revenue, which averaged 84% in the 1965 to 
1970 period, jumped to 90% between 1971 and 1976. Public sector investment 
became the engine of growth. Public expenditure rose from an annual average 
of 6% in 1971 to more than 12% by 1976, while private sector investment 
remained almost stagnated from 12% of GDP in 1971 to 13% of GDP for 1976.
498 Cothran, 109.
499 Looney, 59.
500Pedro Aspe and J. Beristain, "The Evolution of Income Distribution Policies during the Post- 
Revolutionary Period in Mexico," in Aspe and Sigmund.
501 Fiztgerald, 30.
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502 The expansion of public expenditure generated an enormous fiscal deficit, 
due to the absence of a tax reform that increased revenues or price 
adjustments of publicly owned enterprises.503
e) Growing Public Sector Deficit
Price controls on key commodities provided by public enterprises fuelled the 
fiscal deficit. Central government subsidies both to public sector enterprises, 
and to private sector through reduced public prices, averaged 5.3% of GDP in 
the 1973-1976. The philosophy of the time was to keep the price of goods and 
services supplied by the government at very low levels in order to make them 
affordable to the masses.504 Between 1971-76, public sector deficit increased 
to an average of 5.7% of GDP, reaching a 9.5% GDP deficit in 1976, compared 
to an average of 2.5% of GDP between 1965-1970. During Echeverria’s 
administration, the federal government's budget deficit rose from 1% to 3.8% 
GDP.505
State revenues proved to be insufficient for the grandeur of the government’s 
schemes. Faced with the spending-revenue disparity, the government looked 
for alternative means of financing the state. The first option was raising revenue 
throughout taxation, but this proved to be more difficult than anticipated. In the 
absence of an increase in taxation the budgetary deficit expanded as current 
income rose less rapidly than the total expenditure in the government and the
Looney, 58.
503 Fitzgerald, 39.
504 Interview Adrian Lajous former Director General PEMEX, London, March 3rd, 1999.
505 Looney, 59.
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SOEs.506 To finance the deficit the government followed a path of mixed foreign 
borrowing and inflationary financing.507 The other alternative was external debt, 
which was widely used causing a rapid escalation in public debt.
f) Escalating Public Debt
The inability to finance the expansion of the industry with internal resources 
rapidly increased the amount of foreign debt.508 Between 1961 and 1965, 
foreign loans financed only 7% of the industrial deficit; by 1975 the figure was 
nearly 66%. As a result, the net income paid abroad in the current account 
deficit increased to more than 50% between 1970-74, compared to 29% 
between 1960-64.509 The expansion of state investment pushed its Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirement as % GDP from 2% in 1971, to 6% in 1973, to 
10% in 1975.510511 In monetary terms foreign public debt grew from USD $4 to 
22 billions in the span of the sexenio.512 By 1976 Mexico owed nearly one 
quarter of all third world debt to private multinational banks.513
The availability of foreign borrowing increased because of OPEC's dollar 
surpluses. The government had easy access to international borrowing, mostly 
due to the petrodollars from oil exporting nations recycled by private banks.
506 Fiztgerald, 30.
507 Bazdresch and Levy, 242. Luke argues that the government chose inflation over taxation to 
finance itself, see Luke, 45.
508 Sidney Weintraub “Case Study of Stabilization: Mexico,” in William Cline and Sidney 




511 Fitzgerald, 33. The annual borrowing requirement average rose from 3% of GDP in the 





The 1973 oil boom enhanced Mexico’s access to international resources, as 
the international financial markets needed to recycle these large petrodollar 
deposits. As a result, commercial banks increased their lending to developing 
countries substantially.514 In 1975, the announcement of the discovery of large 
oil deposits in the south improved Mexico’s already easy access to foreign 
borrowing. For government officials, foreign borrowing offered an easy 
alternative to finance government expansion. External borrowing was perceived 
by the political elite as an opportunity to be taken advantage of.515 This was a 
source of relative cheap resources that did not entail the high political cost of 
taxation.516
g) Capital flight
By the end of Echeverria’s term, after large budget deficit and increasing 
devaluation expectations, businesses and the middle class slowed their 
investment in Mexico and sent much of their money abroad. The trust in the 
currency eroded and dollar deposits increased from 17% of total deposits in 
1970 to 40% in 1976.517 The general economic situation worsened, as a result 
of the capital outflows that began in mid 1974. The decline in private sector 
confidence was reflected in the large amounts of capital flying out of the 
Mexican economy. An estimated US$ 4bn fled the country during the 18 
months preceding the devaluation.518 The combination of under-investment and
514 Most borrowing came from private banks rather than multilateral organisations, charging 
variable interest rates at shorter maturities.
515 See Tello, also interview Adrian Lajous, former director PEMEX, London March 3rd 1999.
516 Luke argues that the large sums of money raised in the private banks merely financed 




capital flight, plus a notorious worsening of the balance of payments,519 
contributed to a decline in the economic growth rate from 8% to 4% in the last 
year of the sexenio.520 In September 1976, with no more alternatives left the 
peso was devalued by 59%, after depleting the country’s foreign reserves 
attempting to defend its value. The inflation rate was 22% and foreign debt 
amounted to $29.5bn. Echeverrla’s term ended in a liquidity crisis and the 
need for an agreement with the IMF to stabilise the economy after the 1976 
devaluation.521
5.2.2.- Policy Actors and their Influence: Struggle at the top
The literature describes in detail the influence of corporate actors in Mexico 
during this period. Representatives of these social organizations have 
described this period as the “golden days,” when they considered themselves 
to be influential in policy making.522 Determining the degree of influence of the 
corporate actors is without doubt a difficult task. Nevertheless there are indirect 
means that help to evaluate the true leverage of organised groups, such the 
number of subsidies and privileges received, the scope of political autonomy 
and, most evident, the political positions occupied by their representatives. The 
former is particularly significant in a system where the executive assigned 
congressional seats according to negotiated “quotas.”523
519 Enriquez, 31.
520 Cothran, 11.
521 For a detail description in the stabilization strategy followed by Mexico and the IMF 
requirements see Fitzgerald, 24-63.
522 Interview with Deputy Augusto G6mez Villanueva, Mexico, March 20th 1999.
523 This is a good way to visualise the power exercised by corporate groups in a given sexenio, 
since the government usually compensated their political support through congressional seats.
In an interview, Santiago Onate, former PRI’s president confirmed this assumption, London 
March 8th, 2000. Camp shows that very few administrative positions were given to the leaders 
of the corporate organisations. See Roderic A. Camp, “El Tecndcrata en M6xico,” Revista 
Mexicana de Socioloaia Mexico, UNAM, num. 2-3, April-June, 1983.
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a) Labour: rebuilding the support base
Economic and political subsidies to labour increased in exchange for support 
to government policies during Echeverrfa's term. According to Middlebrook, 
President Echeverria promoted a democratic opening of organised labour by 
permitting greater freedom of action for opposition labour and political groups. 
There was more tolerance of labour politics, and the number of applications for 
union registration increased greatly; 327 applications were received just in the 
first year.524 He also expanded government subsidised worker housing, granted 
government employees a forty-hour working week, and enacted several 
emergency wage hikes to compensate workers for price increases. In addition, 
the prices of goods and services provided by the state were kept low to support 
the working class.525
As state owned enterprises expanded so did the numbers and consequently 
the bargaining power of organised labour. Labour’s “political quotas” increased 
in both chambers during the Echeverrfa’s administration.526 Table 7.1 shows a 
large rise in organised labour's seats in Congress during Echeverrfa's term, 
up from 20% to 30% of the PRI’s total representation. Similarly, in the lower 
Chamber, the number of deputies representing labour increased from 11% to 
22% of the total number of deputies (See table 5.2).
524 Middlebrook, 175.
525 See Middlebrook, 160 and Paulina Fernandez Chistlieb and Octavio Rodriguez Araujo, “En 
el Sexenio de Tlatelolco,” in Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, La Clase Obrera en la Historia de 
Mexico (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1985).
b2b According to Renddn, President Echeverrria tried to manipulate internal opposition rather 
than suppressing it by force. Heavily relaying on corporate organisations within the official 
party, Echeverria expanded their seats in Congress. To see a detail account of the governors, 
and seats in Congress occupied for labour leaders see Armando Renddn Corona, La 
Renovacidn de la Clase Politica en Mexico. 1940-1977 (Mexico: Universidad Autdnoma 
Metropolitana, 1990): 93.
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Table 5.1.- PRI’s Sectorial Representation before Congress
Year/Total Agrarian % Labour % Popular %
1970(177) 26.6 20.3 53.1
1973(192) 27.1 19.8 53.1
1976(196) 28.6 29.6 41.8
Source: Rend6n, 258
Table 5.2.- Chamber of Deputies: percentage in relation to the total
number of deputies
Agrarian Popular Labour
Year Number % Number % Number %
1970 41 18 72 34 22 11
1973 42 18 83 36 27 12
1976 33 17 77 40 42 22
Source: Rendon, 257
b) Peasants: consolidating their strong hoid
The agricultural agenda was at the top of Echeverria's programme. In an 
interview with Gomez Villanueva, former Secretary for the Distribution of Rural 
Land, he stated “Echeverria's top priority was developing the rural sector, he 
used to called me every single day to learn how things were progressing.” 527 
Echeverria was personally committed to accelerate the distribution of 
communal land called “ejidos,” even to a degree that effected many large
527 Interview with Augusto G6mez Villanueva, former Secretary of Land Tenure, Mexico, March 
20th 1999. According to Echeverria’s probably his closest collaborator in his cabinet. See 
Castaneda, la Herencia.
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landowners.528 According to Needier, at the end of his term the President was 
supporting even illegal land seizures by peasants.529 The evidence clearly 
suggests that the agricultural agenda was a priority for this president. This 
could be explained either because the CNC was the main corporate force 
behind his presidential nomination or because he was really committed to it. 
Mexico had suffered a profound decline in agricultural growth since the 
1960s.530 The fundamental reason was the potential of political unrest in rural 
areas, due to the unequal inequities of distribution of wealth in the 
countryside.531
In the 1970s, there was evidence of a declining trend in agricultural production 
and in public investment in the rural sector. Per capita agricultural production 
decreased from 12% during 1965-1970 to 8% from 1970-75. To reverse this 
trend Echeverria increased federal investment in agriculture from 15% in 1971 
to 20% in 1976.532 In 1971, Mexico began to import significant amount of food 
stuff and grains. This caused strident complaints from the rural representatives. 
To compensate for the agricultural decline, Echeverria extended subsidies and 
further tax privileges to this sector.533 The statistical data shows that 
proportionately the agricultural sector contributed much less to tax receipts 
than this sector’s overall contribution to GDP.534 Curiously, the number of
528 Interview G6mez Villanueva, Mexico, March 20th 1999.
529 Needier, 36.
530 To learn about the forces behind Echeverria’s nomination see Castafieda, La Herencia.
531 Merillee S. Grindle, “Policy Change in an Authoritarian Regime," Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs. N. 4119,531.
632 Cothran, 107.
533 See David Barkin, Distorted Development: Mexico in the World Economy (London:
Westview Press, 1990).
534 See Informacidn Sobre los Ingresos Gubemamentales 1970-80 (Mexico: Secretaria de 
Programacidn y Presupuesto y Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, 1982).
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political appointments offered to peasants and farm leaders, either in the form 
of governorships or congress seats, did not increase considerably.
c) Business sector: confrontation and struggle
During Echeverria’s period, the business elite felt alienated from the process of 
economic decision making. As early as 1970, Coparmex accused the 
government of not consulting business organisations for the design of 
economic policy.535 The relationship between the government and the state 
deteriorated because of Echeverria's economic policies and his anti-business 
rhetoric.536
The economic elite felt so alienated that it confronted the government, by 
openly challenging its strategy on economic development. The process of 
confrontation rapidly escalated to conflict. At the beginning, business 
organisations adopted a very critical position over the government’s economic 
policy, but as this strategy failed to provide results they organised themselves 
into a common front. The Monterrey conglomerate formed a national pressure 
group called the Co-ordinating Council of Businessmen (CCE). This group was 
constituted by a very select group of the 30 or so largest companies in the 
country. To Tello and Cordera, the CCE was born in reaction to state policies 
that might remove their prerogatives.537 But to its leader, Eduardo Bours it was
535 Luke, 46
536 For a detailed account of the origins of the conflict with the private sector see Roberto 
Newall and Luis Rubio, Mexico's Dilemma: The Political Origins of Economic Crisis (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview, 1981) for an account on the war of words see pages 126-127.
537 Tello and Cordero, 65.
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simply a natural response of the big entrepreneurs who felt that these 
economic policies were affecting their interests.538
The conflicting relationship between the state and the business community is 
summarised with two articles of the time.539 The first article by Lorenzo Servitje, 
one of the most important entrepreneurs in Mexico, shows the stern struggle 
with the private sector over the management of the economy, particularly 
inflation and those policies aimed at redistributing income. He fiercely attacks 
the government’s monetary policies and its inflationary effects. Furthermore, 
although he acknowledges the large income disparities, he harshly criticises 
the policies implemented by Echeverria's government, suggesting they could 
be depicted as “dictatorial.” The discourse also shows the confrontation with 
labour organisations calling them a “working aristocracy.”540
At the core of the dispute was the role of the state and the proposed tax reform. 
Bernardo Pacheco, President of the Studies Committee of the Social Union of 
Mexican Empresarios (USEM), demanded a greater autonomy and 
participation of the business community in the planning of economic 
development. Openly he asked for tax privileges for those who co-operate with 
the state and suggested coercion, either by business organisations or the state, 
for those business men reluctant to participate in the shared development plan. 
Although Pacheco accepts that the deficiencies of the private sector should be 
compensated by state participation in the economy, he stands for clear rules of
538 Interview Eduardo Bours, London, October 13th 1998.
539 These articles show the profound struggle between the private sector, the state and labour 
organisations over the strategy of economic development.
Lorenzo Servitje, “La Inflacibn, la Distribucon del Ingreso y los Empresarios,” Revista USEM 
No 29, January and February 1975, 20-24.
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the game that draw up the boundaries of the public and private sectors sphere 
of influence.541
Soon the verbal confrontation escalated into a political struggle over the 
country’s economic strategy of development.542 Echeverria’s economic policies 
were seen as a threat to businesses interests, in particularly to the northern 
Monterrey fraction, which saw these policies almost as a declaration of war 
against the business community.543 Ultimately, the struggle caused the rupture 
between the entrepreneurial class and state elites.544 For the economic elite the 
tacit agreement between the state and entrepreneurs had been broken with the 
expansion of the state and the proposed tax reform.545 Three public policies, in 
particular, caused acute problems between the state and the business elite: the 
tax reform proposal, the strategy for international trade and the one for 
agricultural development. The government policy reversal in these three areas 
shows the power of the business elite. The distributional tax reform was 
ultimately aborted; the strategy of international trade culminated by postponing 
Mexico’s entrance to GATT and the agricultural development strategy, was 
timidly implemented with the SAM (Mexcian Food System) programme.546
541 See Bernardo Pacheco, “Dinamica del Desarrollo," Revista USEM No 29, January and 
February 1975, 3-7.
542 See Carlos Tello and Rolando Cordera on the struggle over the strategy of economic 
development.
543 Conversation with Oth6n Ruiz, director of one of the large Monterrey companies, after a 
conference at the Harvard Business School over the relationship between government and the 
private sector, May 18th, 1994.
For more information on the confrontation of the state and the economic elites see Hamilton.
545 This was the perception of the business community in Monterrey, according to Nuevo Le6n 
Senator Eloy Cantu, interview London November 12th, 1999.
546 See Tello and Cordera, 63.
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Capital holders soon realised the powerful leverage embedded in their ability to 
move their capital abroad, and began to use it as political instrument to oppose 
unfavourable economic policies. One of Echeverria's cabinet members, Carlos 
Tello, stresses in particular the power of the Banking community.547 In his book, 
Tello harshly criticises the ample benefits given to financial groups, like free 
convertibility of the peso, anonymity of property, special tax treatment, ample 
guarantees to their investments and deposits, high yields and profits, and no 
problems with unions.548 He goes even further, to place the blame of the 1976 
crisis on President Echeverria, and his lack of courage to remove the system of 
privileges given to the financial sector.549
d) External Actors: distant relations
Exogenous actors did not play a prominent role in shaping the government’s 
economic policies during Echeverrfa's term 550 In spite of this, the government 
ended up signing a loan agreement with the IMF after the economic crisis of 
1976. The conditions required by the loan were very limited and its surveillance 
lax. The only specific commitment that was demanded by the IMF stabilisation 
programme was cutting it public sector deficit from 9.9% in 1976 to 2.5% of
547 SeeTello, La Polftica Economica de M6xico.
548 Tello and Cordera, 105. According to Jean Moorhouse, the Bank of England supervisor of 
Latin America, Mexico more than any other country of the world enjoys the high degree of 
protection of investments and deposits by the state. Interview, London, February 2 9 h, 2000.
See Tello, 208. This author was a prominent member in the Eceheverria and L6pez Portillo 
economic cabinet. According to Tello a restrictive monetary policy and the worldwide crisis of 
capitalism were the main factors behind the crisis of confidence in 1976. He argues that there 
was not commitment from the President to re-define the way the economy was financed. He 
criticises the state's excessive protection to the financial sector and its “unlimited" privileges. 
Interview, CarlosTello, M6xcio City, feb 29, 2000.
550 According to Gil Elourdy, Echeverria’s private secretary, he concentrated on politcal 
institutions rather financial ones. Echeverria distanced his agenda from that of the US, by 
embracing the cause of so called not allineated countries. Interview, Philippines, July 28th 2000.
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GDP by 1980. Nor even a drastic cut in public spending was required by the 
IMF, just an expenditure cut of 0.5% GDP was recommended.551
During his term Echeverria was strongly committed in breaking Mexico’s 
dependence on foreign investment and markets.552 In an attempt to reduce the 
influence of foreign companies in the Mexican economy, he tightened the legal 
requirements for the majority of Mexican ownership and exposed those 
companies owned by Mexicans just on “paper” (prestanombres). 553
5.2.3.- President Echeverria’s Tax Reform: In Pursuit of Revenues and 
Equity
Right from the start of his period Echeverria stressed the need for a radical tax 
reform that would increase revenues. According to one of his economic 
Secretaries, a fiscal reform that would increase revenue seemed the logical 
option for the expansionary plans of the government.554 Echeverria originally 
planned to finance increasing spending through a progressive tax reform, which 
at the same time would help to redistribute income by increasing the tax burden 
on those better off. Nevertheless, the ambitious plans for a fiscal reform ended 
up just as fiscal adjustments (adecuaciones) due to the opposition from the 
private sector and the perceived political cost of implementing the desired 
reforms.555
Luke, 47.
552 Interview, Ernesto Gil Elourdy, Philippines, July 28th 2000.
553 Cothran, 109.
554 Tello.
555 For an excellent overview see Elizondo, “In Search."
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The first attempt to increase government revenue was made in 1970, but it had 
a small impact in revenue terms.556 The business community opposed the tax 
reform on the grounds that they had not been consulted. By 1972, the 
executive tried to revive a 1964 tax proposal for an increased tax burden for 
companies, previously blocked by business interests during Diaz Ordaz's 
term.557 This second tax proposal faced strong opposition from within the 
government, particularly from the Central Bank and the Secretary of Finance 558 
The proposed changes included direct taxation of property income, as well as 
the aggregation of personal incomes from different sources of income in a 
single tax base, plus the abolition of anonymous forms of wealth holding.
These proposals largely affected the interests of the better off. The studies at 
the Secretariat of Finance, revealed that the tax rate in some categories was 
not only very low, but as income was fractionalised it was impossible to impose 
progressive taxation. Income could be moved to another category to avoid 
higher tax rates, and it was very easy to deduct personal expenses. The 
anonymity of wealth represented a big fiscal issue, since income was taxed 
according to income categories or source of income. Taxpayers were not 
obliged to disclose their wealth assets, so property holders remained largely 
anonymous.559 Hence, income tax was borne principally by wage earners, the
556 To see more details Elizondo, “In Search ,” 166.
557 See Ortiz Mena for the 1964 proposal that was rejected.
558 See F. H. Purcell and S. Kaufman, El Estado v la Empresa Privada. Nueva Polftica Col 1, 
No 2 (1976), 230 and Elizondo," In Search," 167.
559 See Elizondo, “In Search.”
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only ones that faced a progressive tax scale.560 The statistics show that wage 
earners contributed most of the tax receipts.561
Tax authorities saw the elimination of the anonymity of wealth more as a 
control mechanism than a way to raise revenues significantly.562 The 
government expected to provide relevant data on capital flows and the wealth 
position of rich Mexicans.563
Businesses, particularly big ones opposed the reform, arguing that the 
government had over-reached its traditional economic boundaries. The bill 
never reached Congress, having been dropped by President Echeverria under 
pressure from business groups and the Central Bank, arguing that would lead 
to capital flight.564 In addition, the adjustments to tariffs and prices of public 
services were delayed in an attempt to curb inflation, and to avoid alienating 
the support of popular sectors. At the end, fearing that the reforms would affect 
the corporatist groups, only minor changes were implemented, in the form of 
increases in tax rates.
After a long struggle, in 1974 the government introduced the so called 
"adecuaciones fiscales,” or mild modifications to the tax structure to increase 
revenue, which did not alter the nature or composition of the fiscal system. The
560 The direct tax burden shifted towards earned salaries See Fiztgerald in Thorp and 
Whitehead Inflation and Stabilization. 31.
561 Informacidn sobre los Inaresos Gubernamentales.
562 See Solis, Economic Policy Reform. 72-73 and Maxfield, Governing Capital 88-92.
563 Elizondo, "In Search," 167. Elizondo argues there was great concern among businessmen 
of the government knowing who owned what, since the satate would be in a better position to 
impose other kind of controls in the future. Elizondo," In Search," 168. Solis argues that the 
private sector saw the proposal as the first step to impose foreign exchange controls. Solis, 
Economy Policy Reform. 76.
Fiztgerald, 31.
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increase in revenue was based on indirect taxation, higher rates of personal 
income and the reclassification of wage earners’ tax brackets due to inflation. 
The reforms had some distributional effects. The maximum marginal tax rate 
for individuals was raised from a 35% to 50%. For companies, the tax rate was 
a flat 42%, despite a progressive schedule for corporate income. There were 
also important reforms in indirect taxation, increasing taxes on items consumed 
by the rich and higher excises. As a result, federal tax revenues were 
augmented thanks to the increased rates of the turnover Sales Tax (TST) and 
in excise taxes on goods such as beer, soft drinks, alcoholic beverages, 
telephones, cigarettes, and electricity. Tax rates remained low, compared to 
international standards and both the TST and the excises stood at extremely 
low levels. The only exception where Mexico was conspicuous was luxury rates 
of 30%.565 However, tax increases were not restricted to the better off. Taxes 
on popular consumed goods such as beer and petrol were increased as well, 
showing that Echeverria's commitment to increase tax revenues was beyond 
his populist stance.
On the administrative front, significant changes were made in terms of co­
ordination between federal and state fiscal authorities. The introduction of a 
new turnover sales tax led to the co-ordination of federal and states sales taxes 
and helped to eliminate the multiplicity of rates and treatments that had spread 
over time across the thirty-two federal entities. The reform of the revenue 
sharing scheme provided a unified tax system that paved the way for the 
introduction of VAT some years later.
565 Gil Diaz, “Tax Reform.” 262 -265.
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Two other important reforms in Echeverria’s period were the inclusion of 
financial interest income from rented property in the tax base and the changes 
to taxation of financial interest income. The first reform was largely cosmetic, 
but tax increases on financial interest had profound effects. According to Gil 
Diaz such policy raised very little revenue, but affected the main internal 
sources of funding for the government and private sector; the deposits made to 
domestic financial intermediaries. The government was a prime borrower of 
internal funds, so the higher tax was reflected in the higher cost in its internal 
debt. As a result, both the private and the public sector enhanced the level of 
foreign borrowing.566 This reform affected the bankers and holders of capital, 
enhancing their proclivity to transfer their resources abroad.
The results of the adecuaciones were that total tax revenue went up from 
8.15% of GDP in 1971 to 9.78% in 1974, 11.25% in 1975, and then down to 
10.97% in 1976. The three most important indirect taxes went up even faster: 
from 4.22% of GDP in 1971, to 5.18% in 1974, 6.18% in 1975, then down in 
1976 to 5.72% Income tax revenues rose from 3.44% of GDP in 1971, to 
4.05% in 1974, 4.47% in 1975 and 4.82% in 1976.567
566 Gil Diaz, “Tax Reform,”263.
567 Elizondo," In Search," 172.
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5.3.- Lopez Portillo (1976-1982): Management of Abundance
7 want to inform the Mexican people that as a result of the 
discovery of abundant oil reserves in the south, Mexico has 
become finally financially self-sufficient. From now on, the country’s 
only economic problem is how to manage our wealth. ”
President Lopez Portillo, 1979
As a candidate Lopez Portillo talked about the financial needs of the State, the 
lack of adequate means of financing it and the urgent demand for a tax reform. 
Such reform included greater faculties to states and municipalities so they 
could increase their tax collection share.568 Lopez Portillo implemented far 
reaching tax policies in some of these fronts, but the promised deep tax 
reforms that would improve Mexico’s financing capacity never arrived.
President Lopez Portillo shared the same strategy of economic development as 
his predecessor, undertaking a large expansionary role of the state in the 
economy. Regarding taxation, however, L6pez Portillo's approach to reforming 
the tax system was different. According to his Secretary of Finance, David 
Ibarra, a distinctive change of tactics took place, moving towards a consensus 
building strategy, which helped to pass important reforms, above all, the 
introduction of VAT.569 Noticeable is the fact that tax reform proposals began to 
move away from the hefty distributional agenda of the previous government. 
Nevertheless, tax authorities still believed that the real income of low-income 
people could be improved through tax-rate tailoring.570 Also significant is the
568 See El Pensamiento Politico de Jose L6pez Portillo: La Campana Presidencial (Mexico. 
IEPES, PRI, 1979) 361, 369, 372 and 376.
569 Interview David Ibarra, M6xico, September 25th, 1999.
570 Gil Diaz, 264.
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fact that the tax reforms moved away from instruments that could clash with the 
interests of capital and big business.
The literature has been consistent in asserting that the Mexican government 
always opted for alternative means of financing the state that would avoid 
political conflict, in particular taxation. However, Lopez Portillo's successful 
reform seems to contradict this argument, since significant tax reforms were 
implemented during a period of plentiful revenues from oil. Undoubtedly, the 
new approach of extensive negotiations and the avoidance of conflict with 
capital through anticipatory tactics were fundamental for the success of the 
reforms, but they alone cannot explain it. Hence, the answer may rest on the 
fact that the oil resources gave the state greater autonomy before the economic 
elite; a financial and thus political autonomy sought by all presidents. 
Reinforcing this argument, former Secretary of Finance David Ibarra states that 
oil revenues provided an unprecedent leeway to the government in dealing with 
the private sector over economic policy.571
According to Luke, after the 1976 crisis the immediate priorities for the Lopez 
Portillo administration were to stabilise the economy and restore confidence to 
large sections of the populace, especially the middle classes and the private 
sector.572 L6pez Portillo's private secretary Roberto Casillas agrees with this 
argument, highlighting the priority given by President Lopez Portillo to 
rebuilding the relationship with the private sector, describing it as “a
571 Interview Ibarra, September 25th, 1999.
572 Paul Luke, "Debt and Oil-led Development: The Economy Under L6pez Portillo," (177-82) in 
Philip, The Mexican Economy.
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fundamental state policy”.573 This President tried to win the people’s support 
with more privileges and subsidies, both in the form of open and covert 
transfers from the public sector, rather than confronting the private sector. 
During this administration all sorts of subsidies increased, like artificially low 
public sector tariffs and tax exemptions.574 Luke has cleverly described this 
period as “oil fired populism.” 575
Lopez Portillo populism included extensive subsidies to all sectors of the 
society, not just businesses, ranging from inexpensive public goods and 
services to cheap dollars. This administration has been described as one 
“obsessed with pleasing all groups” and oil revenues provided the necessary 
means to do so, at least for a short time. Unfavourable external conditions 
added to the destabilising internal factors affecting the economy, culminating in 
the financial crash of the economy in 1982. One year before the sexenio ended 
the price of oil began to decline rapidly, while world interest rates increased. 
The government recurred to foreign borrowing to finance the growing deficits, 
but such funds rapidly dried up, leaving the country’s public finance in chaos.
573 Interview Roberto Casillas, President L6pez Portillo's private secretary, Mexico, April 28th 
2000.
574 A policy of price contention was established with controls of nominal wages and the price of 
public services. The contention of the price of public services resulted in huge subsidies to 
state owned enterprises. A large social programme by the name of the Mexican Food System 
(Sistema Alimentario Mexicano) was implemented. It was aimed to reduce poverty and improve 
nutrition of lower income group as well as raising incomes of the rural poor through guaranteed 
prices for basic grains. Badrezch and Levy, 249.
675 Luke, 59.
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5.3.1.- Economic and Political Conditions: Handling the Oil Boom
a) In search of financial independence
At the centre of the discussion is the search for the financial autonomy of the 
Mexican State. Gil Diaz argues that the favourable revenue environment made 
it politically difficult to sell an increase in the tax load or a "structural” tax 
reform.576 However, it can be argued that oil revenues gave the government 
more independence to pursue a reform on its public finances. Most actors 
interviewed for this thesis agree that vast oil resources postponed the much 
needed tax reform. Yet the evidence shows that some of the most important 
reforms in the last three decades took place during this period, including ihe{ 
introduction of VAT and the Fiscal Co-ordination Agreement, as well as 
important reforms to direct taxation which affected those with higher incomes J 
This apparent contradiction reinforces one of the main arguments in the thesis, 
that the Mexican state has been largely constrained to impose tax reforms 
because it is largely dependent on capital not generated by the state.577
Lopez Portillo shared Echeverria’s belief in the strategic role of the public 
sector in the economy, and the state as the guiding force in the economy 
(Rectoria del Estado). Since the post-revolutionary period the state had been 
searching for greater financial autonomy and oil revenues seem to provide 
such desired self-sufficiency. According to Bazdresch and Levy, L6pez Portillo 
wanted a large public sector and an economy immune to the will of the private 
sector. This meant a government capable of producing its own inputs or at least
576 Gil Diaz, “Tax Reform”. 261.
577 President Zedillo in his PhD thesis has argued that the Mexican State was financially 
constrained by lack of savings, tax revenues and oil income. Maxfield has shed some light on 
the large dependency of the state on the savings of the capital holders in Mexico, see Maxfield.
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capable of generating the foreign exchange required to buy these inputs, 
without running the risk of being blackmailed by the private sector with capital 
flight.578 All presidents have been constrained in economic policy making, 
particularly in taxation by the menace of the transfer of large private resources 
abroad. Not even Lopez Portillo who enjoyed vast oil revenues, was immune to 
the devastating effects of capital flight.
During Lopez Portillo's period oil resources offered the necessary resources to 
carry out an extensive government programme which included the 
development of industry, infrastructure, the tourist sector and simultaneously 
could eliminate poverty and malnutrition while achieving self sufficiency in 
energy and basic grains.579 To Anglade and Fortin oil revenues dramatically 
eased external constraints and allowed the resumption of growth at an average 
rate of 8.4% between 1978 and 1981.580 For Cothran, thanks to the oil wealth, 
Mexico appeared less bound by the financial constraints than previous 
governments.581 Confirming this argument, David Ibarra, Lopez Portillo's 
Secretary of Finance, stated that “oil revenues gave the State the confidence 
necessary to pursue the tax reforms.”582
b) From Economic Boom to Boost
Lopez Portillo’s sexenio shows three distinctive periods: In 1977 the 
government attempted to restore economic stability through fiscal discipline 
after the economic crisis inherited from the Echeverria administration. Then, in
578 Bazdresch and Levy, 248
579 Bazdresch and Levy, 246.
580 Anglade and Fortin, 270.
581 Cothran, 119.
582 Interview David Ibarra September 25th, 1999.
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1979, the oil bonanza translated in a renewed spree of government spending 
and foreign indebtedness. The oil boom provided an enormous inflow of foreign 
exchange to finance the expensive public expenditure programmes. Lastly, 
when the oil boom waned in 1981, macro-economic desequilibrium 
reappeared, ending in an acute financial crisis. Like his predecessor, Lopez 
Portillo concluded his term amidst a financial crisis and by signing a 
stabilisation program with the IMF. This time, however, the Mexican economic 
crisis had international repercussions, leading to a painful decade of economic 
stagnation in Latin America.
c) The Oil Bonanza and Growing Government Spending 
In the first two years of his administration, President Lopez Portillo tried to 
maintain fiscal prudence in government finance. But the discovery of large oil 
reserves, returned the government to the expansionary polices of the past and 
the postponement of much needed structural reforms, including taxation.583 
During 1978 and 1979, the price of oil skyrocketed multiplying government 
revenues. The new oil revenues triggered government spending, which 
increased from 13.7% in 1978 to 14.1% in 1979 in real terms.584 Oil revenues 
also had a positive effect on taxation.585 The private sector responded 
positively to large economic growth and the change in the official rhetoric, and 
private investment rose from 5.1% of GDP during 1978 and by 22% in 1979. 
The risk of devaluation was perceived as minimal given the expected volume of
583 To Solis the abundant supply of new resources turned the government’s attention away from 
structural reforms. Solis, Economic Policy Reform in Mexico. 59-72.
584 Bazdresh and Levy, 248
585 According to Baillet tax revenues as percentage of GDP rose with the oil boom from 11.3% Ti 
in 1976 to 15.1% in 1982. After the effects of the oil bonanza, the ratio drastically fell to 11.4% | 
in 1983 and 10.3% in 1984. See Alvaro Baillet, The Mexican Fiscal System (M6xico: El Colegio < 
de Mexico, 1986): 7.
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foreign exchange earnings coming from oil.586 According to Gil Diaz and 
contrary to some widespread notions, the economy on the whole had been 
adequately managed up to the end of 1980. The increase in public 
expenditures had been matched by even faster increases in revenues, thus 
permitting regardless of ever-increasing foreign debt financing of the fiscal gaps 
an improvement in the external and internal public debt ratios to GDP.587 As a 
result the Mexican economy was strong and growing, and foreign bankers were 
eager to lend money to the Mexican government. Few years later, it became 
clear that oil revenues were not sufficient to pay for the ambitious government 
agenda, and the government recurred to external borrowing once again.
Although government revenues largely increased thanks to oil income, 
expenditures increased further during the second period, as the state 
undertook large projects in infrastructure, health and nutrition, as well as 
productive public enterprises. Large amounts were channelled to the 
development of state owned enterprises, with heavy investment to the 
petrochemical and energy sectors, and large subsidies on energy prices.588 
The large range of sectors where the government intervened and the vast 
resources coming from oil generated large inefficiencies in state owned 
enterprises. A statement by former Secretary of Finance Jesus Silva Herzog 
clearly illustrates the scope of the inefficiencies when he said “we were so 
inefficient in managing state owned companies, that the Mexican government
586 Bazdresh and Levy, 249.
587 Gil Diaz, 261.
588 In the interview Ibarra complained that a large portion of oil revenues went to subisidise 
energy prices and invest in the development of PEMEX.
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was the only proprietor in the world that ran a cabaret club in red numbers.”589 
In addition to inefficiency, the lack of control in the allocation of resources 
stimulated the spread of corruption. Oil revenues helped to expand the scope 
and depth of public works, but the abundance of resources triggered rampant 
corruption and mismanagement. Corruption flourished as a result of massive 
spending without control, accountability or professional bureaucracy.590
d) Losing the Handles of the Economy
Large government projects, subsidies to the population and state owned 
companies generated huge deficits in the current and fiscal account. The 
current account deficit increased from $2.7billion in 1978 to $16 bn in 1981. In 
spite of the ample revenues from oil, the deficit in the current account was met 
with foreign borrowing. Foreign debt increased dramatically from $ 36.4bn in 
1978 to $74.4billion in 1981, most of which was contracted with private banks 
at short maturities and variable interest rates. In 1982 the total external debt 
represented, 51.7% of the country’s GDP.591 The ratio of public external debt 
as a percentage of total external debt jumped from 73.1% in 1975 to 83.2% in 
1982. According to Ibarra, the vast oil revenues led the economic cabinet to 
believe that the government could undertake large development projects 
financed with relatively inexpensive international loans.592
589 Conversation in Georgetown University in November 12th, 1994.
590 The magnitude of corruption during Lopez Portillo administration shocked the nation, see 
Juan Miguel de More, Esto nos Did L6pez Portillo (M6xico: Anaya Editores, 1982) and Julio 
Scherer Garcia, Los Presidentes (Mexico: Editorial Grijalbo, 1986). Corruption spread to such 
extent that in his presidential campaign Miguel de la Madrid tried to disassociate himself from it 
by calling for a national crusde against corruption.
The Mexican Economy, 1985 (Mexico: Banco de Mexico, 1985).
592 Interview David Ibarra September 25th,1999.
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In 1981, the price of oil plummeted and subsequently so did government 
revenues. As a result the government had to turn to foreign borrowing to 
finance spending. The external debt increased from USD$49bn to almost 
$75bn in 1981 alone. After the oil boom was over, foreign commercial banks 
continued to lend money to Mexico, probably because they felt that the fall in oil 
prices was just a temporary phenomenon, and there was hope that the 
American government would come to the rescue if needed.593 In 1982 Mexico 
owed $16.5 billion to the 13 major US banks. This amount accounted for almost 
half of the US’s largest banks' capital.594 There was fear that if Mexico 
defaulted other major debtor nations in Latin America could follow, unleashing 
an international economic crisis that, according to Green, could be at the scale 
of the 1930s crash.595 By the end of L6pez Portillo administration foreign debt 
totalled $92.4 bn.596
The government’s first response was to implement a small devaluation and a 
contractionary package, which included cuts in public investment and in food 
subsidies, as well as increases in public energy prices, but this failed to stop 
the stampede of resources. In a second attempt the prices of public services 
were raised, all imports were subject to control and the rate of growth of public 
expenditure was reduced from 25% in 1981 to just 3.7% in 1982. But the 
government lost control, inflation reached almost 100% and the public sector
593 Bazdresch and Levy, 251.
594 For more information on the issue check Adhip Cahuhuri, The Mexican Debt Crisis. 1982. 
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Studies of Diplomacy, Georgetown University 
School of Foreign Service, case 204).
595 Green, Silent Revolution. 60.
596 Badrezch and Levy, 252.
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deficit nearly 18% of G D P.597 Suddenly the flow of external borrowing halted, 
while the defence of the peso drained foreign reserves further. By August 1982, 
the government announced a moratorium in payments and a large devaluation 
(the peso devalued 470% from December to December) that year.598
The private sector responded to economic uncertainty and the lack of economic 
adjustments to government’s fiscal disparities with massive capital flight. To 
Anglade and Fortin the escalation of capital flight generated confrontation 
between the financial sector and Lopez Portillo's administration. The president 
blamed the crisis on financial speculators.599 This developed in an intensely 
acrimonious relationship that culminated in the nationalisation of the banking 
sector.600 Badrezch and Levy argue that President Lopez Portillo nationalised 
the banking industry and introduced exchange controls, probably as means to 
punish the private sector for taking their capital abroad or to reassert the 
primacy of the government in the economy.601
Table 5.3.- Capital Flight
(billions of dol ars)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
1.88 2.67 7.36 8.22 4.07
Source: Dornbusch in Williamson.
597 Badrezch and Levy, 252.
598 Anglade and Fortin, 270.
599 Anglade and Fortin, 271.
600 See Elizondo, interview February 19th, 2000. 
801 Badrezch and Levy.
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5.3.2.- Policy Actors and their Influence: In search of reconciliation
According to Bazdresch and Levy, during the L6pez Portillo sexenio economic 
policy was characterised by an attempt to “please all." The populist economic 
policies tried to please urban workers by providing more jobs, middle classes 
with price subsidies and an overvalued exchange rate, the bureaucracy with 
greater influence due to larger involvement of the government in the economy, 
the private sector with an overvalued exchange rate and sizeable profits in the 
domestic market, and rural Mexico to an increase in employment, infrastructure 
investment, and the subsidies of the Mexican Food System (SAM).602 The 
primary task was to restore the legitimacy of the regime that had been 
tarnished by Echeverria, and in particular restore business confidence in the 
regime.603
Luke asserts that the strategy adopted by L6pez Portillo was to use “political 
reform” to acquire legitimacy with the left and liberals and “corporatism” to 
marshal the support of the private sector.604 With the use of abundant 
resources, the government sought to buy the support of corporatist groups. 
Economic subsidies were distributed indiscriminately, and political subsidies in 
the form of electoral posts were also assigned discreetly amongst PRI's 
corporate organisations.
The multiple exemptions and privileges in VAT and other tax instruments 
shows that corporate actors remained very influential in economic policy. The 
business sector maintained its predominant influence over economic policy, but




the nationalisation of the banking industry represented a strong blow to their 
traditional dominant position. International actors exercised just a marginal 
influence on policy making, even the IFIs. The US did not become involved in 
Mexico’s financial difficulties until 1982, when they realised that Mexico’s 
defaulting on its payment could have a large impact on large American Banks.
a) Labour: accommodating Union’s interests
In addition to the subsidies established by his predecessor, Lopez Portillo 
increased the “political subsidies” to labour, trying to consolidate their support. 
Labour leaders were uneasy with the high rates of inflation experienced during 
1976 and demanded more political positions for their representatives in 
exchange for the economic sacrifices made by workers.605 In 1976 the number 
of seats “assigned” to labour representatives at the chamber of deputies 
augmented, as recognition of their influence and support for the government’s 
economic policies.606 Labours' quota expanded further between 1979-1982, to 
reach almost a third of total PRI’s deputies.607 In addition, Lopez Portillo 
strengthened his personal ties with long lasting labour leader Fidel Velazquez, 
and other union leaders from state owned companies 608 Gil Diaz recalls the 
power of union leaders in the input to the design of tax policies, remembering 
that a famous union leader bluffed that “the exemptions in VAT had cost blood,” 
referring to the pressure put into government to include these amendments that
605 Interview with Angel Aceves, three times President of the Treasury Committe at the Lower 
Chamber and economic advisor to labour's leader Fidel Velazquez, London, October 14th, 
1999. See also Middlebrook, The paradox.
606 Ibid.
607 Forty four deputies belonged to the CTM.
608 Interview Angel Aceves, London, October 14th, 1999.
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would benefit workers the most.609 Mr. Ibarra states that as Secretary of 
* » » .  h . tad » ,  ■ « .  c r ,  -  * .  », |
workers in the design of the VAT reforms.”610 Thus, extensive negotiations took^ 
place to accommodate the interest of labour.
b) Peasants: fighting for survival
Large subsidies went to the rural sector during this period. In 1980, the 
government introduced the SAM, the objective of which was to make the 
country self-sufficient in seven basic crops by 1985.611 The scheme aimed to 
help improve farm incomes and increase the demand for domestic products. 
Large investment went to modernise the state owned company producing 
fertilisers (FERTIMEX). The funding of agricultural production increased during 
Lopez Portillo's term to an annual average of 4.5% compared to Echeverria's 
2.6%.612 In political terms, quotas to agricultural representatives via the 
National Confederation of Peasants (CNC) increased from 20% of Congress 
seats in 1950 to almost 30% during the 1976-1979 613
c) Business: rebuilding a deteriorated relationship
One of the top political objectives was to re-establish the strained relationship 
with the private sector. According to Roberto Casillas, President Lopez 
Portillo's private secretary, the first government priority was to rebuild business 
confidence in the regime, stating that “the President and his cabinet went out
609 Interview Francisco Gil Diaz, former Under-Secretary of Finance, during Salinas term, 
Mexico, September 21st 1999.
610 Interview Ibarra September 25th, 1999.
611 Luke, 62.
612 Badrezch and Levy, 248.
613 Renddn, 259.
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to re-establish the channels of communication and rebuild the deteriorated 
relationships with diverse interest groups, in particular the private sector.”614 
Another clue that it was fundamental to re-erect the relationship with the private 
sector, is the fact that acting President Echevema decided on L6pez Portillo as 
his successor as a way to build bridges of understanding and cooperation with 
financers, since as Secretary of Finance L6pez Portillo enjoyed a good 
relationship with the private sector. 615
President Lopez Portillo's rhetoric towards the private sector changed 
drastically, compared with that of the previous administration. In the first couple 
years of his presidency, L6pez Portillo embarked on making conciliatory 
gestures to the private sector. Among these new attitudes was active 
consultation of economic matters with business and professional organisation, 
particularly issues related to tax policy making.
In order to win back the support of the private sector, L6pez Portillo's 
government introduced a number of general and particularised subsidies. The 
reasoning behind the subsidies was to create instruments that would 
encourage business to invest in selective sectors considered key areas for the 
development of the country. 616 Towards this aim, many subsidies in the form of 
tax exemptions or privileges were instituted under government programmes. 
One of the most important efforts was the “Alliance for Production,” an 
agreement where the private and public sector jointly committed to increase 
investment and productivity. In exchange the president offered tax relief on
614 Interview Roberto Casillas, Mexico April 28th, 2000.
615 Interview Casillas, Mexico April 28th, 2000 and JorgeCastaneda, Spain, March 1 1th, 1998.
616 Retckiman, 35.
invested profits. The Alliance for Production was an important attempt to 
improve the relationship with the government, giving a prominent role to 
business in the development strategy, though detractors understood the 
scheme as an excuse to hand over privileges unilaterally.617
There were many other schemes aimed to seduce the private sector using 
fresh resources and tax incentives. In 1978, a large programme to support 
small and medium size companies was launched, offering assistance for pre­
investment studies, credit lines and different investment incentives, including 
those of a fiscal nature.
Other programmes supporting industry reduced duties on imported inputs and 
offered various tax incentives, including accelerating depreciation. Moreover, 
the Industrial Development Plan established a system of “fiscal promotion 
certificates” applicable against any federal tax, issued in support of new 
investments, new sources of employment and the purchase of domestic 
machinery and equipment.618 But despite the numerous subsidies and 
incentives, by the end of the sexenio the relationship between the government 
and the private sector had deteriorated due to capital expatriation. In return, 
Lopez Portillo retaliated with the nationalisation of the banking sector619
Luke, 51.
618 Luke, 54.
619 Many scholars see the nationalisation of the banking sector as an expression of the power 
of the state over capital. See Anglade and Fortin, 271. I see it more like a personal vendetta 
than a properly thought state policy. According to an interview with Ibarra it was made 
secretively and unexpectedly, since he found out very shortly before the announcement. In my 
opinion it was driven by the President’s frustration and anger against those whom he thought 
responsible for the collapse of the economy in 1982, the so called “sacadolares" or those 
super-rich who had moved their capital assets abroad.
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The Secretary of Finance of the time, David Ibarra, complained about 
“businesses blackmailing the government over whether to invest and keeping 
their capital assets in Mexico.”620 He was particularly bitter about the way the 
bankers had triggered capital flight with “false accusations over the handling of 
the economy.” To the Secretary of Finance during Lopez Portillo presidency, 
“the massive stampede of capital abroad orchestrated by the banking 
community caused the breaking-off between the state and the business 
community.”621
d) Foreign actors: just a marginal role
International actors played a limited role during the Lopez Portillo 
administration. Former Finance Secretary, Ibarra, recalls that “their (IMF and 
World Bank) input in tax policy was largely technical and only marginal.”622 The 
fact that the economic collapse took place at the end of the presidential term, 
put all the burden of adjusting and implementing stabilisation programmes on 
the next administration. However, this time important stabilisation measures 
were required.623According to Tello and Cordera, the US had become more 
tolerant to Mexico’s policies because it was one of its largest oil providers 624 
The US government did not become involved in the country’s economic policies 
until the liquidity of the major US banks was put in jeopardy with the possibility 
of Mexico declaring a debt moratorium 625
620 Interview David Ibarra September 25th, 1999.
621 Ibid.
622 Ibid.
623 See the vast literature before quoted on the 1982 debt crisis and the conditionality clauses. 
For an overal review see Lustig in the Remaking of the Economy.
624 See Cordera and Tello.
625 See Maxfield.
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It is important to highlight that state governors emerged as influential actors as 
a result of extensive tax negotiations. The Secretariat of Finance spent a long 
time persuading state governors of the benefits of the introduction of VAT and 
the new fiscal co-ordination agreement. David Ibarra, describes the 
negotiations as “very difficult” and remembers “the huge task involved in 
lobbying state governors for their support.”626 He stresses the difficulties faced 
in removing well-established clientelism, since mutual benefits between 
companies and state or municipal authorities had developed at the cost of 
collection.
5.3.3.- Lopez Portillo's Tax Reforms : A Consensual Approach
President Lopez Portillo took a different approach to fiscal reform: by favouring 
consensus over confrontation, and instead of clashing with the private sector 
over who will carry the burden of the taxes, his administration improved indirect 
taxation spreading the cost over consumers. There are three very significant 
reforms implemented during the Lopez Portillo term, amendments to income 
taxes, the improvement of indirect taxation through the introduction of the VAT 
and a new fiscal co-ordination agreement that brought uniformity and improved 
the revenue sharing system.
The reforms were carried out in various stages from 1978 to 1982. Some 
important changes to the income tax of individuals and corporations were 
introduced in the 1977 income tax law, such as the differentiation between 
cumulative and non-cumulative incomes. The objective was to make taxation
626 Interview Ibarra September 25th, 1999.
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more progressive, by adding ail the sources of income of an individual into only 
one taxable base.627 The law also established a distinction between enterprises 
as major and minor taxpayers according to their yearly gross income. For minor 
taxpayers the law stipulated a flat rate of 5% on gross income and for major tax 
payers the average corporation income tax rate was 40%.
There was a gradual change in the income tax. The three objectives of income 
tax reform were to increase its scope, reduce its distortive effects on resource 
allocation and adjust it to inflation. With regards to base broadening, dividends 
were made cumulative to personal income with the introduction of an 
integration scheme that allowed full credit for the corporate income tax. Some 
important reductions to tax privileges were implemented. Capital gains were 
included in the individual income tax base, with the exception of gains on stock- 
listed shares. The reforms were able to bring under the normal tax rules the 
construction industry, previously among the "areas of special treatment” such 
as agriculture, newspapers and trucking. This was an important 
accomplishment because it ended the possibility of over-invoicing through 
construction industry receipts.
In the individual income tax, the elimination of itemised personal deductions in 
favour of a single personal deduction equal to an annual minimum wage also 
introduced the indexation of deductions. More importantly, the income tax 
schedule was adjusted every year to account for inflation. According to Gil Dlazl
I 1
although the inflation adjustments were incomplete, especially in the corporate
627 Baillet, 5.
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income tax, they prepared the way for full indexation in 1987.628 However, the 
reforms to accumulate income were ineffective, since multiple loopholes in the 
legislation and lax surveillance allowed large income earners to evade the 
higher marginal rates. 629 Lopez Portillo was firmly committed to implementing 
an inheritance tax since he was Secretary of Finance during Echeverria's 
presidential term. However, he failed to do so even as President due to the 
stern opposition of the economic elite.630
a) The Introduction of VAT
The most important reform was the introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT) 
in substitution for the purchase tax and multiple other levies.631 It was a 
remarkable achievement since it involved the elimination of the 4% TST, a 30% 
luxury rate and 25 federal and 300 state excises 632 To achieve this task 
important administrative changes were made in order to simplify and facilitate 
the incorporation of local taxes into the VAT system. But most significant were 
the extensive negotiations needed to pass the law enacting VAT.
At the beginning, the private sector and professional groups were opposed to 
the VAT, because they felt it would trigger inflation.633 Nevertheless the 
administration was convinced that the effect of VAT would be at most a slight
628 Gil Diaz, 265-266.
629See lnformaci6n sobre los Inaresos Gubemamentales.g ■»-r
His son Jose Ramon L6pez Portillo, then Under-Secretary of State during his father 
sexenio, described the conversations with his father on this matter and how committed he was 
to the idea, which never became reality due to the powerful opposition of the “very rich" in 
M6xico. Interview Jos§ Rambn L6pez Portillo, London February 17h, 1998.
631 For a statistic overview of VAT see Mario Calderon Daniel, “Evolucion del IVA,” Secretaria 
de Hacienda y Cr6dito Publico, November, 1998. Mimeo.
632 According to David Ibarra, the reforms eliminated 600 local taxes and 36 federal ones, 
Interview September 25th.1999.
633 This was the same argument presented by the private sector during Echeverria’s term.
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once-and-for-all increase in the price level.634 A feature that increased public 
resistance was the visibility of the levy. Unlike other countries, the Mexican law 
requires the tax to be shown separately from the price on sales slips.
Gil Diaz argues that the VAT proposal almost fell through due to the opposition 
both from within and outside government.635 To persuade different socio­
economic actors and non-supporters within the government, the Secretary of 
Finance presented position papers, international evidence, and comparisons on 
the benefits of the proposal. In a departure from the previous administration, 
extensive consultation took place, taking into account the various points of view 
to make the necessary amendments.636 Diverse groups were interested in how 
the new tax would affect them, and separate negotiations were conducted 
before the law was enacted and in the year before it went into effect637
Extensive negotiations were needed to build consensus. Secretary of Finance, 
David Ibarra, recalls that “the benefits of the new indirect taxes were clear both 
in terms of revenue and as an evasion control mechanism. But it was a difficult 
endeavour to convince sceptics both outside and inside the government.”638 
Among those sceptics was President Lopez Portillo himself639 Gil Diaz
634 Stated by Gil Diaz and confirmed during the interview with Ibarra.
635 Interview Gil Diaz, Mexico, September 21st, 2000 and Guti6rrez Prieto June 5th, 1999 over 
opposition to the VAT.
According to David Ibarra, the Secretary of Finance used tax experts to convince the private 
sector and political intermediaries, and frequently deputies to convince labour organisations. 
Interview September 25th, 1999.
637 Gil Daiz, 264. Former Secretary Ibarra explained how the new tax system altered the burden 
of taxation causing new winners and losers. In particular he recalls the stem opposition posed 
by the radio and television companies, which without a productive chain were not able to 
deduct the VAT tax. Interview Gil Diaz, September 21st, 1999.
638 Interview Ibarra September 25th, 1999.
639 In an TV interview President L6pez Portillo stated that he regrets to this day introducing the
VAT mechanism.
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highlights that in the end it was all due to the Secretary of Finance’s ability to 
persuade the president and the different socio-economic groups that the 
inconveniences were outweighed by the advantages that the VAT scheme was 
carried.640
The rapid evolution of VAT exemptions shows how the government had to 
accommodate its tax policies to the pressures of interest groups. Current 
Secretary of Finance Gurria, recalled in a recent speech that from the day the 
VAT was born multiple exemptions began to appear. 641 Union stores came 
first; not much later a cascade of products were exempted from value added 
tax, demonstrating the influence of corporatist sectors.
Two distinctive stages of the VAT rate structure during L6pez Portillo term 
illustrate the influence of the corporate actors: 642 In 1980, a 10% general rate 
was introduced with a special rate of 6% for the northern border. This special 
rate was an effort to standardise the level of sales taxation at that of 
neighbouring U.S cities.643 A zero rate was given to some agricultural goods 
and some basic foodstuffs, demonstrating the influence of labour leaders and 
unions. In addition to the products given zero rating, exemptions were given to 
sales through union stores. In the interview David Ibarra, bitterly complained
641 In a speech to the CCE, Secretary Gurria recalled the night when VAT was introduced at the 
Chamber of Deputies, particularly how representatives from labour and other organisation 
began to demand exemptions for foodstuffs. See Jos6 Angel Gurria speech to the Business 
Coordinating Council, in Mexico city on November 4th 1999.
642 Gil Diaz, 265.
643 Gil Diaz states that it is impossible to have a tax for purchases much higher than that of the 
US, taking into account that more than 200 million people cross the border every year. 
Interview, Mexico, September 21st,1999. See “Evolution del IVA.”
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about weakening the original VAT scheme with such exemptions, stating that it 
has been “contaminated by politics.”644
A year later, the VAT zero rate was extended to include more foodstuffs.645 
With this action, the government responded to political pressures and to those 
who argued that VAT had fuelled inflation.646 A shift, to expand the items under 
preferential tax treatment, shows the pressures exercised from business 
organisations and corporate groups, who attributed the rise in inflation to this 
new indirect tax.
The two most important issues in the VAT debate involved the general rate and 
the revenue sharing formula. The Secretary of Finance estimated that the 
general VAT rate should be at 12.7%, to compensate for the revenue that was 
going to be lost through the elimination of the plethora of federal and state 
taxes. Meanwhile the business sector demanded the general rate be set at 
10%. In order to eliminate the biggest obstacle for the negotiation, the 
Secretary of Finance agreed to lower the rate to 10% to avoid the main 
obstacle to the consensus.647 The other central issue in the negotiation with the 
states was the formula for sharing revenues.
The administrative changes for the implementation of VAT required intense 
negotiations with state fiscal authorities regarding the new revenue formula.
644 Interview David Ibarra September 25th, 1999.
645 This largely affected the overall tax collection yield of VAT from 2.8% of GDP in 1981 to 
2.2% in 1982. See data Calderon, 103.
646 The rise of inflation from 18.2% in 1979 to 26.3% in 1980 was attributed to the introduction 
of VA T.
647 Gil Diaz, 260.
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The old formula for revenue sharing was based on a portion of the amount they 
collected, which was nearly impossible to calculate under the VAT.648 A new 
formula based on rewarding with a large coefficient to those states that 
produced a greater percentage increase with respect to the average 
percentage, did not work. To keep all the states content, tax authorities 
proposed raising the overall percentage while maintaining the system’s 
constant coefficient, which unfortunately led to a complacent administrative 
attitude in most states and an increasing haemorrhage of federal funds.649
b) Fiscal Co-ordination Agreement
In 1980, the government introduced a programme of Fiscal Co-ordination 
aimed to eliminate overlapping tax competencies among tiers of government, 
give uniformity to the tax system, avoid competition for investment amongst 
provincial states and to introduce a mechanism for the distribution of federal 
resources. The National System of Fiscal Co-ordination (NSFC), was 
integrated by two agreements: the NSFC and the Administrative Collaboration 
for Fiscal Federal Issues.650 The Secretary of Finance, David Ibarra, recalls the 
difficulties of building consensus among the governors, since more developed 
states, and those with oil revenues refused to relinquish part of their resources 
to those less well off.651 At the end, the NSFC programme was so 
contaminated by politics that ended by enhancing the process of centralisation.
648 Gil Diaz, 263.
649 Ibid.
650 For more information on fiscal coordiantion, see Diaondstico del Sistema de Contribucidn v 
Distribucion de Hacienda Publica Estatl v Municipal (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de 
Adminsitracion Publica, 1996), Maria Emilia Janetti Diaz, “La Coordination Fiscal y los 
Ingresos Estatales," Comercio Exterior Vol. 39, no.9, September 1989, 769-774. Managing 
Across Levels of Government: Mexico (Paris: OECD, 1997).
651 Interview, David Ibarra, Mexico, September 25th, 1999.
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Conclusion
The analysis of Echevema's period highlights the consequences of divorcing 
spending from income, it also shows the government’s concern over the lack of 
sufficient tax resources to finance the state. This is an issue widely discussed 
in the literature. For Cothran, Echevema’s problem was that “he tried to 
redistribute more (resources) than those that were sustainable by the revenues 
available.” 652 Enriquez, taking a similar position argues that it was a 
“government that tried to do too much and too fast without the necessary 
resources to succeed.”653 Fitzgerald also believes that the great mistake of 
President Echeverria was that public expenditure expanded without having 
attained reforms on the financing side.654 Ultimately, the absence of a tax 
reform that would boost revenue contributed to the loss of control of the 
economy in 1976.
The evidence demonstrates that Echevema’s policies responded more to 
political than to economic concerns. He and his cabinet tried to adjust the 
system in the direction they thought necessary to maintain political 
stability.655As cleverly stated by Looney, “Echevema’s economic strategy is 
best evaluated not as a mere product of arbitrary and irresponsible personal 
leadership, but as a reasonable rational attempt to reinvigorate the political
652 Cothran, 112.
653 Enriquez, 30.
654 Fizgerald, “Stabilisation Policy in Mexico," 25.
655 Cothran, 116.
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system, accepting a certain loss of short term economic equilibrium as the 
price.” 656
In the end, Echevema’s government was ultimately unsuccessful in 
undertaking a fiscal reform that would provide the necessary funds to 
redistribute wealth and finance and the enlargement of the state. Two great) 
deterrents were capital flight and the possibility of disrupting the fragile socio­
political coalition that supported the regime. It was the resistance of the' 
business class and particularly the threat of capital flight which inhibited the 
type of tax reform Echevema dearly wanted.657 Purcell and Kaufman speculate 
that Echevema did not seek the support of popular sectors or the middle 
classes to pass the tax reform because it would have politicised the issue to 
such an extent that it would had provoked a greater flow out of capital from the 
economy.658
The government’s tax policy reversal shows a weak state, highly responsive to 
the pressures of the corporate groups. In the view of the participating actors, 
the government could not introduce the desired tax reforms without causing 
major economic and political disruptions. This shows a state largely 
constrained by the influence of socio-economic actors, particularly the business 
community and their ability to move their capital abroad, which largely 
constrained the leeway of economic policy-makers. He confirmed that “the 
state was constrained in economic policy, any reform required negotiations and 
compensate those affected”. Soon, the economic elite discovered that the
656 Looney.
657 Fitzgerald, 263-282.
658 Purcell and Kaufman, 245
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menace of capital flight could act as a powerful deterrent in opposing 
government economic policies and began to make full use of it. This was 
particularly worrisome for a country with such “borrowing requirements” as 
Mexico.
Echeverria’s tax reform, land distribution and social welfare policies threatened 
the economic interests of business and the wealthy. However, it is notable that) 
the social bias of the reforms were targeted to extract resources mainly from 
big business and the better off the accumulation of income in one taxable base, 
the tax on property and the end to wealth anonymity). No reform efforts were 
made to eliminate tax privileges benefiting corporate actors.
In conclusion, those aborted tax reforms during President Echevema’s 
administration generated a negative precedent over the capacity of the state to 
extract resources from the private domain. Surprisingly, despite vehemently 
defending the tax reform, Echevema made a policy reversal aborting the 
intended tax policy changes. This was considered by the business elite as a 
victory against “intrusive government policies,” boosting their confidence to 
oppose further tax attempts that could affect them.659 This precedent, plus 
recurrent fiscal imbalance and the state’s growing need of funds gave the 
holders of capital a powerful leverage to influence economic policy making from 
then on. Ironically, the tax proposals sought financial self-sufficiency but I 
increased its dependence on domestic and international capital. '
659 Interview Gutierrez Prieto, August 22nd, 2000.
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In contrast, President Lopez Portillo and his team took a different approach in 
how to operate the proposed tax reforms. Extensive consultations and lobbying 
was undertaken to avoid possible confrontation with powerful interest groups. 
Negotiations and premiums (subsidies and tax holidays), given to economic 
sectors allowed the government to implement important reforms. The 
introduction on VAT exemptions shows how interest groups were able to 
secure additional tax privileges. Nevertheless, sensitive tax policies which 
affected the interest of powerful political groups, such as the construction 
sector (which had enjoyed a privileged tax treatment for a long time), were 
implemented as well.
Elizondo stresses that the relatively low opposition to tax change during L6pez^ 
Portillo's term is largely attributable to the gradual implementation of the 
reforms, the lack of anti-business rhetoric by the government, plus the 
existence of loopholes to avoid payments of taxes and the oil boom.660J 
However, another relevant reasoning behind the success of Lopez Portillo's 
reforms is that they did not affect to a large extent the interests of the economic 
elite. The burden of the tax reform was passed on to consumers, setting a trend 
that would be followed by the next Presidents. As oil prices waned the Mexican 
State lost power and the momentum to push for further tax reforms, suggesting 
the plausibility of constrained autonomy of the state.
Baillets suggests that the designers of any tax reform must take into 
consideration the type of tax payers their proposals are designed to affect, as
660 Elizondo, "In Search," 175.
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well as discriminate in order to maximise efficiency.661 Following this reasoning, 
Lopez Portillo's administration took a different approach to reform, aware of the 
conflicts with the private sector brought about by the attempted tax reforms 
during Echeverria's period. This time the fiscal reform emphasised indirect! 
taxation, affecting consumers and not taxpayers with large incomes and 
holders of wealth.
Oil revenues provided the trust behind the tax reforms, as the state found itself 
with almost no financial constraints. For a few years Lopez Portillo was able to 
reach the highest level of autonomy enjoyed by any of his predecessors. 
Unfortunately this comfortable situation did not last. Badrezch and Levy argue 
that Lopez Portillo's populism failed to reach its political objectives, as the huge 
debt built up, the bank nationalisation and the exchange controls did not 
strengthen but instead further weakened the government.662
As a general conclusion, the evidence provided in this chapter reinforces the 
main hypotheses of this thesis, that politics dominated the tax policy-making 
process. Both populist policies ended in the need for macroeconomic 
stabilisation after recurrent liquidity crisis. In each term policies seem to have 
been introduced as a response to inadequacies or errors in previous 
approaches.663 The tax exemptions introduced into VAT legislation 
demonstrate the power of corporate actors to shape policy. In both 
administrations the volatility of domestic capital was a major source of concern. 
Business confidence developed after what they considered a successful
661 Baillet, 77.
662 Badrezch and Levy, 265.
663 Philip ed., The Mexican Economy , 4.
202
attempt to reverse tax policy. As the financial position of the state deteriorated 
the economic elite confirmed that capital flight represented an important 
deterrent to adverse economic policies.
The conflict generated by Echevema’s tax reform proposals confirms the 
sensitivity of the issue of taxation in the relationship between the state and the 
business elite. It supports the idea that a tacit agreement between the state and 
private sector over the load of taxation existed. The failure of the state to 
implement the tax reform reinforces the argument of a rather weak state, 
contradicting the popular depiction of the Mexican State as a strong and 
authoritarian regime.664
The evidence suggests that the policies of Both presidents represent clear 
attempts to obtain greater financial independence for the State. However, as 
has been stated by Professor Philip, “foreign borrowing during Echevema and 
a combination of borrowing and oil revenues under Lopez Portillo, led policy­
makers into the dangerous illusion that Mexico had become a constraint-free 
economy; the result of this illusion was economic crisis in 1976 and far more 
severely in 1982.”665
664 In analysing the Echevema period Cothran questions the authoritarian depiction of the 
Mexican political system. He high lights the weak position shown by the state to impose the 
necessary tax reform. Cothran, 112.




“Taxation was a tool, just a part of our greater strategy of 
modernisation of the economy. Our true objective was opening the 
Mexican economy to the world.”666
Pedro Aspe, Salinas’ Finance Secretary
6.1 Characteristics of this Period
a) Economic Transformation Triggered by the Debt Crisis 
The presidencies of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) and that of Carlos Salinas 
(1988-94) undertook an unprecedented programme of economic 
transformation. The implementation of these policies shifted Mexico’s economic 
strategy from inward looking to export oriented. This process of transformation 
was triggered by the Mexican debt crisis.667 In 1982, the supply of foreign 
resources to Mexico stopped as creditors realised the magnitude of Mexico’s 
debt and the unstable economic situation. Mexico’s debt stood at approximately 
$80 billion (51.7% of GDP).668 If Mexico defaulted then other major debtor 
nations in Latin America could follow, unleasing an international economic 
crisis, that according to Green, could be of the scale of the 1930s crash.669
666 Interview Pedro Aspe, September 20th, 1999.
667 To learn about the third world debt, see Thomas D. Lairson and David Skidmore, 
International Political Economy: The Struggle for Power and Wealth (Florida: Harcourt Brace 
College Pub, 1993): 275-313.
668 A large part of the debt was contracted with commercial banks from OECD countries, US 
financial institutions being the largest creditors. Mexico owed $16.5 billion to the 13 major US 
banks. This amount accounted for almost half of the bank’s capital. To learn about Mexico’s 
1982 debt crisis see Rosario Green, Lecciones de la Deuda Externa de Mexico, de 1973 a 
1997 (Mexico: Fundacion Colosio y Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1998) or Cahuhuri, The 
Mexican Debt Crisis. 1982.
S6a Green. Silent Revolution. 60.
204
The debt crisis spread to other Latin American countries, which like Mexico 
were unable to service their international debt. As a result I FIs decided to tackle 
the mounting problem with macroeconomic adjustment programmes, debt 
rescheduling agreements and structural reforms. Creditors decided that these 
types of programmes were the only viable strategy to solve debtor countries’ 
economic crises.670
As a condition for new financing, I FIs demanded a set of structural adjustment 
policies. Multilateral organisations promised medium term credit facilities for 
assisting debtor countries to gain economic self-sufficiency if debtor 
governments implemented a recipe of structural economic reforms671 and 
stabilisation programmes 672 The set of policies required by IFIs and the US 
Treasury in order for debtors countries to renegotiate their international debt, is 
known as the “Washington Consensus.”673 The ten policy instruments are: 
fiscal balance, reducing public expenditure, tax reform, interest rates, exchange 
rates, trade liberalisation, foreign investment, privatisation, deregulation and 
property rights 674 However, after years of implementing these policies, they 
failed to restore growth675 while inflicting an enormous social cost.676
670 See Edwards, The Latin American Debt Crisis.
671 For information about structural adjustments see: Adjustment Lending Policies for 
Sustainable Growth: Structural and Sectorial Adjustments: World Bank Experience. 1980-92. 
Peter Kenne, “The Use of IMGF Credit” and Edwards, Crisis and Reform.
672 Stabilisation programmes are designed to reduce demand by cutting government 
expenditure, controlling money supply and rising interest rates, devaluating to correct currency 
overvaluation, restricting imports and expanding exports. For information on stabilisation 
programmes in Mexico see Fitzgerald, “Stabilisation Policy in Mexico," and Lustig, Mexico: The 
Remaking of the Economy and Jim6nez “The Social and Economic Cost of Structural 
Adjstments.” Masters’ thesis, Harvard University, 1999.
673 See Williamson, Latin American Structural Adjustments.
674 To look at the record of implementation of policy reforms in Latin America, including Mexico 
see Williamson, Latin American Adjustment: Edwards, Latin America and the Caribbean and 
Lora, "A Decade of Structural Reforms in Latin America".
675 According to the World Bank, the aim of structural adjustments loans (SALS) is to support
programmes of policy and institutional change necessary to modify the economy, so debtor
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Right at the core of the structural reform programme was the opening of the 
economy, which constituted a departure from the ISI development strategy 
followed since the 1930s in the region.677 External factors played a major role in 
the countries’ economic transformation, IFIs being the key factor in the shift of 
the region’s economic development strategy towards an outward-market 
economy.678 Another contributing factor was the process of globalisation, which 
greatly facilitated the worldwide expansion of IFIs recipe for economic 
adjustment.679
As a result of the country’s economic opening, Mexico became more vulnerable 
to external shocks and the influence of international actors. In particular, policy­
makers became more responsive to international conditions and foreign 
influences. A greater autonomy of market forces meant reducing the 
government’s influence in political and economic terms. In general, the
countries implementing such reforms could restore growth as well as maintain the viability of its 
balance of payments in the medium term. However, they have only been successful in the 
second objective, since economic growth stalled for more a decade. See Structural and 
Sectorial Adjustment. 107.
To learn about the social cost of structural adjustments see Mohsin Khan, “The 
Macroeconomic Effects of Fund Supported Adjustment Programs,” IMF Staff Paper. 37.2 
(Washington DC: IMF, 1990); Tony Killick, Moazzam Malik, and Marcus Manuel in “What Can 
We Know About the Effects of IMF Programme? World Economy 15 (1992): 212-234; Victor 
Bulmer Thomas ed., The New Economic Model in Latin America and Its Impact on Income 
Distribution and Poverty (London: Macmillan, 1996); David Barkin, Distorted Development: D. 
Woodward, The Impact of Debt Adjustment at the Household Level in Developing Countries 
(London: Printing Publishers, 1992); Nelson, “The IMF and the Impact of Structural 
Adjustments on the Poor,” in The IMF in a Multipolar World: Green, The Silent Revolution: 
Watkins, The Oxfam Report: David Ibarra, Transicidn 6 Crisis? Las Contradicciones de la 
Politica Economica v Bienestar Social (Mexico: Nuevo Siglo, 1996).
The import substitution model was based heavily on public sector spending as the primaryl 
engine of growth in a highly protected inward looking industry. CEPAL’s model of ISI included A 
state interventionism, inward orientation and disregard for a macro economic balance. ■*
678 The World Bank recognises the increasing insistence of IFIs economists to shift Latin 
American development strategy torwards market based policies. See Edwards, Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 23g?g ■— ■ 1
Harvard Professor Dani Roderick believes that globalisation has helped to spread the neo­
liberal model around the world, Spain March 17th, 1997.
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profound economic transformation, as well as the sharp decline in economic 
growth during this period had a large impact on tax collection in Mexico.
A common pattern emerges in the political economy of tax collection. Like their 
previous nationalistic governments, these outward oriented presidents share 
the same weakness, and small tax capacity. De La Madrid and Salinas 
governments continued to avoid a substantial tax reform, relying instead on 
alternative means of financing the state. Although some important reforms 
were made during the Salinas’ term, they fell short of substantially increasing 
the rate of tax collection, more as a response to IFIs influence than a 
maximising revenue policy. The analysis of each administration’s tax reforms, 
shows that politics continued to shape taxation policies, reflecting the 
bargaining power of interest groups.
During this period the sharp re-configuration of influential actors in the process 
of economic policy making is noteworthy. While the power of the private sector^ 
increased significantly, the influence of those traditionally strong corporatist 
sectors, such as organised peasants and labour, decreased. Due to the large 
financial obligations, external actors such as global business and IFIs gained 
substantial leverage. Economic transformation expanded the business elite’s ) 
policy making influence, strengthening their capability to resist taxation efforts. 
Trade and financial liberalisation facilitated their capability to transfer capital 
abroad, increasing their leverage over economic policy-makers. The influence 
of policy actors changed the tax system and the direction in which public policy 
actions were taken. In an attempt to avoid confrontation with interest groups, 
particularly with the business elite, these governments moved to less conflicting
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ways of increasing revenues, such as indirect taxes or improving the 
administrative process of tax collection.
Especially significant is that during the neo-liberal era the underlying problems 
of the Mexican fiscal system were accentuated. The declining economic 
conditions further reduced an already low tax revenue capacity. In addition, the 
country’s income distribution gap worsened, increasing the number of people 
living under poverty and the size of the informal sector. Economic austerity 
measures had an impact on wages and income, eroding both, the small tax 
payer base and the yield of collection. At the same time wealth concentrated 
further in fewer hands, making it more difficult for the state to tax the economic 
elite.
b) Different Development Strategies, Same Weakness 
Despite a radically different approach between the nationalist and neo-liberal 
development strategy, a similar pattern emerges. Both administrations 
continued to avoid a substantial tax reform, focusing instead on alternative 
means of financing the state. During the 1980s, external financing dried up and 
oil revenues plunged, compelling the government to seek new ways of 
financing itself.680 Neo-liberal governments, like their predecessors, avoided a 
substantial tax reform, forcing their respective governments to rely on 
alternative means. Traditional methods included borrowing, printing money, 
raising the price of goods and services provided by the public sector and 
recycling direct foreign investment. Novel ways were incorporated such as 
privatising state owned companies or recycling volatile capital flows, but these
680 The Mexican 1980s debt crisis triggered a period of economic reform in the whole Latin 
American region.
alternative means made government finance more vulnerable to economic 
changes and external shocks. In the end revenue maximising policies were 
either a one-time income as privatisation or socially too costly as often 
increasing the price of goods and services supplied by the public sector.
The primary alternative for balancing the government finance was cutting 
expenditures rather than raising revenues. This policy approach aimed at 
balancing the budget has a devastating effect on the economy and the 
population. Due to the insufficient stream of revenue from taxation, the severity 
and number of structural adjustments increased. If instead the Mexican 
government had focused on increasing a stable stream of revenues from 
taxation, not just reducing expenditures, structural adjustment policies would 
have been less stringent for the population.
c) The Neo-liberal Strategy Aggravated Structural Weakness of the Tax 
System: Increased Marginality
Fiscal adjustment fell on expenditure reducing policies rather than a serious 
attempt to increase revenues. The orthodox programmes for reducing inflation, 
the current account deficit and the fiscal deficit, were achieved through a 
squeeze on popular consumption and living standards.681 Structural reforms 
brought the stagnation of the economy and the drastic contraction of public 
investment, greatly reducing the income levels of the population and worsening 
the income distribution gap. In the end, this economic approach impoverished
681 Anglade and Fortin, 292-293 and Lustig, Mexico the Remarking of the Economy.
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the population since the main government targets were cuts in social spending 
and public investment.
As result of the recession and limited expansion of employment, wages 
declined in real terms. They lost about 50% of their value between 1983- 
1989.682 Although they slightly improved between 1989-1993, due to the control 
of inflation,683 this was a short-lived phenomenon and proved to be 
unsustainable.684 The table below shows the real depreciation of minimum
/
wages since 1972. The minimum wage in 1999 represents about one third of 
the value of 1972. The sharp decline in wages affected labour contributions, 
personal income taxes, and consumption taxes such as VAT and excise taxes. 
Graphic 6.1.- Variation of Minimum Salary
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Sharp economic contraction reduced government revenues and increased 
evasion. The contractionary polices plunged the rate of economic growth to 
negative figures. The 1980s are known in Latin America as the “lost decade” for
Barkin, 101.
683 See Reporte Social Sobre America Latina v el Caribe (Santiago: CEPAL, 1996).
684 Such improvement did not reflect the real conditions of the economy, since foreign 




the lack of economic expansion in the region. Mexico was one of those 
countries hard hit by the adjustment process. The average GDP growth rate 
under De la Madrid was 1%, and under Salinas only 3%, very low compared to 
the historical growth ratio of the 1960s and 1970s.685
Graphic 6.2.- GDP Growth (1970-1997)
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Source: Banco de Mexico
The stringent contraction of the economy had a large impact on taxation. The 
shrinking of economic activity, and the process of economic transformation 
forced many small and medium companies to close down, unable to compete 
with foreign competitors and a squeezed domestic market. Sector output 
changed enormously while revenues from corporate taxation plunged from 
2.6% in 1981 to 1.6% in 1998 as percentage of GDP.
Public and private lay offs pushed millions of people to look for jobs in the 
informal sector. On top of those sacked during the recession and 
rationalisation, more than a million young Mexicans entered the labour market
685 It is worth noticing that De la Madrid term was largely affected by the drop of 50% in oil 
prices, a galloping inflation that reach to 160% in 1997, a large net outflow of resources of 
about 6.8% of GDP. While During Salinas’ term the average inflation was about 16%, they 
enjoyed large revenues from the privatisation of banks and other state owned entities, and a 
total inflow to the economy of 5.6% of GDP. See Lustig, The Remaking of the Economy.
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each year for the first time. In the absence of job opportunities, those alienated 
from the labour force found their way into the informal sector, outside the 
taxpayers net. Large numbers moved into the informal sector, amounting to 
more than 10 million people.686 By 2000, a forecast estimated up to 2.5 million 
street vendors in Mexico City.687 To Mexico City mayor Cuauhtemoc Cardenas 
one the greatest concerns of his administration was dealing with street vendors 
in downtown. The Mayor blamed the alarming number of people in the informal 
economy on the “erroneous policies implemented by neo-liberal governments, 
which generated armies of unemployed workers.”688
The spectacular growth of the informal sector during this period has contributed 
to the expansion of the black economy, which escapes all types of taxation, 
from corporate to personal income taxes, import taxes, excises and VAT. To 
the Deputy Fiscal Attorney “the problem is not just the people in the informal 
economy outside the tax register, but all the evasion that evolves around it.”689 
I Personal income contributions from the 11 million people or so would only 
amount about .006% of GDP of income taxes, due to the fact that in general 
these people earn a very low income. But if the estimates by the private sector 
are correct, that the underground economy constitutes a third of the formal 
economy, as much as USD $150 bn a year escapes any form of taxation. 
Thousands of unregistered companies operate within the underground 
economy avoiding the payment of any kind of taxes, while many registered
686 El Sector Informal. INEGI.
687 A study from Mexico’s College of Architects found that there were more than 1,5million 
street vendors in 1996. See “En el Ano 2000 Podrla haber mas de 2.5 Millones de Vendedores 
Informales: Colegio de Arquitectos,” La Jornada February 19th, 1997: 2A.
688 Interview Cuauhtemoc Cardenas London, March 25th, 2000.
689 Interview Rafael Estrada, Deputy Fiscal Attorney, Mexico, November 12th, 2000.
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ones do not report their business transactions when undertaken in this sector. 
Very little efforts have been directed towards bringing accountability to the 
companies working in the underground economy or the informal sector. Tax 
authorities argue that bringing them into the tax net would yield very little 
revenues, while the administrative cost would be very large.690 Some others 
argue, that these tax havens are tolerated due to political motives. Cardenas 
pointed out that “street vendors in particular represented a stronghold for the 
PRI’s mobilisation groups, therefore any attempts to call them into order would 
cause political conflict. During the Priistas’ government, officials tolerated such 
groups because of their electoral support to the PRI.”691
Tax evasion became widely practised during the De la Madrid term, while 
voluntary compliance declined as a result of political disilusion. In addition the 
stagnation of the economy and the official rhetoric against corruption 
discouraged individuals and companies from paying taxes. According to a 
businessman “the economic crisis was the result of corrupt politicians stealing 
the resources from tax payments.”692 The Salinas administration made very 
significant efforts to eliminate certain group privileges and reduce evasion. 
Nonetheless, such efforts were targeted mostly at current taxpayers, and not by 
trying to incorporate those in the black economy. In the end, fiscalisation and
690 The Secretary of Finance argued that the efforts to reduced evasion in the informal sector 
have not gone further due to the fact that they offered very little retribution in revenue terms. In 
addition, it was very difficult to discover large tax evaders in this sector, since they operate 
almost anonymous, always in cash and they tend to protect each others. Interview former 
Secretary Aspe. In the same context, projections done by the Tax Collection Under Secretariat 
showed that a broad fiscalisation scheme would bring a very small increase in collection, while 
at the same time it implied a very large administrative cost. See Economia Informal.
691 Interview, Cuahutemoc Cardenas, London, March 25th, 1999.
692 De la Madrid campaigned for the moral renovation of society, promising a war against 
corruption. Although not real change was achieved, the campaign brought the issue to the 
national debate. During the economic crisis many in the opposition argued that corruption was 
to blame for the lack of growth. This changed the taxpayers mood over voluntary compliance.
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firm enforcement of the fiscal law during the Salinas period changed public 
perceptions increasing voluntary compliance.693
d) Polarising Further Income Distribution Disparities
Neo-liberal structural adjustment policies accentuated the income distribution 
gap in the country, a topic which has been widely explored by authors such as 
Lustig, Bulmer-Thomas, Meller, Londono, Heredia, Green and others.694 These 
authors agree that economic transformation during this period further polarised 
the unequal Mexican society, as wealth was concentrated in few hands. 
Government statistics show that in 1984 the richest 20% of the population 
received 49.5% of the national income; by 1994 it was 54.5%. On the other 
hand the poorest 20% fell from 4.83% in 1984 to 4.35 % in 1994.695
Graphic 6.3.- Income Distribution Disparities
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693 Solidaridad was the government programme for social development, it channelled large 
resource to various social sectors. This program largely improved the popularity of government 
policies. See survey on the popularity of government policies in Robert R. Kaufman and Leo 
Zuckermann, “Attitudes toward Economic Reform in Mexico: The Role of Political Orientations,” 
American Political Science Review. Vol. 92. No 2. June 1998.
ZTC7....................................................   ’
To learn more see Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America: Juan Luis Londono and 
Miguel Seakely, "Distributional Surprises After a Decade of Reforms: Latin American in the 
Nineties" (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1997) Mimeo; Lustig, Mexico 
the Remaking of the Economy: Nora Lustig, Copying with Austerity: Poverty and Inequality in 
Latin America (Washington, DC: Brooking Institute, 1995); Patricio Meyer, Economic 
Adjustment and Its Distributive Impact (Paris: OECD, 1998); Victor Bulmer-Thomas ed., The 
New Economic Model in Latin America and Its Impact on Income Distribution and Poverty.







However, the official data does not show the real extent of the polarisation of 
the Mexican economy. During this period the number of dollar billionaires 
passed from 2 in 1982 to 24 in 1993.696 In 1997 the assets of the 100 richest 
Mexicans constituted 49% of that year GDP. The astonishing accumulation of 
wealth in few hands has made taxing these groups extremely difficult.
In interviews with three of these billionaires (Carlos Slim, Antonio Gutierrez, 
Eduardo Bours), all tried to avoid talking about taxation. They described the tax 
system as unfair because it punished those who create capital and pointed out 
the need for an integral tax reform, which would promote growth, employment 
and private investment. All cautiously hinted that the state has traditionally 
abused its taxing powers although none would elaborate further. In the same 
context, in a public lecture, Othon Ruiz, general manager of one of the largest 
Mexican companies, gave a detailed account of the relationship between the 
government and the private sector since the days of Diaz Ordaz. He bitterly 
complained about the continuous shifts in government polices and how the 
President’s broad discretionary faculties had affected business interests. Later 
in private, he argued that the “business sector had been a victim of the 
unlimited power of the president” and accepted that capital flight has been a 
way to show private sector discontent with certain government policies.697
Authorities recognise the difficulties in taxing those at the top of the economic 
elite. In his speech at IADB Bank meeting in Spain, Guillermo Ortiz, then 
Secretary of Finance, commented on the fierce opposition by some powerful
696 Forbes Magazine July 18th, 1994:19.
697 Conversation Othon Ruiz, Cambridge MA., June 14th,1994.
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groups to the process of structural reform in Mexico -including taxation. When I 
questioned him later whether this included some members of the economic
i
elite, he hesitantly accepted, but immediately added that business 
organisations have been supportive of tax reforms.698 Salinas’ Finance 
Secretary, Pedro Aspe, also commented on the large companies’ resistance to 
taxation. He stated that when he took office “only a handful of the 300 largest 
companies registered at the stock market paid taxes.” He even mentioned a 
large car manufacturing company that in the past 25 years hadfailed to report 
any profits. According to Aspe, this was the reason why they implemented the 
2% tax on companies assets, “more as a mechanism for assisting authorities to 
fight tax avoidance, than as a means for increasing revenues.”699
The huge concentration of capital in a very small group empowered them to 
strongly oppose any taxation efforts. Those getting richer were paying less and 
less taxes proportionally to their wealth. Corporate and income taxes were cut, 
and gains made at the stock market the transfers of capital abroad or 
inheritances were left untaxed.
e) The Reconfiguration of the Main Actors in Tax Policy Making 
A major realignment of the main influential actors in the process of economic 
policy making took place during this period, with large consequences for the tax 
system. The economic elite and international actors such as the World Bank, 
the IMF and IADB sharply increased their influence in the process of economic
698 Guillermo Ortiz was Under-Secretary of Finance during Salinas' administration, interview 
March 15th, 1997.
699 Interview Pedro Aspe, September 25th, 1999.
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policy making, while the corporatist sector influence significantly decreased as 
the technocracy rose to power.
f) The Rise of the Technocratic Elite and the Fall of Corporatist Sector Influence 
The new economic model facilitated the rise and consolidation of an ambitious 
technocratic elite.700 The implementation of structural reforms required a 
technically qualified team of policy-makers.701 As the technocratic elite held on 
power, the influence of the corporatist sector languished. Both the De la Madrid 
and Salinas administrations sought to reduce the influence of labour.702To 
Middlebrook, most labour organisations emerged from the 1980s in a 
substantially weaker position vis-£-vis both private enterprise and the state.703 
The economic developments during the 1980s weakened labour organisations 
and seriously eroded the bases for the social pact that had existed since the 
1950s. Economic transformation affected the size, composition, organisational 
strength, and bargaining effectiveness of labour organisations. Economic 
stagnation and subsequently high unemployment, reduced labour's sector 
bargaining power. Industrial restructuring, privatisation and the closure of state 
owned enterprises created massive lay offs, sapping the strength of the most 
important industrial unions.704
700 See Centeno, Democracy Within Reason.
701 See Smith and Acuna on the need for a strong executive branch in order to implement the 
structural reforms agenda.
702 Salinas even tried to dismantle the regional corporate structure by introducing a territorial 
division within the PRI instead of the traditional peasants, labour and popular sector groups.
703 Middlebrook, 287.
704 Economic stagnation reduced union’s market-based bargaining leverage with employers. 
Privatisation of state owned companies undermined major national unions’ ability to use their 
political influence to achieve economic goals, as well as their capacity to mobilise organised 
protest. Industrial reorganisation affected unions, which lost part of their control in hiring and 
firing.
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Organised labour lost influence in economic policy making, despite the fact that 
workers had borne much of the sacrifice in the economic adjustments 
programme. Workers economic welfare declined enormously, as wages 
plunged and inflation skyrocketed during the De la Madrid period.7®5 
Additionally, the economic stagnation in most of the 1980s included the 
dismantling of subsidies and the increase in public service supplied by the 
state, worsening workers’ economic conditions.
g) New Economic Conditions Enhanced the Influence of the Economic Elite 
In sharp contrast to the fate of organised labour, the influence of the economic 
elite grew enormously. According to a high-ranking government official during 
the De la Madrid and Salinas’ administrations, “the relationship with the private 
sector was right at the top of the government agenda.”706 The De la Madrid task 
was to re-build the relationship with the private sector, which had largely 
deteriorated during Echeverria term.
Salinas inherited a very favourable relationship with the private sector and 
improved it. A close relationship between the economic and technocratic elite 
developed and translated into direct subsidies to domestic productive capital.707 
According to Munoz Ledo not only were economically dominant classes safe­
guarded through specific, targeted measures aimed at compensating them for
705 According to former Labour Secretary worker's purchasing power lost nearly 65% between 
1982-1996. Interview Santiago Onate, London June 11th, 1998. To Roxborough the massive 
drop in real wages affected the leadership of labour leaders, since they were unable to deliver 
jobs for their members. Roxborough, 117-118.
06 Interview Suarez Davila, Chairman of the Treasury Committe at the Lower Chamber and 
former Under-Secretary of Finance, London, May 23rd, 1997.
707 Anglade and Fortin, 312-313.
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the impact of the economic policies, but the economic transformation largely 
benefited them.708
Many of the economic reform policies favoured the economic elite. The 
Economist stated that “stabilisation and structural adjustments brought 
magnificent returns to the rich.”709 A greater autonomy of market forces meant 
reducing the government’s influence in political and economic terms. The 
dismantling of the state economic apparatus translated into great opportunities 
for a small domestic elite to enrich themselves with the divestiture programmes. 
In general the decrease in employment strengthened the bargaining power of 
employers. Trade liberalisation facilitated the outflow of capital throughout 
misinvoicing international trade,710 and financial liberalisation allowed the free 
transfer of resources.
A sensational rise in the influence of domestic and international capital 
decreased the state’s autonomy in economic policy making. This reached such 
a level that many relevant political decisions were made to please capital 
holders and investors. The underlying factor behind the sharp rise to power of 
the domestic economic elite was their ability to transfer their capital abroad. In 
a time of the government’s limited resources, the threat of capital flight had 
became a very powerful weapon for the economic elite. According to a public
708 See FICORCA programmes. Interview London, February 19th, 1999.
709 “A Survey of Latin America," The Economist. November 13th, 1993.
710 See Fitzgerald or Dornsbuch Transfer Pricing.
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official at the Treasury, “capital flight was constantly used or at least threatened 
to do so, in order to advance their policy agenda.”711
h) The Growing Influence of International Actors
The role and influence of international actors increased substantially, as a 
result of the economic world changes and the profound opening up of the 
economy in the country. Exogenous factors, including those ideological, 
political and economic, played a major role in reshaping the Mexican economy 
and the process of economic policy making. Globalisation of the economy, 
economic opening, the expansion of the neo-liberal ideology throughout; the ’ 
Washington Consensus’ receipt of structural * reform, the consolidation of 
conservative governments in industrialised countries and the 1980s world wavey 
of tax reform, all had a significant impact on Mexico. In particular, these 
exogenous events opened the door to greater participation of international 
actors in the Mexican economy.712
711 This is particularly evident with the presidential nominations in the official party in 1982, 
1988 and 1994. The active president, chose his successor not based in his popularity or grass-" 
roots support, but by assessing if such candidate would be "accepted" by domestic and 
international capital. J.R. L6pez Portillo points out that “the main concern of former Presidents 
L6pez Portillo, De la Madrid and Salinas was to avoid sending the wrong message to7 
international markets by choosing the wrong candidate. Both L6pez Portillo and De la Madrid 
took care in selecting a candidate that would be popular with the financial sector. Jos6 Ram6n 
L6pez Portillo, interview 17 September 1997. In the same context, Castaneda points out that 
president Salinas was seen by the De la Madrid as the candidate who most likely would 
appease international markets. See Castaneda, la Herencia. During the unvailing process 
(“destapes”) of de la Madrid and Salinas, organised labour and the traditional political groups 
opposed their nomination, on the grounds that they did not represent the interest of the 
corporate sectors of the PRI.
712 The globalisation of the economy spread “Neo-liberalism” as the only feasible model of 
economic development. IFIs contributed to spread the neo-liberal recipe to developing 
countries, through the conditions attached to fresh resources and debt restructuring. The 
transformation of economic thinking, was a drastic change, moving from protectionism to 
liberalisation in a very short span. During the 1980s, both developing and developed countries 
experienced drastic economic policy reversals. Christopher Hood, Explaining Economic Policy 
Reversals (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994).
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I FIs influence became so important, that they constituted the thrust behind 
Mexico’s shift in the model of economic development.713 In the early 1980s, 
when the priority was to stabilise the economy, the IMF played a larger 
influence, taking advantage of the government’s need for emergency credit. 
Conditional policies were mostly aimed at maximising revenue. However, 
according to Salinas’ Secretary of Finance in his term “the pressure to reform 
the tax system came from the World Bank, rather than from the IMF.”714 In spite 
of the fact that taxation was part of the structural agenda promoted by I FIs and 
the great need for revenues in debtor countries, the World Bank tax reform 
agenda was not aimed at increasing revenues. Instead it tried to harmonise
i
corporate and income taxes with international levels and emphasised policies/
i
/
aimed at reforming the system of tax administration.
According to W. Perry, Chief Economist of the World Bank “in the 1980s it 
became clear that in order to increase tax collection, it was necessary first to 
improve the tax administration.”715 Once IFIs recognised that tax reform 
required further development than just cutting corporate and personal income 
rates, multilateral institutions began to pour resources to member countries to 
develop their administrative and tax collection systems. Inter-American 
Development Bank President, Enrique Iglesias, pointed out that the reform of 
Latin America’s administrative tax systems had become one of the priorities of
713 A World Bank’s publication states that as the 1980s unfolded, leading economists in Latin 
America including those in the IMF and the World Bank insisted in a shift of the economic 
development strategy to market-based policies. Latin America and the Caribbean. 23.
714 During the Salinas term there was no need for emergency credit facilities from the IMF, 
therefore IMF presence was less common than during the De La Madrid sexenio. Interview 
Aspe September 20th, 1999.
715 Interview William Perry, Spain, March 16th, 1997.
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I FIs, making references to the large number of loans given to member 
countries to develop their tax system.716
Another relevant international event, was the 1980s’ world wave of tax reform, 
which set the issues of fiscal reform at the top of the political agenda. 
According to former under-secretary of Finance, Suarez Davila “Mexico’s tax 
cuts and the modernisation of the fiscal system were heavily influenced by the 
international trends in taxation during the 1980s; particularly, because tax 
reform was one of the ten policies of the Washington consensus policies.”717 
Salinas' Secretary of Finance, Pedro Aspe, insisted on the importance of 
remaining internationally competitive, keeping tax rates and administrative 
procedures in accordance with international standards.718 The new trend of tax 
reform was aimed towards increasing indirect taxation and improving the 
efficiency of the tax administration.
i) Moving Towards Indirect Taxation and the Streamlined Tax Administration 
During this period, economic policy making became more responsive to 
economic issues than political ones. Compared with “nationalist” governments, 
the agenda was less dominated by political concerns. Facing a contracted 
economy, a largely eroded tax base and an increasingly powerful economic 
elite opposing new taxes, both administrations moved towards less conflictive 
grounds, such as indirect taxation and administrative reform. In a period of 10 
years the burden of indirect taxes almost doubled, from 6.3 % of GDP in 1978
716 Interview, Enrique Iglesias, Barcelona, March 17th, 1997.
717 Interview Suarez Davila, London May 23rd, 1997.
718 Interview Pedro Aspe, Mexico, Sptember 23th, 1999.
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to 13.6 % in 1988.719 The De la Madrid administration focused on indirect taxes 
and raised the price of goods and services provided by the state; while Salinas’ 
tax reform efforts focused on correcting flaws in the fiscal structure, improving 
collection and the administration of taxes. Fiscal authorities during Salinas' 
term were modestly successful in expanding the tax payers base and closing 
legal loopholes, increasing revenues considerably.
6.2.- De la Madrid (1982-1988): Economic Realism
“After living in opulence during Lopez Portillo's presidency, we
learned to live in austerity”
President Miguel de la Madrid
De la Madrid’s administration had to adjust to unfavourable factors such as a 
crunch in foreign credit and high inflation. Tax collection substantially declined 
as result of the erosive effect of inflation and the lack of growth (see graphic 
8.2). The average rate of inflation during the sexenio was 91%, while the 
average annual rate of growth was just above 1%. Expenditures largely 
exceeded revenues, thus increasing the financial deficit. To finance the state, 
De la Madrid’s government used oil revenues, increased the price of services 
provided by the state, internal borrowing and through inflation. More than a 
third of the budget was financed by borrowing.720 As the presidential terms 
passed the burden of debt became an impediment to growth.721 Faced with the
719 Gil Diaz, "Tax Reform Issues in Mexico," 255.
720 Armen Kouyoumdjian, "The Miguel de la Madrid Sexenio: Major Reforms or Foundation for 
Disaster?" in Philip, The Mexican Economy. 83.
721 From 1983 through 1988 Mexico was a net exporter of capital transferring billions of US 
dollars in debt services every year (approximately an average of 4.5% of GDP). The transfer of 
resources drained the economy of savings and investment creating a major impediment to 
growth.
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scarcity of foreign funds and pressured by I FIs, De la Madrid administration 
slashed government expenditure and increased taxes.
Minor tax reforms were made, but their impact in terms of revenue were 
minimal. In 1987, in response to high inflation, this administration extended the 
process of indexation to corporate income tax. Fearing further conflict with the 
private sector, De la Madrid’s administration avoided restructuring the fiscal 
system “in a way that could re-open the old wounds created by the 
nationalisation of the banking sector.”722
Table 6.1.- Economic Indicators During De la Madrid’s Term
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
GDP% -0.6 -4.2 3.6 2.6 -3.8 1.7 1.2
Revenue
(%GDP)
28.9 32.9 32.2 31.2 30.3 30.5 30.2
Expenditure 33.4 33.0 32.1 32.6 37.9 39.1 35.0
Fin. Balance 16.9 8.6 8.5 9.6 15.9 16.0 12.4
Exports 21.2 22.3 24.2 21.7 16.0 20.7 20.6
Imports 14.4 8.6 11.3 13.2 11.4 12.2 18.9
Trade 6.8 13.8 13.0 8.5 4.6 8.4 1.7
Disb. Debt 
(bn)
86.0 93.0 94.8 96.9 100.9 109.5 100.8
Inflation % 99 81 59 64 106 159 52
Sources: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in 
Latin America, Reports 1992 and 1993.
De la Madrid implemented a set of policy responses to cope with the economic 
crisis. Unfavourable international events which took place during his 
administration ended up deteriorating an already stringent economic situation. 
The two main economic priorities of this government were: reducing the huge 
government deficit and fighting high levels of inflation (see table above). Both 
circumstances had an impact on the policies related to taxation. To balance the
722 Interview Jesus Silva-Herzog, former Secretary of Finance, Mexico June 12th, 2000.
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budget De la Madrid faced two options: either increase taxes or cut down on 
expenses; he choose the later, implementing a stringent austerity programme. 
To some analysts this was a perfect time for implementing a profound tax 
reform, to others the prevailing political cleavage could have escalated into a 
political crisis with such reform.
6.2.1.« Economic and Political Conditions
During De la Madrid's term two significant political events took place, events 
that would prove to have far-reaching political and economic implications in the 
country’s future. First was a cleavage within the PRI elite, caused by the split 
over the economic strategy followed by the technocratic elite.723 Secondly 
significant was the continuous growth of the PAN at local and state level, 
triggered by the discontent of small and medium business with the banking 
nationalisation and the stringent economic conditions suffered by the people.724
De la Madrid began his term with great impetus towards an overall tax reform, 
but soon the impetus faded away.725 During his presidential campaign he 
committed himself to fight evasion and increase the number of tax incentives to
723 The shift in the economic strategy caused an abrupt split in the ruling class. Lead by 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and Porfirio Munoz Ledo, a sector in the official party, left the PRI to 
form a new party. Both Cardenas and Munoz Ledo, confirmed that they left the official party in 
protest to the orthodox economic strategy, although Munoz Ledo insisted in the lack of 
democracy as the main reason. Interviews Cardenas and Porfirio Munoz Ledo, both in London 
March 2 5 h, 1997 and February 19th, 1998 respectively. To learn about the cleavage see 
Manuel Pastor, Whirpool: US Foreign Policy Towards Latin America and the Caribbean (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). To leam about the political struggle during Salinas 
term see Cothran: 177 -208.
724 Comments made by Soledad Loaeza in the Seminar on Mexico at the London School of 
Economics, February 12th, 2000. See also Soledad Loeza, El Partido Accion Nacional.
725 See Miguel de la Madrid: Tres Informes de Gobierno. 1983-1985 (M6xio: Presidencia de la 
Republica, 1985).
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companies.726 Among the key policies put forward in his campaign, De la 
Madrid highlighted the need to increase public income. He promised a fiscal 
reform that would ensure equity on the levy of direct taxes, to harmonise the 
rates of indirect taxes, to increase the tax collection rate, to improve the 
administration of taxes, and to overhaul all tax incentives in order to keep only 
those that promote employment, industrial output and exports. He also 
pledged to increase tariffs for goods and services consumed by those better off 
and committed to raise the standard of efficiency and productivity of state 
owned enterprises.727 The highlights of this administration include an extensive 
programme of municipal reform, which included the reform to article 115 of the 
Federal Constitution.728 In tandem with the municipal reform, this presidency 
embarked on programmes of decentralisation,729 federalism and administrative 
simplification.730
a) Balancing the Budget through an Austerity Programme 
When president De la Madrid entered office in 1982 the economy was in a big 
mess. According to former Under-Secretary of Planning, Jose Ramon Lopez 
Portillo, beside the lack of external credit, the state faced a record fiscal deficit
726 Miguel de la Madrid, Pensamiento Politico (Mexico: Coordinacidn General de 
Documentacidn y Analisis, PRI, 1982) and Miauel de la Madrid H: Campafia Presidencial 
Sexta Etaoa 5-16 de Enero (Mexico: Presidencia de la Rpublica, 1982).
See Puntos Proaramaticos: Proarama Inmediato de Reordenacidn Econdmica (Mexico: 
Presidencia de la Republica, 1982).
728 See” Miauel de la Madrid H: Camoana Presidencial. 145.
729 The terrible 1985 earthquake triggered the process of decentralisation. On October 10th 
1985, in the presidential house President De la Madrid instituted the “Committee for 
Decentralisation.” See “Comite de Descentralizacion,” Mexico, Presidencia de la Republica, 
October 9th, 1985. Rodolfo Landeros, then governor of the state of Aguascalientes recalls the 
efforts made by then Secretary Salinas and President De la Madrid to agree on the allocation 
of government agencies in provincal cities. Interview Rodolfo Landeros, April 22nd, 2000.
730 To strengthen federalism, President De la Madrid instituted a new system of coordination for 
the allocation of federal resources between the states and the federal government, known as 
“Convenio Unico de Desarrollo.” He also passed a Presidential Decree to encourage 
decentralisation called “Decreto para la Descentralizacion Publica Federal, Junio 1983.” See 
Miauel De la Madrid: Tres Informes de Gobierno. 1983-1985.
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of the order of 17% of GDP.731 To Jose Angel Gurria, “the most urgent priority 
in 1983 was putting public finances on a sound footing and ensuring that fiscal 
discipline would be a guiding principle in the future.”732 To do so the 
government implemented large cuts to keep the financing gap under control.
To reduce the fiscal deficit, President De la Madrid called for a programme of 
economic austerity, which drastically cut subsidies for basic commodities such 
as transportation, electricity, natural gas, and gasoline,733 and imposed 
stringent controls on wage increases, cut public sector employment and social 
spending. The stringent orthodox policies which included cuts in subsidies 
translated into higher prices for state-controlled goods and services, increasing 
the already rocketing inflation.734 Reduction in public spending was a critical
element of the administration’s fiscal programme. Expenditure was cut from
*■
31.5% to 26.75% of GDP, allowing the deficit to fall from 17.1% in 1982 to 8.9% 
in 1983.735 In order to strengthen revenues during 1983 and 1984, the 
government increased further the prices of public services. VAT rates also went 
up, as well as the progressive stages of individual income tax rates.
These policies had positive effects on the government’s income, but it was 
much less than expected.736 By 1986, the austerity programme had caused a
731 Interview Jose Ram6n L6pez Portillo, Under-Secretary of Planning during De la Madrid’s 
term, London, February 17th, 1998.





736 Ernesto Estrada Gonzalez, El Impuesto Sobre la Renta de las Empresas v la Reforma 
Fiscal: Un Analisis del Eauilibrio General Aplicado (M6xico; Colegio de Mxico, 1987): 2-3.
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dramatical decline in real wages and cut down living standards.737 In the mid 
1980s, adverse international events altered the performance of the economy. 
In 1986 the international price of oil plunged to around one third of the previous 
year’s value. When oil prices collapsed export earnings declined from about 
$16 bn in 1985 to an estimated $9bn in 1986. To balance the budget, the 
government introduced massive rises in the prices of goods and services 
provided by the state. The public sector balance returned to a large deficit of 
16.% of GDP while the economy contracted by 3.8% of GDP.738 To make up for 
the loss of oil revenues, the government went to the market for more internal 
borrowing, but it reached alarming proportions. Interest payments represented 
18.5% of GDP, absorbing a large proportion of federal government revenues. 
Servicing the debt accounted for as much as 86% of the states revenues.739
In November 1987, the New York stock market crashed affecting the Mexican 
stock market whose index lost nearly 75%.740 The stock market crash and the 
rising inflation triggered a large devaluation of the peso, losing more than one 
third of its value. Frequent currency devaluations ignited a devaluation-inflation- 
devaluation cycle. The disappointing performance of the economy and the 
adverse exogenous events pushed the government to move towards deeper 
economic transformation. The first steps of economic restructuring were taken 
during the De la Madrid period in the mid 1980s. The government embarked on 
a process of privatisation741 and trade liberalisation. In order to cut subsidies, 
the government tried to divest loss making public sector companies responsible
737 See Lustig, The Remaking.
738 Kouyoumdjian, 84.
739 Ibid.
740 To learn about the unrealistic growth of the market see Kouyoumdjian 90-91.
741 See The Mexican Economy 1995 (Mexico: Banco de Mexico, 1995).
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for a large part of the deficit. The number of public enterprises declined from 
1,155 in 1982 to 412 in 1988. However, no major state companies were sold 
during De la Madrid’s period. Regarding trade liberalisation, the government 
signed up in 1986 for membership to the GATT after long-standing internal 
opposition, and reduced unilaterally by 95% the number of products subject to 
import licences.742
b) Economic Stagnation and its Impact on Taxation
Tax revenues were hit hard by a sharp slowdown in economic activity. 
Corporate income tax revenue lost considerable ground from 2.6% of GDP in 
1981 to around 1.6 % in 1987. The fall in corporate taxes further weakened 
public finance, which already had to face the suspension of foreign credit and 
the precipitous economic opening.743 High inflation, lower imports, and higher 
exports, also contributed to the relative loss of value added taxation. Tax 
authorities reacted by increasing considerably the level of taxation. Income and 
indirect taxes rates had to be increased to compensate for the Treasury
742 The purpose of opening the economy was to boost non-traditional exports (non oil exports 
grew from $5.6bn in 1982 to $12bn in 1987). Opening of the economy was done unilaterally 
despite stern resistance from nationalist and protected industries. Economic opening was 
viewed by most businessmen with great trepidation, since many companies, after so many 
years of inefficiency and protectionism, were incapable of competing with international 
standards of efficiency and productivity. According to Bailey the groups that favour a gradual 
opening of the economy and the entry into GATT were: the bureaucracy (Treasury, SPP, Bank 
of Mexico, SECOFI) and a minority of business organisations ANIERM, CANACO, 
COPARMEX and the large-scale firms of CONCAMIN. Opposing: were at the bureaucracy 
(Foreign Relations, SEMIP) the majority of small and medium sized industries represented 
specially by CANACINTRA, as well as unions. Bailey, Governing. 142. An interview with 
Fernando Solana, former Secretary of Foreign Affairs during Salinas' administration confirmed 
that many powerful groups opposed to the opening of the economy. Mr Solana fiercely 
criticised the process of economic opening, stating that it was done abruptly, adding that it 
should have been done gradually and included safeguards similar to those governing the 
European Union. Interview, London, February 16th, 1997.
743 Gil Diaz, 268.
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forecast loss.744 The significance of indirect taxes rose from 9.2% to 13.2%, 
while collection from corporate taxes declined (See table 8.2). However, higher 
rates made evasion extremely profitable.
Table 6.2.- The Impact of the Economic Contraction on Taxes
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Indirect Taxes (%GDP) 9.2 12.6 11.7 11.6 9.7 10.6 13.2
Revenue VAT (million 
pesos)
72,877 87,200 93,026 92,612 84,245 90,763 96,123
Year increase -12.4 19.7 6.7 -0.4 -9.0 7.7 5.9
Corporate Tax 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 n.a.
Loss Revenue
Due to Inflation ( % GDP) 1.04 0.88 0.68 0.73 0.78 0.82 0.40
Source: Gil Diaz various tables in Tax Reforms Issues in Mexico, in The World Tax Reform. 
Indirect taxes do not include trade taxes. The amount of Revenue from VAT is in real receipts 
in millions of 1978 pesos. The year increase is in relation to the previous year.
6.2.2.- Policy Actors and their Influence: The Decline of Corporatism
The balance of power among policy actors began to shift during De la Madrid’s 
term. The government envisaged new mechanisms to control interest groups 
economic and political demands. While the power of corporate actors rapidly 
waned, the technocratic wing of the government rose to power. In the mean 
time the influence of both domestic and international capital reached 
unprecedented leverage.
a) Corporate Actors: Controlled with the “Pactos”
After failed attempts to halt inflation the government implemented a different 
approach which included the participation of all socio-economic actors. Such 
strategy not only proved to be successful in reducing inflation, but provided an 
efficient mechanism of political control over corporate actors. In December
744 They forecasted huge losses in tax collection as result of economic contraction, September 
20th, 1999.
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1987, the government called for an economic alliance to halt hyperinflation, the 
instrument was called “pactos.” The social pact provided a forum where 
different sectors of the society (workers, farmers, employers and government) 
could examine the national economic problems and those problems faced by 
the participants. The “pactos” also provided an exceptional environment for 
dealing with the demands of the socio-economic actors. This is particularly^ 
relevant for our case, because pactos changed the traditional bargaining 
process, since they provided a forum where proposals and concerns were j 
openly negotiated.745 Finance Secretary, Pedro Aspe, states that the pactos 
became “the natural channel to address most of the tax concerns of the various 
economic sectors represented in the accord.”746 For corporate sectors, such 
open economic debates weakened their bargaining power.747
b) Business: Rebuilding the Relationship with the Government 
The first issue confronting De la Madrid’s administration was to overcome 
mutual distrust and to rebuild the government-business relationship. He had to 
work to alleviate business class resentment against the government’s 
nationalisation of the banking sector. De la Madrid opened the channels of 
communication and largely improved the relationship with the private sector.
745 Important tax concessions were made to the corporate sector under the “pactos” framework. 
Organised labour obtained some important concessions such as the elimination of income 
taxes for workers earning less than tree minimum salaries VAT rate for some basic products, 
while large agro-industries retained most of their privileged tax status.
746 Interview Aspe September 20th, 1999. According to a former Secretary of Labour, this open 
bargaining system benefited the government. The fact that each interest group operated with a 
conflicting agenda constrained their bargaining capacity at the negotiations table. Interveiw 
Oftate, June 11th, 1998. Agricultural representative, CNC president Hector Hugo Olivares 
complained that many of the accords between the private sector and government, were made 
behind closed doors, usually before the general pacto meetings. Interview, Aguascalientes, 
January 13th, 1998.
747 Interview, Rodriguez Le6n, former Senator and union leader, who complained that in the 
“pactos", business did not comply with their the end of the deal, increasing prices while salaries 
remained frozen, Mexico July 23rd, 1998.
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The new model of economic development, that included privatisation and 
deregulation, pleased the business elite. The relationship was improved further 
with actions such as subsidies to big business and a swift compensation to the 
expropriated bankers. De la Madrid arranged quick compensations and 
divestiture of corporate shares held by banks as loan collateral. Despite the 
previous disillusionment with the competence of the political class, the foreign 
debts of many large companies made them increasingly dependent upon 
government assistance.748
c) International Financial Institutions: Get Back on the Scene 
The contraction of the economy plus greater borrowing requirements of the 
Mexican government made it largely dependent on IMF resources to stabilise 
the economy. Such resources were subject to hard conditions that must be 
obeyed in order to keep the fresh resources flowing. This provided a leverage 
over economic policy to any international financial institution supporting Mexico, 
particularly the IMF as largest sponsor.
6.2.3.- Tax Reform During de la Madrid’s Term: Copying with Adversity
a) Increasing Indirect Taxation
Due to the poor performance of the economy and its impact on taxation, the 
government moved towards indirect taxation, as the simplest and quickest way 
to increase revenues. State revenues from indirect tax increased significantly 
from 9.2% of GDP in 1982 to 13.2% in 1988. VAT introduced in 1980, 
prevented a substantial loss in revenues, but rates had to be increased
748 Bailey, Governing Mexico. 123.
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because the percentage of collection declined. The adjustments to VAT rates in 
1983 improved collection to 19.7 %, after falling to 14.2% in 1982. The VAT tax 
rate rose from 10% to 15%, but it grew more complicated as the number of 
rates proliferated to meet political demands, showing that the influence of 
interest groups shapes the tax structure. These rates ranged from zero rate for 
foodstuffs and medicines to a 20% rate for luxury items. Gil Diaz, a former 
Under-Secretary of Finance, recognised the influence of political actors in the 
tax policy making process, stating that due to political arrangements original 
simplicity of the ad valorem tax soon disappeared.749 He also stresses how 
these multiple rates complicated the administration of the tax. Political 
negotiations were not just limited to representatives of the economic sectors, 
but included the authorities of the states as well. Problems with the collection 
sharing formula for the states contributed to the laggard performance of VAT 
during this term. But in 1987 the VAT formula was corrected bringing new 
stimulus to collection. The reforms gave states 30% of the VAT they collected 
without holding this part of their share to a ceiling.750
The rates of excise taxes were substantially raised as well. In spite of the 
reforms, excise revenue ratios fell far behind international standards. The 
substantial increases in the rates of excise did not increase revenues 
considerably. The ratio of excise to GDP was 1.81% in 1982 and increased to 
only 2.39% in 1983. The figures from 1984 to 1987 averaged 2.41 %.751 The 
openness of the economy had a negative impact on excise taxes, since they 
are not generally paid on exports, and there is a full rebate on them and on
749 Gil Diaz, 267. Interview September 21st, 1999.
750 Gil Diaz, 264.
751 Gil Diaz, 267
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VAT paid in previous stages. Non oil exports increased from 2.4% of GDP in 
1982 to 8.49% percent in 1987; with imports lagging behind, the taxable base 
of excises and the VAT contracted.
b) Struggling Against Inflation
Inflation had a major negative effect on tax collection; income taxes declined 
26.6% between 1982 and 1986, and just in 1983 alone they fall by 19.7%. 
Corporation taxes accounted for most part of this drop (about 70%).752 The high 
rate of inflation during the De la Madrid administration 1982-87, caused a large 
loss in revenue, before fully inflationary corrections were made in the tax base.
The decline in the collection of corporate income tax was partly attributable to 
the fact that such tax was collected in three payments annually. To correct the 
distortions created by inflation, in 1987 the government implemented a fiscal 
reform indexing corporate taxes to inflation.753 Tax brackets were indexed and 
assets were valued on an inflation adjustment basis. Advance monthly 
payments replaced quarterly tax payments. Unfortunately, these reforms further 
complicated the administration of taxes.754
752 Ernesto Estrada Gonzalez, El Impuesto Sobre la Renta: 4.
753 For a detail account of the complexities involved in indexing corporate income tax see Gil 
Diaz, 268-270.
754 Inflation had an impact on the administration of taxes. It created an extremely complicated 
set of rules that have to be calculated every month, together with the ever more complex VAT 
and in some cases monthly excises. To see the impact of inflation in taxation see Gil Diaz and 
Kaldor, 1973.
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Table 6.3.- Collection of Corporate Income, and the Effect of Inflation
Year Inflation % Inflationary
Effect
Total Effect on 
Tax Collection
1981 28.9 0.3 0.40
1982 98.8 0.76 1.04
1983 80.7 0.76 0.88
1984 59.1 0.56 0.68
1985 53.3 0.64 0.73
1986 05.7 0.77 0.78
1987 159.1 n.a 0.82
. 1988 51.7 n.a 0.44
Source: Own elaboration with data from Banco de Mexico, Gil 
Diaz, Estrada and Elizondo.
The transition period was characterised by extremely complex procedures. 
Corporations were required to use two different accounting systems to 
calculate their taxable income and still another method to calculate the profits 
to be shared with workers.755 Other significant reform in the 1987 fiscal law was 
that corporations were allowed only to deduct real interest rates, eliminating the 
subsidy to capital financing. The measure was aimed to induce companies to 
use healthier financing mechanisms such as the issue of stock.756
755 Gil Diaz, 251.
756 Estrada, 5-10.
6.3. Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994): Modernising the Economy
“Our greatest achievement on the tax front was to increase tax 
revenues while reducing tax rates. ”757
President Carlos Salinas
In a gradual tax reform, the Salinas administration increased the tax base^, 
enlarged the number of taxpayers, lowered taxation rates, simplified 
procedures and improved collection by implementing tax evasion control 
mechanisms. Additionally, tax havens, subsidies and exemption were reduced 
and loopholes were eliminated. During the Salinas’ government more than half J 
of the 18 federal taxes that existed in 1988 were cut. The VAT was reduced 
from 20% and 15 % to 10%, as well as personal income tax rates from 50% to 
35%, and corporate income tax from 42% to 34%. Fiscal authorities broadened 
the tax base, by eliminating unjustified fiscal privileges, and enlarging the 
number of taxpayers. A noticeable decline in tax evasion came as a result of 
tougher application of fiscal laws and fiscalisation. All these factors contributed 
to an increase in tax collection of 35% in real terms, between 1988 and 
1993.758
Salinas’ tax reform’s most notable stroke was the expeditious modernisation of 
the tax system, with far-reaching changes in tax administration. These include 
a large investment in information technology to process more adequately a 
large volume of information and reducing the auditors discretion. New 
computerised auditing systems were installed, together with a system of
757 See Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Mexico: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad (Madrid: Ed. Plaza 
Jane, 2000): 386. Non-oil tax revenues increased by 34% in real terms from 1989 to 1993 and 
Gurria, "The Modernisation of the Economy," 18.
758 See Gil Diaz, Rojas, Arindam Das-Gupta, and Dilip Mookherjee, Incentives and Institutional 
Reform in Tax Enforcement (Oxford: Oxford University, 1998) and Elizondo, "In Search."
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economic incentives for auditors. But the greatest achievement was in policy 
enforcement, directed to the deterrence of tax evasion, tax avoidance and 
corruption. Penalty policies were revised and tax offenders were prosecuted for 
the first time in 60 years. A presumptive tax on real assets on companies was 
implemented mostly as a deterrent of tax avoidance. The enforcement 
measures largely helped to an increase in voluntary tax compliance.759
However, despite all the administrative improvements and reforms made to the 
tax system, Mexico’s tax collection yield remained very low when compared 
with other OECD countries. It moved from 11.6% in 1988 to 9.3% in 1995, 
lagging far behind a desirable 20% tax collection rate.760
Nevertheless, the evidence seems to suggests that tax reform responded more 
to international pressures to homogenise tax rates and practices around the 
world, than to a real attempt by the authorities to increase badly needed 
revenues. Broadening the tax base and enlarging the number of registered tax 
payers was made to compensate for the losses incurred when cutting tax rates.
6 .3 .1 Economic and Political Conditions: Putting the House in Order
President Salinas came to power in 1988 with a clear reform agenda, among 
popular discontent after years of hardship and economic austerity. The 1988 
Presidential election was questioned by opposition leaders and academics.761 
De la Madrid’s decision to hand pick Salinas de Gortari as his successor (to
759 See Das-Gupta.
760 See Ingresos Ordinarios del Sector Publico Federal y Total de Contribuyentes Activos, 
Anexo del Tercer Informe de Gobierno. Poder Ejecutivo Federal, September 1997: 64.
761 For those academics who questioned the election see Pastor. Cuahutemoc Cardenas 
claimed Salinas stole the presidency from him. Interview, London, March 25th, 1999.
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ensure the continuity of the neo-liberal model) brought important divisions 
within the PRI. A powerful fraction of the ruling party broke away, forming a 
new party with its own presidential candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the son 
of a popular former president. The cleavage in the PRI, plus the popular 
discontent for the years of economic hardship resulted in a substantial decline 
in the share of the PRI’s vote, from 74 % to 50%. Salinas arrived to the 
presidential office under allegations of electoral fraud, after the inexplicable 
break down of the computerised counting system in the 1988 federal election. 
However, President Salinas grew from weak political legitimacy to huge 
popularity. He was able to win popular support by improving Mexican’s 
economic conditions resulting from savings in the external debt, privatisation, 
financial flows and by allowing a huge increase in the current account deficit, 
but most significantly thanks to the hand over of discretionary government 
resources distributed through the implementation of this social programme for j 
low-income groups known as “Solidarity.”762
During his campaign Carlos Salinas paid little attention to the need of reforming 
the tax system763 but briefly addressed the issue in the National Development 
Plan 1989-1994. In this document, that serves as the guideline for public 
policies during each presidential term, President Salinas offered to decrease 
the number of special tax regimes, fight tax avoidance and tax evasion and to 
improve the fiscal relations between federal, state and local governments.764
762 See Presidential Decree that creates “The Comission for the National Solidarity 
Programme,” Official Gazette. Tuesday 6th of December 1998: 7-9.
763 Salinas makes no coments on the need of a tax reform in his campaign policy proposals, 
see Carlos Salinas de Gortari, El Reto (M6xico: Diana, 1989).
764 See Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1989-1994 (Mexico: Presidencia de la Republica, 1989): 
58.
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The issue of Federalism appears early in the agenda as a key concern of 
Salinas' government. 765
Salinas’ reforms sought to modernise the tax system so it would conform with 
the new economic environment and better respond to the development 
objectives of the country. The new strategy of development required rules 
compatible with a market-oriented economy.766 According to Pedro Aspe, 
Finance Secretary, the government objective was to modernise the economy 
by opening it to the world.767
a) Deepening Economic Reform
The Salinas administration inherited favourable political conditions for the 
introduction of tax reforms. De la Madrid had improved the relationships 
between the government and businessmen. The government was able to 
reduce inflation and renegotiate very favourable conditions for the country’s 
international debt.768 Overall it had embarked on a profound programme of 
structural adjustments highly praised by IFIs.769 Salinas’ administration
765 See David Colmenares Paramo, El Federalismo Fiscal en Mexico 1989-1994 Volumes I, II, 
III (Oaxaca: Gobiemo del Estado, 1995).
766 Pedro Aspe, Economic Transformation the Mexican Wav (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1993): 96.
767Aspe argues that they were well aware of the large losses incurred by cutting up tax rates (it 
had been carefully evaluated by specialised economists at the Treasury Department). 
However, the priority was to remain internationally competitive, and get rid of the obstacles to 
foreign investment. In addition, measures taken, as increasing the tax base, and the number of 
taxpayers registered among others, helped to compensate for the loss of revenue. Interview 
Aspe September 20th, 2000.
768 Smaller debt services free budgeted resources that were then channelled into social 
investment and development infrastructure.
769 According to the World Bank, Mexico and Chile were the only countries in Latin America that 
had reached mature consolidation in their reform programmes. Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In the same context, the IMF stated that “Mexico has achieved a remarkable 
economic transformation since the late 1980s on the basis of prudent macroeconomic policies 
and far reaching structural reforms.* See IMF Press Release No.95/10.
/
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commitment to market oriented reforms increased flows of foreign investment, 
financing the Mexican economy for a few years.770
The first problem that the Salinas’ administration faced was a heavy burden of 
debt service, which had become an impediment to growth.771 A condition for 
the re-negotiation of credits was a programme of structural reforms, which led 
the country to experience a substantial transformation of the economy. Mexico 
followed step by step the structural adjustment policies recommended by IFIs 
and the US government known as “the Washington Consensus.”772 But the 
Salinas’ administration went beyond the original set of policies, achieving very 
significant macroeconomic results. These included: reducing inflation from 
almost 160% in 1987 to 8% in 1993, without a sharp decline in national
770 See net flows of capital in Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: The Case of 
Lattin America (Madrid: IRELA, 1994) and Inversidn Extraniera Directa en America Latina en 
los Anos 90s (Madrid: IRELA, 1996).
771 From 1983 through 1988, Mexico was a net exporter of capital, transfering billions of US 
dollars in debt services every year (approximately in 4.5% average) This transfer of resources 
drained the economy of savings and investment and created a major impediment to growth. 
Between 1989-92, the Salinas’ administration negotiated a financing package for Mexico, 
together with a subsequent debt reduction operation. To learn more about the rescheduling of 
the external debt during the Salinas’ administration see Jos6 A. Gurrla, La Politica de la Deuda 
Externa: Una Vision de la Modernization de Mexico (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econdmica,
1994) and Green. In addition, a substantial programme of structural reforms reduced the 
Mexican economy’s reliance on borrowed funds as well as GDP ratio of external debt. Total 
public sector debt as percentage of nominal GDP fell from a high of 124.4 % of GDP at the end 
of 1987 to 32.8% of GDP at the end of 1993. Later reflecting the sharp devaluation of the peso 
at the end of 1994, it increased to 49.8% of nominal GDP at December 31, 1994. Banco de 
Mexico various issues.
772 Noteworthy are the similarities between the IFIs recipe and Salinas’ government agenda. 
According to the 1988-94 National Development Plan, the top priorities in the Salinas 
administration agenda were: 1) Control wage and price instability through an agreement among 
labour, business and government, the Pact for Economic Stability and Growth (PECE); 2) 
Renegotiate the foreign debt so as to eliminate its excessive drag on economic growth; 3) 
Open the country to world trade flows, in order to stimulate the Mexican economy’s 
competitiveness, encouraging exports; 4) Attract foreign and national investment; 5) Privatising 
state owned companies, freeing resources for social programmes; 6) Implement a social 
program to combat poverty; 7) Reform the fiscal system; 8) Maintain strict fiscal discipline; 
Mexican Agenda. 13th edition, (Mexico; Presidencia de la Republica, Direction de 
Comunicacion Social, 1992): 72. See Wiliamson ed. Latin American Adjustment.
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productivity. A successful re-negotiation of the foreign debt773 reduced the total 
external debt from 47% of GDP in 1998 to only 19% in 1993 (Public sector debt 
passed from 28% of GDP to 11%).774 Public social expenditure increased from 
6.3 % of GDP in 1988 to 10.2% in 1994. In addition up to 50% more resources 
went to local and provincial governments. There was a reduction of the number 
of people living in extreme poverty from 14.1% in 1989 to 11.8% in 1992. 
Government finance moved from a fiscal deficit of 12.4% of GDP in 1982 to a 
public sector surplus of 1% in 1993. Also significant, was a programme of 
disincorporating hundreds of state owned companies. Such achievements were 
possible thanks to the reduction and rationalisation of public expenditure, a tax 
reform, the privatisation of public enterprises,775 and priced adjustments for 
goods and services supplied by the public sector.
Nevertheless, the greatest change took place with trade and financial 
liberalisation. Trade liberalisation was at the core of the economic programme; 
the objective was to move away from traditional oil exports. In 1982 oil 
represented 78% of total exports, while manufacturing exports represented only 
14%. By 1993 manufacturing exports amounted to 80%, while oil exports
773 The 1989-92 Financing Package for Mexico, implemented in March 1990 was intended to 
reduce the principal amount of and the debt services burden associated with Mexico’s 
commercial bank debt, and to secure sufficient future financing to allow Mexico to resume 
sustained economic growth. Of the approximately $48 billion of external debt held by Mexico’s 
commercial bank creditors in 1989, approximately $ 43 billion participated in the principal and 
interest reduction options; approximately $ 20.6 billion was exchanged for Discount Bonds and 
the balance was exchanged for Par Bonds. Thus, Mexico was able to reduce the principal 
amount of its external debt by approximately $ 7 billion. The balance of Mexico’s commercial 
bank creditors agreed to participate in the new money option and to lend Mexico approximately 
$ 1.07 billion in new credits over four years. Since the 1946 rescheduling of debt incurred prior 
to the revolution in 1910, Mexico has not defaulted in the payment of principal of interest on 
any of its external indebtedness. See Mexico's Agenda.
774 Total consolidated internal and external debt of the Mexican government, diminished from 
68% of the GDP in 1988 to 22% in 1993.
775 Total revenues from privatisation between December 1988and December 1993 amounted to 
$23 bn. But privatisation revenues are one-time income only.
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decline to 14% of the total export output. During the Salinas administration 
Mexico expanded and diversified its commercial relations through regional and 
multilateral agreements; specially significant was the Free Trade Agreement 
signed with Canada and the US (NAFTA).776 Likewise, a broad legal and 
institutional reform took place to open the financial system to local and foreign 
investors.777 Financial liberalisation attracted capital, Mexico received a major 
inflow of capital of more than US$90 billion dollars from 1988 to 1994. 
According to Banco de Mexico, $71,731 million were in portfolio and only 
$23,185 million were in the form of foreign direct investment.778 The financial 
opening has caused the country to became very vulnerable to international 
events and susceptible to the influences of foreign actors.779
6.3.2.- Policy Actors and theire Influence: The Growing Influence of 
Capital
As stated before in this chapter, the power of corporate actors continued to 
decline in an effort by the Salinas' administration to diminish their political 
influence. Once the relationship with the business sector was restored to 
amicable levels, Salinas made sure that the interests of business were 
protected and opened the door for new juicy business. President Salinas was
776 In 1993 it joined the OECD and APEC, and in 1994 the North American Fee Trade 
Agreement with the US and Canada entered into effect. Additional trade agreements were 
signed with Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica y Central America. To learn about NAFTA 
see Lustig, Bosworth and Lawrence eds., Assesina the Impact of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement.
In 1988 there were a total of 19 banks, by 1994 there were more than 50, among another 
300 other financial institutions. To learn about the modernisation of the stock market see Luis 
Miguel Moreno, “The Internationalisation of the Mexican Stock Market,” El Mercado de Valores. 
Nacional Financiera, January-February 1994:2632.
778 See Banco de Mexico, various issues.
779 In the late 1980s and early 1990s the providers of foreign capital shifted form institutional 
funds to capital from private investors. This expensive and highly volatile capital fled after a 
year of uncertainty and political turmoil causing a severe liquidity crisis at the end of 1994.
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obsessed with the idea of taking Mexico into the first world, further deepening 
the policies of structural adjustments. Detractors accused the government of 
following a neo-liberal agenda that increased the leverage of external actors, 
both financially and ideologically.
a) Exogenous Influences: Reform from Abroad
The tax reform polices came into Salinas government agenda propelled by the 
IFIs and the worldwide wave of tax reform. While Suarez Davila, Under­
secretary of Finance during De la Madrid’s term recognised the powerful 
influence exercised by the IFIs through the Washington Consensus policies. 
Pedro Aspe, Salinas' Finance Secretary, played down their influence, pointing 
only to their advisory role. The evidence shows surprising similarities between 
the Mexican tax reform agenda and that of the World Bank.780
As noted earlier, during the Salinas presidency the pressure to reform the tax 
system came from The World Bank, rather than from the IMF. The Mexican 
government closely followed World Bank’s tax reform policy recommendations, 
implementing them almost to the letter. Tax reform policies included 
broadening the tax base, increasing incentives to investment through a lower 
marginal base and improving the administration of taxes.781
780 Aspe’s lessons of tax reform in Mexico are almost identical to those policy recommendation 
made by the World Bank to developing countries reforming their tax system. See Aspe, 
Economic Transformation the Mexican Wav. 96.
701 The World Bank recommendation on fiscal reform, are summarised in Lessons of Tax 
Reform. The book discusses the issues that must be addressed when reforming taxes. It 
summarises current best practices in tax reform, including examples of countries that have 
adopted these measures and it reports on the tax advice that the World Bank has been giving 
in this topic. The study concludes with recommendations on future Bank operational and 
research work in the field of taxation.
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The most important polices favoured by the World Bank are: a) limiting the use 
of fiscal incentives782 that could lead to distortions in resource allocation across 
sectors and b) generating revenue by widening the tax base rather than by 
raising rates.783 Broadening the base generally involved eliminating or reducing 
exemptions, plus related deductions, allowances and loopholes.784 The World 
Bank strongly encouraged countries to cut income tax rates, arguing that in 
developing countries, “personal income taxes tend to have high rates on 
narrow bases, and generate little revenue. The low yields reflect limited 
coverage and poor design.”785 The general objective according to the World 
Bank was to increase revenue while minimising the distortions and inequities in 
the existing tax system. World Bank officials recommended paying particular 
attention to efficiency, horizontal equity, and administration.
In a similar tone, the world-wide wave of tax reform that took place during the 
1980s and early 1990s, focused on improving efficiency to minimise the 
distortions created by taxation. The trend included lower marginal tax rates, a 
response to international pressures, and a consideration of the value added tax 
as a broad-based source of revenue.786 The objective was to make taxes 
interfer as little as possible with the free working of the markets.787 New 
emphasis was placed on improving efficiency of the tax administration, tax 
simplification and voluntary compliance. However, the wave of tax reform that
782 The World Bank tax reform study, is particularly critical of the fiscal incentives scheme used 
by the Mexican government to promote investment in the early 1980s. The incentive 
(CEPROFIS) was given in the form of a tax credit based on a special certificate that was used 
to pay the beneficiary’s tax liabilities.See Lessons of Tax Reform. 37
783 The World Bank’s new attitudes for the design of tax reforms in Lessons of Tax Reform. 37.
784 Lessons of Tax Reform. 38.
785 ibid:
786 Boskin and McLure.
787 See Boskin and McLure. For a detailed record in the developed world see Sandford, 
Successful Tax Reform, see also Taxation and International Capital Flows.
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swept the world in the 1980s was largely revenue “neutral” (some countries like 
Germany even lost income).788 In addition, the reform neglected vertical equity, 
(a more progressive tax schedule) and instead emphasised horizontal equity 
(known as levelling the field). This was a marked contrast to earlier reform 
attempts, where vertical equity was dominant, taxing heavier those better off to 
reduce income inequalities. According to Sandford a negative by-product of the 
world wave of tax reform was that it significantly accentuated inequalities of 
income distribution.789
6.3.3.- Salinas Tax Reforms: Harmonising the Tax System with the First 
World
Studies show the huge influence of IFIs, but is important to recognise that 
enforcement and administrative reforms went far beyond international 
guidelines. The reforms included cutting income tax rates to persons and 
corporations, and eliminating some exemptions and deductions. Administrative 
change and the commitment to enforcement and surveillance was highly 
prized by the international comunity.
a) Cutting tax rates
The objective was to reduce income tax rates from individuals and 
corporations, to international standards. The fiscal reform included large cuts in 
tax rates, which had the explicit aim of making Mexico’s tax rates similar to 
those in the US, and Canada, as well as reducing the incentives for tax 
evasion. The top personal rate went down from 50% in 1988 to 35% in 1989.
788 Taxation and International Capital Flows. 45.
789 Sandford, Successful Tax Reform. 71.
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The corporate tax rate also went down, from 42% in 1988 to 35% in 1990. 
Simultaneously, personal income tax was indexed to the consumer price index 
and corporate income tax was adjusted to inflation.790
Indirect tax rates were also reduced. In the framework of the “pactos” 
negotiations in 1991 the general rate for the VAT was reduced from 20% and 
15% to a common rate of 10%. In addition, in 1992 VAT rates at the border 
zone (6,15, 20%) changed to a general rate of 10%.791 To maintain similar tax 
revenues, the tax base was broadened and the number of taxpayers increased. 
The number of registered taxpayers other than workers, increased from 
1.7million in 1988 to 5.6 million in 1994.792
Table 6.4.- Total Number of Taxpayers
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Individual 1,457 1,604 2,741 3,042 4,461 5,066 5,264
Corporate 301 325 336 332 351 354 382
Total 1,759 1,929 3,077 3,374 4,812 5,421 5,647
Source: Ingresos Ordinarios del Sector Publico Federal y Total de Contribuyentes Activos, 
Anexo 3 Informe de Gobierno. Poder Ejecutivo Federal, September 1997: 64.
Tax officials carefully forecast the potential losses in tax revenues, resulting 
from the reduction of tax rates. Former Secretary Aspe signalled that they were 
“perfectly conscious of the probable loss in revenue, but it was considered a 
necessary step in moving towards a free trade agreement with the United
790 Aspe, Economic Transformation. 99
791 Gil Diaz, "Rehabilitation of Public Finance": 51 and Aspe, Economic Transformation. 100.
792 Gil Diaz, “Rehabilitation of Public Finance,” 53.
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States.”793 Ultimately, revenue figures tend to increase despite the reduction on 
the tax rates, showing the importance of tax evasion. This shows the effect 
caused by the pressure exercised by IFIs. In order to compensate for the 
losses a programme of enforcement and collection was implemented (see table 
on revenue yields from different taxes). Aspe accepted that without enhancing 
the number of taxpayers and a strict programme of enforcement, the country 
would have experienced a much greater loss of tax revenues. 794
b) Eliminating Exemptions and Deductions
According to former Finance Secretary Pedro Aspe, the burden of taxes lay 
largely on individual tax payers. Regarding corporate income it was 
concentrated only in a few sectors of the economy with tax rates usually higher 
than international standards. Some privileged sectors of the economy enjoyed 
tax exemptions despite the lack of social or economic justification for it. These 
tax system structural weakness and inequalities were one of the reasons 
behind the 1989 and 1991 tax reforms.795 The reform included a detailed 
survey of exemptions and deductions of previous tax laws, as well as an 
assessment of those fiscal privileges that were not truly justified according to 
economic rationale. Two examples are the elimination of deductions in 
restaurant consumption and expensive cars for executives.796 For Secretary 
Aspe the tax system was contaminated by a system of fiscal credits, conceived 
in an strategy of industrialisation in vogue 25 years before.797 Eliminating
793 Interview Aspe, September 20th, 2000.
794 Ibid.
795 Aspe, Economic Transformation. 97.
796 AsDe. Economic Transformation. 101.
Aspe. Economic Transformation. 96.
247
exemptions and cutting the number of items that could be deducted helped 
broaden the tax base.
An unprecedented move was a stringent treatment of hard-to-tax-groups. In 
December 1989, special provisions for so-called minor taxpayers (MTP) and 
the special tax basis (STB) were eliminated.798 These had covered around a 
million and a half firms (compared with 250,000 registered as normal 
taxpayers) that each paid a specific quota depending on their activity, and did 
not pay VAT. These two taxes were designed as a means of taxing hard-to-tax 
groups, but end up unjustifiably subsidising many taxpayers. Tax exemptions 
enjoyed by artists were also eliminated. Through this legal change thd,
i
L
government took away fiscal privileges enjoyed by 17% of all Mexicans, who 
had legally paid no taxes or enjoyed special treatment. As no accounting was 
required the authority did not know how much they were making, leading to the 
manipulation of profits and evasion. Many special groups were well organised 
and exercised political pressure by mobilising mobs and lobbying government 
officials as well as PRI leaders. The taxpayers that prospered enough to fall 
outside the special scheme, were able to resist this pressure supported by the 
political organisation that acted as their tax agents, lobbying in their favour. 
These schemes provided a legal cover up for many companies in the informal 
sector. A new scheme of cash tax flow was introduced, substituting the 
previous ones. An amnesty on all past obligations was granted if the taxpayers 
completed a declaration of assets owned. The taxpayers were required to 
maintain daily records and issue receipts to all customers. Concessions
798 Minor Taxpayers Regime (Contribuyentes Menores) and Special Basis Taxpayers (Bases 
Especiales de Tributacibn).
remained for peasants and truckers, who complained about the difficulty of 
getting receipts.799 Some minor privileges granted to areas such as agriculture, 
fishing, forestry, livestock, transport, banks and publishing industry were 
eliminated. Agriculture, fishing and cattle remained in a special regime with a 
reduction of 50% in the tax rate, but they were obligated to maintain a record of 
all the transactions in cash.800
To broaden the tax base fiscal subsidies to income tax were cancelled, 
companies were paying about one third of their employees’ salaries on tax- 
exempt fringe benefits. The subsidy consisted in a tax reduction that was 
steeper for employees receiving a higher proportion of their income in the form 
of cash.801 This is a practice that is commonly abused. The Mexican 
government itself is the first to fail to report to tax authorities full salaries; its 
employees receive up to 30% of their salary on tax-exempt income known as 
“compensacidn.” This is a practice commonly used in both federal and local 
governments.
To fight tax avoidance a 2% levy on enterprise assets was introduced in 
1989.802 The Tax on Real Assets (TAR) was designed to stop tax 
manipulations, which had previously enabled up to 70% of business to avoid 
paying any profits. For many years, large companies in particular declared
799 Das-Gupta, 313-314 and interview Beatriz Paredes former peasent leader, Mexico 
September 25th, 1999.
800 Aspe, Economic Transformation ,93.
801 Das-Gupta, 308.
802 In 1989, Mexico introduced the Ley de Impuesto al Activo, (Asset Tax Law) an alternative 
form of minimum income tax on corporations and individuals engaged in business activities, the 
new tax was aimed at reducing tax evasion. The tax on real asset is assessed at a rate of 1.8% 
on the aggregate book value of the assets owned by a company in each fiscal year. Income tax 
payment may be credited against the Asset Tax. Tax authorities strongly believe that the TAR 
has been helpful in increasing tax collection.
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continuous losses, but with the implementation of a new tax they had to pay at 
least 2% of the value of their assets each year. The tax was envisaged to curb 
widespread use of paper losses by companies, mostly in the form of transfer 
pricing by multinationals trying to avoid paying any income tax.803 According 
to Pedro Aspe, TAR was credited towards the payment of income tax, thus only 
affecting those which had no profits or had devised ways to avoid the payment 
of income tax.804 However, the tax caused great trepidation among the 
business community, who were opposed to the idea that they had to pay taxes 
when experiencing losses and accused the TRA of being unconstitutional805 
Thousands of habeas corpus writ, (Injunctions) were filed in the courts. Since 
then the Supreme Court has declared this levy unconstitutional, on the grounds 
of proportionality and ability to pay. Nevertheless, in order for a company to 
benefit from the Supreme Court ruling it must file itself a suit.
c) Administrative Reform
The modernisation of the tax system required a complete revision of 
administrative procedures.806 Tax authorities came to the conclusion that the 
problem with low collection was to a large extent structural, meaning weak tax 
infrastructure and administration, plus the handicap of widely spread corruption 
and evasion.807 To address these problems they proposed a package of 
measures that included the revision of administrative procedures and the
803 See Dumsbusch on Transfer Pricing.
804 Interview Aspe, September 20 ,1999.
805 Interview Raul Picard, President of CANACINTRA, Mexico, September 25th, 2000.
806 Aspe, Economic Transformation. 97.
807 Esperanza Dur£n, "Mexico’s 1986 Financial Rescue: Palliative or Cure?" in Philip The 
Mexican Economy. 98.
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expansion of human and capital resources.808 There were partial attempts to 
decentralise the collection of taxes, by allowing the collection of taxes through 
commercial banks. The customs warehouses were opened to the 
administration of private companies, where private customs agents managed 
the information and the tax calculations. The special regime was replaced by a 
simplified one, in an attempt by the government to abandon the paternalistic 
approach, and introduce new conditions and incentives to gradually incorporate 
these companies to a competitive economy. A simple accounting system was 
required for the smallest companies, with simpler rules to calculate depreciation 
of assets, no obligation to pay total asset taxes nor to maintain a record of all 
the expenses 809
A new system of invoices was introduced with special forms to be printed by 
authorised printing establishments, with all the details of the selling 
establishment as well as those of the printer to avoid duplication. Sanctions on 
invoice irregularities were strongly enforced in 1993, when 2985 business were 
shut down and 24,871 fines were imposed 810 Fiscal cash registers were also 
introduced to automatically record all sales; however, surrendering to political 
pressure they were withdrawn under the Zedillo’s administration.
Important administrative reforms to the organisational structure took place 
during the Salinas term.811 Many of these reforms had the objective of making 
the system more efficient and reducing petty corruption. The authorities
808 Duran, 97




reduced the number of manpower from 46,000 in 1988 to 36,000 in 1991,812 
eliminating a large part of the bureaucracy that resisted to the changes. Banks 
acted also as collector agencies, largely increasing the number of tax collection 
windows, reducing queues and improving services. To maximise collection they 
minimised direct contact with taxpayers and incorporated the use of computers 
and a new system of issuing and printing forms. The process of 
computerisation allowed collectors to increase the number of collection notices 
from 250,000 in 1988 to a staggering 2 million a year in 1993. To get around 
the bureaucratic obstacles of a fully computerised operation, the Tax 
Collection Agency privatised the entire computerisation process, using pre­
programmed laptop audits.
d) Enforcement and Surveillance
One of the main objectives of the Salinas administration’s fiscal policy was to 
fight tax evasion by improving the fulfilment of tax payers’ obligations.813 The 
Finance Secretary justified the fiscal reforms on the grounds that the capacity 
of the tax system to support the permanent expenditure of the government, the 
social infrastructure and the system’s ability to correct the problems of 
inequality was greatly threatened by general evasion and tax avoidance.814 
Many legal changes were made to strengthen enforcement and firm actions 
were taken to enforce fiscal laws. The objective was to make an exemplary 
punishment that would induce other tax evaders to regulate their fiscal 
situation. Penalties for tax evasion were augmented, and the law was amended 
to close loopholes, and facilitate enforcement. Prior to the Salinas
812 Des-Gupta, 319.
813 Gil Diaz, "Rehabilitation", 49.
814 Interview Aspe, September 20th, 1999.
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administration, a tax evader was not prosecuted if they paid what was owed 
plus a fine and charges. Fiscal laws were reformed to enhance the grounds on 
which government could imprison tax evaders. Before the legal reform only 
those who presented a fraudulent declaration could be prosecuted and those 
not registered as taxpayers could not.815 The number of prosecutions increased 
from only two registered cases between 1929 and 1988, to more than 600 tax 
evasion prosecutions by 1994, of which more than 250 included 
imprisonment.816 According to the deputy fiscal prosecutor, the legal 
department decided to pursue only those cases with a large public impact, 
using them as exemplary punishment to increase deterrence.817 The amount of 
the fraud should be around US$3 million for targeted personalities.818
The number of active taxpayers grew sharply as a result of the improved tax 
enforcement.




1988 11.14 1.76 12.90
1989 11.87 1.93 13.80
1990 12.70 3.08 15.78
1991 13.60 3.38 16.98
1992 13.94 4.81 18.75
1993 14.01 5.42 19.43
1994 14.50 5.65 20.15
Source: Director General of Revenue Policy and International Fiscal 
Affairs, Secretary of Finance, 1998.
e) The Auditing Programme
815 Elizondo, "In Search."
Interview Aspe, September 20th, 1999 and Aspe, Economic Transformation. 100.
817 Interview Enrique Hernandez, Deputy Fiscal Attorney, Mexico, October 24th, 2000.
818 Among those prosecuted were a world boxing champion, some soap stars, couple of 
singers, a large banker, the owner of a foot ball team, and some prominent businessmen.
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A large fiscalisation programme meant that 10% of taxpayers were subject to 
random audits. In 1988, only 14% of the 54,000 audits carried out showed 
credit balances favouring fiscal authorities. By 1991, out of the 156,00 audits, 
90% favoured the treasury.819 The benefit-cost ratio of the audits increased ten 
fold during a very short period of time, due to a programme of incentives for tax 
auditors. Bonuses were given according to the number of penalties realised by 
tax auditors, and as a result their salaries went up more than 100%. This 
method increased by 60% the total revenues collected from penalties. Although 
the incentives scheme was largely attributable for improving the effectiveness 
of audits, other policies like the dismissal of corrupt officials, changes in the 
audit procedures, rotating periodically auditor involved in different stages of the 
auditing process contributed to the rise in collection-effectiveness ratio. 
Reducing the contact between taxpayers and auditors to curb collusion proved 
to be a huge success. According to the leader of the bureaucracy, Deputy 
Jimenez, the bureaucracy posed no resistance to the reform process; in his 
words “our open support to the reforms in public management was the key 
element in the successful implementation of the new policies.”820
Another innovative scheme was the introduction of private sector auditors for 
large taxpayers 821 The auditor, a certified public accountant, was liable for 
criminal penalties if there were proven irregularities in the tax return. The 
number of taxpayers subject to private audits grew from around 25,000 in 1988
819 Gil Diaz, "Rehabilitation," 50.
820 Interview FTSE leader, Deputy Carlos Jimenez, Philipines, July 28th, 2000.
821 The system was mandatory for those with annual income of around US$2 million (N$5.8) or 
real assets of at least US$3.9m ( N$11.7m).
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to 65,000 in 1993.822 As a result, tax officials in the auditing department 
focused on middle and small taxpayers, increasing the auditing pressures on 
these taxpayers. Despite the good relations between the private sector and 
government, the efforts to prosecute tax evaders for exemplary punishment 
and increase auditing were described by business organisations as “fiscal 
terrorism.”823 Business representatives complained that they were harassed 
with unlawful practices. The audits were accused of being politically motivated, 
while the government continuously assured every one that audits were drawn 
at random.824
f) The Results of the Tax Crusade in Revenue Terms
These were the most important tax reforms in thirty years. Although the 
increase of the tax collection ratio was not very large, the administrative 
reforms put Mexico in the vanguard in Latin America. As a result of the 
adopted fiscal policies, tax receipts of the federal government (excluding oil 
related taxes) increased from 9.7 % of GDP in 1987 to 11.3 % by 1994. In real 
terms, tax receipts grew 30% between 1988 to 1991, whereas the economy, 
during the same period, grew just 11.8%.825 In 1987, 43.2% of the resources of 
the Federal Government came from the oil industry; and resources extraneous 
to oil, including revenues not derived from taxes, represented 56.8%. This 
situation changed considerably by 1991, when figures from said sources
822 Audits Statistics, Administration General de Auditoria Fiscal Federal, Secretary of Finance, 
1996.
823 Carlos Abascal, President of COPARMEX, Mexico, September 26th, 1998, various 
newspapers.
824 However, the method looks at the history of the taxpayer, such as recurrent losses, large 
changes in the reported profits of income, or constant credits. The crossing of information, as 
well as complains are taken into account.
825 Gil Diaz, "Rehabilitation," 50.
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reached 28.8% and 71.2% respectively.826 Between 1989 and 1991, real non­
oil tax revenues increased 29.5%, that is 1.5% of GDP. An increase of nearly 
60% was the result of more revenue from a broader income tax base and a 
growing number of taxpayers. The rest came from an increase above 12% in 
the collection of the value-added tax and indirect taxes from international 
commerce. 827
Income tax rose from 3.9% of GDP in 1987 to 5.1% in 1992. VAT income grew 
from 2.7% in 1987 to 2.9% in 1988, 3.1% in 1990 and 3.3% in 1991 828 In 1988, 
the taxpayer census numbered 13.1 million, this figure went up to 17.2 million 
in 1991 (31.7% higher than the previous one).829 With regard to private 
individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activities, the number grew by 106% 
during the above period.830
Table 6.6.- Tax Collection as % of GDP
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
11.6 11.7 11.1 10.6 11.3 11.4 11.3
Source: Ingresos Ordinarios del Sector Publico Federal y Total de Contribuyentes 
Activos, Anexos Tercer Informe de Gobiemo, Poder Ejecutivo Federal, Septiembre 
1997:64.
Conclusion
As seen here, Salinas’ reforms have been praised by academics and 
international institutions. The success is largely due to the fact that the policy 
shift was accompanied by profound changes in the administration and the
826 ibid.
827 Aspe, Economic Transformation.102.
828 See figures in Elizondo, "In Search," which may differ with other official sources.
829 This include all kind of workers.
830 Gil Diaz, "Rehabilitation," 50.
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enforcement mechanisms. This confirms Bird’s theories that a legal tax reform 
is futile without an administrative change. Undoubtedly, the most important 
administrative tax reforms in the last three decades took place during Salinas’ 
term. But despite its administrative success, tax collection yield increased little 
and many of his tax policies were abandoned by the next president.
According to Salinas, his greatest achievement on the tax front was enhancing 
tax collection efficiency without raising new taxes. In his memoirs, he praises 
himself for cutting taxes while increasing tax collection and social spending. He 
highlights his commitment towards tougher enforcement of fiscal laws, from 3 
to 700 tax convictions during his term and broadening the number of register 
taxpayers three fold.831 But, in the same text he recognises that he could have 
done more; what he calls in his book “an additional effort to enhance 
collection.” However, political difficulties during the first year of his 
administration inhibited the possibilities of implementing a profound tax 
reform.832
According to Salinas there were three reforms missing that needed to be 
introduced:
1.-Improve the surveillance on the management of VAT by the states, 
since many provincial governments made not even one VAT audit.
2.-lmprove taxes on land ownership (Predial), increasing its collection 
yield from 2 to 4% of GDP, like the yield in Chile.
831 See Carlos Salinas, Mexico : Un Paso Dificil a la Modemidad. 389.
832 Ibid.
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3.-lmplement a general VAT rate and eliminate the zero rate, since it 
prompted evasion representing up to 3% of GDP.833
The origins of Salinas’ tax reforms lies in the deep fiscal desequilibrium of the 
country and the need to rapidly adapt to globalisation. The depth of the fiscal 
problems in the early 1980s was the force that triggered the need for a 
comprehensive tax reform. The economic crisis and the crunch of resources 
pushed the government to have recourse to new ways for raising revenue. 
Traditional sources of finance such as inflation and borrowing were not possible 
any more, so new ways such as privatisation were envisaged. Once again the 
state ended up using alternative means for financing itself while avoiding 
taxation as much as possible.
The concentration of economic power with the wave of globalisation and 
privatisations complicated further the ability of the state to extract resources 
from the economic elite. Their financial mobility increased their economic 
leverage, in a time of great demand for financial resources. Globalisation 
enabled IFIs to push their ideological agenda forward. In addition, the 
conditions attached to the loans allowed them to get directly involved in 
economic policy making. The drift of reform came from outside while the 
Mexican technocracy welcomed it. The political leadership clearly understood 
the need to move forward by opening the economy to a globalised world and 
the cost of ignoring it.
833 Ibid.
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The large transformation of the tax system affected all sorts of taxpayers 
differently. Large and medium size businesses benefited the most, from the 
reduction of tax rates, investment write offs, inflation accounting procedures, as 
well as the institution of private auditors which led to quicker refunds. The only 
major cost was the new tax on real assets, which nevertheless could be 
credited to the payment of income taxes. Industries with special political clout 
such as agro-industries and the transport industry continued to enjoy a large 
number of special concessions.
The greatest burden of the tax policy reforms fell on small business, with the 
elimination of special treatment, stricter tax enforcement and the 
implementation of new rules for accounting and issuing invoices. For the middle 
classes the tax services improved but many deductions were eliminated, 
increasing their tax burden, they also benefited from the lower tax rates. 
Salaried employees benefited with the introduction of fiscal subsidies for the 
poorest taxpayers and the reduction of VAT.834 Defending himself against his 
detractors, who accuse him of benefiting the richest. Salinas argues in his 
memoirs, that his tax policies favoured mostly the poorest, since tax increases 
concentrated on gasoline levies (80% increase during his term) which are paid 
by only 10% of the population with higher income, while he reduced the general 
VAT benefiting those less well off.835
Noteworthy, is that these reforms were possible thanks to the sui generis 
nature of the Mexican political system. According to Das-Gupta the scope and
834 See Das Gupta, 328-332.
835 See Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Mexico: Un Paso Diffcil a la Modernidad .
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span of the reforms was possible because of the willingness of the President 
and the new team of technocrats in economic policy making sphere, but more 
importantly thanks to the unique political conditions that existed in Mexico. He 
highlights the virtual absence of political resistance and the lack of inertia from 
within that could have constituted an obstacle to administrative reorganisation, 
to the unique character of the Mexican state, with the hegemonic role of the 
PRI and great presidential power, acting as a manager of conflict among 
interest groups. He also points out that the legislature has acted as a rubber 
stamp to executive initiatives because of the weak power of the opposition. In a 
few words, the autocratic regime facilitated the implementation of policy 
reforms.836 Nevertheless, these political conditions dramatically changed after 
1994, changing the framework and bringing new actors into the process of 
policy making. The democratic opening would have an impact on taxation, and 
the next chapter examines Zedillo’s tax reforms within a new framework of 
democratisation.
836 See Smith, Acuna and Gamarra on the authoritarian technocratic leaders in Latin American 
countries following the neo-liberal paradigm. William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuna and Eduardo 
A. Gamarra, eds. Democracy. Markets and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina. 
Bolivia. Brazil. Chile and Mexico (Miami: North-South Center University of Miami, 1993).
Chapter VII
Democratic Openness
“I will not make false promises over tax cuts. We will review our tax 
system and I will make sure to undertake all the necessary steps to 
become fully competitive at the international level.”
Ernesto Zedillo as presidential candidate.837
After more than 70 years of hegemonic control by a single political party, the 
country has gradually opened up, becoming a democratic regime. The resilient 
characteristics of the Mexican political system, identified by Das-Gupta as the 
main reasons behind the successful implementation of the tax reforms during 
the Salinas’ period are quickly disappearing. The new political framework is 
changing some of the most important variables, and these include the rapid 
deterioration of the PRI’s hegemonic role, the weakening of the presidential 
office and the emancipation of the legislative branch. These changes have 
taken place in the short span of time of six years. Political turmoil and the 
unexpected crisis in 1994 cracked the fundamentals of the long lasting political 
regime, opening the door to democracy.
7.1.- Characteristics of this Period
The 1994 crisis largely redefined the geopolitical face of the country. Popular 
discontent over the grievous political events at the end of the Salinas term, and 
the devastating financial crisis in 1995, changed electoral preferences 
benefiting opposition parties. The official results gave President Zedillo victory
837 Campaign speech before private sector representatives in Manzanillo, Colima, May 14th 
1994. See Ernesto Zedillo, Una Propuesta en Campaha. PRI: Coordination General de 
Campana, 1994: 75. To learn more about Zedillo's campaign tax proposals see speech given 
on June 6th, 1994 “Crecimiento Economico para el Bienestar Familiar,” Ernesto Zedillo, 
Propuestas v Compromisos (Mexico: Editorial Noriega, 1994): 68-70.
261
with only 50.2%, a tight victory, if one takes into account that before 1982 the 
official party has rarely announced victories of less than 95%.838 From the mid 
1980s opposition parties increasingly began to conquer numerous elective 
posts at state and municipal level.839 The rapid growth of opposition victories, 
both from the left and right, encouraged opposition parties (mostly PAN) to call 
for an overhaul of the relationship between the state and municipal 
governments with the central government. The government responded, 
incorporating a scheme called “new federalism,” a priority for President 
Zedillo’s government programme.840
The issue of federalism was a very important part of the public rhetoric of 
Zedillo’s presidential campaign.841 As a candidate, he stated that “in federalism 
we have a legal, political and social instrument to take fully advantage of. We 
are going to reform our federal transfer system in order to strengthen the fiscal 
resources transferred to state and municipalities.”842 The pressure of opposition 
parties put the issues related to federal transfers and fiscal coordination at the 
top of the agenda.843 However, as soon as the growth of opposition at state 
level lost steam, at its mid-term elections so did the impetus of the new federal
838“Mexico: Country Profile 1995-1996.” Economist Intelligence Unit. United Kingdom, 1996:4.
839 See Loeza on the growth of PAN since mid 1980’s.
840 Federalism was one of the main issues during the 1994 presidential campaign, see Zedillo's 
campaign records in Una Propuesta en Campana and Propuestas v Compromisos.
841 For further information on the relevance of federalism see Miguel Osorio Zedillo Frente a su 
Pueblo (Mexico: Coordinacion Nacional de Estudios Historicos Politicos y Sociales, PRI, 1994) 
and Una Proouesta en Campana and Propuestas v Compromisos.
842 Speech given in Netzahualcoyotl, Mexico State on April 15th, 1994.
843 For interesting efforts made to strengthen the system of fiscal coordination, the transfers of 
federal funds to municipalities and their powers to collect local taxes, see Foros Reaionales de 
Presidentes Municioales (Mexico: Federacidn Nacional de Municipos en Mexico, 1999). On the 
issue of Federalism and Municipal reform see “Reuni6n Nacional de Legisladores Locales 
Prnstas,” Cancun, Quintana Roo, October, 1999.
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scheme. At the end, only limited reforms were achieved on the fiscal 
coordination front.844
The Zedillo term’s tax reforms responded mostly to the devastating economic 
effects of the 1994 financial crisis and the international plunge in oil prices in 
1998. Small improvements were made to streamline the tax system as well as 
cracking down on evasion and corruption. Despite these efforts, however, tax 
collection remained very low. Not even the economic buoyancy experienced in 
the last few years (more than 5% GDP growth from 1996-2000) translated into 
an increase in the tax revenue capacity. The reason rests to a certain degree 
on the stiff adjustment measures implemented to counteract the 1995 
economic crisis. These measures and the contraction of the economy had a 
harsh toll on tax collection. Unfortunately, despite the loud campaign, what 
stands out is Zedillo’s lack of political commitment towards reform.
The economic crisis at the start of Zedillo’s term and the democratic conditions 
reshaped not just the forces involved in the tax policymaking process, but the 
process itself. The executive branch had lost sole control of the tax 
policymaking process. New influential actors have been incorporated into the 
process, particularly the legislative branch, which has regained its role as 
decision-maker. In addition, the scarcity of credit brought back the powerful 
influence of domestic capital and IFIs, specially the IMF.
844 See “Reformas a la Ley de Coordinacidn Fiscal 1998-2000,” LVII Legislatura, Comisidn de 
Fortalecimiento Municipal, January 2000.
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The new political framework, characterised by greater political competition and 
“altemancia” (shift of power among political contenders), had a far-reaching 
impact on public policies. It also affected the way tax policy is designed and 
implemented. However, the full impact of democracy on the political economy 
of taxation remains uncertain due to the fact that the democratic process is just 
beginning.
7.2.- Economic and Political Conditions
a) Economic Policies Ridden by the 1995 Crisis
The fiscal policies during Zedillo’s sexenio had to respond to the devastating 
effects of the 1995 economic crisis.845 From the first day in office, President 
Ernesto Zedillo had to face huge macroeconomic disequilibrium, as well as 
pressing international financial requirements in the short term. A large current 
account deficit of US$ 29.4 bn, equivalent to 8% to GDP, and US$ 28 bn in 
short term maturity debt instruments known as “tesobonos.”846 There were 
growing doubts among investors that the Mexican government could honour 
the US$28 billion short-term dollar-linked debt due in 1995. In addition, the 
Mexican economy suffered other structural weaknesses such as a reduced 
level of domestic savings and an overvalued peso, reducing its capacity to 
withstand internal and external political and economic shocks that was those 
occurred in 1994. 847 These economic difficulties plus unprecedent political 
turmoil increased the lack of confidence of portfolio investors who took their
845 Jos6 Angel Gurria, interview Mexico city, September 23rd, 1999.
846 See Jimenez, “The Mexican Financial Crisis.”
847 While during 1975-1985 the average domestic savings was 20% of GDP, by 1995 it had 
fallen to 15% of GDP. “The Alliance for Economic Growth,” Under Secretariat of Finance and 
Public Credit, October 26th, 1996.
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investment out of the economy resulting in the 1994 liquidity crisis.848 An 
interest rates like in the US also had a negative impact on financial flows to 
Mexico.
On the first of January, the day that NAFTA come into effect, a group of armed 
indigenous peasants in the southern state of Chiapas declared war on the 
federal government. Although the insurgent “Zapatista Army” entered 
negotiations with the government a couple of months later, civil unrest and 
political uncertainty remained. Politics became violent as never before, and in 
March 1994, Luis Donaldo Colosio, PRI’s presidential candidate was 
assassinated. During the same year, the PRI's former secretary general, 
Francisco Ruiz Massieu was also killed. The kidnappings of prominent 
businessmen added fuel to rampant uncertainty and political instability. These 
unfortunate events made investors very nervous, specially with the Presidential 
and congressional elections to be held in August that year, pushing further the 
outflow of foreign capital that traditionally precedes elections.
The economic uncertainties and the political turmoil caused first a sudden 
interruption of foreign capital flows into Mexico, and later a reversal of capital 
flow.849 In response, president Zedillo devalued the currency and later adopted 
a floating exchange rate. The US financial sector felt betrayed by the 
devaluation. Besides, the mismanagement of the devaluation added fuel to the
848 For a review of the causes of the 1994 liquidity crisis see Fieldstain. See “To Mexico 
Rescue,” The Economist February 4th, 1995 and Jim§nez.
849 See “Under the Volcano”.
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prevailing uncertainty,850 triggering probably the worst economic crisis in 
Mexico’s contemporary history.851 The vicious cycle of devaluation-inflation led 
to extremely high interest rates in real terms, contributing to a severe 
contraction in aggregate demand. As a result, countless companies and 
households were unable to carry their debt burden, the economic activity 
shrank and unemployment rose to unprecedented levels.852 In 1995 the 
economy plunged into a deep recession, and GDP contracted by 6.9%. In the 
end, the Mexican government was able to weather the liquidity crisis with a 
syndicate of loans and loan guarantees put together by the US government for 
an unprecedented US$50bn.853
b) The 1998 Plunge in OH Prices
Tax policy responded once again to exogenous events with the international 
plunge in oil prices.854 Confronting a sharp decline in revenues, the government 
decided to drastically cut expenditures to balance the budget. The Finance 
Secretary announced three budgetary adjustments to absorb oil revenue 
losses, which amounted by the end of 1998 to US$ 7,300 million (1.9% of
850 Newspapers editorials reflected the general mood in the US over the Mexican devaluation 
and the lost of confidence in Zedillo's policies. The Wall Street Journal stated that with the 
devaluation, the Mexican government sacrified its most valuable forward moving asset “market 
confidence,” Review and Outlook, Mexico: Policy Matter,” The Wall Street Journal. Febraury 
1st, 1995 and Colin McMahon, “Peso, Stock and Confidence Fall in Mexico,” The Chicago 
Tribune January 11th, 1995. Investors harshly criticised President Zedillo who has promised he 
would not devalue the Mexican currency. Few days earlier Many experts also criticised the 
mishandling of the devaluation, labeling it as the “December error." Tanzi in The Poltical 
Economy of Fiscal Deficit Reduction, highlights the importance of credibility, were being 
perceived as sincere is as important as believed competent, 514.
See Sidney Weintraub, Mexico's Devaluation: Why and What Next? (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic International Studies, 1995).
852 Unemployment rose to 5-6% and the number of bad loans rose to 70% of the total loans.
853 See, Jimenez, Edwards, “to Mexico’s Rescue” and “Rescuing the Sombrero”.
854 See “Sexophobia,” The Economist October 31st, 1998 an “Mexico’s Economy. Miracle or 
Mirage?” The Economist April 11th. 1998.
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GDP).855 For every dollar the price of oil fell, Pemex lost about US$1.1bn per 
year.856 When the price of oil plunged to 25 year record lows, Luis Tellez, 
Secretary of Energy, highlighted the importance of a tax reform in order to 
increase tax collection from 11% to 20% of GDP. He stated that “ it was no 
longer possible to finance the budget, primarily on oil revenues.”857 As a result 
of the international collapse of oil prices, the country reached an 18 year low 
record in total revenues 858
To compensate for the loss of revenues, the Secretary of Finance proposed in 
the 1999 budget new taxes and tax rate increases to Congress. Among the 
new taxes suggested was a telephone service tax.859 However, the powerful 
lobbying of the telephone companies, owned by Mexico’s largest billionaires, 
blocked the entry of the new levy.860 Curiously, the highly passionate debate 
over the VAT rate in 1998 did not resurface in the 1999 budget. According to an 
opposition congressman, “it was inappropriate to suggest tax cuts at a time 
when government revenues had been considerably squeezed by large losses 
in oil revenues.”861
855 In 1998, the average price of the Mexican oil mix was 10.20 dollars per barrel, 38% below 
the 16.46 dpb in 1997; such a fall represented losses for more than 1% of GDP. To offset the 
losses, the government implemented three fiscal adjustments during the year amounting to 
29,775 million pesos and an increase in non- oil revenues of 6,472 million pesos. “Mexico 
Implements a Third Budgetary Adjustment,” Press Release. Hacienda, July 8,‘ 1998. To learn 
about the plunge of oil prices, see “Nueva Proyeccion para el Precio de la Mezcla de 
Exportation del Petrdleo Mexicano,” Secretaria de Energia, Mexico, July 8th, 1998, or 
"Sagging Oil Prices Complicate Pemex Future,” Petroleum Economist June 1998.
856 See Henry Tricks, “Mexico Faces Oil Price Crunch,” Financial Times March 20th, 1998 and 
interview Pablo Espresate, Pemex representative in Europe, London, May 16th, 1999.
857 Yadira Mena, "Debe Aumentar a 20% la Recaudacion Fiscal,” El Economista December 8th, 
1998:1.
858 Victor Ballinas and Mireya Cuellar, n En 98, los Menores Ingresos de 18 anos, senala 
Hacienda," La Jornada July 1st, 1998:12.
859 See “Economic Policy Guidelines for 1999,"Secretariat of Finance, November 13th, 1998.
860 Some of the tycoons behind the large telephone companies are Carlos Slim, Telmex’s 
owner; Carlos Peralta lusacell’s owner and Roberto Hemdndez owner of Avantel.
861 Interview, Senator Enrique Franco from PAN, Mexico City, September 2erd, 1999.
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c) Export Growth Boom
A resilient characteristic of this period is that Mexico experienced a remarkable 
recovery in GDP growth, thanks to the astonishing growth in exports. During 
Zedillo’s term, Mexico had become one of the most successful export countries 
in the world, ranking number seven world-wide. Thanks to the implementation 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), international trade was 
boosted from US$ 51.9bn in 1993 to US$ 160 bn for the year 2000. The 
average annual growth rate in exports growth since 1993 was 18%.862 Exports 
had been the most dynamic component of aggregate demand, contributing to 
growth and employment creation.863 However, despite the blossoming of the 
export sector it had only generated a limited impact on the income of the State. 
Trade agreements reduced tariffs and therefore revenues.864
Exports also contributed very little to the tax receipt due to the preferential tax 
treatment enjoyed by the in-bond industry. The number of maquiladoras865 in 
Mexico had grown from 2, 047 in 1993 to 4, 367 in 1998, in total they 
contributed US$ 45,500 million in 1998, almost half of total exports.866 Maquilas 
were exempt from VAT and import tariffs, since they paid a safe harbour tax 
equivalent to 5% on assets. Their status changed from temporary assembly 
plants to permanent establishments in the year 2000, and with that they lost 
some privileges like the tariff waiver (eliminated on January 1st, 2001). The
862 “Report on International Trade,” SECOFI, 2000. Mimeo
863 For the recent statistics on international trade see “Mexico’s Achievements in Export 
Activity,” Bancomext, 1999. Mimeo.
864 Interview Secretary of Trade and Industry, Hermino Blanco, London, February 11th, 1997. 
See also Mayela Vazquez, "Golpea TLC Recaudacidn," Reforma July 10th, 1998,1.
865 Maquiladoras are engaged generally in assembly activities and combine Mexican labour 
and material with foreign technology, components and capital.
866 See “NAFTA Update,” Report by the SECOFI-NAFTA Office, Mexican Embassy in the US, 
Washington DC, 1998.
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proposal to collect income tax from maquiladoras encountered heavy 
opposition, even from the US Treasury whose representatives argued that 
these measures could provoke double taxation.867
In order to meet the large expansion of trade, the government had undergone a 
process of modernising the customs agency, one of the busiest in the world. 
Nevertheless, corruption and deficiencies in this agency prevailed despite the 
new policies.868 A document from the Secretariat of Finance reports that an 
internal programme for auditing customs officers, ended up in many agents 
been prosecuted for corruption.869 To the Vice-president of the Association of 
Customs Agencies, what has been found only represents the tip of the 
iceberg.870
Very significant, is the fact that the economic crisis accelerated the process of 
democratisation; bringing politicians from opposition parties to numerous 
elected posts and offices of influence in decision-making. This has changed the 
way tax decisions have been made in Mexico for seventy years.
d) Political Openness: Changing the Way Tax Policy is Made
Challenges both from the left and right began to render electoral fruit to
opposition parties by the end of the 1980s. In this decade there was a rapid
867 See Andrea Mandel-Campbell, “Shipping Mexico: To Raise Harbour Taxes," Financial 
Times Ocotber 29th, 1999: 13 and Christopher Parkes, “Free Trade Zone May be Victim of its 
Own Suces,” Financial Times May 14th, 1999, 11; Andrea Mandel-Campbell, "Maquilas 
Prepare for Tax Shake-Up," Financial Times May 13th, 1999:8.
868 "Corrupcion, Fraude y Deficiencias en el Sistema de Aduanas: Omar Fayad," Novedades. 
March 11 , 1999 and interview wth a custums agent at Mexico city international airport, on 
September 19th 1999.
869 Reporte interno Direccibn General de Aduanas, Secretariat of Finance, 1998.
870 Interview Jorge Rivera, Vice-president Private Customs Agents, September 28th, 2000.
269
decline in the hegemonic role of the PRI, as well as a significant fall in the 
previously omnipotent power of the president.871 A wave of democratisation in 
the late 1990s brought a more plural political system to the country, to such 
degree that Krauze has claimed that “the age of politics has begun in 
Mexico.”872
Political openness during Zedillo’s term had far-reaching effects in tax policy 
making, incorporating new actors while opening the economic debate for the 
first time in seven decades. However, it is important to note that these were not 
presidential initiatives but political victories by opposition parties.
In tax policy terms the main effects of democratisation were:
a) The growth of opposition has translated into greater demand for a 
new meaning to federalism, aimed at regulating a more equal 
relationship among the tiers of government.
b) Opening the tax debate to new actors, including business 
representatives as well as legislators from the official party who have 
become outspoken as presidential power declines.
c) Most important reinstituting the role of the Legislative power as tax 
policy maker, bringing to an end the role of the Executive as a sole tax 
policymaker.
871 Krauze has described the Mexican Presidency as an “imperial Presidency” due to the great 
powers enjoyed by the chief of the executive. Krauze, La Presidencia Imperial.
“Mexico Enters the Era of Politics,” The Economist July 12th, 1997:32.
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a) The Growth of Opposition: the Impetus Behind the New Framework of 
Federalism
The growing number of electoral victories achieved by opposition parties at 
state and municipal level translated into new demands for administrative 
decentralisation as well as redefining the relationships amongst tiers of 
government. Such demands were channelled by the government via a new 
framework for inter-governmental relations known as “new federalism.”873 
Esteban Moctezuma, former presidential appointee for leading the programme 
of federalism, argued that “Mexico enjoys a de jure federalism but suffers the 
burden of de facto centralism,” ”874 despite the fact that in the Constitution 
Mexico is a Federal government.875
Centralism has caused subnational governments to become largely depended 
on federal revenue shares.876 At present, the federal government raises most 
revenues and then distributes them among states and municipalities. The tax 
sharing agreement represents about 80% of states’ revenues, with 20% going 
to the municipalities. In addition, there is an unequal allocation of revenue 
shares, since a small group of states (the Federal District, Jalisco, Mexico, 
Nuevo Leon, Tabasco and Veracruz), account for 59% of the government’s
873 This was one of the main issues during Zedillo s campaign.
874 Esteban Moctezuma, Conference on Federalism, The North American Institute, June 7th, 
1996.
875 To learn more about Mexico’s Federalism, see Alicia Hernandez Chavez, “Federalismo y 
Gobernabilidad en Mexico," in Marcello Carmagnani Ed. Federalismos Latinoamericanos: 
Mexico. Brasil. Argentina (Mexico: Colegio de Mdxico 1993): 263-74.
b76 See Marcela Astudillo Moya, Mexico la Distribution de los Inaresos Publicos. la Federacidn 
v los Estados (Mexico: UNAM, 1989). Federalism has been one of the central demands of the 
PAN, interview with PAN President Bravo Mena, London, 24th February, 2000, see also Victor 
Gonzalez, “Busca el PAN Terminar con el Exacerbado Centralismo Econdmico, “ El Financiero 
August 20th 1997, 9.
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grants know as “participaciones,” and 44.2% of the total public investment.877 
For Francisco Suarez, these large regional inequalities called for a new 
framework for revenue sharing.878
Many governors from both the official and opposition parties, began to question 1
i -v
the revenue sharing formula demanding more resources for their governments, i " 
Richer states complained that they were unfairly shouldering the burden for the [ 
less developed states in the south and subsidising the Federal District. I 
Competing this view, governors from less developed states demanded an
i
equitable formula for the distribution of resources, one which recognised ! 
regional inequalities.879 The State’s governors also complained about the wide 
discretionary faculties given to tax officials when distributing the budget. 880
To deal with this problem Zedillo’s administration implemented a federal 
scheme that sought to delineate the scope of authority in the hierarchy of 
governments and redefine the decision of fiscal functions among levels of 
government. The objectives included redesigning the formulas for revenue 
sharing among levels of government and sharing responsibilities not just 
passing greater tax powers and more resources. The reform extended to
877 See Astudillo Moya.
878 Interview, Suarez Davila, Chairman of the Treasury Committee at the Chamber of Deputies, 
London, May 23rd, 1997.
879 C6sar Camacho, Governor of the State of Mexico, argued that the distribution of resources 
should be clearly based on the law, not in the discretion of tax authorities. Oaxaca's governor, 
Diodoro Carrasco and Rigoberto Ochoa governor from Nayarit asked to allocate the federal 
resources based on the state’s needs, benefitting the poorest states, while Nuevo Leon's 
governor Canales demanded an end to the subsidies to the federal district and a distribution of 
resources according to their contribution to the tax reciept. See “Se Fortalecer£ el Federalismo 
Si Hay Trato Equitativo en la Reforma Fiscal,” El Hidroc3lido September 6th, 1995:4.
880 Interviews with Aguascalientes' governors, (PRI) Otto Granados, Aguascalientes, Marh 3rd 
1997 and (PAN) Felipe Gonzalez, Mexico, September 19th, 1999; Guanajuato's Governors 
(PAN) Medina Plascencia, Le6n, October 2nd, 1998 and Fox Quezada, London, June 5th, 1997.
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institutional restructuring, enhancing the autonomy and welfare of the local 
governments, and at the same time preserving their sovereignty.881
Traditionally, the federal government had transferred resources through the 
revenue sharing agreement and the programmable budget. Zedillo’s 
government introduced a third mechanism for transferring resources to the 
states and municipalities known as “aportaciones” or “Ramo 33,” These 
entitlement grants were additional to the revenue sharing allocations known as 
“participaciones” However, they were tied to a specific purpose, and certain 
provisions with a clear set of responsibilities for each level of government, 
monitoring and accountability. 882
b) Democracy Incorporated New Actors to the Economic Policy Debate 
The July 1997 Congressional election was a watershed in Mexico’s political 
history.883 After seven decades of congressional monopoly, the official party 
(PRI) lost control of the majority at the lower house as well as Mexico City’s first 
elected mayor.884 Opposition victories fundamentally altered the balance of 
power in economic policy making and led to an unprecedented dispute over
881 Interview Esteban Moctezuma, Mexico, May 4th, 2000.
882 The 1998 budget made a reform to the Fiscal Coordination Act, institutionalising federal 
contributions to state and municipal governments via the creation of three funds: primary 
education and teacher training, health services, and investment in basic social infrastructure at 
the municipal level. See also Avances en el Federalismo (Mexico: Presidencia de la 
Republica, November 25th, 1997).
883 See “A Watershed in Mexico,” The Financial Times July 8th, 1997: 39. Mexico emerged as 
a new political system after the mid-term 1997 elections. See “Mexican Voters Abandon PRI 
After Seven Decades,” Financial Times July 8th, 1997:39.
884 See “Mexican Voters Abandon PRI After Seven Decades” and “Mexicans Vote for a 
Peaceful Revolution: In an Historic Switch the Opposition May Have Won 255 of 300 Directly 
Elected Seats, “ Financial Times July 8th, 1997: 39.
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the power of decision making.885 To Krauze, the election was a historical event 
“forcing the government/PRI to negotiate with opposition parties over the 
passage of important legislation through Congress, resulting in a greater 
balance of power between the legislature and the presidency.”886 Deputies from 
opposition vowed to transform a rubber-stamp Congress into an independent 
branch of government, ending sixty eight years of legislative subordination to 
the President.887 They proclaimed the end of “presidential absolutism” in 
economic affairs.888
The results of the elections brought for the first time in seven decades co­
habitation in Congress, and the need for the official party to negotiate economic 
policy. Opposition parties have built support for their causes on popular 
discontent with austerity measures and declining living standards. They 
campaigned blaming the neo-liberal economic model for the harsh situation, 
promising to change economic policy if they were elected. Once in control of 
Congress, they even announced that PAN, PRD and PT had reached a 
consensus to change the economic model.889 Two opposition leaders Lopez 
Obrador from PRD and Calderon Hinojosa from PAN called Congressmen to 
overhaul the country’s economic policy. Both agreed that it was no longer the
885 Gerardo Albarran de Alba, “En la Camara, el Choque entre Oposicion y Rbgimen se 
Convirtib ya en Una Autentica Disputa por el Poder,” Proceso August 31st, 1997: 6-10.
886 “Mexicans Vote for a Peaceful Revolution.”
887 See Santiago Creel comments on “Mexico’s New Congressmen Mount Challenge,” 
Financial Times Julv 9th. 1997:37.
BOB J
Carlos Acosta Cbrdova and Francisco Ortiz Pardo, “Legisladores de Oposicion Advierten: 
en Politica Econbmica, se Acabb el Absolutismo Presidencial,” Proceso August 31st 1997:12- 
16.
889 Statement made in conjuntion by Porfirio Munoz Ledo, Francisco Paoli Bolio and Gonzblo 
Yanez See Jose Luis Galan, “Logran Consenso PRD, PAN y PT para Modificar la Politica 
Econbmica," El Economista August 1st 1997:34. “A Discusibn Progama Econbmico,” El 
Heraldo September 5th, 1997:5.
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President’s role to decide the country’s economic path alone.890 Porfirio Munoz 
Ledo warned “the President does not decide the economic policy by himself 
any more. Now he has to share that responsibility with Congress.”891
The opposition electoral victories brought great expectations over Congress’ 
economic role. In interviews with the leaders of the two main opposition 
fractions at the lower house, Porfirio Munoz Ledo (PRD) and Medina 
Plascencia (PAN), both stated that top that their priority was to re-orient the 
economic model of development.892 This issue was seriously considered, 
despite the loud opposition by President Zedillo, who warned deputies of the 
dangers of a drastic shift in the country’s economic model.893 Zedillo promised 
that "political interests will not change the path of economic development."894 
Academics and business leaders supported Zedillo’s warning over the risks of 
drastic shifts in economic policy.895 Fearing it would suffer a historic reverse 
over economic policy, Zedillo instructed key Secretaries to set up special 
Congressional liaison offices to negotiate economic policies with opposition 
congressmen.896
890Roberto Morales y Rolando Ramos, “No es Facultad del Presidente Decidir el Rumbo 
Econbmico del Pals: Qposicibn.” El Economista August 1st, 1997: 34.
891 Interview Porfirio Munoz, London, February 19th, 1999.
892 See Xochitl Rodriguez and Adriana Contreras, "Insisten el PAN y el PRD en Revisar la 
Politica Economica." Diario de Mexico August 1st, 1997: 25.
893 “Plantea PRD Modificar Politica Econ6mica,” La Aficibn August 29th, 1997: 1. Ricardo Platt 
Garcia President of the Cbmara Mexicana de la Industria de la Construccibn considered as 
“disastrous” any attempt to change the economic model. See Antonio Gutierrez, “Desastroso 
Modificar el Modelo Econbmico: CMIC,” Novedades August 14th, 1997:6-F.
894 Manuel Moreno, "EZPL: Ningun Interes Politico Cambiarla el Rumbo Econbmico," El 
Financiero July 31st, 1997: 34.
B9i> See Ricardo Gutibrrez and Ana Rosas, “Alterarla la Recuperacion Politizar Debate sobre el 
Modelo Econbmico, Estima IP.” El Universal August 11th. 1997:1.
896 Interview Federico Rubll, liaison officer between Banco de Mexico and Congress, London, 
June 4th, 1999.
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The new conditions in Congress woke up Mexico’s business associations .897 A 
plural Congress required greater negotiations with the various economic actors. 
A new form of dialogue between tax authorities and business leaders was born. 
Particularly significant were unprecedent negotiations between the various 
political parties represented in Congress and the private sector. As soon as 
they were elected PRD and PAN deputies approached private sector leaders to 
discuss changes in economic policy as well as the programme of fiscal 
reform.898 Eduardo Bours leader of the Coordinating Businessmen’s Council 
stated that “in the past, all negotiations were conducted only with the PRI. 
Under a plural Congress, the business sector should have to interact 
extensively with legislators from all parties.”899
Tax authorities, anticipating a heated debate after the 1997 congressional 
elections, offered to open a debate on tax matters with the private sector.900 In 
the first round of meetings, each one of the business organisations tried to put 
forward their self-centred agenda. The President of the Confederation Nacional 
de Camaras de Comercio (Concanaco), Armando Araujo, demanded tax 
deductibility, fiscal simplification and reducing penalties for tax violations, plus 
the elimination of the official cash register machines, and the 2% tax on assets.
897 See Crawford, “Political Troubles Stir Mexican Business,” Financial Times August 1st, 1997: 
3.
898 Lourdes Martinez Gonzalez, Felipe de Jesus Gonzalez and Guadalupe Baez, "Negocfan los 
Empresarios con PRD y PAN un Proyecto de Reforma Fiscal,” August 8th, 1997:1.
899 Crawford, “Political Troubles Stir Mexican Business”, 3.
900 The negotiations meetings between private sector (Concamin, Canacintra, Concanaco, 
CEE) and tax authorities, included ways to simplify procedures in order to facilitate the 
compliance of fiscal obligations, deregulation and expanding the tax payers base. The 
representative of the private sector called for a new tax framework that would foster 
investment, savings and employment and could offer legal security to taxpayers. See Alinda 
Archundia, “Platicas Para Conformar Nuevo Marco,” 1. Interview Carlos Gutierrez, former 
CANACINTRA President, Mexico, October 25th, 2000.
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Additionally, he called for the elimination of privileged tax sectors.901 Camara 
de la Industria de la Transformacion (Canacintra) leader Carlos Gutierrez, 
asked for fiscal simplification as well, and for the implementation of a fiscal 
stamp schemes for those operating in the informal economy. 902 CEE leader 
Eduardo Bours’ petitions concentrated on a new fiscal framework and reducing 
tax rates.903 The Confederation of Mexican Employers (Coparmex), in the voice 
of its President Gerardo Aranda Orozco, supported the idea of a fiscal reform 
that would foster the creation of new enterprises and employment.904 Groups 
representing specialised sectors like the auto makers or the large brewersing 
companies lobbied to eliminate or reduce taxes affecting them, trying to diffuse 
the cost into other sectors.905
The leaders of the business organisations responded favourably to the debate 
on tax issues stating that they welcomed any initiative which would take into 
account their proposals and concerns, however they expected specific 
results.906 Zedillo’s team claims that they instituted for the first time an “open 
dialogue” between the different economic sectors and tax authorities.”907
901 Antonio Castellanos, Patricia Munoz and Humberto Ortiz, “Gobiemo y Empresarios 




905 See Sergio Nogueira, Director of the US Pan American Car Industry, demanding the 
elimination of the tax in new cars but warning that the reduction of VAT would generate the 
productive industrial sector. See Fernando Pedrero, “ La Reduccidn del IVA Podria Perjudicar 
la Planta Productiva, “ El Heraldo August 22nd, 1997: 3.
906 Interview Eduardo Bours, President CCE, London, October, 13th, 1999 and Jorge Marin 
Santilten, President CONCAMIN, London, October 14th, 1999.
907 Anticipating tensions on the economic debate after the congressional elections, the 
Secretary of Finance offered a forum to “debate openly” with the private sector tax matters. See 
Tiburcio Cadena, “El Titular de la SHCP Aseguro que Dialogar£ con Empresarios para Analizar 
la Legislation Fiscal”, El Sol de Mexico July 11th, 1997: 1-F. The issues that would not be 
negotiable were a) cuts in tax rates, b) fiscal incentives to specific sectors, c) deductibility in 
restaurant bills, school fees and mortgage payments. See Andrea Ornelas, “Deber£ Mantener 
la Reforma Fiscal Finanzas Publicas Sanas: CCE,” El Economista June 27th, 1997: 31.
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However, the consultation group only lasted a single year, after tax authorities 
(SAT) were unable to provide the highly publicised “overhaul fiscal reform.”908 
There had been previous consultation exercises during the Salinas 
administration, which one of the most important businessmen Antonio Gutierrez 
described as “mere shows” to keep the private sector calmed.909 Similarly, 
other participants such as the professional association of accountants and the 
representatives of small business have complained that their proposals have 
not been taken into account910 A former economic advisor to the Under­
secretary of Revenue confirmed that private sector proposals were not 
considered very seriously when the authorities were designing tax policies. In 
the end, political pressure was the decisive factor in tax policy changes 911
New Freedom Among Official Ranks
The demise of the presidential power opened the door for a greater debate of 
politics and economic policy making in the whole political spectrum, including 
the official ranks. Governors, senators and deputies belonging to the official 
party found new opportunities to express their views openly, even when their 
beliefs did not conform with the presidential rhetoric. This was a breakthrough 
from the previously unquestionable and hierarchical party discipline, though this 
process was still in its infant stages. The PRI groups such as Galileo at the 
Senate and Reflexidn in the Chamber of Deputies stood to confront the “linea”
908 See Alima Archundia, “Pl£ticas Para Conformar Nuevo Marco Tributario en 6 Mesas de 
Trabajo, Inician SHCP y Organismos Cupula," El Sol de Mexico. June 26th 1997:1.
909 Interview Antonio Gutierrez Prieto, London, August 22na, 1999.
910 Interview Rafael Escudero, President Small Businessmen in Mexico city, May 12th, 2000.
911 Interview Javier Sanchez, former economic advisor to Under-Secretary of Revenues, 
London, June 12th, 1998.
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or the imposition of the party line.912 Leaders of these groups, Senator Eloy 
Cantu and Deputy Oscar Gonzalez, agree about the welcomed unprecedented 
freedom of speech within party ranks; however Gonzalez insists that their 
members still faced even repression when they did not follow the party line.913 
Unfortunately, President Zedillo did not take criticism kindly from within his own 
party, neither demands for more transparent and democratic practices within 
the PRI, raising serious doubts about his true commitment to democracy.
Many see such political openness as a by-product of the decline in presidential 
power. Both scholars and politicians have reported a demise in presidential 
power, attributing it to President Zedillo's lack of leadership914 To his 
detractors Zedillo has been a weak President with no control over the political 
forces in the country or his party. They criticised his apathy towards political 
and party matters and questioned his commitment to democracy, since he took 
no actions towards democratising his own party. In an unprecedented move, 
President Zedillo distanced the government from the PRI calling it "a healthy 
distance." This caused disorientation among party members and a political 
vacuum. Suddenly the official party found itself without political leadership. To 
his supporters President Zedillo was a modem democratic leader, arguing that
912 Carlos Velasco, "Acuerdan Trabajo Contra la "Linea" los Priistas Inconformes," El Universal 
October 23rd 1998, 1 and Fabiola Guarneros and Jorge Teheran, "Fin a los Acuerdos 
"Cupulares" con el Gobierno, Demandan Diputados," El Universal Ocotber 22nd, 1998:1.
913lnterviews Eloy Cantu January 6th, 2000 and Oscar Gonzalez September 14th, 1999. 
Members of these groups have been accused of traitors. Gonzalez recalls that he was 
punished for voting against Fobaproa. The party leadership immediately after the vote removed 
him from the presidency of the Development Committee at the Lower House. To learn about 
the attempts to silence them see Isidro Chavez, “Instruyen a Diputados del PRI no Comentar 
M£s Sobre el IVA” Novedades August 1st. 1997, 5. See also “No Mas Sumision Legislislativa: 
Los Priistas ya no Somos Incodicionales del Presidente, Afirma Oscar Gonzalez," El Heraldo 
August 26th, 1998:1.
914 Lucy Conger, “Cautious Zedillo Shies from Fraught Issues” Financial Times September 31st, 
1998.
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gone are the days of authoritarianism of strong and unaccountable “caudillos”, 
and highlighting that the strength of Zedillo’s leadership rested on the rule of 
law and the separation of powers.
7.3.- Policy Actors and their Influence
a) Reinstating the Role of the Legislative Power as a Policy Maker 
New found democracy’s most significant impact on taxation was the sudden 
transformation of the legislative power from a merely “rubber stamp branch” to 
a full tax policy maker. Up until 1997, the official party had controlled both 
chambers in Congress,915 constraining the original check and balance function 
of the legislative branch. Nowadays, legislative proposals have to be negotiated 
among political fractions within Congress and coalition building governs the tax 
policy making process.916 This new situation has created explosive 
confrontations among Congressmen, to such a degree that Zedillo’s Secretary 
Gurria labelled the Congress floor “the circus.”917
During the first months of the new plural congress, opposition parties put aside 
their differences and voted against the PRI to get control of important 
committees within the lower house. But when the budget debate began, the two 
major parties, the leftist PRD and the right-wing PAN, split. The PAN ended up 
voting together with the PRI to pass the budget, which included both tax
915 In 1994, the PRI lost the 3/4 majority needed for Constitutional reforms but maintained the 
simple majority until the 1997 elections.
916 On the works studying the policies of coalition building to pass legal reforms, see Amparo 
Casar “ La LVII Legislatura de la Camara de Diputados en Mexico. Coaliciones y Cohesion 
Partidaria en un Camara sin Mayoria,” Politica v Gobierno Primer Semestre, 2000.
917 For the conflicts on the floor with Guillermo Ortiz see Oscar Camacho, Ciro P6rez and 
Roberto Gonzalez “Se Centrd la Comparecencia de Ortiz Martinez en un Forcejeo en Torno al 
IVA," La Jornada November 19th, 1997:1, and for those taking place during Jos6 Angel Gurria, 
see Henry Tricks, “ Congress* Blow to Mexican Budget," Financial Times November 28th, 
1998:13.
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revenue and spending laws. Although PAN and PRD voted together to reduce 
the VAT rate from 15% to 12%, the measure was blocked in the Senate that 
was still controlled by the PRI.918 Open dissent became the hall-mark in 
Congress, not only among the executive and legislative braunch, or the political 
parties represented in the lower chamber but also among parliamentarians 
from the official party themselves. 919 The VAT debate in Congress showed that 
in the end, tax measures were raised for their electoral potential rather than 
their economic soundness.
b) Corporate Actors: Weak and Divided
Corporatist structures lost political influence with the consolidation in power of 
the technocracy. President Zedillo distanced himself from this group. Labour 
organisations had grown more fractious since the death of their leader Fidel 
Velazquez. A group of more than 100 unions representing one million members 
broke away from the official union CTM. The chief organiser, the leader of 
TELMEX, Francisco Hernandez, announced his opposition to the government’s 
economic policy as a whole. Private sector organisations supporting the 
government were also weakened. Businesses no longer had to be full 
members of the pro-government chambers of commerce and industry.920
918 See “The Sour Fruits of Victory,” The Economist December 20th, 1997; “Watershade in 
Mexico,"
Financial Times: “A Lesson in Mexico: Open Dissent is the Hall-mark of Democracy," The 
Economist September 28th, 1996.
920 See Alonso Urrutia, Fabiola Martinez and Martha Garcia, “Hoy la Formal Integracidn de la 
UNT: Agrupar£ a 1.5 Millones de Trabajadores, “La Jornada November 28th, 1997: 1; and 
“Mexican Unions in a Breakaway Group.” Financial Times August 25th, 1997:16.
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c) Foreign Influence Returns
The need for foreign resources to cope with demanding financial requirements 
made the Mexican government once again vulnerable to the influence of 
international financial actors. Unable to cope with the financial requirements in 
1995, Zedillo’s administration turned to the IFIs and US Government for help. 
Fearing that economic instability could spread to the whole region by a “domino 
effect,” the US government put together a very large bail-out package for 
Mexico to refinance the public sector’s short-term debt, (primarily tesobonos), 
as well as to restore the country’s international reserves and to support the 
banking sector reform. The rescue package amounted to US$ 48 billion in 
credit facilities, including: US$20 billion from the US, $1.5 billion Canadian 
dollars from the Bank of Canada, US$1 Obn from monetary authorities of 
several countries coordinated by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
and $18 billion from the IMF.921 These resources allowed the government to 
roll over its financial obligations under longer payment schedules.
The large amount of resources directed to Mexico, gave foreign actors a 
powerful leverage on the country’s economic policy making. A good example 
on how influential they became, is given by the Draft of the Law Accompanying 
the American Bailout Package for Mexico. The original Draft of “the Mexican 
Economic Stabilization Act of 1995” required Mexico to consult with the US on 
the country’s economic policy.922 Mexican politicians were outraged by such
921 See Jim6nez, “The Mexican Financial Crisis," and R.W. Apple, “Risky Course for Clinton,” 
The New York Times February 1st, 1995: 1; David A. Singer, “International Package Aid Could 
Reach Almost $ 50Billion, “ The New York Times Febraury 1st, 1995. See also “IMF Approves 
US$17.8 billion Stand-by Credit for Mexico.”
922 This draft proposed that the Mexican government should engage in consultations to address 
monetary and budget policies, privatisation, NAFTA, and other policies with respect to financial,
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proposals. The Mexican Ambassador to the US at the time, Jesus Silva 
Herzog, stated that such a clause was like “rendering Mexico’s economic 
sovereignty to the US.”923 In the end, thanks to stiff opposition the law was 
rejected. The IMF, a major provider of funds, played a very important role in 
advising the government about the means to boost public sector revenues.924 
The credit facilities agreement with the IMF required the Mexican government 
to undertake large budget cuts and increase taxation 925 (instructions that the 
Mexican authorities followed up to the letter). Despite their active role, IFIs 
strongly deny that they had dictated Mexico’s economic policies during the 
financial crisis. Chief Economist from the World Bank, William Perry claimed 
that IFIs provided just “advisory support” to the Mexican government in the 
design of the 1995 economic plan to increase public sector revenues, but had 
no power to impose such policies.926
d) Business: The Influences of Capital (Fobaproa)
The influence of the economic elite is evident with the banking rescue 
programme. This deposit insurance vehicle put by the government to hold all 
these bad debts is known by its Spanish acronym, Fobaproa. The problems of 
the financial sector go back to the privatisation scheme in 1991, when a new 
breed of industrialists converted to bankers made loans anxious to recoup the
capital markets and deregulation. See “Draft of the Mexican Economic Stabilization Act of 
1995,” at House/Senate Discussion Draft of Mexico Loan Guarantee Bill, dated January 20th,
1995.
923 Conversation with Ambassador Silva Herzog in the Mexican Embassy in Washington D.C., 
February 11th, 1995.
924 Interview with an official from the Secretary of Finance who actively participated in the 
negotiations and asked not to be quoted.
925 See IMF agrrement in the rescue package. See also how the SAT re-engineering 
programme was presented to IMF Fiscal Affairs Office for review on the 11-12 of November, 
representing the IMF was Carlos Silbani.
Interview William Perry, Spain, March 18th, 1997.
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price paid for the privatised financial institutions. The 1995 crisis put the banks 
in the brink of collapse and exposed the poor quality of their loans. In response 
to the banking community, the government took over poorly managed banks 
and acquired thousands of delinquent loans.927 Bank shareholders (mostly 
large private investors) only collaborated with US$11 bn, while the large cost of 
the bail out programme, approximately US$70bn, come from taxpayer’s money.
The government insisted that it was of the most importance to maintain the 
banks alive,928 adding that state intervention would have been a more 
expensive alternative. Nevertheless, Michael Mackey the Canadian auditor 
hired by the Mexican Congress to audit Fobaproa, concluded that there was no 
evidence that an early intervention was the most expensive alternative as the 
authorities have argued. In contrast, he stressed that keeping the weak banks 
operating for several years ended up being more expensive than intervening in 
them immediately after the 1994 financial crisis.929 According to the legislative 
committee evaluating the scheme, not only financial institutions benefited, but 
also large companies and some state governments received huge debt cuts, 
some even up to 60% or more. 930 Despite the large inflows of capital from 
taxpayer money to the wobbly financial institutions, they still required huge 
quantities of money for recapitalisation. Ironically, while huge resources were
927 Jean Morhouse, supervisor for Latin America at the Bank of England, argues that in no other 
country in the world she has seen such ample protection to banks' investment as in Mexico. 
Interview, London, February 24th, 2000.
928Conference to UK investors at the HSBC office in London, March 17th, 1999.
929 See Sergio Martin, “Mexico: Fobaproa Initial Findings Constructive for Longer-Term Bank 
Reform,” Chase Emerging Markets Today. July 21st, 1999: 11. “Mexican Banks, Debts to 
Society, “ The Economist February 6th, 1999: 31.
930 Among those are Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, belonging to the Ballesteros family, 
Hermes Group owned by Hank Rhon's family, K 2 owned by Abel Vazquez Rana, Salinas y 
Rocha owned by Salinas Pliego and the Newspaper Excelsior and ICA. See Fabiola Guarneros 
and Osiel Cruz, “Did Fobaproa Apoyos llimitados; Mutilan el Informe,“ El Universal July 23rd, 
1999:1.
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given to bankers throughout Fobaproa, the government pledged to reduce 
general subsidies benefiting the lower strata, further eroding the living 
standards of Mexicans already affected by the crisis.931 While the government 
was allocating huge resources to “save the banks, the social budget reached 
record lows in twenty-five years.”932 The unbelievably large amount of 
resources channelled to the banking sector during hard economic times shows 
the mighty power of Mexico’s economic elite.
The debate over Fobaproa caused a legislative deadlock, postponing much 
needed tax reform.933 Opposition parties, particularly PRD, refused for months 
to authorise the cost of the rescue programme as public debt. They demanded 
that the cost of the bail-out should be shared more equally among bankers, 
corporations that defaulted and taxpayers. Meanwhile, Mexican banks were 
expecting the government to help them again; therefore they were reluctant to 
put more pressure on shareholders to build capital adequacy levels. 934ln the 
end, Fobaproa passed with the support of the PAN, which shows again the 
power of the economic elite. PAN deputies voted in favour of the law despite 
the measure being largely unpopular. 935
931 “Reducir Subsidios, Meta del Presupesto para 1999," El Heraldo de Mexico Novmber 16th, 
1998. In total there were 225% more resources to bail out financial institutions than to fight 
poverty. See Roberto Gonzalez and Cesar Martinez, “Para Sanear Bancos, 225% Mas 
Recursos que Contra la Pobreza,” La Jornada November 13th 1998. The elimination of tortilla’s 
price controls and com subsidies, caused upheaval in the population. See Elisabeth Malkin 
“Who’ll Flatten Whom in the Tortilla Wars? Business Week November 16, 1998, 42. The 
government spend as much as 7.5% of GDP in subsidies, see “Canaliza el Gobiemo Subsidios 
por 7.% die PIB en 1998,” El Economista February 18th, 1999: 2.
32 Interview Eloy Cantu, London, January 16th, 2000.
933 See Yolanda Morales, “Reforma Fiscal Integral: Nuevamente Condicionada por Intereses 
Politicos,” El Economista March 9th, 1999: 3.
934 See Tricks, “Banking System’s Problems.”
935 See Henry Tricks. “Accord on Bank Bail Out fund Passed in Mexico, “ Financial Times 
December 14 ,1998: 3.
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7.4.- Zedillo's Tax Reforms: Crisis Ridden Adjustments
Zedillo’s fiscal policies responded largely to the effects of the economic shocks, 
first the 1994 crisis and later the collapse of the price of oil during 1998. The 
economic crisis limited the leeway of the government’s tax policies. The 
Finance Secretariat had to deal with the terrible effects of a severe recession in 
1995, which had a large impact on the fiscal account.936 Tax revenues suffered 
a fall of 2% of GDP after the economic crisis.937 Collection dropped in real 
terms and thousands of taxpayers incurred arrears. The sharp devaluation of 
the peso, and the consequent up-turn in interest rates, together with the decline 
in economic activity, seriously affected domestic firms, specially small and 
medium size companies unable to fulfil their fiscal obligation.938 The Treasury’s 
taxpayers monthly census showed a step decline in the number of 
taxpayers.939 In addition, industrial production shrank, reducing companies' 
sales and utilities, largely affecting corporate taxes. Very weak domestic 
demand reduced consumption taxes such as VAT and excises.
936For the policies in response to the economic crisis see “Unity Agreement and Program to 
Overcome Economic Emergency,” Presidencia de la Republica, 1995.
937 Internal data from the Direccidn General Adjunta de An£lisis de Indicadores de la 
Administracidn Tributaria, such as “Comparativo de Recaudacidn Nacional 1996-1999,” 
“Comparativo de Ingresos Tributarios,” y “Recaudacidn Bruta y Neta de las Administraciones 
Locales de Recaudacion," various years. See also the statements made by the Secretary of 
Finance in “Ortiz Plans to Boost Spending on Public Works.” Financial Times September 26th,
1996.
938 Ironically a select number of firms prospered amongst the economic adversity see Noll 
Scott, “ Mexico Winners in Adversity,” and Victor Bulmer Thonas, “Mexico The Peso Crisis One 
Year On," in World Link Magazine January-February, 1996.
939 See “Universo de Contribuyentes,” Estadfsticas Mensuales. Internal Document from the 
Secretariat of Finance.
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To increase state revenues the government adopted a number of so called 
emergency measures. Such measures were outlined in the 1995 Programme to 
Overcome the Economic Emergency which included:940
i) An increase in the general value added tax (VAT) rate from 10% to 
15%, effective on April 1st 1995, except in Mexico-US border region and 
in duty-free zones, where VAT rate remained at 10%. With respect to 
pharmaceutical products and food, they continued to be subject to a 
VAT rate of 0%.
ii) Prices of gasoline and diesel fuel increased by 58.5 % in 1995. 
Residential natural gas and electricity increased by 20% in March 1995, 
and increased each month thereafter by 0.8%, resulting in an aggregate 
increase of 40.98% by the end of 1995.
iii) Prices of other public services, such as railroads, airports and 
highways, were also gradually increased by an average of 2.5% per 
month, with aggregate annual increases limited to 30%. The prices of all
other goods provided by the public sector were adjusted to eliminate
subsidies. Such adjustments plus the lingering effects of inflation, hit 
harshly the income of working classes and consequently taxpayers 
receipts.
The Secretary of Finance, Guillermo Ortiz explained that due to the contraction 
of the economy and the loss of income of the population, the Secretariat of 
Finance projected a massive decline in tax collection, specially income tax.
940 For an overview of the programme see “Joint Program to Overcome the Economic
Emergency,” El Mercado de Valores March-April, 1995, 5-11.
This forced the government to increase consumption taxes (VAT) and tariffs in 
an attempt to raise revenues.941 To William Perry from the World Bank, the 
Mexican government had no other alternative but to increase taxes, stating “the 
massive reversal of foreign capital flows, pushed the (Mexican) government to 
look for domestic means to increase its revenues.”942
The economic crisis boosted the share of non-performing taxpayers. In 
response, the Secretary of Finance announced on July 3rd 1996 a support 
programme for firms and individual taxpayers with tax arrears, called 
“Programa de Apoyo a Deudores del Fisco Federal” (PROAFI). The statistics 
show that about 10% of individual taxpayers and nearly a quarter of 
corporations, benefited with Proafi I and II. See table below on the number of 
taxpayers who benefited and the arrears forgiven.
Table 7.1.- PROAFI PROGRAMME
Period Non performing tax payers
Individuals Corporations Total
August-December 1996 319,462 76,956 369,418
February-December 1997 143,588 39,186 182,774
January-September 1998 21,922 6,609 28,531
Total 484,972 122,751 607,723
Tax paid Amount Forgiven
Individuals Corporations Total Individual Corporations Total
816,686 2,607,979 3,424,665 313,973 544,140 858,113 25.10%
930,407 5,800,873 6,731,280 524,041 2,434,982 2,959,023 44.00%
262,328 1,465,331 1,727,659 134,973 736,099 871,072 50.40%
2,009,421 9,874,183 11,883,604 972,987 3,715,221 4,688,208 39.50%
Source Proafi, Internal Memo, SHCP and tables from the Administration del Centro Contable, 
SAT and Proafi Reuniones Mensuales de Evalauci6n Regional, Administracidn General de 
Recaudaci6n, (various reviews) SAT, SHCP, 1998.
941 Interview Guillermo Ortiz, Spain, March 17th, 1997.
942 Interview William Perry, Spain, March 18th, 1997.
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The 1996 and 1997 reforms to the Revenue Laws contained a vast number of 
tax breaks to stimulate the economy’s growth, 943 like tax cuts on the Asset Tax 
for companies with income less than 8.9 million pesos, immediate deductions 
on corporate income tax, a 71% deduction on new cars, a reduction from 6.5% 
to 2.5% on the levy on new cars, the introduction of the programme for 
taxpayers arrears and tax credits for companies opening new job 
opportunities.944
As a presidential candidate President Zedillo pledged to overhaul the tax 
system.945 Then as President, in his inaugural address he confirmed his 
commitment to a simpler and an equal tax system,946 plus a priority to simplify 
the tax system,947 and the elimination of what he described as “stifling” 
centralism.948 But among business organisations scepticism remained on the 
political commitment and true extent of the reforms. 949 At the end, only minor 
reforms were made during Zedillo’s term. The overall reform was postponed in 
1996 by the economic crisis, although many argue that it was the right time to 
implement it. Then, it was put off by the debate over VAT in 1997, while in 1998
943 See Salvador Rotter, “Comentarios a la Iniciativa de Reformas Fiscales para 1996 del 
C6digo Fiscal de la Federaci6n,” Nuevo Consultorio Fiscal December, 1995:9-11.
944 Tercer Informe de Gobierno del Presidente Ernesto Zedillo Mexico: Presidencia de la 
Republica, October, 1997.
945 A new tax policy to impulse investment was one of the ten campaing flags. See Zedillo in 
Propuestas v Compromisos and Una Propuesta en Camoafia.
946 See “Inaugural Address of Mexican President, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Le6n,” Presidencia 
de la Republica, Comunicacion Social, December 1st, 1994.
947 Rosa Elvira Vargas, “La Simplificacion Tributaria, un Esfuerzo Proiritario: Zedillo, “La 
Jornada August 21st, 1997: 21. Armando Alcantara, “Simplificacion Tributaria con Estricta 
Responsabilidad Fiscal: Ernesto Zedillo,” El Nacional. August 21st, 1997, 3.
948 “Eliminar el Centralismo Asfixiante Acelerara el Desarrollo, Dice Zedillo, “ El Sol de Mexico 
August 13th, 1999: 1.
949 Mariel Zuniga, “Habr£ Reforma Fiscal hasta Dentro de 8 anos,” Reforma September 5th, 
1997: 7.
289
the Fobaproa feud paralysed the legislative agenda.950 By 1999 the 
politicisation of the presidential succession made it impossible according to tax 
authorities.951 The year 2000 was Zedillo's last year in office, making it almost 
impossible to push any important reform. Nevertheless, PAN president Bravo 
Mena, perceived a window of opportunity after the election had taken place.952 
But, Zedillo's had lost his grip and influence, and besides his supposed political 
commitment was never strong enough to pass the promised tax reforms.
No spectacular tax reforms took place during Zedillo’s term. The set of 
measures that characterised Zedillo's term included policies aimed at 
modernising the fiscal system, improving administration, combating tax evasion 
and strengthening the federal pact. As shown here, most policies responded to 
the impact of the crisis on state revenues. Zedillo's' tax team argue that they 
went further than its predecessors on improving the tax administration, 
improving the efficiency of the system and reducing corruption 953 But their 
overall impact was very modest. Some improvements were made on 
information systems and computerised technology, making records more 
difficult to tamper with. Some interesting efforts were made towards 
redistributing federal resources to municipalities and states, but failed to widen
950 President Zedillo, in a speech to the Civil Engineers Association stated that the tension 
generated over the financial reform in Congress and the contraction of the economy due to the 
plunge in oil prices, impeded the reform to the tax system. See President Ernesto Zedillo 
speech to the Civil Engineers Council in the President's Official Residence, November 11th, 
1998.
951 Jos§ Gurria, Secretary of Finance stated during a presentation organised by HSBC for UK 
investors satated, that the idea of a tax reform previous to the elections was certainly 
impossible, London, March 17th, 1999.
952 Interview Bravo Mena, London, February 24th, 2000.
953 In Peru comprehensive administrative reforms, particularly improving quality personnel and 
a programme of incentives largely increased revenues, from 5.4%of GDP in1 1990 to 9.0% of 
GDP in 1991. See Dilip Mookherjee, “Incentives Reforms in Developing Country 
Bureaucracies: Lesson from Tax Administration, “Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics". 1997. Mimeo.
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their faculties to rise taxes.954 At the beginning of President Zedillo's 
administration a special working group was formed with the objective to explore 
new ways to increase tax faculties.955 However, these programmes soon faded 
away, leaving little results. The early impetus and support disappeared as the 
PRI began to consolidate its hegemonic position, winning back most state 
elections.
Experts from the Secretariat of Finance have concluded that in order to 
improve tax collection the reform should focus on the administrative process.956 
For this task a new administrative body with technical autonomy was created: 
the Tax Administrative System (SAT).957 This new agency was part of the 
campaign proposal, although it had been conceived and structurally drawn 
during the previous administration 958 The SAT substituted on the 1st of July 
1996 the Under-Secretary of Income,959 in order to ensure greater autonomy 
for the new agency. Less than two years later, however, the policy was 
reversed, and currently SAT is again subordinated to the Under-Secretary of
954 For the views of Provincial Finance Secretaries see Hugo A. Michel, "Avance en los 
Trabajos del Grupo de Expertos en Materia de la Fdrmula de Participaciones," Revista Indetec 
October-November 1996, 50-54. Interview Guillermo Huizar, Secretary of Finance of the State 
of Zacatecas, London, February 4th, 2000.
955 The Working group was chaired by Miguel Rubiano, Secretary of Finance from the State of 
Tamaulipas, see a summary report in "Actividades del Grupo de Trabajo de Fuentes the 
Ingreso Local y Potestades Tributarias," Revista Indetec October-November 1996, 96-100.
Interview Under-Secretary of Revenue, Tomds Ruiz, Mexico, September 25th, 1999.
957 To learn about the nature, objectives and faculties of the New Tax Collection Agency, see 
“Ley del Servicio de Administracidn Tributaria, Diario Oficial, 15 de Diciembre de 1995. See 
also “Descripcidn Plan de Trabajo del SAT, ITAM, April 2nd 1996. The new agency draws 
experiences from Spain, US, New Zealand, Puerto Rico, Australia, Colombia and Chile, see 
“Estructuras de Modelos Tributarios,” a study prepared by ITAM for SAT (ITAMC11). To learn 
about the implementation stages se “Plan Estrategico del ITAM para la Reactivacidn del 
Proyecto SAT,” ITAM Mexico, 1996.
958 Zedillo proposed an autonomous agency for the collection of taxes at the Forum 
“Crecimiento Econdmico para el Bienestar Familiar,” Mexico, June 7th, 1994.
959 Fernando Pescador, “Ley de Ingresos Afectada por Resultados Electorales,” El Financiero 
July 10th, 1997:10.
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Revenue.960 Tax authorities hoped that by partly privatising the rights to collect 
taxes (awarded by auction-like procedures), accountability would rise and 
efficiency and voluntary compliance would increase. In addition, fiscal control 
would be enhanced through auxiliary activities.
a) Cracking Down on Corruption and Evasion
According to Tomas Ruiz , the tributary strategy is based on reinforcing the 
battle against tax evasion and the informal economy, as well as eliminating 
bureaucratic obstacles to economic activity.961 Tax authorities believe that in 
order to increase tax revenues the answer lies in cracking down on evasion 
and fighting internal corruption. Under-Secretary of Revenues and Tax Affairs, 
Tomas Ruiz estimated that cracking down on evasion could raise tax 
revenues.962 For this task, a scheme with two fronts, which included internal 
and external approaches, was developed.
Fighting corruption from within. Under-Secretary Ruiz stressed that “one of the 
biggest obstacles to improve tax collection lies in corruption within the 
government itself.”963 In the same context, Guillermo Ortiz, as Secretary of 
Finance acknowledged that corruption prevailed among tax personnel. He also 
underlined that the SAT was an appropriate vehicle to eliminate corruption
960 Interviews with top tax authorities defend their argument in the fact that they wanted to give 
to the Under-Secretary of Revenue full powers to design policy. Interviews Javier Trevino, 
Oficial Mayor, Secretariat of Finance, Mexico, September 23rd, 1999, separate interviews with 
Tomeis Ruiz, Under-Secretariat of Finance and Alma Rosa Moreno, President of the SAT, in 
Mexico city on September 25th, 1999.
961 Interview Ruiz, Mexico city, September 25th, 1999.
962 “Mexico Puts Inspectors Overtime," Financial Times September 20th, 1996.
963 Ibid
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among tax collectors, improving the quality of the tax bureaucracy.964 SAT 
focused on improving the quality of tax administration personnel by raising 
wage levels, instituting stricter screening and promotion and recruitment criteria 
and through incentive schemes.965 Policy actions to fight corruption included 
measures for “cleaning up the house” where incompetent or dishonest officials 
were induced to leave. More than 200 corrupt tax inspectors were fired just in 
1996. More than 1,800 customs police officers were placed under military 
control, and army intelligence officers were used to root out contraband 
networks and corruption rings within the tax agency 966
The government implemented legal changes to simplify the tax system, closed 
loopholes and make prosecution of tax evaders easier. The authorities stiffened 
sentences for tax evasion, in an attempt to prompt compliance, but the results 
were meagre in the first couple years. The private sector opposed plans to 
classify tax evasion above a certain threshold as a “serious crime” in the penal 
code.967 But, in 1999 Congress passed a new law that did classified tax 
evasion as such. Authorities emphasise the new commitment to fight evasion.
964Antonio Gonzalez Vazquez, “Cientos de Casos de Corrupcidn en Hacienda: Ortiz," La 
Jornada July 11th, 1997:18. SAT seeks to decrease corruption among tax collectors through 
the professionalisation of its personnel. For the first time, the new agency would provide 
officials in the Secretary at Finance the opportunity to pursue a civil service carrier within this 
federal institution.
965 Zedillo’s team reduced tax collectors’ incentive mechanisms implemented during the Salinas 
term, because according to the economic advisor to the Under-Secretary of Revenue they did 
not eliminate corruption, but increased harassment to honest taxpayers. Additionally, it created 
huge wage inequalities among the tax collection personnel. Interview Diego Yribarren, 
Economic Advisor to Under-Secretary of Revenue, Mexico city, January 11 , 1998. For 
information on incentive mechanisms see Dilip Mookherjee, “Incentives Reforms.”
966 “Mexico Puts Inspectors Overtime”.
967 Gerardo Aranda, President Coparmex, believed that it would increase tax harassment 
(terrorismo fiscal). However on December the 31st the Higher Chamber approved the bill which 
classified tax evasion for more than 700,000 pesos (almost $US 70,000) as a serious crime.
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According to Mr. Ruiz, where fraud is detected the government would no longer 
drop charges if fines and arrears were paid.968
There was also an increase in tax audits for recent years: in 1997 tax officials 
audited more than 400,000 companies and individual tax payers,969 and about 
650,00 audits were planned for 1999.970 In 1998 nearly 8,000 industrial and 
commercial establishments were closed because they were not registered with 
tax authorities.971 Business representatives complained that these auditing 
policies constituted "tax harassment" (terrorismo fiscal).972 Defending auditing 
polices, Tomas Ruiz argued that every time tax authorities enforced the fiscal 
law to fight evasion, they were accused of harassing taxpayers.973
The crackdown scheme included an audit programme directed to street 
vendors called “sweeping the streets.” This programme responded to the 
mounting pressures from the private sector to fight the informal economy.974 
The Secretariat of Finance promised to incorporate in the tax net 1.2 million 
street vendors by the year 2000, with very poor results 975 Carlos Gutierrez 
Ruiz, Canacintra’s President believed that the first step towards solving the 
complex tax problems was to incorporate the informal economy and those
968 “Mexico Puts Inspectors Overtime.”
969 Ibid.
970 Yolanda Morales, “Realizar£ Hacienda 650,000 Actos de Fiscalizacidn para Coptar 
Evasores en 1999,” El Economsita Janaury 12th, 1999:1. In the first half of 1999, the SAT 
reported 403,419 fiscalisation.
97 See data on “Evaluacion de Actos de Fiscalizacidn,” Centro Contable de la Administracidn 
General de Recaudacidn, SHCP, 1999.
972 See Fernando Ortega “Los Empresarios se Quejan: Las Medidas Intimidatorias de 
Hacienda no Propician Mas Recaudacion y Si Mayor Corrupcidn,” Proceso January 5th, 1997: 
12.
973 Interview Ruiz, Mexico, September 25th, 1999.
974 Interview Eduardo Garcia, General Director Mexico's city Chamber of Commerce, Mexico 
City, September 23rd, 1999 and Ruben Gonzalez, CONCAMIN Secretary for the Tax Reform 
Committe, Mexico City, September 19th, 1999.
975 Interview Ruiz and Moreno, Mexico city, March 25th, 1999.
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street vendors into the tax system, thus increasing the tax payers registered 
and as result tax revenues.976 Nevertheless, Tomas Ruiz argued that 
incorporating those in the informal economy to the tax register would not solve 
the financial problems of the country, since they earned very little. In addition, it 
is difficult to incorporate the vast number of illegal street vendors, since they 
constitute a strong political force that has resisted regulation.977
Fighting Evasion from Above. President Zedillo promised to end privileged 
sectors, and to reform the tax code, closing loopholes that allowed companies 
to legally evade taxes.978 Following this policy line, tax authorities highlight that 
their campaigns for cracking down evasion included auditing powerful and 
influential businessmen. Other measures that have affected powerful vested 
interests are: taxing offshore investments and eliminating special tax regimes 
that unfairly benefit large taxpayers.979 Tax authorities launched a tax evasion 
crusade hunting down selected tax offenders. The Fiscal Attorney issued arrest 
warrants against construction magnates, newspapers owners and even a 
world’s boxing champion. 980 But more surprisingly, tax audits were ordered 
against economic tycoons such as Ricardo Salinas Pliego, owner of Television
976 Leticia Rodriguez, “Timbre Fiscal para Pago de Impuestos Propone Cancintra,” E[ 
Financiero July 11th, 1997: 8; Interview Carlos Gutierrez, former President CANACINTRA, 
Mexico, October 25th, 2000.
977 Interview Ruiz, Mexico city, March 25th, 1999.
978 K.Casillas, A. Asalgado, G. Flores, V. Gonzalez, “Alza de 15% a Bienes y Servicios 
Publicos,” El Fianciero November 12th, 1998:1.
979 Interview Ruiz, Mexico, March 25th, 1999.
980 Entrepreneur Alfredo Hakim, El Universal Journal’ owner Ealy Ortiz and World Champion 
boxer Julio Chavez. Interview, Enrique Hernandez, Deputy Fiscal Attorney, Mexico, October 
24th, 2000.
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Azteca; Adrian Sada Blanco, owner of Serffn, Mexico’s third largest bank; and 
Carlos Peralta, owner of lusacell, a large telecommunications company.981
Sceptics dismissed the tax evasion crusade as the traditional “circus” 
performed once every sexenio to boost collection, using highly publicised cases 
to intimidate delinquent tax payers. In response, Revenue Under-secretary, 
Tomas Ruiz, accepted that the crackdown programme was prompted by the 
sharp drop in tax receipts since the 1994 devaluation,982 and the fiscal 
prosecutor confirmed that none of the cases mentioned above end up in 
conviction. 983 Authorities defend an improved record of enforcement, but 
convictions have largely declined during this period.
The government also directed its crusade against tax havens, obliging 
Mexicans to declare investments held abroad. These include income generated 
by foreign holdings, including undistributed profits or dividends. The penalty for 
failing to disclose offshore income is from 3 to 5 years in prison. The list 
includes 87 countries considered as tax havens.984 However, the enforcement 
in this issue has been quite lax.
The 1999 budget provoked howls of protest from the private sector, since the 
government proposed increases in both gasoline prices and taxes. Business
981 Many saw the audits as political vendettas, since these three billionaires had strong 
business links to President Carlos Salinas’ older brother, Raul Salinas who is currently in jail.
982 In the first months of 1996, tax receipts fell to less than 7% of GDP compared with 9.4% in 
1994. See “Comparative de Recaudacidn,” Direccidn General Adjunta de An£lisis de 
Indicadores de la Administracidn Tributaria, SHCP, 1997.
983 Interview, Enrique Hernandez, Deputy Fiscal Attorney, Mexico, October 24th, 2000. The 
attorney stated that there are more than 25,000 million pesos in dispute over tax claims.
984 Leslie Crawford, "Mexico Plans Tax Crackdown,” Financial Times January 16th, 1997. See 
also Carlos Acosta “Toda Inversion Mexicana en los Parasos Fiscales Deber2 Ser Reportada y 
Pagara Impuestos,” Proceso January 5th , 1 997.
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argued that the burden of reform has fallen on them.985 Despite the obvious 
need to increase revenues, the government abandoned its proposal of 
extending the value added tax to foodstuffs and medicines, showing the muscle 
of corporatist groups.986 In particular the pharmaceutical industry mobilized 
their 20,000 members or so to oppose the levy on medicines 987 Convinced by 
the leadership of the PRI that the intended proposal to extend VAT to food and 
medicine (currently exempt) would be politically disastrous, the Treasury had to 
abandon this move.988 Instead the reforms concentrated on high wage earners 
and eliminated some tax brakes for companies. For the 1999 Revenue Law a 
new tax on telephone services was submitted but rejected 989 plus the 
traditional increase on gasoline prices. Also proposed was a reduction in the 
income tax for firms and the elimination of tax deductions for new 
investment.990
Probably the most significant reform was reducing the span of the consolidated 
status (by 30%). Mexican tax laws allow corporate groups to be taxed on a
985 Interview, Raul Picard, CANACINTRA President, Mexico city, September 26th, 2000.
986 The VAT on food and medicine generated heated debate among the different political 
groups and social representatives, see Guadalupe Hernandez and Juan Arvizu, “Piden a EZ 
Aplicar IVA a Alimentos y Medicinas," El Universal November 19th, 1999:1.
Antonio Pascual, leader of National Association of Pharmacies in Mexico, successfully 
lobbied Congressmen, tax authorities and business leaders to gather support in opposition to 
the levy of VAT on medicines, arguing that it will generate closures and thousands of lay-offs in 
this industry.
988 Jaime Contrearas, “Ningun Alza al IVA: Seguiran Exentos Alimentos y Medicinas: SH,” 
Excelsior November 6th, 1998: 1 and Ana Maria Rosas y Gustavo Talavera, “ Sin Cambios 
en 1999, El IVA Anuncia Gurria,” El Universal November 6th, 1998:1.
989 See Jorge Hildalgo and Wilbert Torre, “Pasa Ley de Ingresos sin Impuesto Telefonico," 
Reforma December 11th, 1998: 1. Francisco Gil Diaz, as president of Avantel, saw such 
measure as political maneuvering by TELMEX, aimed at eliminating competition. Interview, 
Francisco Gil, Mexico, September 21st, 1999.
990 These included: a new tax of 15% on telephone services, a reduction of income tax for 
corporation from 34% to 30% so long as profits were reinvested, the elimination of immediate 
deductions for new investments, and increase in the income tax for individuals from 35% to 
37.5% for those earning more than 1.5 million pesos and 40% for those with more than 2 
million pesos.
297
consolidated basis. The filing of a consolidated return had significant 
advantages for corporate groups, since losses of some of the groups 
companies could be offset against the profits of others. About 300 very large 
companies benefit from this programme. The government eliminated the 100% 
immediate deduction rate for new investments, since only 400 companies 
concentrated 70% of the tax benefit.991
Despite the official rhetoric promising to redistribute resources throughout the 
tax system, it failed to take from the richest tax payers as was promised.992 
Gurria went to the extreme of trying to sell to the deputies the idea that the 
telephone tax and the hike on gasoline prices were examples of equity.993 As 
always, the government has recourse instead to cutting spending, including the 
subsidy on salaries. In the words of Secretary Gurria the “1999 budget was the 
leanest in Mexico’s modern history.”994 In the end, not even businesses were 
happy with the reforms.995
The VAT
However, the 1997 VAT debate opened for the first time in Mexico’s 
contemporary history a tax policy debate between the executive and legislative
991 Interview SAT President, Alma Rosa, Mexico City, September 25th, 2000.
992 Gurria promised that for the 1999 budget, 82% of additional revenues would come from the 
10% higher economic strata, see Jorge Camargo, “No Pasar£, Gritan Panistas a Gurria,” 
Reforma Novemeber 25th, 1998 and “Busca Fisco Cancelar Privelegios; Elevar£ las Tasas,” E[ 
Universal November 4th, 1998.
993 See Angelina Mejia, “Impuesto Telefdnico y Alza en Gasolinas Ejemplo de Equidad, Afirma 
Gurria, "La Crdnica November 25th, 1998:1.
994 Angelina Mejia and Ma. Isabel Melchor, “El Gasto Publico de 1999, el Menor en la Historia 
Moderna de Mexico,” La Crdnica November 10th 1998: 1. For information on the budget see 
"The Mexican Congress Approves the 1999 Budget and Revenue Law," Secretariat of Finance, 
Press Release, January 4th, 1999.
995 Fernando Ortega, “Ni a los Empresarios Dej6 Contentos el Gobierno,” Proceso January 11th 
1999:11.
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as equals. A study of the change in VAT rates, sheds some light in the 
secretive process of political tax bargaining. It also helps to identify the main 
actors and their vested interests. The policy outcome also shows the political 
influence of certain interest groups and how politics end up shaping tax 
policies.
Multiple stances of business organisations demonstrates the variety of interests 
in policy matters and the difficulties in co-ordinating a common front. Sector or 
industry interest may shift considerably in tax matters. The arguments are 
similar, always complaining about the heavy tax burden they shoulder, but 
vested interests vary enormously. The very rich never supported the cut in VAT 
because it would have translated into less resources for programmes in which 
they benefit like Fobaproa or the highways bail out scheme. 996 The shift in 
positions of some actors after secret negotiations took place, gives us a hint on 
the trade-offs made with the authorities in exchange for support for the official 
policy.
The reduction of VAT became a political banner, rather than a true commitment to 
modify the tax system or its redistributive effects. But the negotiations were not all 
political gains. There was a growing concern among party members from the 
PAN that they had been penalised at the polls because of the alliance with the 
official party on economic reforms, and therefore they wanted to distance 
themselves from the VAT cut although many in this party supported it. The
996 The cost of the highway scheme in 1997 was 18,800 million pesos but across the span of 17 
years it would amount to 33,741 million pesos at 1997 value. A figure greater than the 22,000 
million pesos lost in revenue per year if VAT rate was cut to 10%. See Mauricio Flores, "Bajar 
el IVA o Rescatar las Carreteras?" El Economista August 25th, 1997:41.
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members of the PRI also complained that they were penalised for voting in 
favour of neo-liberal reforms, and particularly the 1997 VAT hike.
The struggle between the Executive and the legislative over the VAT rate 
shows the inauguration of the legislative branch as a tax policy decision maker. 
The analysis shows that the VAT debate was born more of a political issue than 
an economic one, every policy actor jumped onto the wagon of the debate 
looking for self-interested gains.
The opposition block that dominated early decision making in Congress came 
to an end when the PRI and the PAN voted in favour of the Revenue Law. 
PAN's leaders had agreed to exchange its support to the Executive's bills in 
exchange for greater municipal decentralisation and autonomy, as well as 
better terms for revenue sharing. Congress learnt to build consensus. By the 
2000 budget, the revenue law was passed with the support of all parties, after 
agreement was reached with those less expected. The small parties signed up 
with the PRI, despite they declined their presidential candidate in favour of the 
two largest opposition parties, PRD and PAN.997 This shows a new threshold 
for coalition building in Mexico, where the legislative is the true centre of 
politics.
Conclusions
In the early 1990s, the bitter clash between the old guard and the technocrats,
together with the economic crisis, broke up the distinctive political
997 See "Aprueba Congreso Presupuesto de Ingresos 2000,” December 15,h 1999, Infosel 
services or Francisco Arroyo, Mayra Aguirre, Ion Teheran, "Amarra Pro Apoyo Verde y Petista 
para Presupesto," El Nacional December 15th, 1999:1.
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characteristics of the Mexican system. Special characteristics such as the 
hegemonic role of the PRI, the dominance of the executive over the other 
branches of government and the large concentration of power in the office of 
the presidency, are all in the process of profound change; even Mexico’s 
corporatist past is rapidly disappearing.
This period also shows a substantial erosion of the extraordinary power of the 
Executive, in the office of the Presidency. For the first time in 70 years the new 
political conditions weakened PRI discipline, and authorities had to learn to 
build consensus even with those within the official party. The evidence 
suggests that policies have not been ideological motivated, but governed by 
pragmatism and political gain. The diverse number of coalitions shows the 
intense negotiations taking place in Congress, highlighting a successful 
working alliance between the PRI and PAN on fiscal matters.
The case sheds light on how the process became highly politicised, after each 
party wanted to make political gains from the proposal to cut rates. Business 
leaders denounced it, arguing that the opposition had become more interested 
in political gains than on the redistributive impact of the tax reforms.998 But 
business representatives also took advantage of the situation and tried to push 
their own agenda. The debate became so heated, that the President had to call 
for the depolitisation of the tax reform proposals999
998 See Adolfo SSnchez, "La Reduccidn del IVA es Bandera Polltica de la Oposicidn: 
Concamin.” Excelsior August 25th. 1997:1.
999 "Habra Reforma Tributaria, Pero con Responsabilidad Fiscal: Zedillo," El Economista. 
August 20th, 1997: 29.
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The contentious and highly politicised environment in Congress made any kind 
of tax reforms difficult. But dissent was not only the hallmark among political 
parties, revolt arose internally. Disagreement between the leadership and the 
rank-and-file arose to the surface frequently. The lack of a common and 
coherent tax policy stance within the parties was evident, shown by the 
discrepancies and conflicting arguments posed by the members of the same 
party.
In the end, Zedillo’s tax reform proposals en up as his predecessors: just in 
public rethoric. He probably did less that the others Presidents, despite it hat to 




This thesis demonstrates that tax policy making is a combination of rational 
economic calculations, incremental adjustments of functioning policies, and 
attempts by interest groups to maximise political gains. The outcome of tax 
policy making arises from the struggle of political and social actors rather than 
just economics. This is a highly politicised bargaining process that reflects the 
equilibration of political forces, economic, and administrative constraints. A 
process driven by “inertia,” inheritances as well as political accommodation and 
coalition building, allowing me to conclude that client politics best describes the 
process.
This dissertation first indicated Mexico’s low tax collection yield and its 
stagnation for more than thirty years. The analysis portrays an inefficient tax 
collection system, with a tax structure plagued with a plethora of privileges and 
exemptions that dilute collection. A large number of interviews with public 
authorities, politicians, intellectuals, representatives of business, social and 
international organisations showed a common concern for Mexico’s low tax 
effort. An issue which surprisingly has been always in the rhetoric of the 
political agenda, but has received very little political, social or scholarly 
attention.
The study of tax policy decision making highlights the dominant role of politics 
in the policy making process. The evidence put forward in the empirical 
analysis shows that political considerations have become the fundamental
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factor in considering any attempt to transform extant tax structure and its 
instruments.
The thesis raises a puzzling paradox; the dynamics of tax reform seem to 
suggest that even in a strongly centralised and hierarchical state like Mexico 
(frequently depicted as authoritarian), policy-makers have been constrained in 
shaping tax policy. Government’s policy objectives and the “uniqueness” of the 
relationship with socio-economic actors, principally the business community, 
have affected the nature, profile and outcome of the tax reforms. I argue that 
the unique nature of the Mexican political system has been upheld by a very 
fragile political coalition with socio-economic actors, which has become the 
most important constraint on reform.
The profile of the Mexican tax structure reflects a system shaped by the 
government’s need to co-opt interest groups, despite the fact that by doing so, 
it has put in jeopardy the most important and stable source of economic 
stability: tax income. The vast number of exemptions and privileges can only be 
explained as a result of political bargaining in a state, whose main priority has 
been to maintain a fragile political coalition that legitimises the political regime.
A) Tax structure
The analysis of the tax structure showed loopholes and tax expenditures, which 
have developed in the tax system. Preferential tax regimes and exemptions 
built over the years are responsible for the low level of tax collection. These 
harmful preferential tax practices are deeply rooted in the tax legislation
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eroding tax revenues. Interest groups have accumulated ample benefits over 
the years and now constitute the strongest obstacle to reform.
The tax structure is a mixture of older accommodation inherence, and 
measures to compensate gaps and new privileges. Although the individual 
taxpayer is a passive actor, rent-seeking groups pressure decision makers 
seeking to maximise their welfare. By deconstructing the tax system, I have 
shown the impact of vested interest on the tax legislation.
I have also addressed the many structural weaknesses that help to explain 
why the tax revenue yield in Mexico is small compared with countries with a 
similar level of development. Among these are: a low number of taxpayers, 
large disparities in income and between regions, low wages and per capita 
income and social attitudes towards taxation. However, concurring with tax 
authorities, Mexico’s low tax collection effort is best explained by the number of 
harmful tax practices embedded in the tax structure that give preferential 
treatment to some sectors, services and products.
The plethora of tax exemptions and privileges for some sectors as well as the 
large number of fiscal incentives to companies (an issue frequently overlooked) 
dilute the raising capacity of tax instruments. Tax expenditures do not only 
dilute revenue but facilitate evasion and complicate tax administration, arguing 
that the tax system is horizontally inequitable in terms of incidence across 
different types of income activities. Treating the same kind of income
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differently causes inequality and reduces the taxable base, forcing authorities 
to keep high rates for medium income levels.
There is extensive empirical evidence that suggests that the lack of significant 
tax reforms in Mexico is closely tied to political interests. The government has 
not been free to bring about substantial change in taxation due to political 
compromises with “privileged” social groups and to business elite. These 
privileged sectors have been successful in blocking moves to tax them more 
effectively, particularly the business elite. The government feared that any 
significant change in the tax system would damage the privileges of certain 
groups putting at risk their political support and loyalty. A profound tax reform 
could put in jeopardy the loyalty of social sectors (CNOP, CTM, CNC) or 
damage the fragile relationship with the business elite. These actors were 
indispensable to maintain the corporatist political system. Elected politicians in 
Mexico were not so concerned with being re-elected, as Rose and Karran’s 
theory suggests, but they were concern with preserving the PRI’s hegemony in 
the political system.
In the Mexican case, economic policies and tax policy in particular have been 
subordinated to the attainment of political stability. Policies were guided 
towards maintaining a fragile corporate political system. The historical analysis 
shows that the government could have done more to reform the tax system 
even in the face of structural, administrative, political and economic constraints, 
but attempts lack sufficient political will by political actors. None of the last five 
administrations risked implementing a profound change that would have
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eliminated privileges or preferential treatment to some sectors, despite the fact 
that tax reform has been considered a high priority in their public agendas. 
Efforts have concentrated on the administrative front to avoid confrontation with 
members of the fragile socio-economic coalition.
The historical analysis showed that a substantial tax reform has been avoided, 
despite the fact that increasing government revenue is crucial for the long term 
economic development of the country. Instead, the government pursued other 
less politically troublesome means for financing the State. Nonetheless, these 
alternative revenue raising policies exacted a very high social and economic 
cost in the long run. An overview of thirty years of tax reforms showed that they 
have been mostly revenue neutral and politically oriented. In the light of the 
historical analysis, actors that shape the tax system have been transformed by 
the evolving political and economic conditions in Mexico.
B) Macroeconomic Populism
These two governments have been described as "populist," since they pursued 
a set of economic policies designed to achieve specific political goals, 
disregarding the economic desequilibrium they caused. According to 
Bazdresch and Levy, the economic policies were designed to please political 
groups, not to meet economic concerns. The populist policies and the 
continuous anti-business rhetoric during Echeverrfa’s term and the later 
nationalisation of the banking system during the Lopez Portillo presidency, 
damaged the fragile relationship with the private sector. Orchestrated by the 
business elite, Echeverrfa's government experienced for the first time in post
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revolutionary Mexico an open challenge to the direction of the country’s 
economic policy. The strategy of development and the attempts to raise taxes 
seriously damaged the tacit agreement of mutual co-operation between the 
state and the business elite.
Under the strategy of import substitution and industrialisation, Echeverria and 
Lopez Portillo’s administrations expanded the role of the state in the economy. 
Both administrations enjoyed easy means for financing the state, largely 
increasing government expenditures. Both governments undertook a spending 
spree and ignoring fiscal deficits which ultimately ended in a liquidity crisis. 
Echeverria benefited from the 1973 world oil boom, which enhanced Mexico’s 
access to international resources, as the financial markets need to recycle the 
large petrodollar deposits. The discovery of large oil reserves in the mid 1970s, 
pushed Lopez Portillo’s government into an expansionary spree. But when the 
oil boom waned in 1981, macroeconomic desequilibrium reappeared ending in 
an acute financial crisis.
It was during this period that the economic elite discovered the powerful 
leverage of capital flight. Since then, it has used its ability to mobilise capital to 
push its own agenda. Thus, since the 1970s the fear of capital flight has 
constrained the autonomy of the state in policy making. The analysis of the tax 
reforms during Echeverrfa's term shows the futile attempts of the administration 
to increase tax collection from the better off. Echeverrfa's tax reforms ended 
just as mere adjustments to the tax system, since the president was not willing 
to invest much political capital in support of the tax reform. Lopez Portillo took a
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different approach to fiscal reform. Instead of confronting the private sector with 
proposals to reform tax income, his administration focused on improving 
indirect taxation, best exemplified with the introduction of the Value Added Tax. 
This time the economic elite did not tackle Lopez Portillo’s tax reform because 
the burden of the reform was passed to consumers, not large income earners 
or companies. In the end, Lopez Portillo was not able to attain the desired 
“financial autonomy” he preached, diverting to other means for financing the 
state, particularly reverting to the vast resources coming from the oil boom.
C) Economic Openness
These two presidential terms are characterised by a profound process of 
economic transformation and the stagnation of economic activity. In this period, 
the economy’s expansion plunged to less than 2% on average compared with 
the historical ratio of 7% of GDP growth. Most significant is the process of 
economic liberalisation that radically shifted the strategy of development to an 
outward oriented economy. This period of stabilisation, adjustment and 
economic transformation had a large impact on taxation. Many argue that this 
could have been an excellent time for undertaking a far-reaching tax reform 
that would have strengthened revenues. Despite the shift in the development 
strategy however, the state suffered from the same old weakness: insufficient 
tax revenues.
As with the previous administrations, these “neo-liberal” presidents avoided 
taxation and pursued alternative means for financing the state, heavily relying 
on privatisation and the recycling of foreign investment, usually in the form of
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portfolio investment. The precipitous liberalisation of trade sharply reduced 
income from imports and the financial liberalisation made the economy very 
vulnerable to external shocks and the influences of foreign actors. The new 
strategy pursued by the neo-liberal governments aggravated the structural 
deficiencies of the tax system, increasing poverty and widening an already very 
large income distribution gap. The implementation of IFIs programmes induced 
structural adjustments and enlarged the numbers of people unemployed, 
pushing them into the informal economy.
The changing economic conditions caused a re-configuration of the main actors 
in the tax policy making process. The technocratic elite achieved control over 
the state, while the influence of the traditional corporatist sectors decreased 
rapidly. The process of economic transformation enhanced the power of the 
economic elite and the influence of international actors. Following the lines 
recommended by IFIs, tax reforms moved further to indirect taxation and the 
pursuit of revenues by streamlining tax administration. De la Madrid’s limited 
tax reforms responded to the heavy burden of the economic crisis. Most 
economic policies, including taxation, were geared to cope with a severe 
economic contraction and skyrocketing inflation. An austerity programme for 
economic stabilisation was implemented at the cost of a huge plunge in 
economic growth. To make matters worse hyperinflation was not curbed until 
very late in De la Madrid’s term.
On the other hand, the Salinas administration embarked on a far-reaching 
programme of economic reform that included taxation. Between 1989-1991 tax
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rates in direct and indirect taxes were cut to emulate the international wave of 
tax reform that took place during the 1980s and harmonise the tax system with 
that of those, soon to be, commercial partners. Tax authorities closely followed 
the World Banks tax reform recommendations, putting special emphasis on 
reforming the administrative system to increase efficiency and fight evasion. To 
compensate for the loss of revenues from cuts of rates and trade tariffs, the 
Salinas team increased the tax base, enlarged the number of taxpayers, 
simplified procedures and improved collection by implementing tax evasion 
control mechanisms. Some exemptions and deductions were eliminated and a 
new system of invoicing and auditing was successfully introduced. Stringent 
enforcement policies were implemented improving voluntary tax compliance. 
The number of registered taxpayers rose from 1.7 million in 1988 to more than 
5 million by 1994. Despite the reform, tax collection increased only modestly, 
and in reality it was more a response to the loss of revenues from the cuts on 
rates and trade tariffs than a serious attempt to increase revenue. At the end of 
the day the thrust behind the adjustments on the tax front was to remain 
competitive in order to attract foreign investment.
D) Democratic Openness
This chapter focused on Zedillo’s administration, which although it had closely 
followed the neo-liberal economic model pursued by the previous two 
governments, the new conditions provided by a newly found democracy had 
transformed the process of tax policy making. Democracy brought a 
fundamental shift in the unique political system in Mexico, reducing the power 
cf the presidential office, and the hegemonic role of the PRI. It also provided a
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new framework for tax policymaking, brought new actors, such as state 
governors and political parties, to the bargaining table. Most significant is how 
the legislature regained its constitutional role as decision-maker.
The electoral achievements of the left and the right in recent years developed 
in a multiparty political system and a plural Congress since 1997, after the 
official party lost the majority in the lower chamber. In addition, an increasing 
number of governorships had gone to opposition parties, which began to 
demand an overhaul in the tax system as well as redefining the financial 
relations between the tiers of government. The so called new federalism 
became a priority on Zedillo's government agenda, largely because of the 
growing electoral achievements of opposition parties. But it did not last very 
long; as soon as opposition victories waned in 1998 and 1999, so did the thrust 
behind the programme. The demise of the power of the president also brought 
more freedom and debate among members of Congress belonging to the 
official party; groups like "Galileos" and "Reflexion" voiced their political and 
economic concerns, which included among others the design and 
implementation of taxes. State governors also began to demand more freedom 
to levy taxes and called for a careful review of the Fiscal Co-ordination 
Agreement.
Tax reforms during Zedillo’s term focused on improving efficiency, through 
streamlining the administration of taxes. For this purpose a new entity, called 
the System of Tax Administration (SAT), was instituted, though it was designed 
during Salinas’ term. Originally it was supposed to be independent from the
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government to reduce favouritism and clientelism, but it has not delivered the 
expected results yet. Zedillo’s tax reforms are best described as crisis-driven 
changes, since they responded to the economic debacle of 1995. Among the 
most important are the increase of VAT from 10% to 15% and the programme 
of fiscal incentives to stimulate employment and investment. Other reforms for 
fighting evasion were merely cosmetic, and there was even a backward step in 
auditing policies.
A detailed analysis of how VAT rates were increased in 1995 and how the state 
has managed to keep the high marginal rate, despite opposition parties 
pledges to reduce them, disclosed the struggle and bargaining among the 
different actors involved in the tax policy making process in Mexico. It also 
displayed how different actors voice their proposals and concerns, and 
revealed that if successful, tax authorities would try to accommodate vested 
interests into tax policies.
At last, the conclusion is that the empirical evidence of the various periods 
shows that the government has been largely constrained in manoeuvring within 
the tax policy making process, trying to maintain a fragile political coalition that 
legitimises the political system. The evidence shows a weak state, constrained 
by corporate actors and the business community. I argue that the unique nature 
of the Mexican political system has been upheld by a very fragile political
i
coalition with the socio-economic sectors. Traditionally, such a coalition has 
contributed to legitimising the governing elite and securing political stability, but 
now it has become the most important constraint on reform.
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The government became almost powerless to increase the fiscal burden on 
certain groups, continuously confronted by their political resistance and threats 
to boycott the economy and break the political pact. The study shows the 
autonomy of the State is constrained, particularly vis-a-vis domestic and 
international capital. The examination of the main actors and their evolving role 
and degree of influence provides substantial evidence of the deteriorating 
ability of the state to control economic policy making. The menace of capital 
flight has given the economic elite the most powerful instrument to oppose and 
sometimes reverse the government’s economic policies. Paradoxically, the 
economic elite’s ability to transfer capital abroad represents a powerful weapon 
only because Mexico lacks a sufficient and stable flow of tax revenues. The 
devastating effect of capital flight on the economy could only be reduced if 
Mexico strengthens its tax revenue sources.
The thesis examined many changes in the tax legislation, in the role and 
influences of policy actors, on the economic conditions, tax policy objectives 
and strategies. However, tax collection has remained extremely low, because 
the state has been not able to make people pay taxes.
In 2000, after seventy one years in power, the PRI lost the presidency. This is 
a threshold of a new political era in Mexico, raising great expectations of 
change amongst Mexicans. The newly elected president from the PAN, Vicente 
Fox, loudly campaigned his commitment to reform profound political and 
economic changes. At the top of his agenda has been tax reform, as demonstrated 
by his campaign speeches. However, he rapidly confronted reality. As presidente elect
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even before he took office, he and his team proposed to expand the VAT base 
to include medicines and basic consumption products. The proposal aroused 
upheaval among business organisations (particularly pharmacy associations) 
and social representatives, forcing them to withdraw it in the meantime.
This shows that although, the new political system has detached itself from the 
corporatist actors of the PRI era, increasing tax collection will continue to pose 
great problems to whoever is in power. In addition, Mr. Fox still has to deal with 
the powerful economic elite, some members of which strongly supported his 
political campaign. An economic elite that has been able to successfully 
oppose significant tax reforms for more than thirty years, and is likely to 
continue doing so, suggests that newly found democracy may not make the 
difference in taxation, and tax inertia will prevail.
Nevertheless, this is an historic opportunity to change Mexico’s most worrisome 
structural deficiency, as never before the government enjoys the freedom and 
legitimacy necessary to make change possible. Taking advantage of the 
synergy given by popular support and willingness to change, tax reform seems 





I began this dissertation with an open mind on the possible explanations to the 
constraints to tax reform. From the specialised literature, I identified four 
possible hypotheses in response. They range from structural weaknesses 
embedded in the Mexican economy and society, limited administrative 
capacity, exogenous influences to domestic politics. It soon became clear, after 
a dozen interviews or so with primary actors that the political hypothesis was 
the most influential variable. As the research progressed, however, I realised 
that the other three hypotheses were also crucial in explaining this very 
complex issue. Thus, across the dissertation the other alternative answers are 
discussed as contributing factors.
a) The Difficulties faced for the research
As Mexico’s low tax collection is one of the country’s most serious weaknesses, 
the limited academic work analysing this topic is surprising. This can be 
attributable to the difficulty of gathering data. Taxation was, until very recently, 
considered one of the great “taboos” surrounding the relationship between the 
state and the business community. Neither side was open to discuss it, 
considering it to be a “sensitive” matter, most of all they feared being quoted. In 
one of the interviews with a high ranking public official at the Revenue Office, I 
was even searched (although with the outmost discretion) and asked if I had a 
hidden recorder. Despite these difficulties, I was able to interview an incredible 
sample of nearly a hundred policy actors, who, kindly offered to share their
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experiences and views on the topic with me for which I am deeply grateful. The 
level and variety of those interviewed is particularly notable, offering the reader 
a very wide view of the profile, perception and stance of the wide spectrum of 
policy actors involved in taxation.
The collection of data was even more difficult since it is considered 
“confidential” and only rough statistics are published occasionally in official 
documents, often contradicting each other. Fortunately, I was able to gather 
nearly seventy “classified” internal documents and “confidential” documents, 
providing information not publicly available, much less published. Some times 
papers were shown to me, but i was not allowed to quote or photocopy them. 
Such data are not presented here, however, they helped me to understand the 
trends and conditions that led policy-makers to make the reforms. In addition, I 
made a very extensive search of documents published by international 
organisations as well as newspaper library sources (particularly in the case of 
the VAT debate), totalling around 400 national and international newspaper 
articles.
b) Research Aims and Methodology
This research makes a cross-examination of several sources of data to analyse 
the complex factors that have inhibited the development of the Mexican tax 
system. Note that the thesis does not seek to explain Mexico’s poor tax 
performance in revenue terms, although indirectly the research sheds some 
light on this issue. The data analysed include both primary and secondary
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sources. It relies primarily on qualitative methods, although some basic 
quantitative instruments of analysis were used to interpret statistical data.
The research draws upon a set of theories and analytical methods that provide 
a theoretical framework where the data is codified, processed, typified, 
examined and interpreted. My basic unit of analysis is tax policy actors, 
identified in chapter three, though their role and influence is examined across 
the dissertation as well as the political and economic conditions motivating the 
reforms. Part of the analysis is a historical overview of the primary attempts to 
reform the tax system in the past thirty years, divided into three periods. For 
academic purposes, I have divided the last thirty years in three distinctive 
periods, subcategorised based on their resilient characteristics as well as the 
economic and political conditions prevailing at the time.
c) Qualitative Analysis
Selective Interviewing was undertaken to discover the logic of the process 
behind tax reform. Particular attention has been given to policy actors, their role 
in tax reform and their interpretation of events. The core of the research 
questions, its structure and objectives are discussed in this part. A general 
guide was used for the interviews with three distinctive sections. A common set 
of questions about the tax system and the forces that have shaped it and 
inhibited its development were directed to the subjects. Secondly, the policy 
actors and their role. Lastly, a specific section design for each interviewee was 
used, taking into consideration their position or role in the tax reform process.
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d) Quantitative Analysis
Most of the analysis is qualitative, although quantitative methods have been 
used to asses the evolution of some tax instruments in terms of revenue yields, 
the evolution of taxes in relation to GDP or simply to evaluate the performance 
of taxes compared to other tax instruments or previous years. It is noteworthy 
that the thesis does not attempt to evaluate the reforms in terms of their 
success in revenue yields or applicability.
The basic data has been taken from primary sources:
1. -Primary Sources
> Documentary Sources
> Official and Non-Official Publications and Documents
• Data from the Secretariat of Finance
The thesis heavily draws on different sources of information from the 
Secretariat of Finance. I divide this information in five subcategories: published 
data, data for public presentations, internal documents for the use only of high 
ranking officials, internal memos, and monthly and yearly evaluations. The last 
three sources are in particular, “highly confidential” and will be quoted only 
when authorised; please note that most of them can not be quoted for legal 
reasons. Nevertheless, they gave me an invaluable insight into the tax system, 
its evolution, the tax structure and its main actors.
• Studies and documents from Businesses Organisations, including leaflets, 
brochures, magazines, declaration of principles, etc.
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• Studies and documents from Political Parties, including leaflets brochures, 
magazines, and declaration of principles, documents on party ideology.
• Studies and documents from Professional Organisations
• Data from academic institutions
• Data from International Organisations like the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and
ECLA.
2. - Secondary Sources
• Bibliography on Taxation, Structural Reform and the Political System in 
Mexico.
• Specialised journals
• National and international newspapers and magazines
• Providers of Economic and Political analysis like Chase Manhattan Bank
and the Economist Intelligence Unit country Report.
•  Electronic Data: Computer Services like Reuters and Infosel.
3.- Interviews
•  Selecting Non-structured Interviews
Data generated through open-ended, semi-structured interviews. Selecting 
interview included key tax policy actors and representatives of interested 
groups. The interviews expanded to include a vast scope of subjects ranging 
from public officials (especially former and current tax authorities), state 
governors, entrepreneurs, business executives, representatives from business 
associations, political leaders, deputies and senators, leaders and 
representatives of corporatist organisations within the PRI structure,
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intellectuals, academics, representatives from IFIs and journalists among 
others. The subjects were selected after identifying the policy actors using the 
Forte and Peacock model.
Research Questions
The questions were divided in three sections. The first part was geared to the 
structural level, inquiring about the characteristics of the tax system and the 
possible reasons for its shape and stalemate. The second part was centred on 
the operative level, asking about the process of tax policy making, the influence 
of policy actors and the interpretation of the interviewee of tax reforms and the 
role of policy actors. This was with the purpose of learning about the process, 
the actors, their relative influence, and their overt objectives and if co-operative, 
about the vested interests of the group represented by the subject. The third 
section asked about specialised information based on the subject profile. A 
specific set of questions for each interviewee was used, designed to take 
advantage of their expertise, personal view or perceptions of historical tax 
reforms or failed attempts. Interviews with academics and intellectuals did not 
contemplate the second section, but focused on their field of specialisation. For 
the representatives of international institutions the emphasis was on a 
comparative perspective.
Guide for interviews with policy actors’ representatives




3.The Effect of Exogenous and Indigenous Conditions
4. The Effect of Politics
B. Operative Level
1. Identifying Policy Actors
2. Tax Strategies and activities promoted and organised by them
3. Relationship with other policy actors.
4. Perception of the person or his group influence





• Carlos Slim, President Grupo Carso, richest businessman in Latin 
America, London, October 14th, 1998.
• Antonio Gutierrez Prieto, London, August 22nd, 1999.
• Lucio Gutierrez Cortina, President BDI-Binswager, Mexico, August 
23rd, 1999.
• Bernando Gutierrez Cortina, Sales Marketing Jugos del Valle, London, 
August 23rd, 1999.
• Patricio Slim, Director General for Massive Markets TELMEX, Mexico, 
October 19th, 2000.
• Manuel Diaz, President ICI Group Mexico, London, February 11th, 1997.
• Andres Penate, Regional advisor for BP Amoco, London, January 22nd, 
2000.
•  Jorge Rivera Lozano, Mexican Textile Exporter, London, July 22nd,
1999.
• Arturo Astaburuaga, Europe's Representative of Moctezuma Beer, 
March 27th, 1999.
• Jose Luis Jauregui, Representative Corona Beer in the UK, London, 
February 16th, 1998.
•  Carlos Ponce, Banamex UK, London, April 24th, 1999.
Representatives of Business Organisations
•  Eduardo Bours, President Mexican Business Co-ordinating Council
(CCE), London, October 13th and 14th, 1998.
• Jorge Marin Santillan, Chairman of the Board, CONCAMIN, October 
14th, 1998.
• Raul Picard del Prado, President CANACINTRA, Mexico, September 
26th, 2000.
• Pedro Baca Elguero, Vice-president CANACINTRA, Aguascalientes, 
March 12th, 2000.
1000 The interviews list shows the position held at the moment of the interview.
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• Ruben Gonzalez, Secretary of the Fiscal Reform Committee, 
CONCAMIN, Mexico, September 19th and 22nd, 1999.
• Eduardo Garcia, Director General, CANACO, September 23rd, 1999.
• Marcos Sanchez, Legal Director CANACO, September 22nd, 1999.
• Sara Cortes, Head of the Media Department, CANACO, Mexico, 
September 22nd, 1999.
• Rafael Escudero, President of the Small Businessmen Association in 
Mexico City, May 12th, 2000.
• Ruben Gonzalez, Technical Secretary of the Fiscal Commission, 
CONCAMIN, Mexico, September 21st, 1999.
• Carlos Gutierrez Ruiz, Former President CANACINTRA, October 25th,
2000.
•  Carlos Abascal, President COPARMEX, Mexico, September 26th,
1998.
Tax Authorities
•  Jos§ A. Gurria, Secretary of Finance (Zedillo’s term), Sptember 23rd,
1999.
•  Guillermo Ortiz, Secretary of Finance (Zedillo’s term), Governor of the 
Central Bank, Spain, March 15th, 1997.
•  Pedro Aspe, Secretary of Finance (Salinas' term), September 20th,
1999.
•  Jesus Silva Herzog, Secretary of Finance (De la Madrid's term), June 
12th, 2000.
•  David Ibarra, Secretary of Finance (L6pez Portillo's term), September 
25th, 1999.
• Martin Werner, Under-Secretary of Finance, June 25th, 1997 and May 
15th, 1998.
• Tomas Ruiz, Under-Secretary of Revenue, Mexico, March 25th, 1999.
• Francisco Gil Diaz, Under-Secretary of Revenue, Mexico, September 
21st, 1999.
•  Alma Rosa Moreno, President of the System of Tax Administration, 
September 25th, 1999.
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•  Enrique Hernandez, Deputy Fiscal Attorney, Mexico, October 24th, 
2000.
• Javier Trevino, Oficial Mayor (General Administrator), September 23rd,
1999.
• Carlos Tello, Under- Secretary of Finance (Echeverria’s term), Mexico, 
February 29th, 2000.
•  Carlos Mendoza, General Director of Public Credit, March 16th, 1997.
•  Rigoberto Ariel Yepes, General Director of Tariffs for Public Services, 
September 24th, 1999.
• Juan Amievas, Head of International Affairs, Secretariat of Finance, 
Mexico, October 12th, 1997.
• David Topete, Director for Europe and foreign investment. January 8th
1998.
• Diego Yribarren, advisor to the Under-Secretary of Income, January 
11th, 1998 and September 24th, 1999.
• Javier Sanchez, former economic advisor to the Under-Secretary of 
Income, London, June 12th, 1998.
•  Gonzalo Canseco, Deputy Director Press Office at the Treasury, March 
18th, 1999.
• Lilia Charvel, special advisor to the Director of STA, London, 
September 22nd, 1999.
Public Officials
•  Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, November 3 rd, 2000
• Luis Echeverria A., Former Mexican President, October 12th, 2000.
•  Adrian Lajous, Former Director of Pemex, March 3, 1999.
• Juan Ramon de la Fuente, Health Secretary, London, March 25th, 
1997.
•  Herminio Blanco, Secretary of Trade and Commerce, London, 
February 11th, 1997.
•  Miguel Limon, Secretary of Education, October 31st, 1996.
•  Angel Aceves Saucedo, President CONDUSEF, London October 14th,
1999.
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• Francisco Suarez Davila, Chairman of the Treasury Committee at the 
Chamber of Deputies, London, May 23rd, 1997.
• Rafael Estrada, National Deputy Attorney, London, November 12th,
1996.
• Emilio Rabasa Gamboa, Coordinator for the Dialogue and Nagotiations 
in Chiapas, London, January 24th, 2000.
• Carlos Hurtado, Chief Advisor to the President on Economic Affairs, 
Mexico, September 19th, 1999, and March 27th, 2000.
• Carlos Almada, former speaker of President Zedillo, April 22nd, 2000.
• Jaime Zabludowsky, Ambassador to the European Union, August 27th,
1999.
• Eduardo Perez Mota, Secretary of Ecoomic Affairs, Mexican Mission in 
the European Uniona, London, Febraury 28th, 2000.
• Mario Palma, Under-Secretary of Social Development, Mexico, May 
26th, 2000.
• Javier Moctezuma, Under-Secretary of Labour, Mexico, September 
25th, 1999.
• Carlos Bazdrech, Director of Conacyt, Mexico, May 31st, 2000.
• Federico Rubli, Director of External Relations, Banco de Mexico, June 
4th, 1999.
•  Luis Felipe Vilches, Director of Foreign Investment, Bancomext, 
November 11th, 1999.
•  Jose Ramon L6pez Portillo, former Under-Secretary of Planning, 
London, February 17th, 1998.
• Carlos Casillas, Private Secretary to President Lopez Portillo, May 7th,
2000.
•  Ernesto Gil, Private Secretary to President Echeverrla, Manila July 24th,
2000.
•  Arturo Nunez, former coordiantor of the PRI at the Chamber of 
Deputies, June 6th, 2000.
•  Jorge Nuno, Private Assistant to President Echeverrla, November 12th,
2000.
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Governors and Local Authorities
• Vicente Fox, Governor of the State of Guanajuato, London, June 5th,
1997.
•  Otto Granados, Governor of the State of Aguascalientes, March 3rd, 
1997.
• Felipe Gonzalez, Governor of the State of Aguascalientes, September 
19th, 1999 and March 29th, 2000.
• Ricardo Monreal, Governor of the State of Zacatecas, London, 
February 4th, 2000.
• Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, Head of Mexico’s City Government, March 
25th, 1999.
• Rodolfo Landeros, former Governor of the State of Aguascalientes, 
Secretary of Press Offfice (Lopez Portillo’s term), Mexico, May 8th and 
June 11th, 2000.
• Antonio Sampayo, Former Matamoros Major, March 9th, 1999.
• Guillermo Huizar Carranza, Secretaryof Planning and Finnace in the 
State of Zacatecas, London, February 4^2000.
• Alfredo Reyes, Mayor of Aguascalientes and President of the 
Association of Municipal Governments, November 11th, 1997.
Members of Congress 
Senators
•  Maria de los Angeles Moreno, Leader of the Senate, Mexico, June 7th,
2000.
•  Jose Luis Medina Guiar, President of the Finance Committee and 
President of the National Leage of Economists, Manila, July 28th, 2000.
• Oscar Lopez Velarde, President of the Housing and Urban 
Development Committee and President Fundacion Colosio A.C., March 
20th, 2000.
• Esteban Moctezuma, former Chair for Fiscal Federalism, May 4th, 2000.
• Eloy Cantu, President of the International Relations Committee 
European and Asian, one of the leaders of the Galileo Group, January 
6th, 2000.
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• Fernando Solana, Former Minsiter of Foreign Affairs (Salinas’ term), 
February 16th, 1997.
• Luis H. Alvarez, London, May 7th, 1998.
• Jesus Orozco, President of the Transport Committee, Bangkok, July 
18th, 2000.
• Jose de Jesus Padilla, July 26th, 2000.
• Enrique Franco, September 23rd, 1999.
Deputies
• Porfirio Munoz Ledo, leader of the PRD’s branch, February 19th, 1999 
and September 19th, 1997.
• Carlos Medina Plasencia, leader of the PAN’s branch, September 19th,
1997.
• Oscar Gonzalez, leader of the PRI’s dissent group “Reflexion,” 
September 19th, 1999.
• Fernando Gomez, member of the Budget Committee, September 27th,
1999.
• Jesus Rodiguez, former President of the Committee of Budgeting, 
October 27th, 2000.
• Agusto Gomez, advisor to the Secretary of Finance, and former
Secretary of Land Tenure, Mexico, March 20th, 1999.
• Jesus Olvera, member of the Public Finance Committee, May 23rd,
2000.
• Abraham Gonzalez, May 24th, 2000.
• Alfredo Phiips Olmedo, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
June 14th, 2000.
• Carlos Jimenez, leader government workers (FETSE), Manila, July 
28th, 2000.
Party Leaders
•  Amalia Garcia, President of the PRD, London, February 27th, 2000.
• Luis Felipe Bravo Mena, President of the PAN, London, February 28th,
2000.
• Dulce Marla Sauri, President of the PRI, London, February 28th, 2000.
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• Santiago Onate, former President of the PRI, Chief of Staff to President 
Salinas, March 8th, 2000.
• Felipe Calderon, former President of the PAN, Aguascalientes, June 
11th, 1997.
Leaders of Corporate Sectors
National Federation of Peasants
• Sen. Beatriz Paredes, former leader, London, September 25th, 1999.
• Sen. Heladio Ramirez, current leader, London, September 25th, 1999.
• Hector Hugo Olivares, Mexico, January 13th, 1998.
Mexican Workers Confederation
• Jorge Rodriguez, former senator and union leader, July 23rd, 1998 and
June 4th, 1999.
• Alfredo Gonzalez, former deputy, union leader, February 28th and 
September 29th, 1999.
• Jorge Craviotto, National Leader of the Profesionist association, June 
6th, 2000.
• Jorge Diaz de Leon, President of the Associations of Engeneers, June 
12, 2000.
•  Aleandro Rendon Rivera, Director of the Civil Engineers College, June 
17th, 2000.
• Romero Apis, Leader of the National Lawyers Federation, June 23rd,
2000.
Intellectuals and Academics
• Jose Saramago, 1998 Nobel Prize Winner for Literature, London, July
7th, 1999.
• Carlos Fuentes, Mexico’s living most renowned writer, London, July 7th,
1999.
• Juan Molinar Horcasitas, El Colegio de Mexico, London, November 
20th, 1997.
• Enrique Florescano, London, April 21st, 1997.
• Arnoldo Cordova, UNAM, London, December 4th, 1997.
• Rolando Cordera, UNAM, Director of TV Nexos, March 10th, 1998.
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•  Anthony Giddens, Director London School of Economics, January 4th, 
1999 and September 21st, 2000.
•  Arnold Howitt, Director A. Alfred Taubman Center for State and Local 
Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, September 13th, 1999.
•  John Womack, Professor of History, Harvard University, September 
15th, 1999.
• Dani Rodrik, Rafiq Hariri Professor of International Political Economy, 
March 17th, 1997.
• Carlos Elizondo, Mexico, March 24th, 1999 and London, February 20th,
2000.
• Jorge Castaneda, Madrid, March 11th, 1998.
• Miguel Gonzalez Avelar, Mexican Historian, Mexico, June 17th, 2000.
• Carlos Monsivais, writer, November 19th, 1997.
• Alonso Lujambio, Electoral Council, IFE, London, November 17th,
1997.
• Sergio Garcia, Mexico, June 17th, 2000.
International Organisations
• Enrique Iglesias, President of the Inter-American Development Bank,
Barcelona, March 16th, 1997.
•  Guillermo Perry, Chief Economist for Latin Americ and the Caribbean 
Region, The World Bank, March 16th, 1997.
•  Jean Bonvin, President OECD Development Centre, Barcelona, March 
16th, 1997.
• Jean Moorhouse, Director for Latin America, Bank of England, July 8th, 
1998 and February 24th, 2000.
•  Nigel Jump, Chief Economist for the Americas, Barclays Bank, 
February 22nd, 1999.
• Anthony Westnedge, President Canning House, former Johny Walker 
employer, October 13th, 1998.
Journalists
• Joaquin Lopez Doriga, El Heraldo, London, October 14th, 1999.
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• Jaime Contreras, Excelsior, London, October 13th, 1999.
• Jaime Arizmendi, El Sol de Mexico, London, October 13th, 1999.
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